haggle

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 13582 is silver Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13582/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13582)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13582"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13582/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    AGL Australia smart meter -> Home Assistant Energy dashboard (Claude-generated custom integration)

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) states the requirements for acceptable contributions: the mandatory dev loop (ruff lint/format, strict mypy, pytest, pre-commit) that CI re-runs and rejects failures on, enforced Conventional Commits with provenance trailers, a required PR checklist, and anonymisation rules for API fixtures. The referenced AGENTS.md carries the full coding-standard detail ("What NOT to Do", endpoint procedure).


  • Project oversight


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    CONTRIBUTING.md contains an inbound=outbound licensing statement ("By contributing, you agree your work is licensed under the project's Apache-2.0 license") but no mechanism by which contributors assert they are legally authorized to make their contributions - there is no DCO sign-off requirement, no link to the Developer Certificate of Origin, and no CLA; commit history does not carry Signed-off-by trailers.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    The governance model is documented plainly as single-maintainer: CONTRIBUTING.md (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) states the single-maintainer model and the issue-first contribution process, .github/CODEOWNERS routes every change to the maintainer (* @naanyabiz), and SECURITY.md's risk-acceptance register states the key role explicitly: "the same person authors, triages, and accepts every exception in this project - self-acceptance is the operating model of a single-maintainer repository" (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). AGENTS.md's "Human-approved boundary" section documents that every merge, tag, and release requires the maintainer's live decision.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project has adopted the Contributor Covenant 2.1 as its code of conduct, posted at the standard location https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md. It states scope and enforcement and includes a private reporting contact (security@naanya.biz) with a 5-business-day acknowledgement commitment.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    The project publicly documents its role structure: .github/CODEOWNERS assigns ownership of everything to @naanyabiz, SECURITY.md states plainly that the same person authors, triages, releases, and accepts every exception ("self-acceptance is the operating model of a single-maintainer repository"), and AGENTS.md section Provenance enumerates every AI tool operating on the repo with its role and scope plus the human-approved boundary (merging, tagging, and releasing always require the maintainer). The committed conformance map (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/compliance/conformance.md) records under CO-1 that all role functions collapse into the named owner, so it is unambiguous who holds which role.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    The project documents a continuity and succession plan in SECURITY.md (section "Continuity and succession"): on the maintainer's death or permanent departure, ownership of the GitHub account/repository and the ed25519 release-signing key passes to next of kin per the maintainer's will, and a digital-legacy arrangement grants next of kin identity access to operate, wind down, or transfer the project. Risk-acceptance RA-04 records the residual (estate-administration latency; the living-incapacity gap). https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The project has a bus factor of 1: a single maintainer authors, reviews, and releases everything. This is recorded openly as risk-acceptance RA-04 in SECURITY.md (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md), with the public Apache-2.0 licence, AGENTS.md as a succession document, and attested releases as the compensating controls.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    ROADMAP.md documents the project's direction for roughly the next 12 months and its explicit non-goals (single-retailer AGL only; electricity and solar feed-in only; read-only Energy-dashboard import; no telemetry, device control, or portal scraping). https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/ROADMAP.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    docs/threat-model.md section 1 "System description" (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md) documents the high-level design, including a core data-flow diagram (browser -> config flow -> AGL Auth0 -> coordinator/parser -> HA recorder -> diagnostics) and the trust boundaries between components. AGENTS.md's "Repo Map" (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/AGENTS.md) describes every major component (config_flow, coordinator, sensor, diagnostics, agl client/parser/pinning) with its role and relationships, and the "Energy Dashboard Contract" section documents the key statistics-interface properties.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md documents what users can and cannot expect: the data handled and impact assessment, token storage (including the explicit statement that the OAuth refresh token is plaintext at rest on the HA host, with host-FDE guidance), warn-only TLS SPKI pin-mismatch behaviour, supported versions, and what is in/out of scope. The full per-boundary security requirements, data classification, and resilience targets are in the committed threat model, https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md (sections 2, 3 and 8).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The README's Install section (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/README.md) is a five-step quick start taking a new user from HACS install to a working configured integration, including the browser-based AGL login step, and is followed by an Energy-dashboard section telling users exactly which statistics to add; a full setup guide lives at docs/energy-dashboard.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation currency is enforced per-PR: AGENTS.md's "Documentation Checklist - Required on Every PR" mandates updating the CHANGELOG, repo map, API facts, and security docs with every code change (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/AGENTS.md). Known documentation defects are corrected when found - SECURITY.md's storage section explicitly retracts an earlier incorrect claim that HAOS encrypts data at rest, and a README version-rot defect was fixed by policy (no hardcoded version strings; a shields.io release badge instead).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository front page README (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/README.md) displays hyperlinked achievement badges at the top: the OpenSSF Best Practices badge (project 13582, linking to bestpractices.dev), the OpenSSF Scorecard badge (linking to the scorecard.dev viewer), and the latest-release badge. The Best Practices badge was added the same day the passing badge was earned (2026-07-12, PR #172).


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The project ships no user interface of its own: it is a headless Home Assistant integration whose config flow, sensors, and Energy-dashboard statistics are all rendered by Home Assistant's standard frontend (the integration contributes only strings.json/translations, no HTML/JS/frontend assets), and accessibility of that UI is owned upstream by Home Assistant. Project documentation is plain Markdown rendered by GitHub.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    User-facing text is externalized through Home Assistant's standard translation framework: custom_components/haggle/strings.json (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/strings.json) holds all config-flow, error, and entity strings, mirrored in translations/en.json - localizing to another language is a matter of adding a translations/<lang>.json file. Only English is currently provided.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    All project sites (repository, issue tracker, releases, security advisories) are hosted on GitHub, which handles external-user authentication and stores passwords per this criterion; the project operates no site of its own that stores passwords.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    SECURITY.md section Supported Versions states the latest tagged release on main is the only supported version, with upgrades surfaced to users automatically via HACS. The README's "Rollback / downgrade" section (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/README.md) documents that any prior release can be reinstalled via HACS, that config entries are downgrade-safe and statistics survive in both directions, and docs/releasing.md requires a recorded manual downgrade test with each stable release.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project tracks individual issues on the GitHub issue tracker at https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/issues, declared machine-readably in the integration manifest ("issue_tracker" in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/manifest.json) and in pyproject.toml project URLs. CONTRIBUTING.md requires an issue-first workflow and AGENTS.md defines a triaged label taxonomy (P1-P3 priority, sev:high/med/low, escaped) consumed by the release flow and quarterly delivery metrics.


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability reports have been received or resolved in the last 12 months (the project is only a few months old); SECURITY.md's "Hall of Fame" section explicitly reads "(none yet - be the first.)". SECURITY.md commits to crediting reporters in release notes and the Hall of Fame unless anonymity is requested (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The one CVE fix in CHANGELOG (idna, dev-only lockfile) came via automated Dependabot monitoring, not an external report to this project.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md documents the full response process: private reporting via GitHub Private Security Advisories or security@naanya.biz, acknowledgement within 5 business days, graduated response targets by severity (critical 72 h / high 7 days / moderate-low 30 days), a self-escalation forcing function honest about the single-maintainer bound, a coordinated-disclosure window (14 days), and the known-vulnerable-release procedure (GHSA advisory, superseding release, HACS delisting).


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md requires contributions to pass the documented dev loop - ruff check, ruff format, and strict mypy - before pushing (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). The specific style configuration is committed in pyproject.toml ([tool.ruff] with 17 rule families, line-length 88, isort ordering; [tool.mypy] strict = true) (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/pyproject.toml), and .github/workflows/ci.yml enforces ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy as part of a required PR status check.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Coding style is enforced automatically by FLOSS tools: ruff lint, ruff format --check, and mypy run on every push and pull request in CI (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml, steps at lines 41-48), and the containing 'Test (Python 3.14)' job is one of eight required status checks under the zero-bypass protect-main ruleset, so a style violation blocks merge. The selected style is committed in pyproject.toml ([tool.ruff]) and also enforced locally via pre-commit hooks.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The project is a pure-Python Home Assistant custom integration: manifest.json declares "requirements": [] and the hatchling build backend produces no native binaries, so no compiler or linker is ever invoked and CC/CFLAGS-style variables have no referent.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The release build (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml, "Build release artifact" step) zips the unmodified Python source of custom_components/haggle, excluding only pycache/.pyc; HACS installs that zip as-is. Nothing is stripped, minified, or compiled, so full source-level debugging information (readable source, tracebacks with line numbers) is always preserved in what users install.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The only build step is a single, flat packaging step in the release workflow: release.yml zips the contents of custom_components/haggle/ into haggle.zip in one command, then generates SBOMs and attestations from that artifact (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml). There are no subdirectory builds, no Makefile recursion, and no cross-directory build dependencies; the integration is pure Python with zero compiled components.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    Not applicable: haggle is a pure-Python Home Assistant custom integration whose source is used directly - HACS extracts the release archive and Home Assistant imports the .py files unchanged, so there is no compilation or build step to reproduce bit-for-bit. The criterion explicitly permits N/A where source is used directly rather than compiled.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    The integration is distributed via HACS (the Home Assistant community package manager) and is in the HACS default store; README section Install documents the install (HACS -> search Haggle -> Download -> restart) and section Removing documents uninstall via HA's Settings -> Devices & Services, including a best-effort revocation of the stored OAuth grant on removal (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/README.md). hacs.json configures the attested zip_release asset that HACS installs.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    The installation system is HACS, which installs the integration into Home Assistant's standard custom_components/ location inside the user-chosen HA configuration directory - the platform's standard convention for install location (install and rollback steps documented at https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/README.md#install). Nothing is compiled, so no DESTDIR-style build-time relocation applies to this artifact type; the install location follows the ecosystem convention exactly.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    CONTRIBUTING.md section Dev loop (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) documents a one-command setup - uv sync installs the complete dev and test environment from the hash-pinned uv.lock - followed by uv run pytest / ruff / mypy / pre-commit, matching what CI runs. A committed .devcontainer/devcontainer.json additionally provides a ready-made containerized dev environment with uv preinstalled.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Runtime dependencies are declared machine-readably in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/manifest.json ("requirements": [] - the integration deliberately ships zero packages; everything it imports is vendored and pinned by Home Assistant core, as documented in SECURITY.md's supply-chain section). Development/test dependencies are declared in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/pyproject.toml and hash-pinned in uv.lock; Dependabot processes both the pip and github-actions ecosystems weekly.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Dependabot runs weekly on both the pip lockfile and github-actions ecosystems (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml), and every PR is gated by a required "Dependency review" check (actions/dependency-review-action, fail-on-severity: moderate, vulnerability-check: true) in ci.yml. SECURITY.md documents the triage ladder for alerts (critical 72 h / high 7 d / rest 30 d) and the exploitability analysis: manifest.json ships zero runtime requirements, so lockfile CVEs are dev/CI-only and are triaged on that recorded basis.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    The shipped integration reuses only components vendored and version-pinned by Home Assistant core - https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/manifest.json declares "requirements": [] - so users receive standard platform-provided components. Development dependencies are enumerated in pyproject.toml and hash-locked per artifact in uv.lock, and https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml runs weekly grouped update PRs for both the pip and github-actions ecosystems.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    Ruff's pyupgrade (UP), flake8-async (ASYNC), and bugbear (B) rule families are enabled in pyproject.toml and gate every PR, flagging obsolete Python idioms and deprecated patterns (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/pyproject.toml); pytest runs with filterwarnings = "error" so deprecation warnings from the project's own code fail the suite (upstream homeassistant DeprecationWarnings are the only scoped exception). A weekly compat workflow additionally runs the full suite against the latest Home Assistant releases including betas to catch upcoming upstream deprecations early (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/compat.yml).


  • Automated test suite


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    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The full automated test suite (pytest, with a combined line+branch coverage floor of 89% enforced via --cov-fail-under) runs on every push to main and every pull request via https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml, producing a success/failure report as a GitHub check run on each commit; the check is required for merge by the protect-main ruleset.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    The committed test strategy (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/testing.md) requires that every escaped defect gets a named, pinned regression test and lists the existing pins (e.g. test_uses_outer_consumption_quantity_not_inner_values, test_baseline_looked_up_at_earliest_fetched_hour, test_band_reachback_baseline_after_long_absence). Verified in git history: 14 of the 16 integration-code bug-fix commits in the last six months (~87%) included automated-test additions or changes in the same commit, well above the 50% threshold.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The FLOSS test suite (pytest + coverage.py, ~254 tests including recorder-backed integration tests) is gated in CI at a combined line+branch coverage floor of 89% via --cov-fail-under=89 in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml, part of the required "Test (Python 3.14)" status check enforced by the zero-bypass protect-main ruleset. Current statement (line) coverage is 91.6% (local coverage.xml line-rate 0.9162; https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/testing.md records 90.0% combined at floor-setting time and defines the floor as an upward-only ratchet).


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    docs/testing.md (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/testing.md) is the formal written test policy: its "Required depth per change type" section mandates automated tests for every functional change class (new endpoint => new fixture + parser tests; coordinator/statistics change => harness-integration tests, with real-recorder tests for sum-chain changes; every escaped defect => a named pinned regression test), enforced by the required CI check with a ratcheting coverage floor (--cov-fail-under=89). CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENTS.md's "Adding a New Endpoint" procedure repeat the tests-required rule for contributors.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md requires new-endpoint contributions to "Add an anonymised fixture, parser, client method, and tests", and https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/testing.md section "Required depth per change type" mandates the specific test layer for every class of change (new endpoint => new fixture + parser tests; cumulative-sum changes => recorder-backed tests in test_recorder_statistics.py; escaped defects => a named pinned regression test), enforced by CI's ratcheting 89% coverage floor.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Warnings are maximally strict and enforced in CI: mypy runs with strict = true plus warn_unreachable, warn_unused_ignores, and warn_redundant_casts; ruff enables 17 rule families including security (flake8-bandit), pylint, bugbear, and a max-complexity 12 gate; and pytest converts warnings to errors (filterwarnings = "error" with narrowly scoped upstream exceptions) - all configured in pyproject.toml (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/pyproject.toml) and run as part of the required "Test (Python 3.14)" PR check in .github/workflows/ci.yml.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    Secure design principles are applied and documented per trust boundary in the committed threat model (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md section 3): all untrusted AGL JSON passes allowlist parsing with numeric clamping to finite non-negative values (complete mediation / input validation, fuzz-enforced); least privilege governs OAuth scopes (read-only, with a documented re-assessment tripwire on any write scope) and CI tokens (read-only default, job-scoped writes); fail-safe defaults appear as fail-closed release gates (tag ancestry + signature verification) and a fail-closed secret-scanner self-test; secret exposure is minimised (memory-only 15-minute access token, rotate-on-use refresh token, hash-only fallback unique_id).


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    All cryptographic mechanisms in the integration use SHA-256 or stronger: the OAuth PKCE challenge is S256 (config_flow.py), TLS pins are SHA-256 SPKI hashes (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py), diagnostics anonymisation is HMAC-SHA256 (diagnostics.py), and the fallback unique_id is a SHA-256 digest. A search of the integration code finds no MD5 or SHA-1 usage; TLS itself is provided by the host Python/aiohttp stack with modern defaults.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    All transport cryptography is delegated to the platform TLS stack (Python ssl/OpenSSL via aiohttp), which negotiates among multiple cipher suites and inherits new/updated algorithms from platform updates - the project hard-codes no protocol cryptography. The only project-level primitive is SHA-256, used for the Trust-On-First-Use SPKI pin comparison (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py) and a fallback hashed unique_id; the pin check is deliberately warn-only (SECURITY.md), so a break in that hash degrades a defence-in-depth signal without blocking traffic, and the algorithm is swappable in a single helper.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    The only credential the project processes is the user's own AGL OAuth refresh token, which is stored in Home Assistant's config-entry store (.storage/core.config_entries) - a data file entirely separate from the integration code - alongside the TOFU TLS pin hashes; SECURITY.md section Storage documents this (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). Credentials are replaced at any time via the standard HA Reconfigure/reauth flow with no code change (pure Python, nothing is compiled), and no credentials or keys are embedded in the source (enforced by the layered gitleaks scanning).


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network communication is HTTPS: the only outbound endpoints are https://secure.agl.com.au and https://api.platform.agl.com.au, defined in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/const.py, with no plaintext-protocol code path. TLS is additionally hardened with Trust-On-First-Use SPKI pinning of both hosts (custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py; documented in SECURITY.md section Trust-On-First-Use TLS pinning).


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    All upstream communication is HTTPS-only to secure.agl.com.au and api.platform.agl.com.au (const.py) via aiohttp on Python >=3.14, whose default TLS context negotiates a minimum of TLS 1.2 and supports TLS 1.3; no code in the repository lowers the TLS minimum or constructs a weakened SSL context. On top of transport TLS, both hosts are Trust-On-First-Use SPKI-pinned, with mismatches surfaced to the user (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py).


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    All upstream communication is HTTPS via aiohttp, whose default TLS certificate verification is never disabled anywhere in the shipped code (no ssl=False, verify overrides, or CERT_NONE exist in custom_components/), and the integration additionally layers Trust-On-First-Use SPKI pinning of both AGL endpoints on top of standard verification (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py; behaviour documented in SECURITY.md, 'Trust-On-First-Use TLS pinning').


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    All upstream endpoints are HTTPS (const.py: secure.agl.com.au, api.platform.agl.com.au) and every request goes through aiohttp with default certificate and hostname verification - no ssl=False, CERT_NONE, or check_hostname override exists anywhere in the tree - so verification completes during the TLS handshake before any HTTP headers carrying bearer tokens are sent. On top of WebPKI verification, a Trust-On-First-Use SHA-256 SPKI pin is checked on every new connection (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/pinning.py); the pin layer is warn-only by documented design, but standard certificate verification always applies.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Releases are cryptographically signed twice over: release tags are ed25519-SSH-signed by the maintainer's offline key and the release workflow refuses fail-closed any tag whose signature does not verify against the committed public key file https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/allowed_signers (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml, "Verify tag signature"); the installed artifact haggle.zip is Sigstore-attested via actions/attest-build-provenance with the .sigstore bundles and attested SPDX/CycloneDX SBOMs attached to every GitHub Release. The user verification process is documented in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md (gh attestation verify haggle.zip --repo NaanyaBiz/haggle). No private key is on any distribution site - the tag key is held offline and Sigstore signing is keyless (ephemeral OIDC). Historical honesty: releases <= v0.4.0-beta.4 predate attestation and pre-2026-07-13 tags render Unverified, recorded as accepted risk RA-10; all releases from 2026-07 onward are signed and attested.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Release tags are cryptographically signed: each v* tag is SSH-signed (ed25519) with the maintainer's release identity, whose public key is committed at .github/allowed_signers (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/allowed_signers), and release.yml refuses fail-closed to build any tag whose signature does not verify against that file. I verified the latest tag (v0.4.0-beta.6) locally with git tag -v against the committed allowed_signers. Tags cut before 2026-07-13 predate the registered signing identity and are recorded as a historical exception (SECURITY.md RA-10).


  • Other security issues


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    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    The untrusted input surface - AGL API JSON (attacker-influenceable, since TLS pin mismatch is warn-only by design) - is processed by allowlist-style parsers in https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/parser.py that are total over arbitrary JSON: only named fields are extracted (open-schema dict passthrough is prohibited in AGENTS.md), interval types are checked against a known set, and every numeric is clamped to a non-negative finite float via _safe_float before it can reach recorder statistics. The property is enforced by the atheris fuzz harness (tests/fuzz/fuzz_parser.py, a required PR check via fuzz.yml) and TestParserTotality in tests/test_parser.py.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Multiple hardening layers make defects less likely to become vulnerabilities: both AGL endpoints are SPKI-pinned (TOFU) yet their JSON is still treated as attacker-influenceable - parsing is allowlist-style (no open-schema passthrough), numeric values are clamped through _safe_float so inf/NaN/negatives can never reach the recorder (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/custom_components/haggle/agl/parser.py), and the parser boundary is fuzz-tested with atheris on every PR plus a weekly deep run (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml). Ruff's flake8-bandit security rules gate CI, diagnostics pass a scrub layer backed by leak tests, and upstream error bodies are stripped before exceptions propagate (docs/threat-model.md sections 2-3).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    The committed living threat model is the assurance case: it describes the system and threat model (an 18-threat STRIDE register, each threat tracked to a disposition with cited evidence), identifies five trust boundaries and the controls at each (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md sections 1-5), and argues how secure design principles are applied and common implementation weaknesses countered (allowlist parsing, numeric clamping, fuzz-enforced parser totality, secret redaction backed by leak tests, plus CodeQL SAST and atheris fuzzing as required merge gates - https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/SECURITY.md, 'Gating Policy'). The statement-level conformance map extends the argument control-by-control against the committed secure-SDLC standard (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/docs/compliance/conformance.md).


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL Python analysis runs weekly and on every PR (https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml) and is one of the eight required status checks enforced by the zero-bypass protect-main ruleset. CI additionally runs ruff with the flake8-bandit security rule set ("S") enabled in pyproject.toml on every PR, so two FLOSS vulnerability-oriented static analyzers gate every change.


  • Dynamic code analysis


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    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The shipped software is written entirely in Python, a memory-safe managed language; the tree contains no C/C++/assembly and the integration declares zero compiled runtime requirements (manifest.json "requirements": []), so no memory-unsafe code exists to instrument. (Dynamic hostile-input testing runs regardless: atheris fuzzing of the parser trust boundary on every PR plus weekly deep runs, https://github.com/NaanyaBiz/haggle/blob/main/.github/workflows/fuzz.yml.)



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Project badge entry owned by: NaanyaBiz.
Entry created on 2026-07-12 09:21:52 UTC, last updated on 2026-07-14 20:21:06 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-07-12 09:34:54 UTC.