nucleus

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 15665 is passing Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Kernel forge: compiles, hardens, gates and signs Linux kernels (four streams, three architectures) as Debian packages for imago.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The repository README and documentation succinctly describe cordanaLLM/nucleus as the automated Linux kernel forge producing customized, hardened, and hardware-optimized Linux kernel distributions and Debian packages for imago. The description details supported kernel streams, target hardware stacks, and compilation architecture. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L35-L47 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L80-L90


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    SUPPORT.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, and structured GitHub issue templates explain how users and contributors interact with the project to report issues, submit kernel patches, and ask questions. Inquiries and defect reports are handled via GitHub Discussions and GitHub Issues. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L1-L29 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L7-L43 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml#L1-L9


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents the complete contribution process, including topic branching, Conventional Commits, local quality gates, and pull request metadata requirements. It outlines the trunk-based workflow and developer verification requirements before submission. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L7-L43 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L45-L116


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    Contribution requirements are explicitly detailed in CONTRIBUTING.md, which enforces trunk-based development, versions.json single-source-of-truth, NASA/JPL Power of 10 compliance, and local verification passes. Pull requests must satisfy the automated metadata gate and pass all CI checks including ShellCheck, Ruff, and pytest. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L11-L19 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L56-L116 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/AGENTS.md


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    All code and build tooling authored by the project are licensed under the European Union Public Licence v1.2 (EUPL-1.2), an open source copyleft licence. The licence is declared repository-wide via the root LICENSE file and REUSE-compliant metadata. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSE https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSES/EUPL-1.2.txt https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/REUSE.toml#L1-L16


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The project's licence, the European Union Public Licence v1.2 (EUPL-1.2), is officially approved as an open source licence by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSE https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSES/EUPL-1.2.txt https://opensource.org/license/eupl-1-2


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    The full text of the license is provided in the standard root LICENSE file and under LICENSES/EUPL-1.2.txt in compliance with the REUSE specification. The license is also prominently linked in the README header and detailed in the README license section. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSE https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/LICENSES/EUPL-1.2.txt https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L31 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L256-L280


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Basic documentation including project mission, architecture, kernel streams matrix, quickstart installation commands, and local build instructions is provided directly in README.md and the docs/ directory. Step-by-step guides explain how to build, test, and verify kernel artifacts. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L39-L196 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/docs/principles.md https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/docs/streams.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The external interfaces of the forge—including CLI flags for build scripts, kconfig fragment layering rules, and versions.json manifest schemas—are comprehensively documented. Contractual kernel requirements from downstream consumers (imago and Aegis-OS) are defined via JSON schemas and validated in CI. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L80-L196 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/docs/streams.md https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.schema.json


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    All project sites, documentation pages, source repositories, and upstream download endpoints use HTTPS exclusively. Upstream kernel sources and Git repositories configured in versions.json use secure https:// URLs. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json#L4-L37 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L7-L13 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L25-L33


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    The project provides public GitHub Discussions as a dedicated community channel for questions, hardware compatibility discussions, and architectural proposals. In addition, GitHub Issues and Pull Requests provide public discussion for defects and changes. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L17-L29 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml#L3-L6


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All documentation, source code comments, script error messages, issue templates, and commit messages are written and maintained in English. CONTRIBUTING.md explicitly mandates an English register for all contributions and discussions. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L18-L19 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/AGENTS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is actively maintained with frequent commits, continuous integration workflows running against multiple kernel streams, and automated changelog tracking. Kernel stream definitions in versions.json are kept current with upstream Linux releases. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#L1-L35 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json#L4-L68


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    The version-controlled source repository is publicly readable at standard URLs on GitHub. Anyone can inspect the full commit history, branches, issues, and pull requests. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L39-L41


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    The project uses Git to track all code changes, committer identities, timestamps, and commit signatures. The repository ruleset enforces commit signing and linear history on the main branch. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/docs/repository-governance.md#L44-L45 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/rulesets/main.json#L27-L32 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L133-L136


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    The Git repository records granular interim development commits and pull requests rather than bulk code dumps or infrequent snapshots. Development proceeds on topic branches with Conventional Commits before merging to main. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L13-L14 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L45-L101


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    The software is tracked using Git, a widely used distributed version control system that allows full offline inspection of repository history and decentralized collaboration. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L45-L54


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Every release of the repository tooling is assigned a unique Semantic Version recorded in VERSION and .release-please-manifest.json and tagged as nucleus-v<X.Y.Z>, while kernel release builds are uniquely identified by their stream and upstream version in versions.json together with the forge revision in the v<version>-<stream>-lusoris<N> release tag. Each release produces distinct git tags and package versions. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/VERSION https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/release-please-config.json#L3-L12 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json#L8-L69 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L138-L148


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Every tooling release is tagged in Git using the pattern nucleus-v<X.Y.Z>, and kernel releases are tagged using v<version>-<stream>-lusoris<N>. These tags mark the exact repository commits used to build released artifacts. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#L138-L148 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L64-L75


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    A comprehensive, human-readable record of changes for every release is maintained in CHANGELOG.md following the Keep a Changelog standard. Release entries categorize new features, bug fixes, breaking changes, and linked issues. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#L1-L35 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#L56-L66 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/release-please-config.json#L3-L12


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    No publicly known vulnerability with a CVE has been fixed in any release so far; the repository has no security advisories (https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/security/advisories). Release notes will name CVEs once one exists.


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    The project provides a clear process for submitting bug reports via GitHub Issues using structured YAML issue forms. SUPPORT.md and the issue template configuration direct users to the bug report form and specify required diagnostic details. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L23-L28 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml#L1-L9


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project uses GitHub Issues as its issue tracker to track bug reports, feature requests, and technical defects individually. Each issue receives a unique URL, issue number, state, and discussion history. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/issues https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L23-L29


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The maintainers actively triage and respond to reported issues in GitHub Issues, with incoming reports categorized using repository labels and linked to pull requests. Issues closed with linked fixes demonstrate active response and resolution. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/issues https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#L10-L35


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    Enhancement requests and kernel feature proposals are tracked in GitHub Issues via a dedicated feature request template and discussed openly. Maintainers review and respond to community feature requests to plan kconfig additions and driver support. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/issues https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L28 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    All submitted issues, pull requests, comments, and resolutions are publicly and permanently archived on GitHub Issues. The complete history is accessible to all users without login requirements. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    A formal vulnerability reporting process is published in SECURITY.md, providing instructions for reporting security issues confidentially via GitHub Security Advisories. It outlines triage procedures, reproduction SLAs, and coordinated disclosure steps. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L22-L36 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SUPPORT.md#L29


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    SECURITY.md explicitly directs security researchers to use private GitHub Security Advisories to ensure vulnerabilities are handled confidentially before disclosure. The policy strictly forbids opening public issues for security vulnerabilities. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L22-L30 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml#L7-L9


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability reports have been received in the last 6 months (no repository security advisories). The response process is documented in https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 13/13 ●

 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer knows secure design principles (least privilege, fail-safe defaults, input validation, minimal attack surface) and applies them; the security policy and enforced repository checks document this. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The primary developer knows the common vulnerability classes for this kind of software (OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25) and the methods to counter them; static analysis and dependency scanning run on every change. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    All cryptographic mechanisms employed by the repository rely exclusively on widely accepted, publicly published algorithms such as SHA-256, SHA-512, RSA-4096, and ECDSA P-256. Cryptographic signatures are generated using Sigstore Cosign and OpenSSL. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L276-L281 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/publish_release.sh


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project does not implement bespoke cryptographic primitives, delegating all hashing, signing, and verification operations to standard implementations including OpenSSL, GnuPG gpgv, and Sigstore Cosign. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L276-L287 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/fetch-kernel-source.sh https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    All cryptographic operations are executed using FLOSS implementations, including OpenSSL, GnuPG, and Cosign, with source code licensed under open source licences. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L64-L66 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/fetch-kernel-source.sh#L42 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    Kernel module signing keys generated during builds via scripts/build_kernel.sh use certs/default_x509.genkey, which specifies a 4096-bit RSA key (default_bits = 4096), while release artifact signing uses keyless Cosign with ECDSA P-256 signatures. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L276-L281 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/plain/certs/default_x509.genkey?id=v7.3-rc7 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    The repository does not use broken or deprecated cryptographic algorithms such as MD5, SHA-1, DES, or RC4 for integrity verification or code signing. All verification relies on SHA-256, SHA-512, OpenPGP, or Cosign bundles. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/fetch-kernel-source.sh


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The project avoids cryptographic algorithms with known weaknesses or reduced security margins, requiring SHA-256 or SHA-512 for checksums and standard RSA-4096 or ECDSA for signatures. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L63 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L276-L281


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    As an automated kernel build forge and packaging repository, nucleus does not implement network communication protocols or session key exchange, delegating all network transport to HTTPS. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L39-L45


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    All random numbers and cryptographic keys generated during packaging and module signing rely on the operating system's cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (/dev/urandom) via OpenSSL. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/build_kernel.sh#L276-L281


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    All software, dependencies, and upstream kernel tarballs are downloaded exclusively over HTTPS to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Published release assets are hosted on HTTPS endpoints on GitHub Releases. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json#L4-L37 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L55-L65 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/README.md#L122-L130


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    Upstream kernel sources are verified against cryptographic signatures and pinned SHA-256 hashes using GnuPG or git verify-tag before compilation. Furthermore, published release artifacts carry a Cosign signature over SHA256SUMS and SLSA Level 3 provenance. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/scripts/fetch-kernel-source.sh https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L39-L75 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/versions.json


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    Continuous automated vulnerability scanning runs in CI via Semgrep SAST and Trivy filesystem CVE scanning (configured to fail on CRITICAL and HIGH severity vulnerabilities with available fixes), and SECURITY.md defines response SLAs (24-hour acknowledgement, 72-hour triage) and regular upstream security maintenance across all four kernel streams. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L7-L18 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md#L31-L36 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/workflows/security-scans.yml#L55-L114


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    No critical vulnerabilities have been reported or are open; the documented process in https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/SECURITY.md handles critical reports with priority. Advisories: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/security/advisories


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The repository enforces invariant HISS-12 (zero credentials in Git history) and runs Gitleaks in CI on every push and pull request to scan the entire git history. In addition, tests/test_security_privacy.py verifies that no private IP addresses or local workstation paths are committed. Evidence: https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.gitleaks.toml https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/.github/workflows/security-scans.yml#L115-L150 https://github.com/cordanaLLM/nucleus/blob/main/tests/test_security_privacy.py


 Analysis 8/8 ●


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Project badge entry owned by: lusoris.
Entry created on 2026-10-19 07:44:52 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-25 13:28:01 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-10-25 13:28:01 UTC.