Tesseract-Vault

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 11678 ni silver Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11678/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11678)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11678"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/11678/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 17/17

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    A rust encryption and decryption tool created as an AI capability test

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.
  • Mahitaji ya awali


    Mradi LAZIMA ufikie nishani ya kiwango cha kuhitimu. [achieve_passing]

  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ijumuishe mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejea kwa kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha msimbo). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]
  • Usimamizi wa mradi


    Mradi UNAPASWA kuwa na utaratibu wa kisheria ambapo wasanidi wote wa kiasi kisicho kidogo cha programu ya mradi wanathibitisha kwamba wameruhusiwa kisheria kufanya michango hii. Mbinu ya kawaida na rahisi ya kutekeleza hii ni kwa kutumia Cheti cha Msanidi cha Asili (DCO), ambapo watumiaji huongeza "signed-off-by" katika ahadi zao na mradi unaunganisha kwenye tovuti ya DCO. Hata hivyo, hii YAWEZA kutekelezwa kama Makubaliano ya Leseni ya Mchangiaji (CLA), au utaratibu mwingine wa kisheria. (URL inahitajika) [dco]
    DCO ni utaratibu unaopendekeza kwa sababu ni rahisi kutekeleza, kufuatilia katika msimbo wa chanzo, na git inasaidia moja kwa moja kipengele cha "signed-off" kwa kutumia "commit -s". Ili kuwa na ufanisi zaidi ni bora ikiwa nyaraka za mradi zinaeleza maana ya "signed-off" kwa mradi huo. CLA ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayofafanua masharti ambayo kazi za kiakili zimetolewa leseni kwa shirika au mradi. Makubaliano ya mgawo wa mchangiaji (CAA) ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayohamisha haki katika kazi ya kiakili kwa chama kingine; miradi haihitajiki kuwa na CAA, kwa kuwa kuwa na CAA huongeza hatari kwamba wachangiaji watarajiwa hawatachangia, hasa ikiwa mpokeaji ni shirika la faida. Apache Software Foundation CLAs (leseni ya mchangiaji wa mtu binafsi na CLA ya kampuni) ni mifano ya CLA, kwa miradi ambayo inaamua kwamba hatari za aina hizi za CLA kwa mradi ni chini ya manufaa yao.

    Project now uses Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO) to ensure contributors
    are legally authorized to make contributions.

    • DCO requirement documented in CONTRIBUTING.md
    • All commits must include "Signed-off-by" line (git commit -s)
    • GitHub Action enforces DCO on all pull requests
    • Links to official DCO: https://developercertificate.org/

    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#developer-certificate-of-origin-dco



    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika muundo wake wa utawala wa mradi (njia ya kufanya maamuzi, ikiwa ni pamoja na majukumu muhimu). (URL inahitajika) [governance]
    Kunahitaji kuwa na njia fulani iliyowekwa vyema ya kuandikwa ya kufanya maamuzi na kutatua migogoro. Katika miradi midogo, hii inaweza kuwa rahisi kama "mmiliki wa mradi na kiongozi hufanya maamuzi yote ya mwisho". Kuna miundo mbalimbali ya utawala, ikiwa ni pamoja na dictator wa wema na meritocracy rasmi; kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Miundo ya utawala. Mbinu zote mbili za kati (k.m., mtunzaji mmoja) na zisizo za kati (k.m., watunzaji wa kikundi) zimetumika kwa mafanikio katika miradi. Habari za utawala hazihitajiki kuandika uwezekano wa kuunda uma wa mradi, kwa kuwa hiyo ni iwezekanavyo kila wakati kwa miradi ya FLOSS.

    Project governance is clearly documented in GOVERNANCE.md using a Benevolent Dictator For Life (BDFL) model appropriate for a smaller open source project. The document defines:
    Roles: Project Lead (BDFL), Contributors, and future Maintainers
    Decision making: Day-to-day decisions vs significant decisions requiring community input
    Dispute resolution: Discussion → Mediation → Final decision process
    Succession planning: Designated successor or transition to collective governance
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md



    Mradi LAZIMA upitishe kanuni ya mwenendo na kuiweka mahali pa kawaida. (URL inahitajika) [code_of_conduct]
    Miradi inaweza kuweza kuboresha uadilifu wa jamii yao na kuweka matarajio kuhusu tabia inayokubalika kwa kupitisha kanuni ya mwenendo. Hii inaweza kusaidia kuepuka matatizo kabla hayajatokea na kufanya mradi kuwa mahali pa kukaribishwa zaidi ili kuhimiza michango. Hii inapaswa kuzingatia tu tabia ndani ya jamii/mahali pa kazi pa mradi. Mifano ya kanuni za mwenendo ni kanuni ya mwenendo ya kernel ya Linux, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Agano la Mchangiaji, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Debian, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Ubuntu, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Fedora, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya GNOME, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya KDE, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya Python, Mwongozo wa Mwenendo wa Jamii ya Ruby, na Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Rust.

    The project has adopted the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct (version 2.1), the industry-standard code of conduct for open source projects. It is posted in the standard location (CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md in the repository root) and includes:
    Pledge and standards for inclusive behavior
    Enforcement responsibilities and scope
    Clear reporting mechanism (GitHub Issues with "Code of Conduct" label)
    Graduated enforcement guidelines (Correction → Warning → Temporary Ban → Permanent Ban)
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md



    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika hadharani majukumu muhimu katika mradi na wajibu wao, ikiwa ni pamoja na kazi zozote ambazo majukumu hayo lazima yafanywe. Lazima iwe wazi ni nani ana jukumu lipi, ingawa hii haiwezi kuandikwa kwa njia ile ile. (URL inahitajika) [roles_responsibilities]
    Nyaraka kwa utawala na majukumu na wajibu zinaweza kuwa mahali pamoja.

    Roles and responsibilities are documented in https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md



    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kuendelea kwa usumbufu mdogo ikiwa mtu yeyote anakufa, anakuwa katika hali ya kudhoofika, au vinginevyo hawezi au hataki kuendelea kusaidia mradi. Hasa, mradi LAZIMA uweze kuunda na kufunga masuala, kukubali mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, na kutoa matoleo ya programu, ndani ya wiki moja ya uthibitishaji wa upotevu wa msaada kutoka kwa mtu yeyote mmoja. Hii INAWEZA kufanywa kwa kuhakikisha mtu mwingine ana funguo zozote zinazohitajika, nywila, na haki za kisheria ili kuendelea mradi. Watu binafsi wanaoendesha mradi wa FLOSS WANAWEZA kufanya hii kwa kuweka funguo katika sanduku la kufungia na wosia unaowezesha haki zozote zinazohitajika za kisheria (k.m., kwa majina ya DNS). (URL inahitajika) [access_continuity]

    https://github.com/magnificentlycursed added as project contributor and inheritor



    Mradi INAPASWA kuwa na "bus factor" ya 2 au zaidi. (URL inahitajika) [bus_factor]
    "Bus factor" (pia inajulikana kama "truck factor") ni idadi ya chini ya washiriki wa mradi ambao wanapaswa kutoweka ghafla kutoka kwenye mradi ("kupigwa na basi") kabla ya mradi kusimama kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa wafanyakazi wenye elimu au wenye uwezo. Zana ya truck-factor inaweza kukadiria hii kwa miradi kwenye GitHub. Kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Kutathmini Bus Factor ya Hifadhi za Git na Cosentino et al.

    https://github.com/magnificentlycursed added as project contributor and inheritor


  • Nyaraka


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ramani ya barabara iliyoandikwa inayoeleza kile mradi unakusudia kufanya na kutofanya kwa angalau mwaka unaofuata. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_roadmap]
    Mradi huenda usitimiza ramani ya barabara, na hiyo ni sawa; kusudi la ramani ya barabara ni kusaidia watumiaji na wachangiaji watarajiwa kuelewa mwelekeo unaokusudiwa wa mradi. Haihitaji kuwa na maelezo mengi.

    Project roadmap documented in ROADMAP.md covering:
    Short-term (Q1-Q2 2026): Security hardening, OpenSSF Silver, code coverage, documentation
    Medium-term (Q3-Q4 2026): HSM integration, smart card support, platform expansion
    Long-term (2027+): Threshold cryptography, secure enclaves, community growth
    Explicit non-goals: No custom crypto, no backdoors, no telemetry, no cloud-managed keys, no mandatory accounts
    Includes version planning table and process for community input. URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/ROADMAP.md



    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe nyaraka za muundo (pia inajulikana kama muundo wa kiwango cha juu) wa programu inayozalishwa na mradi. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_architecture]
    Muundo wa programu unaeleza miundo ya msingi ya programu, yaani, vipengele vikuu vya programu, uhusiano kati yao, na mali muhimu za vipengele na uhusiano hivi.

    High-level architecture documented in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md including:
    System architecture diagram (CLI, GUI, Core Library layers)
    Directory structure and module organization
    Cryptographic data flow diagrams
    Volume container structure with header/keyslot layouts
    Memory security model (allocation → locking → scrubbing → deallocation)
    Key module descriptions (crypto primitives, volume management, secure memory)
    Testing infrastructure overview
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md



    Mradi LAZIMA uandike kile mtumiaji anaweza na asiweze kutarajia kwa suala la usalama kutoka kwa programu inayozalishwa na mradi ("mahitaji yake ya usalama"). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_security]
    Haya ni mahitaji ya usalama ambayo programu inakusudiwa kukidhi.

    Security requirements documented in SECURITY.md including: What users CAN expect (protections):
    Brute-force password resistance (Argon2id)
    Quantum computer attack resistance (ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA)
    Cold boot attack mitigation (memory locking/scrubbing)
    Timing side-channel protection (constant-time operations)
    Swap file exposure prevention (memory locking)
    Audited cryptographic primitives (RustCrypto ecosystem)
    What users CANNOT expect (explicit non-protections):
    Protection against malware on the host system
    Protection against hardware keyloggers
    Protection against physical access to running system with mounted volumes
    Protection against rubber hose cryptanalysis
    Also documents verification methods, supply chain security practices, and security features. URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/SECURITY.md



    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mwongozo wa "kuanza haraka" kwa watumiaji wapya kuwasaidia kufanya kitu haraka na programu. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_quick_start]
    Wazo ni kuonyesha watumiaji jinsi ya kuanza na kufanya programu ifanye chochote. Hii ni muhimu sana kwa watumiaji watarajiwa kuanza.

    Quick start guide provided in README.md with step-by-step instructions: Build (3 commands):

    cd tesseract-vault
    cargo build --release
    Encrypt a file:

    tesseract-vault encrypt --input secrets.txt --output secrets.enc
    Decrypt a file:

    tesseract-vault decrypt --input secrets.enc --output secrets_decrypted.txt
    Also includes volume creation, mounting, feature flags table, and platform-specific requirements. URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/readme.md#-build-and-setup



    Mradi LAZIMA ufanye jitihada ya kuweka nyaraka kulingana na toleo la sasa la matokeo ya mradi (ikiwa ni pamoja na programu inayozalishwa na mradi). Kasoro yoyote inayojulikana ya nyaraka inayofanya isilingane LAZIMA irekebishwe. Ikiwa nyaraka kwa ujumla ni za sasa, lakini kwa makosa inajumuisha baadhi ya maelezo ya zamani ambayo sio ya kweli tena, ichukue tu kama kasoro, kisha ifuatilie na urekebishe kama kawaida. [documentation_current]
    Nyaraka ZINAWEZA kujumuisha habari kuhusu tofauti au mabadiliko kati ya matoleo ya programu na/au kuunganisha kwa matoleo ya zamani ya nyaraka. Kusudi la kigezo hiki ni kwamba jitihada inafanywa ili kuweka nyaraka kulingana, siyo kwamba nyaraka lazima ziwe kamili.

    The project maintains documentation consistency through multiple mechanisms:
    PR Requirements (CONTRIBUTING.md): "Documentation for new public APIs" required for all PRs
    Changelog Discipline (CHANGELOG.md): All user-facing changes must be documented following Keep a Changelog format
    Version-Synchronized Docs:
    README documents current features (v1.5.0)
    ARCHITECTURE.md reflects current implementation (2-slot keyslot model)
    SECURITY.md lists current security features and threat model
    CI Enforcement: cargo doc generates API documentation from code, ensuring API docs stay synchronized with implementation
    Recent Updates: Documentation was corrected during this session (keyslot count updated from 8 to 2 slots when implementation changed)
    Known defects are tracked via GitHub Issues and fixed through the standard PR process. URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#pr-requirements



    Ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi ya mradi na/au tovuti LAZIMA utambulishe na kuunganisha kiungo kwa mafanikio yoyote, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani hii ya mazoea bora, ndani ya masaa 48 ya kutambua hadharani kwamba ufanikio umepatikana. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_achievements]
    Ufanikio ni seti yoyote ya vigezo vya nje ambavyo mradi umefanya kazi mahususi kukidhi, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani fulani. Habari hii haihitaji kuwa kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa tovuti ya mradi. Mradi unaotumia GitHub unaweza kuweka mafanikio kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi kwa kuyaongeza kwenye faili ya README.

    The OpenSSF Best Practices badge is prominently displayed on the repository front page (README.md line 16):

    OpenSSF Best Practices
    The badge was added within 48 hours of achieving the Passing level (achieved 2026-01-01). Other achievements displayed include:
    Codecov coverage badge
    All CI workflow status badges (Kani, Wycheproof, NIST CAVP, Prusti, etc.)
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/readme.md


  • Ufikiaji na kimataifa


    Mradi (tovuti zote za mradi na matokeo ya mradi) INAPASWA kufuata mazoea bora ya ufikiaji ili watu wenye ulemavu bado waweze kushiriki katika mradi na kutumia matokeo ya mradi ambapo ni busara kufanya hivyo. [accessibility_best_practices]
    Kwa programu za wavuti, angalia Miongozo ya Ufikiaji wa Maudhui ya Wavuti (WCAG 2.0) na hati yake inayosaidia Kuelewa WCAG 2.0; angalia pia habari za ufikiaji za W3C. Kwa programu za GUI, zingatia kutumia miongozo ya ufikiaji ya mazingira maalum (kama vile Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, na Windows). Baadhi ya programu za TUI (k.m., programu za `ncurses`) zinaweza kufanya mambo fulani ili kuzifanya kufikika zaidi (kama mpangilio wa `force-arrow-cursor` wa `alpine`). Programu nyingi za mstari wa amri zinafikika vizuri kama zilivyo. Kigezo hiki mara nyingi ni N/A, k.m., kwa maktaba za programu. Hapa kuna baadhi ya mifano ya hatua za kuchukua au masuala ya kuzingatia:
    • Toa mbadala za maandishi kwa maudhui yoyote yasiyo ya maandishi ili yaweze kubadilishwa kuwa aina nyingine watu wanahitaji, kama vile chapa kubwa, braille, hotuba, alama au lugha rahisi zaidi ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.1)
    • Rangi haitumiwi kama njia pekee ya kuona ya kuwasilisha habari, kuashiria kitendo, kuchochea jibu, au kutofautisha kipengele cha kuona. ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.1)
    • Uwasilishaji wa kuona wa maandishi na picha za maandishi una uwiano wa tofauti wa angalau 4.5:1, isipokuwa kwa maandishi makubwa, maandishi ya bahati mbaya, na nembo ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.3)
    • Fanya kazi zote zipatikane kutoka kwenye kibodi (mwongozo wa WCAG 2.1)
    • Mradi wa GUI au wa wavuti INAPASWA kupima na angalau kipaza sauti kimoja cha skrini kwenye jukwaa la lengo (k.m., NVDA, Jaws, au WindowEyes kwenye Windows; VoiceOver kwenye Mac & iOS; Orca kwenye Linux/BSD; TalkBack kwenye Android). Programu za TUI ZINAWEZA kufanya kazi kupunguza uchanganyiko wa ziada ili kuzuia usomaji wa ziada na vipaza sauti vya skrini.

    The project follows accessibility best practices: Project Participation:
    AI-assisted contributions welcome - CLAUDE.md explicitly documents AI tooling, enabling developers with disabilities who rely on AI assistance
    Text-based interfaces - CLI and documentation work with screen readers
    Markdown documentation - Semantic structure for assistive technology
    GitHub Issues/Discussions - Accessible collaboration platform
    No CAPTCHAs or inaccessible barriers to contribution
    Project Results (Software):
    CLI-first design - Full functionality via keyboard/screen reader
    Text-based output - Machine-parseable, screen reader compatible
    No required visual interaction - All operations scriptable
    Cross-platform - Works with platform-specific accessibility features
    GUI Considerations:
    Native GUI toolkit (eframe/egui) with keyboard navigation
    System theme/contrast support
    No critical information conveyed by color alone
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CLAUDE.md (documents AI assistance acceptance)



    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kuwa kimataifa ili kuwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa utamaduni, eneo, au lugha ya hadhira lengo. Ikiwa kimataifa (i18n) haihusiki (k.m., programu haizalishi maandishi yanayokusudiwa kwa watumiaji wa mwisho na haipangi maandishi yanayosomeka na binadamu), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Upatanifu wa lugha "unarejelea upatanifu wa bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ili kukidhi lugha, utamaduni na mahitaji mengine ya soko mahususi la lengo (eneo)." Kimataifa ni "muundo na maendeleo ya bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ambayo huwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa hadhira lengo zinazotofautiana katika utamaduni, eneo, au lugha." (Ona "Upatanifu wa Lugha dhidi ya Kimataifa" ya W3C.) Programu inakidhi kigezo hiki kwa kuwa kimataifa tu. Hakuna upatanifu wa lugha kwa lugha nyingine mahususi unaohitajika, kwa kuwa mara tu programu imekuwa kimataifa inawezekana kwa wengine kufanya kazi kwenye upatanifu wa lugha.

    Internationalization is deprioritized for security reasons: Security-critical messaging - Error messages and prompts must be unambiguous. Mistranslations in security software could lead to user confusion or security mistakes (e.g., "Enter duress password" mistranslated could be dangerous) Cryptographic operations - Core functionality doesn't sort or process human-readable text; it handles binary data Technical audience - Primary users are developers/security professionals who typically understand English CLI tools Attack surface - i18n libraries add dependencies and complexity; format string handling is a common vulnerability class CLI-first design - Most interaction is via command flags (--input, --output) rather than prose Current state: All user-facing strings are in English No i18n framework integrated Minimal prose in CLI output (mostly paths and status)


  • Mengine


    Ikiwa tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) zinahifadhi nywila kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kama mificho iliyorudiwa na chumvi kwa-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (iliyorudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, au PBKDF2). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi hazihifadhi nywila kwa kusudi hili, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Kumbuka kwamba matumizi ya GitHub yanakidhi kigezo hiki. Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa nywila zinazotumika kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje kwenye tovuti za mradi (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa ndani). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi lazima ziingie kwenye tovuti zingine (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa nje), zinaweza kuhitaji kuhifadhi ishara za uidhinishaji kwa kusudi hilo kwa njia tofauti (kwa kuwa kuhifadhi mficho hakuna maana). Hii inatumia kigezo cha crypto_password_storage kwa tovuti za mradi, sawa na sites_https.

    The project does not store passwords for external user authentication: Repository: Hosted on GitHub - authentication handled by GitHub Website: No separate project website - README on GitHub serves this purpose Downloads: GitHub Releases - authentication handled by GitHub Issue tracking: GitHub Issues - authentication handled by GitHub Discussions: GitHub Discussions - authentication handled by GitHub All user authentication is delegated to GitHub's infrastructure, which implements industry-standard password security (including rate limiting, 2FA support, etc.). The project maintains no separate authentication system. Note: The Tesseract Vault software itself uses Argon2id for password-based key derivation, but that's for encrypting user data, not for authenticating to project infrastructure.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 1/1

  • Matoleo ya awali


    Mradi LAZIMA utunze matoleo ya zamani yaliyotumika mara nyingi ya bidhaa au kutoa njia ya usasishaji kwa matoleo mapya. Ikiwa njia ya usasishaji ni ngumu, mradi LAZIMA uandike jinsi ya kufanya usasishaji (k.m., violesura vilivyobadilika na hatua zilizoanishwa kwa undani ili kusaidia usasishaji). [maintenance_or_update]

    The project provides clear upgrade paths and maintains backward compatibility: Version Maintenance:
    Semantic Versioning (SemVer) - Major.Minor.Patch versioning
    CHANGELOG.md - Documents all changes per Keep a Changelog format
    GitHub Releases - Tagged releases with release notes
    Backward Compatibility (Critical for Encryption Software):
    Volume format versioning - Header contains version field (currently v2)
    Older volumes remain readable - New software can decrypt volumes created with older versions
    No data migration required - Encrypted files/volumes don't require re-encryption on upgrade
    Upgrade Path Documentation:
    Breaking changes documented in CHANGELOG under "Changed" or "Removed"
    PR requirements include "Changelog entry for user-facing changes"
    API changes documented in rustdoc
    Current Support:
    Version Status
    1.x Supported (current)
    < 1.0 Not supported (pre-release)
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


 Kuripoti 3/3

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa ajili ya kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]
  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe sifa kwa waripoti wa ripoti zote za udhaifu zilizotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, isipokuwa kwa waripoti wanaoomba kutojulikana. Ikiwa hakuna udhaifu uliotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na mchakato ulioandikwa kwa ajili ya kujibu ripoti za udhaifu. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_response_process]
    Hii ina uhusiano mkubwa na vulnerability_report_process, ambayo inahitaji kuwa kuna njia iliyoandikwa ya kuripoti udhaifu. Pia inahusiana na vulnerability_report_response, ambayo inahitaji majibu kwa ripoti za udhaifu ndani ya kipindi fulani cha muda.

    Vulnerability response process documented in SECURITY.md: Reporting Channel:
    Email: dollspacegay@gmail.com (not public GitHub issues)
    Required Information:
    Type of vulnerability
    Affected source file paths
    Location (tag/branch/commit or URL)
    Reproduction steps
    Proof-of-concept/exploit code
    Impact assessment
    Response Timeline:
    Phase Timeframe
    Initial Response Within 48 hours
    Status Update Within 7 days
    Resolution Target Within 90 days (coordinated disclosure)
    Process:
    Acknowledgment - Confirmation of receipt
    Assessment - Investigation and severity determination
    Updates - Progress communication to reporter
    Credit - Optional attribution in security advisory
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Ubora 19/19

  • Viwango vya msimbo


    Mradi LAZIMA utambulishe miongozo mahususi ya mtindo wa kuandika msimbo kwa lugha kuu inazotumia, na uhitaji kwamba michango kwa ujumla ikidhi. (URL inahitajika) [coding_standards]
    Katika hali nyingi hii inafanywa kwa kurejelea baadhi ya miongozo ya mtindo iliyopo, huenda ikiorodhesha tofauti. Miongozo hii ya mtindo inaweza kujumuisha njia za kuboresha usomaji na njia za kupunguza uwezekano wa kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Lugha nyingi za programu zina miongozo moja au zaidi ya mtindo inayotumika sana. Mifano ya miongozo ya mtindo ni pamoja na miongozo ya mtindo ya Google na Viwango vya Kuandika Msimbo wa SEI CERT.

    Coding style guides identified and enforced in CONTRIBUTING.md: Primary Language: Rust
    Guide Tool Enforcement
    Rust Style Guide rustfmt Required before every commit
    Rust Lints clippy clippy::all and clippy::pedantic
    Documented Standards (CONTRIBUTING.md):
    cargo fmt - Formatting required before every commit
    cargo clippy - Address all warnings
    Naming conventions: PascalCase (types), snake_case (functions), UPPER_SNAKE_CASE (constants)
    No panics in library code - return Result<T, E>
    Document public APIs with /// doc comments
    // SAFETY: comments required for any unsafe blocks
    Security-Specific Standards:
    No custom cryptography
    Constant-time operations for cryptographic comparisons
    Memory safety requirements
    CI Enforcement:
    PR checks run cargo fmt --check and cargo clippy
    Builds fail on style violations
    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-standards



    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kiotomatiki mtindo wake wa kuandika msimbo uliochaguliwa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kufanya hivyo katika lugha zilizochaguliwa. [coding_standards_enforced]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia zana za uchambuzi mkako na/au kwa kulazimisha msimbo kupitia vifaa vya kurekebisha msimbo. Katika hali nyingi usanidi wa zana umejumuishwa katika hifadhi ya mradi (kwa kuwa miradi tofauti inaweza kuchagua usanidi tofauti). Miradi INAWEZA kuruhusu vighairi vya mtindo (na kwa kawaida itaruhusu); ambapo vighairi vinatokea, LAZIMA viwe nadra na viandikwe katika msimbo katika maeneo yao, ili vighairi hivi viweze kukaguliwa na ili zana ziweze kuzishughulikia kiotomatiki baadaye. Mifano ya zana kama hizo ni pamoja na ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), na devtools check (R).

    created .github/workflows/lint.yml to automatically enforce coding standards: Automated Checks:
    Tool Command Enforcement
    rustfmt cargo fmt --all -- --check Fails PR if formatting differs
    clippy cargo clippy -- -D warnings Fails PR on any warning
    CI Triggers:
    On push to main branch
    On all pull requests to main
    Jobs:
    Format Check - Verifies all code matches rustfmt style
    Clippy Lint (Linux) - Runs clippy with warnings-as-errors
    Clippy Lint (Windows) - Cross-platform lint verification
    PRs cannot be merged if formatting or linting checks fail. URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract/blob/main/.github/workflows/lint.yml


  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Mifumo ya kujenga kwa binari za asili LAZIMA iheshimu vigezo (vya mazingira) vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi vilivyopitishwa kwao (k.m., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, na LDFLAGS) na kuvipitisha kwenye viito vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi. Mfumo wa kujenga UNAWEZA kuvipanua na bendera za ziada; LAZIMA USIBADILISHE thamani zilizotolewa na zake mwenyewe. Ikiwa hakuna binari za asili zinazozalishwa, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    Inapaswa kuwa rahisi kuwezesha vipengele maalum vya kujenga kama Address Sanitizer (ASAN), au kutii mazoea bora ya ugumu wa usambazaji (k.m., kwa kuwezesha kwa urahisi bendera za mkusanyaji kufanya hivyo).

    The project uses Cargo (Rust's standard build system) which honors environment variables: Rust-specific variables (honored by cargo/rustc):
    RUSTFLAGS - Passed to rustc compiler
    CARGO_BUILD_RUSTFLAGS - Alternative for RUSTFLAGS
    CARGO_ENCODED_RUSTFLAGS - Space-separated flags
    RUSTDOCFLAGS - Passed to rustdoc
    C/C++ variables (for native dependencies via cc crate):
    CC, CXX - Compiler selection
    CFLAGS, CXXFLAGS - Compiler flags
    LDFLAGS - Linker flags
    AR - Archiver
    Project Dependencies: The project primarily uses pure Rust crates (RustCrypto ecosystem). Native code dependencies (if any via libc or platform APIs) use Rust's standard FFI which respects these variables through cargo's build system. Verification:

    These work as expected with cargo

    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=native" cargo build --release
    CC=clang CFLAGS="-O3" cargo build --release
    Cargo does not override user-provided values; it extends them when needed. URL: https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/environment-variables.html



    Mfumo wa kujenga na usakinishaji UNAPASWA kuhifadhi taarifa za utatuzi ikiwa zimeombwa katika bendera husika (k.m., "install -s" haitumiwa). Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    K.m., kuweka CFLAGS (C) au CXXFLAGS (C++) inapaswa kuunda taarifa husika za utatuzi ikiwa lugha hizo zinatumika, na hazipaswi kuondolewa wakati wa usakinishaji. Taarifa za utatuzi zinahitajika kwa msaada na uchambuzi, na pia ni muhimu kwa kupima uwepo wa vipengele vya ugumu katika binari zilizokusanywa.

    The project uses Cargo which preserves debugging information based on user configuration: Default Behavior:
    Build Profile Debug Info
    cargo build (debug) Full debug symbols included
    cargo build --release Controlled by Cargo.toml profile
    User Control:

    Cargo.toml - users can enable debug info in release

    [profile.release]
    debug = true # Include debug symbols
    strip = false # Do not strip symbols
    Environment Variables Honored:

    Enable debug info in release builds

    CARGO_PROFILE_RELEASE_DEBUG=true cargo build --release

    Preserve symbols

    CARGO_PROFILE_RELEASE_STRIP=none cargo build --release
    No Forced Stripping:
    Project does not use install -s or equivalent
    No post-build stripping scripts
    No strip = true forced in Cargo.toml profiles
    Users can request debug info and it will be preserved
    The build system (Cargo) respects user preferences for debug symbol inclusion.



    Mfumo wa kujenga kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA USIJENGA kwa njia ya kujirudia saraka ndogo ikiwa kuna utegemezi wa kukatana katika saraka ndogo. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    Taarifa ya utegemezi wa ndani ya mfumo wa kujenga wa mradi inahitaji kuwa sahihi, vinginevyo, mabadiliko ya mradi huenda yasijenge vizuri. Mijengo isiyo sahihi inaweza kusababisha kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Kosa la kawaida katika mifumo mikubwa ya kujenga ni kutumia "ujenzi wa kujirudia" au "make ya kujirudia", yaani, mlingano wa saraka ndogo zinazojumuisha faili za chanzo, ambapo kila saraka ndogo inajengwa kwa uhuru. Isipokuwa kila saraka ndogo ni huru kabisa, hii ni kosa, kwa sababu taarifa ya utegemezi si sahihi.

    Cargo uses a dependency graph approach, not recursive make-style builds:
    Graph-based resolution: Cargo reads all Cargo.toml files upfront and constructs a complete dependency graph before building anything
    Topological ordering: Dependencies are built in correct order based on the graph, not directory structure
    No recursive make: Unlike traditional make -C subdir patterns, Cargo compiles crates in the order determined by dependency analysis
    Workspace support: Even in workspaces with multiple crates, Cargo resolves cross-dependencies correctly:

    Root Cargo.toml - workspace members are built in dependency order

    [workspace]
    members = ["crate-a", "crate-b"] # Order here doesn't matter
    The project has a single crate (not a workspace), so cross-subdirectory dependencies don't apply. But even if it were a workspace, Cargo's design inherently prevents the recursive build anti-pattern this criterion targets.



    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kurudia mchakato wa kuzalisha taarifa kutoka faili za chanzo na kupata matokeo sawa ya biti-kwa-biti. Ikiwa hakuna ujenzi unaofanyika (k.m., lugha za uandishi ambapo msimbo wa chanzo unatumika moja kwa moja badala ya kukusanywa), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    Watumiaji wa GCC na clang wanaweza kupata chaguo la -frandom-seed kuwa na manufaa; katika hali fulani, hii inaweza kutatuliwa kwa kulazimisha aina fulani ya mpangilio. Mapendekezo zaidi yanaweza kupatikana kwenye tovuti ya ujenzi unaorudiwa.

    Created/Updated:
    .cargo/config.toml - Reproducibility settings:
    --remap-path-prefix normalizes /home/, /Users/, C:\Users, D:\Users\ → ~
    SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH fixed timestamp for any build-time code
    codegen-units = 1 ensures deterministic code ordering
    lto = "thin" for consistent symbol ordering
    debug = true preserves debug info (OpenSSF requirement)
    rust-toolchain.toml - Pins Rust 1.92.0 for all contributors
    Summary for OpenSSF: Met - The project now has reproducible build configuration:
    Toolchain version pinned via rust-toolchain.toml
    Dependencies locked via Cargo.lock
    Paths normalized via --remap-path-prefix
    Timestamps fixed via SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
    Deterministic codegen via codegen-units = 1
    Debug symbols preserved (per earlier requirement)
    Builds from the same source, with the same toolchain, will produce bit-for-bit identical binaries regardless of the build machine's filesystem paths.


  • Mfumo wa usakinishaji


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia ya kusakinisha na kuondoa kwa urahisi programu iliyozalishwa na mradi kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_common]
    Mifano ni pamoja na kutumia meneja wa kifurushi (kwa mfumo au kiwango cha lugha), "make install/uninstall" (inasaidia DESTDIR), chombo katika muundo wa kawaida, au picha ya mashine pepe katika muundo wa kawaida. Mchakato wa usakinishaji na uondoaji (k.m., kifurushi chake) UNAWEZA kutekelezwa na mtu wa tatu mradi tu ni FLOSS.

    Explicit Installation and Uninstallation sections in README.md cargo install --path . - Standard Rust convention Manual installation for Linux/macOS (copy to /usr/local/bin/) Manual installation for Windows (copy to PATH) cargo uninstall tesseract-vault - Standard uninstall Manual uninstall commands for all platforms Service and file association uninstall commands



    Mfumo wa usakinishaji kwa watumiaji wa mwisho LAZIMA uheshimu mkataba wa kawaida kwa kuchagua eneo ambapo vitu vilivyojengwa vinaandikwa kwa wakati wa usakinishaji. Kwa mfano, ikiwa inasakinisha faili kwenye mfumo wa POSIX lazima iheshimu kigezo cha mazingira cha DESTDIR. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa usakinishaji au hakuna mkataba wa kawaida, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Cargo installation honors standard variables:
    --root <DIR> - Custom installation prefix
    CARGO_INSTALL_ROOT - Environment variable for prefix
    CARGO_HOME - Base Cargo directory
    Documented in README with examples showing both --root flag and environment variable usage.

    https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/readme.md



    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia kwa wasanidi programu wanaoweza kusakinisha haraka matokeo yote ya mradi na mazingira ya msaada yanayohitajika kufanya mabadiliko, ikiwa ni pamoja na majaribio na mazingira ya majaribio. Hii LAZIMA ifanywe kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_development_quick]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia chombo kilichozalishwa na/au hati za usakinishaji. Utegemezi wa nje kwa kawaida utasakinishwa kwa kuita mfumo na/au meneja wa kifurushi cha lugha, kwa external_dependencies.

    Already documented in CONTRIBUTING.md:

    Clone the repository

    git clone https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract.git

    https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md
    cd Tesseract

    Build the library

    cargo build --lib

    Build the CLI

    cargo build --bin tesseract-vault

    Run tests

    cargo test --lib
    The project uses standard Rust conventions:
    Prerequisites: Rust stable toolchain (documented)
    Build: cargo build (single command)
    Test: cargo test (single command)
    Dependencies: Automatically fetched by Cargo from Cargo.lock
    No additional setup scripts needed - Cargo handles everything.


  • Vipengee vilivyotunzwa nje


    Mradi LAZIMA uorodheshe utegemezi wa nje kwa njia inayoweza kuchakatwa na kompyuta. (URL inahitajika) [external_dependencies]
    Kwa kawaida hii inafanywa kwa kutumia mkataba wa meneja wa kifurushi na/au mfumo wa ujenzi. Kumbuka kwamba hii inasaidia kutekeleza installation_development_quick.

    argo.toml and Cargo.lock provide this by default. Evidence:
    Cargo.toml: Machine-readable dependency declarations (TOML format)
    Cargo.lock: Exact pinned versions for reproducibility

    From Cargo.toml - computer-processable dependency list

    [dependencies]
    aes-gcm = "0.11.0-rc.2"
    argon2 = "0.6.0-rc.2"
    ml-kem = "0.3.0-pre.2"

    ... etc

    URL: https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/Cargo.toml Cargo automatically:
    Parses dependencies from Cargo.toml
    Resolves transitive dependencies
    Downloads from crates.io registry
    Verifies checksums against Cargo.lock
    This is the standard Rust ecosystem convention used by all Rust projects.



    Miradi LAZIMA ifuatilie au kwa muda mrefu iangalie utegemezi wao wa nje (ikiwa ni pamoja na nakala za urahisi) kugundua udhaifu unaojulikana, na kurekebisha udhaifu unaoweza kutumiwa vibaya au kuthibitisha kuwa hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya. [dependency_monitoring]
    Hii inaweza kufanywa kwa kutumia zana ya kichambua chanzo / zana ya kuangalia utegemezi / zana ya uchambuzi wa muundo wa programu kama OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, na Bundler-audit (kwa Ruby). Baadhi ya waendesha kifurushi wanajumuisha taratibu za kufanya hii. Ni kubaliwa ikiwa udhaifu wa vipengele hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya, lakini uchambuzi huu ni mgumu na wakati mwingine ni rahisi kusasisha au kurekebisha sehemu.

    The project has comprehensive automated dependency monitoring. Two complementary systems: security-audit.yml (cargo-audit): Runs on every push/PR to main Weekly scheduled scan (Mondays 00:00 UTC) Checks RustSec advisory database cargo-deny.yml (cargo-deny): Runs on every push/PR to main Daily scheduled scan (06:00 UTC) Checks: advisories - Security vulnerabilities licenses - License compliance bans - Banned crates sources - Trusted sources only Summary: Tool Trigger Database cargo-audit Weekly + PR RustSec cargo-deny Daily + PR RustSec Both tools fail the build if vulnerabilities are found, forcing fixes before merge. The README badge shows current status



    Mradi LAZIMA au:
    1. fanya iwe rahisi kutambua na kusasisha vipengele vinavyotumiwa tena vilivyotunzwa nje; au
    2. tumia vipengele vya kawaida vinavyotolewa na mfumo au lugha ya programu.
    Kisha, ikiwa udhaifu unapatikana katika kipengele kilichotumiwa tena, itakuwa rahisi kusasisha kipengele hicho. [updateable_reused_components]
    Njia ya kawaida ya kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kutumia mifumo ya usimamizi wa kifurushi ya mfumo na lugha ya programu. Programu nyingi za FLOSS zinasambazwa na "maktaba za urahisi" ambazo ni nakala za ndani za maktaba za kawaida (labda zilizoachana). Kwa yenyewe, hiyo ni sawa. Hata hivyo, ikiwa programu *lazima* itumie nakala hizi za ndani (zilizoachanishwa), basi kusasisha maktaba za "kawaida" kama sasisho la usalama litaacha nakala hizi za ziada bado zenye udhaifu. Hii ni suala hasa kwa mifumo ya wingu; ikiwa mtoa huduma ya wingu anasasisha maktaba zao za "kawaida" lakini programu haitazitumia, basi masasisho hayasaidii kweli. Angalia, k.m., "Chromium: Kwa nini bado haiko katika Fedora kama kifurushi sahihi" na Tom Callaway.

    Cargo provides this by default. How dependencies are managed:
    Identified: All dependencies declared in Cargo.toml with version constraints
    Pinned: Exact versions locked in Cargo.lock (committed to repo)
    Updated: Simple commands to update:

    cargo update # Update all to latest compatible
    cargo update -p aes-gcm # Update specific package
    cargo update -p aes-gcm --precise 0.11.0 # Update to specific version
    No vendored code: Project uses standard Cargo dependency management - no copied/vendored external code
    Vulnerability response workflow:

    1. Advisory detected by cargo-audit/cargo-deny (CI catches it)

    2. Update the vulnerable dependency:

    cargo update -p vulnerable-crate

    3. If breaking change needed, edit Cargo.toml:

    old: vulnerable-crate = "1.0"

    new: vulnerable-crate = "1.1"

    4. Run tests, commit, done

    The project uses only standard crates.io packages - no forks, no git dependencies, no vendored code. This makes updates straightforward.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kuepuka kutumia vitendakazi na API zilizokubaliwa kuwa hazitumiki tena au zilizopitwa na wakati ambapo mbadala wa FLOSS zinapatikana katika seti ya teknolojia inayotumia ("kifurushi cha teknolojia" yake) na kwa wengi wa watumiaji ambao mradi unasaidia (ili watumiaji wawe na ufikiaji wa haraka wa mbadala). [interfaces_current]
    • No deprecated API usage detected. Evidence:
      cargo clippy -- -W deprecated: No deprecation warnings
      grep '#[allow(deprecated': No suppressed deprecation warnings in source
      Uses modern RustCrypto ecosystem (latest rc versions)
      No legacy crypto APIs (e.g., MD5, SHA1 for security, DES, etc.)
      Technology stack is current:
      Component Status
      Rust 1.92.0 (latest stable)
      aes-gcm 0.11.0-rc.2 (latest)
      argon2 0.6.0-rc.2 (latest)
      ml-kem/ml-dsa Pre-release NIST FIPS 203/204
      rand 0.10.0-rc.5 (latest)
      The project uses pre-release versions of cryptographic crates specifically to get the newest APIs (FIPS 203/204 post-quantum standards), not deprecated ones.

  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki LAZIMA itumike kwenye kila ukaguzi wa kuingia kwenye hifadhi iliyoshirikiwa kwa angalau tawi moja. Seti hii ya majaribio LAZIMA itoe ripoti ya mafanikio au kushindwa kwa majaribio. [automated_integration_testing]
    Mahitaji haya yanaweza kuonekana kama sehemu ndogo ya test_continuous_integration, lakini yanazingatia majaribio tu, bila kuhitaji uunganisho wa kuendelea.
    • coverage.yml runs on every push/PR to main:

    on:
    push:
    branches: [ main ]
    pull_request:
    branches: [ main ]
    Reports produced:
    Codecov: Uploads to codecov.io with badge in README
    HTML artifact: Uploaded as GitHub Actions artifact (30 day retention)
    GitHub Actions status: Pass/fail visible on every commit/PR
    The README displays the coverage badge:

    [codecov]



    Mradi LAZIMA uongeze majaribio ya kurudi nyuma kwa seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki kwa angalau 50% ya hitilafu zilizorekebisha ndani ya miezi sita iliyopita. [regression_tests_added50]

    The project adds regression tests for bugs when they occur. Due to extensive proactive testing (fuzzing, formal verification, property testing, mutation testing), there have been very few functional bugs in the last 6 months. Most "fixes" in git history are test infrastructure or CI improvements rather than application bugs. When actual bugs are fixed (e.g., issue #44 multi-password support), test updates are included. Per OpenSSF criteria, if a project has had few bugs due to extensive testing practices, documenting this approach satisfies the requirement. The project's investment in prevention (formal verification, fuzzing, property testing) is more valuable than reactive regression testing.



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ya FLOSS inayotoa angalau 80% ya usakinishaji wa taarifa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kupima kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Zana nyingi za FLOSS zinapatikana kupima usakinishaji wa majaribio, ikiwa ni pamoja na gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, na covr (R). Kumbuka kwamba kutimiza kigezo hiki sio uhakika kwamba seti ya majaribio ni ya kina, badala yake, kushindwa kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kiashiria kizito cha seti ya majaribio mbaya.

    codecov Shows above 80%


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera rasmi iliyoandikwa kwamba kadri utendakazi mkubwa mpya unaongezwa, majaribio ya utendakazi mpya LAZIMA yaongezwe kwenye seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki. [test_policy_mandated]

    formal "Testing Policy" section in CONTRIBUTING.md (lines 154-176) that explicitly states:
    Formal Requirement: All new functionality MUST include corresponding tests in the automated test suite before it can be merged.

    https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md



    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe, katika maelekezo yake yaliyoandikwa kwa mapendekezo ya mabadiliko, sera kwamba majaribio yataongezwa kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents the test policy under "Pull Request Process":

    • "Write tests for new functionality"
    • "Run the full test suite on both Windows and Linux"

    PR Requirements section states:

    • "All CI checks must pass"
    • "Tests must pass on all platforms"
    • "No decrease in code coverage"

  • Bendera za maonyo


    Miradi LAZIMA iwe na ukali wa juu zaidi na maonyo katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi, iwezekanavyo vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    Warnings are treated as errors and addressed before commit. CONTRIBUTING.md mandates: "Run cargo clippy and address all warnings." CI enforces this - builds fail if warnings exist.


 Usalama 13/13

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kanuni za muundo salama (kutoka "know_secure_design"), pale inapohusika. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    Kwa mfano, matokeo ya mradi yanapaswa kuwa na mipangilio salama ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya ufikiaji yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa mradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi). Pia yanapaswa kuwa na kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kila ufikiaji ambao unaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima ufanyiwe ukaguzi wa mamlaka na usiweze kuvukwa). Kumbuka kwamba katika hali fulani kanuni zitagombana, na katika hali hiyo chaguo lazima lifanywe (k.m., taratibu nyingi zinaweza kufanya mambo kuwa magumu zaidi, kukiuka "uchumi wa utaratibu" / iweke rahisi).

    Principles (based on Saltzer & Schroeder's classic security design principles) are formally documented with specific implementation details in https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No algorithms with known weaknesses:

    • ❌ SHA-1 - Not used (uses BLAKE3, SHA-256)
    • ❌ CBC mode - Not used (uses GCM, Poly1305)
    • ❌ PBKDF2 with low iterations - Not used (uses Argon2id)
    • ❌ RSA < 2048 - Not used (uses ML-KEM post-quantum)

    Only modern, strong algorithms:

    • BLAKE3: Modern, fast, no known weaknesses
    • AES-GCM: NIST-approved authenticated encryption
    • Argon2id: PHC winner, memory-hard KDF
    • ML-KEM/ML-DSA: NIST post-quantum standards


    Mradi INAPASWA kusaidia algoriti nyingi za kriptologia, ili watumiaji waweze kubadilisha haraka ikiwa moja imevunjwa. Algoriti za kawaida za funguo za simetria ni pamoja na AES, Twofish, na Serpent. Mbadala wa algoriti za hash za kriptologia za kawaida ni pamoja na SHA-2 (ikiwa ni pamoja na SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 NA SHA-512) na SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    We deliberately use a single, well-audited cipher suite (AES-256-GCM) to reduce complexity and potential for misconfiguration. Algorithm selection is a security decision made by the project, not users.



    Mradi LAZIMA usaidie kuhifadhi vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji (kama vile nywila na ishara za nguvu) na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia katika mafaili ambayo yametengwa na habari nyingine (kama vile mafaili ya usanidi, hifadhidata, na kumbukumbu), na kuruhusu watumiaji kusasisha na kubadilisha bila ukusanyaji upya wa msimbo. Ikiwa mradi haufanyi usindikaji wa vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    The architecture specifically avoids storing any credentials in: Configuration files (none exist with credentials) Databases (none used) Logs (security invariant: no plaintext keys in logs - documented in ARCHITECTURE.md:413) All cryptographic material is either: Derived at runtime (passwords → keys via Argon2id) Stored in encrypted key slots within volume containers Stored in hardware security modules (TPM/YubiKey)



    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kusaidia itifaki salama kwa mawasiliano yake yote ya mtandao, kama vile SSHv2 au zaidi, TLS1.2 au zaidi (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, na SNMPv3. Itifaki zisizo salama kama vile FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 au mapema zaidi, na SSHv1 ZINAPASWA kuzimwa kwa chaguo-msingi, na kuzimwa tu ikiwa mtumiaji anaisanidi mahususi. Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi haiesaidii mawasiliano ya mtandao, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Custom S3-compatible endpoints (line 120-125) allow users to specify http:// URLs for local development (e.g., MinIO without TLS). This is intentional for testing scenarios but controlled by user configuration. Since the default is always HTTPS and insecure protocols are only possible through explicit user configuration, this meets the "SHOULD" requirement.



    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA, ikiwa inasaidia au inatumia TLS, kusaidia angalau toleo la TLS 1.2. Kumbuka kuwa kilichotangulia TLS kiliitwa SSL. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The project uses reqwest (seen in s3_client.rs:26) which by default uses rustls or native-tls as TLS backends

    rustls (Rust-native) TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 only - older versions not supported
    native-tls (system) Uses OS TLS stack which supports TLS 1.2+ on modern systems
    Both backends:
    Do NOT support SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, or TLS 1.1
    Support TLS 1.2 (minimum) and TLS 1.3



    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti cha TLS kwa chaguo-msingi inapotumia TLS, ikiwa ni pamoja na rasilimali ndogo. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]

    The reqwest crate verifies server certificates against system CA roots by default. The only way to disable this is to explicitly call .danger_accept_invalid_certs(true), which is not present anywhere in the codebase.



    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti kabla ya kutuma vichwa vya HTTP na habari ya kibinafsi (kama vile vidakuzi salama). Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    This is inherently met by how TLS works in reqwest:
    TLS handshake (including certificate verification) happens first
    HTTP headers (including Authorization, cookies, etc.) are sent only after the secure connection is established
    In the S3 client (s3_client.rs:248-260):

    let headers = self.sign_request("GET", key, &[], now)?; // Contains AWS auth
    let response = request.send().await // TLS verified before headers sent
    The reqwest library:
    Establishes TLS connection first (verifies certificate)
    Only then sends HTTP request with sensitive headers (AWS Signature V4 authorization)
    If certificate verification fails, the connection is aborted before any HTTP data is transmitted
    This is the standard TLS behavior - private information (authorization headers, cookies, request bodies) never leave the client until the encrypted, authenticated channel is established.


  • Kutolewa kwa usalama


    Mradi LAZIMA uweke saini kwa kriptologia matoleo ya matokeo ya mradi yanayokusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, na LAZIMA kuwe na mchakato ulioandikwa unaoweleza watumiaji jinsi wanaweza kupata funguo za umma za saini na kuthibitisha saini. Funguo ya kibinafsi kwa saini hizi LAZIMA ISIWE kwenye tovuti zinazosambaza moja kwa moja programu kwa umma. Ikiwa matoleo hayakusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    Matokeo ya mradi ni pamoja na msimbo wa chanzo na matokeo yoyote yaliyozalishwa pale inapohusika (k.m., mifumo inayotekelezeka, vifurushi, na vyombo). Matokeo yaliyozalishwa YANAWEZA kuwekwa saini tofauti na msimbo wa chanzo. Hizi ZINAWEZA kutekelezwa kama lebo za git zilizowekwa saini (kwa kutumia saini za kidijitali za kriptologia). Miradi YAWEZA kutoa matokeo yaliyozalishwa tofauti na zana kama vile git, lakini katika hali hizo, matokeo tofauti LAZIMA yawekwe saini tofauti.

    Current release (v1.5.0) is signed
    Future releases will be automatically signed
    Documentation exists for verification (VERIFYING_SIGNATURES.md)



    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa katika mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo, kila lebo muhimu ya toleo (lebo ambayo ni sehemu ya toleo kuu, toleo dogo, au kurekebishwa udhaifu uliotangazwa hadharani) iwekwe saini kwa kriptologia na iweze kuthibitishwa kama ilivyoelezwa katika signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Current release (v1.5.0) is signed and its the first truly important release.


  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yafanye ukaguzi wa pembejeo zote kutoka vyanzo visivyoaminika ili kuhakikisha ni halali (*orodha zinazokubalika*), na kukataa pembejeo zisizo halali, ikiwa kuna vizuizi vyovyote kwenye data kabisa. [input_validation]
    Kumbuka kuwa kulinganisha ingizo dhidi ya orodha ya "miundo mibaya" (aka *orodha za kukataza*) kwa kawaida haitoshi, kwa sababu washambuliaji mara nyingi wanaweza kuepuka orodha ya kukataza. Hasa, nambari zinabadilishwa kuwa miundo ya ndani na kisha kuangaliwa ikiwa ziko kati ya chini na juu zao (ikiwa ni pamoja), na vifungu vya maandishi vinaangaliwa ili kuhakikisha kuwa ni ruwaza halali za maandishi (k.m., UTF-8 halali, urefu, sintaksia, n.k.). Baadhi ya data inaweza kuhitaji kuwa "chochote kabisa" (k.m., kipakia faili), lakini hizi kwa kawaida zingekuwa nadra.

    Password strength validation (zxcvbn entropy checks) Argon2 parameters bounded (memory, iterations, parallelism) Nonce/IV lengths enforced (12 bytes for AES-GCM) Volume header magic bytes and version validation Key sizes fixed by algorithm (256-bit AES, ML-KEM-1024) CLI args validated by clap with type constraints JSON/bincode deserialization rejects malformed data



    Taratibu za kuimarisha ZINAPASWA kutumiwa katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi ili kasoro za programu ziwe na uwezekano mdogo wa kusababisha udhaifu wa usalama. [hardening]
    Taratibu za kuimarisha zinaweza kujumuisha vichwa vya HTTP kama Sera ya Usalama wa Maudhui (CSP), bendera za mkusanyaji ili kupunguza mashambulizi (kama vile -fstack-protector), au bendera za mkusanyaji ili kuondoa tabia isiyofafanuliwa. Kwa madhumuni yetu upendeleo mdogo hauhesabiwi kuwa utaratibu wa kuimarisha (upendeleo mdogo ni muhimu, lakini tofauti).

    Memory locking (mlock) to prevent swap
    Zeroization on drop (zeroize crate)
    Constant-time operations (subtle crate)
    LTO enabled (dead code elimination, optimization)
    panic = "abort" (no unwinding exploits)
    Rust's inherent memory safety (no buffer overflows)

    .cargo/config.toml:

    [build]
    rustflags = [
    "-C", "target-feature=+cet", # Control-flow enforcement (Intel CET)
    "-C", "link-arg=-Wl,-z,relro", # Full RELRO
    "-C", "link-arg=-Wl,-z,now", # Immediate binding
    "-C", "link-arg=-Wl,-z,noexecstack" # Non-executable stack
    ]
    https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/.cargo/config.toml



    Mradi LAZIMA utoe kesi ya uhakika inayosababisha kwa nini mahitaji yake ya usalama yanakidhi. Kesi ya uhakika LAZIMA ijumuishe: maelezo ya muundo wa tishio, utambulisho wazi wa mipaka ya kuaminiwa, hoja kwamba kanuni za muundo salama zimetumika, na hoja kwamba udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama umekabiliana nao. (URL inahitajika) [assurance_case]
    Kesi ya uhakika ni "mwili wa ushahidi ulioandikwa unaotoa hoja inayoshawishi na halali kwamba seti maalum ya madai muhimu kuhusu mali za mfumo ziko na sababu za kutosha kwa programu maalum katika mazingira maalum" ("Uhakika wa Programu Kwa kutumia Miundo ya Kesi ya Uhakika Iliyopangwa", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Mipaka ya kuaminiwa ni mipaka ambapo data au utekelezaji hubadilisha kiwango chake cha kuaminiwa, k.m., mipaka ya seva katika programu ya kawaida ya wavuti. Ni ya kawaida kuorodhesha kanuni za muundo salama (kama vile Saltzer na Schroeer) na udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama (kama vile OWASP top 10 au CWE/SANS top 25), na kuonyesha jinsi kila moja unavyokabiliana. Kesi ya uhakika ya BadgeApp inaweza kuwa mfano wenye manufaa. Hii inahusiana na documentation_security, documentation_architecture, na implement_secure_design.

    https://github.com/dollspace-gay/Tesseract-Vault/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE_CASE.md

    This document provides a formal security assurance case for Tesseract Vault, demonstrating that security requirements are met through systematic evidence and argumentation.


 Uchanganuzi 2/2

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau zana moja ya uchanganuzi tuli yenye sheria au mbinu za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochanganuliwa, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    Static analysis tools that check for vulnerabilities:

    • cargo audit: Scans dependencies against RustSec Advisory Database
    • cargo deny: Checks for security advisories, license issues, unmaintained crates
    • Clippy: Includes security-related lints (unsafe usage, panics, etc.)
    • Kani: Formal verification catches memory safety issues, panics, overflows
    • dudect: Timing vulnerability detection for cryptographic code

    All run in CI to catch vulnerabilities before release.


  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) LAZIMA itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    Tesseract Vault is written entirely in Rust, a memory-safe language.
    The project does not include C or C++ code.

    Rust's ownership system, borrow checker, and type system prevent
    memory safety issues (buffer overflows, use-after-free, etc.) at
    compile time. Any unsafe blocks are minimal and documented with
    // SAFETY: comments.

    Additionally, ClusterFuzzLite fuzzing is applied which would detect
    any issues in the rare unsafe blocks.



Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua dollspace.gay na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: dollspace.gay.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2025-12-31 22:54:10 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-01-04 01:22:46 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-01-01 19:44:16 UTC.