monumental-archive-db

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hali ya nishani yako ya msingi kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hali ya nishani ya msingi inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani ya msingi kwa mradi 13998 ni baseline-1 Huu ndiyo jinsi ya kuweka nishani ya msingi:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako ya msingi kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Baseline](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13998/baseline)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13998)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13998"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13998/baseline"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya Kiwango cha Msingi 3. Hizi ni vigezo vya toleo v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    The Monumental Archive's PostgreSQL image: official postgres + PostGIS, pgaudit, edtf_postgres — native multi-arch, tested before published, cosign-signed

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.

 Udhibiti 18/21 ●

  • Udhibiti


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ruhusa zinapopeana kwa kazi katika mfumo wa CI/CD, msimbo wa chanzo au usanidi LAZIMA upee tu ruhusa za chini zaidi zinazohitajika kwa shughuli zinazohusiana. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Sanidi mifumo ya CI/CD ya mradi ili kupea ruhusa za chini zinazopatikana kwa watumiaji na huduma kwa chaguomsingi, ukipandisha ruhusa tu inapohitajika kwa kazi maalum. Katika baadhi ya mifumo ya udhibiti wa toleo, hii inaweza kufanyika katika kiwango cha shirika au hifadhi. Ikiwa sivyo, weka ruhusa katika kiwango cha juu cha mfumo.

    Scopes are granted per job and each grant carries an inline comment saying why: packages: write only on the jobs that push an image, id-token: write only on the job that needs Sigstore OIDC. Everything else inherits the top-level contents: read. Runners additionally enforce egress-policy: block and disable-sudo where applicable.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifuko ya CI/CD inayokubali pembejeo za mshirika anayeaminika LAZIMA isafishe na kuthibitisha pembejeo hiyo kabla ya kutumia katika mfuko. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    Mifuko ya CI/CD inapaswa kusafisha (kunukuu, kutoroka au kutoka kwa maadili yanayotarajiwa) pembejeo zote za mshirika kwenye utekelezaji wa mtiririko wa kazi wa wazi. Ingawa washirika kwa ujumla wanaaminika, pembejeo za mwongozo kwa mtiririko wa kazi haiwezi kukaguliwa na inaweza kutumiwa vibaya na utekaji wa akaunti au tishio la ndani.

    No collaborator-supplied value is interpolated into a shell step. Enforced rather than asserted: zizmor at --persona=pedantic and actionlint run on every commit and in CI, and CodeQL analyses the workflows as its actions language — the combination is specifically good at template injection, which is the form this failure takes in GitHub Actions.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Toleo rasmi linapobuniwa, mali zote ndani ya toleo hilo LAZIMA zihusianishwe wazi na kitambulisho cha toleo au kitambulisho kingine cha kipekee kwa mali hiyo. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Panga kitambulisho cha kipekee cha toleo kwa kila mali ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi, ukifuata kawaida ya uainishaji thabiti au mpango wa nambari. Mifano ni pamoja na SemVer, CalVer, au kitambulisho cha git commit.

    Every asset is identified by content: each layer and each per-architecture manifest carries its own sha256 digest, and the multi-arch index digest commits to all of them. The index is additionally tagged :sha-<commit>, associating the whole set with the exact commit that produced it. Nothing in a publish is identified by anything mutable.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue sera ya kudhibiti siri na ushahidi unaotumika na mradi. Sera inapaswa kujumuisha mwongozo wa kuhifadhi, kufikia, na kuzungusha siri na ushahidi. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Eleza jinsi siri na ushahidi vinavyodhibitiwa na kutumika ndani ya mradi. Hii inapaswa kujumuisha maelezo ya jinsi siri zinavyohifadhiwa (k.m., kwa kutumia zana ya usimamizi wa siri), jinsi ufikiaji unavyodhibitiwa, na jinsi siri zinavyozungushwa au kusasishwa. Hakikisha kwamba habari nyeti haziingizwi kwa msimbo katika msimbo wa chanzo au kuhifadhiwa katika mifumo ya udhibiti wa toleo.

    The policy is documented and unusually simple, because the project deliberately holds nothing to manage: no long-lived registry or signing credential exists. GHCR authentication uses the workflow run's own short-lived token, and signing is keyless — an ephemeral Sigstore certificate bound to the workflow's OIDC identity, so there is no private key at rest to store, access or rotate. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#access-continuity states this explicitly and gives the reason it was chosen: a private key is precisely the artifact that cannot be inherited by a successor. On the consumer side, https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md is equally explicit that the image ships no credentials and that POSTGRES_PASSWORD handling is the deployer's. Enforcement against accidents: gitleaks on every commit and over full history, plus persist-credentials: false on every checkout.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi ulipotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na maelekezo ya kuthibitisha uadilifu na uhalali wa mali za toleo. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Maelekezo katika mradi yanapaswa kuwa na habari kuhusu teknolojia iliyotumika, amri za kuendesha, na matokeo yanayotarajiwa. Inapowezekana, epuka kuhifadhi nyaraka hizi katika mahali pamoja na mfumo wa ujenzi na utoaji wa toleo ili kuepuka ukiukaji mmoja kuhatarisha programu na nyaraka za kuthibitisha uadilifu wa programu.

    Both the README and https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-what-you-pulled give the exact cosign command, including the certificate identity regexp and the OIDC issuer. Integrity is additionally verifiable by digest alone, since consumers pin digests rather than tags.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na maelekezo ya kuthibitisha utambulisho unaotarajiwa wa mtu au mchakato unaothibitisha toleo la programu. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    Utambulisho unaotarajiwa unaweza kuwa katika muundo wa vitambulisho vya funguo vilivyotumika kusaini, mtoa na utambulisho kutoka cheti cha sigstore, au aina nyingine zinazofanana. Inapowezekana, epuka kuhifadhi nyaraka hii mahali palipo sawa na mirija ya kujenga na kutoa ili kuepuka ukiukaji mmoja kuhatarisha programu na nyaraka za kuthibitisha uadilifu wa programu.

    The published verification command names the expected author process precisely: the certificate identity is this repository's publish workflow, anchored through @refs/heads/main$ so a signature minted from any other ref does not verify. The documentation states plainly that a signature not verifying against that identity is not ours, whatever the tag says. The same string appears in the README, SECURITY.md and the pipeline's own post-signing verification step, so the three cannot drift apart silently.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe kauli ya maelezo kuhusu wigo na muda wa msaada kwa kila toleo. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    Ili kuwasilisha wigo na muda wa msaada kwa rasilimali za programu zilizotolewa za mradi, mradi unapaswa kuwa na faili ya SUPPORT.md, sehemu ya "Msaada" katika SECURITY.md, au nyaraka nyingine zinazoweka wazi mzunguko wa maisha wa msaada, ikijumuisha muda unaotarajiwa wa msaada kwa kila toleo, aina za msaada zinazotolewa (k.m., marekebisho ya hitilafu, sasisho za usalama), na sera au taratibu yoyote husika ya kupata msaada.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions — the latest published digest only, with the reasoning: this image has no version surface of its own, so there are no back-branches to maintain. Support consists of the weekly cache-free rebuild plus pin bumps, and the upgrade path is a digest bump, which is what Renovate is for.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zitoe kauli ya maelezo ya wakati matoleo au matoleo hayatapokea tena sasisho za usalama. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    Ili kuwasilisha wigo na muda wa msaada kwa marekebisho ya usalama, mradi unapaswa kuwa na SUPPORT.md au nyaraka nyingine zinazoweka wazi sera ya mradi ya sasisho za usalama.

    The same section states it without euphemism: only the latest published digest is supported. A superseded digest receives no further security updates — it is immutable and remains exactly as published. Because consumers pin digests, this is a property they control directly: a fix reaches you when you bump the digest.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na sera kwamba washirikiano wa msimbo wanakaguliwa kabla ya kupewa ruhusa za juu zaidi za rasilimali nyeti. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Chapisha sera inayoweza kutekelezwa katika nyaraka za mradi inayohitaji washirikiano wa msimbo kupimwa na kuidhinishwa kabla ya kupewa ruhusa zilizopandishwa kwa rasilimali nyeti, kama vile idhini ya kuunganisha au ufikiaji kwa siri. Inashauriwa kwamba upimaji ujumuishe kuanzisha mfululizo wa utambulisho unaoweza kuhalalishwa kama vile kuthibitisha ushirikiano wa mchangiaji na shirika linalojulikana na kuaminika.

    Honest miss. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md describes the current single-maintainer model and says committer status would evolve with the project if it gained regular contributors, but it does not state a policy for vetting a collaborator before escalated permissions are granted. Nothing has been granted to date, so the gap is theoretical rather than active — but a policy written after the first request is worth less than one written before it, which is the point of this control. Tracked for fix as a short addition to GOVERNANCE.md.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, rasilimali zote za programu zilizotolewa na zilizokusanywa LAZIMA zikabidhi pamoja na orodha ya bili ya programu. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    Inashauriwa kuzalisha SBOM kiotomatiki wakati wa kujenga kwa kutumia zana ambayo imepimwa kwa usahihi. Hii huwezesha watumiaji kuingiza data hii kwa njia ya kiwango pamoja na miradi mingine katika mazingira yao.

    Every published image carries an SPDX SBOM attestation generated at build time (sbom: true), alongside a provenance attestation at mode=max. Both are attached to the manifest and retrievable by digest. Note the SBOM is generated by the build that produced the image rather than reconstructed afterwards, so it describes the bytes that shipped.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo linalojumuisha hifadhi nyingi za chanzo cha msimbo, miradi yote midogo LAZIMA ilazimishe mahitaji ya usalama ambayo ni kali au kali zaidi kuliko msimbo wa msingi. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Hifadhi yoyote ya ziada ya msimbo wa miradi midogo iliyozalishwa na mradi na kukusanywa katika toleo lazima ilazimishe mahitaji ya usalama kama inavyolingana na hali na nia ya msimbo husika. Kwa kuongeza kufuata mahitaji ya msingi wa OSPS yanayolingana, hii inaweza kujumuisha kuhitaji ukaguzi wa usalama, kuhakikisha kuwa haina udhaifu, na kuhakikisha kuwa haina masuala ya usalama yanayojulikana.

    The project is a single repository with no subprojects.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zieleze kwa uwazi ni lini na jinsi gani majaribio yanaendeshwa. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Ongeza sehemu kwenye nyaraka za kuchangia inayoweka wazi jinsi ya kutekeleza majaribio kienyeji na jinsi ya kutekeleza majaribio katika mirija ya CI/CD. Nyaraka zinapaswa kuweka wazi majaribio yanajaribu nini na jinsi ya kutafsiri matokeo.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#development-quick-start documents how — task smoke for the test suite, task ci for the whole gate, identical locally and in CI — and when: the lefthook hooks run the lint suite on every commit and build and smoke the image on push when the Dockerfile or the smoke script changed, and CI runs the full gate on every pull request. CONTRIBUTING also documents the one trap in the smoke script (the official entrypoint starts postgres twice on a fresh volume, so the script waits for the second ready line).


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera kwamba mabadiliko yote makubwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi yanapaswa kuongeza au kusasisha majaribio ya utendaji katika seti ya majaribio otomatiki. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Ongeza sehemu kwenye nyaraka za kuchangia inayoweka wazi sera ya kuongeza au kusasisha majaribio. Sera inapaswa kuweka wazi ni nini kinachojumuisha mabadiliko makubwa na majaribio yapi yanapaswa kuongezwa au kusasishwa.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests-are-part-of-the-change — a change to what the image contains comes with a smoke assertion that fails without it, with the reasoning stated: adding an extension without its assertion means the next refactor can silently drop it and the gate stays green. It is listed as one of the four ordered review checks, so it is applied at review rather than merely written down.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Wakati kuruhusu kumefanywa kwa tawi kuu, mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo la mradi LAZIMA uhitaji angalau idhini moja ya binadamu asiye mwandishi ya mabadiliko kabla ya kuunganisha. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Sanidi mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo la mradi kuhitaji angalau idhini moja ya binadamu asiye mwandishi ya mabadiliko kabla ya kuunganisha katika toleo au tawi kuu. Hii inaweza kupatikana kwa kuhitaji ombi la kuvuta kupimwa na kuidhinishwa na angalau mshirikiano mmoja mwingine kabla ya kunaweza kuunganishwa.

    Structurally unreachable, not an oversight. This is a single-maintainer project, so no non-author human approval is available; requiring one would block the only path to main rather than improve review. The compensating controls are documented: every change including the maintainer's own goes through a pull request against a ruleset-protected main with the full gate green as required status checks, and https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-review sets out the ordered checks applied — which is explicit that maintainer-authored changes are self-reviewed against that list. Note the ruleset deliberately does not set require_last_push_approval: at required_approving_review_count 0 it reads like a free toggle but instead demands an approval a lone maintainer cannot give.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, mradi LAZIMA ufanye ufuatiliaji wa tisho na uchambuzi wa uso wa shambulio ili kuelewa na kulinda dhidi ya mashambulizi kwenye njia za msimbo muhimu, majukumu, na mwingiliano ndani ya mfumo. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Ufuatiliaji wa tisho ni shughuli ambapo mradi unaangalia msimbo, michakato na miundombinu inayohusiana, viunganishi, vipengele muhimu na "kufikiria kama kibogoyo" na kufanya mapendekezo ya jinsi mfumo unaweza kuvunjwa au kuhatarisha. Kila tisho iliyotambuliwa imeorodheshwa ili mradi uweze kufikiria jinsi ya kuepuka au kufunga pengo/udhaifu wowote unaoweza kutokea kwa kujihadhari. Hakikisha hii imesasishwa kwa vipengele vipya au mabadiliko ya kuvunja.

    https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md#threat-model is an explicit threat model ordered by exposure, naming supply-chain substitution as primary and enumerating its four distinct points (base image, extension build stage, apt layer, published manifest), then CI compromise, known-vulnerable OS packages, and configuration that misleads a consumer — each with what is explicitly out of scope. The attack surface analysis is the trust-boundary section, which states what crosses each boundary and by what mechanism. https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/docs/security-review-2026.md then tests that model against the implementation on a dated pass and records where it did not hold.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Udhaifu wowote katika vipengele vya programu usioathiri mradi LAZIMA uzingatiwe katika hati ya VEX, ikiongeza kwenye ripoti ya udhaifu maelezo ya kutoweza kutumika vibaya (non-exploitability). [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Weka mfumo wa mlisho wa VEX unaowasiliana hali ya utumiaji vibaya wa udhaifu unaojulikana, ikiwa ni pamoja na maelezo ya tathmini au marekebisho yoyote yaliyowekwa kusimamisha msimbo ulio na udhaifu usiotekelezwa.

    No VEX document is produced. trivy runs with --ignore-unfixed, so unfixed upstream findings are excluded from the gate rather than asserted non-exploitable with a machine-readable justification, and the report-only publish scan puts raw findings on the run log without dispositions. For an image whose CVE surface is almost entirely inherited from PostgreSQL, PostGIS, GDAL and Debian, a VEX would be genuinely useful to consumers — it would let them distinguish 'present in the image but not reachable in this configuration' from 'unremediated'. Tracked for fix.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera inayofafanua kiwango cha chini cha kurekebisha matokeo ya SCA yanayohusiana na udhaifu na leseni. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Andika sera katika mradi inayofafanua kiwango cha marekebisho ya matokeo ya SCA yanayohusiana na udhaifu na leseni. Jumuisha mchakato wa kutambua, kutanguliza, na kurekebisha matokeo haya.

    The threshold is documented and is the strictest available: trivy runs at all severities — UNKNOWN through CRITICAL — with --ignore-unfixed, so any finding with an available fix fails the gate. There is no severity cutoff below which a fixable vulnerability is tolerated. The configuration is https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/trivy.yaml, listed in the coding-standard table at https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-standard, and the remediation model behind it is https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md. Licence findings are handled separately and more strictly by reuse lint, which gates CI on full REUSE 3.3 compliance.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera ya kushughulikia ukiukaji wa SCA kabla ya toleo lolote. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Andika sera katika mradi wa kushughulikia matokeo ya Uchambuzi wa Muundo wa Programu yanayotumika kabla ya toleo lolote, na ongeza ukaguzi wa hali unaothibitisha kufuata sera hiyo kabla ya toleo.

    Documented, and the placement is a deliberate decision rather than an accident, so it is worth stating precisely. The blocking CVE gate lives on pull requests: nothing merges with a fixable vulnerability. It is deliberately NOT on the publish path, and https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/SECURITY.md explains why — a CVE published tomorrow must not retroactively kill a publish, and the weekly remediation rebuild especially must not die because a scanner had a bad day. Publish runs scan report-only so every published digest still has its CVE state on the run log, and the actual remediation for the inherited layer is the weekly cache-free rebuild rather than a gate.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mabadiliko yote kwenye msingi wa msimbo wa mradi LAZIMA yatathminiwe kiotomatiki dhidi ya sera iliyoandikwa kuhusu utegemezi hasidi na udhaifu unaojulikana katika utegemezi, kisha kuzuiliwa endapo kuna ukiukaji, isipokuwa pale ilipotangazwa na kufichwa kama isiyoweza kutumika vibaya. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Unda ukaguzi wa hali katika mfumo wa kudhibiti toleo la mradi unaoendesha zana ya Uchambuzi wa Muundo wa Programu kwenye mabadiliko yote ya msingi wa msimbo. Hitaji kwamba ukaguzi wa hali upite kabla mabadiliko kusanywa.

    Every change is evaluated automatically and blocked on violation: trivy scans the filesystem and the built image on every pull request, and the scan tasks are deliberately never checksum-fingerprinted because vulnerability databases change without commits and a cached skip would be a false pass. Dependency provenance is gated too — https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/scripts/check-edtf-attestation.sh proves the pinned extension image carries GitHub-attested provenance from edtf's own publish workflow at the matching release tag, which is a malicious-dependency control rather than a vulnerability one. Renovate keeps pins current between scans.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera inayofafanua kiwango cha chini cha kurekebisha matokeo ya SAST. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Andika sera katika mradi inayofafanua kiwango cha marekebisho ya matokeo ya Upimaji wa Usalama wa Programu Tuli (SAST). Jumuisha mchakato wa kutambua, kutanguliza, na kurekebisha matokeo haya.

    The threshold is zero, documented as such: https://github.com/CarlAllenn/monumental-archive-db/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md states that fixing tool output is never optional and that there are no bypass flags. Any finding from hadolint, shellcheck, actionlint, zizmor --persona=pedantic or CodeQL fails the gate regardless of severity, and the gate is enforced twice — locally by the lefthook hooks and remotely by required status checks on main.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mabadiliko yote kwenye msingi wa msimbo wa mradi LAZIMA yatathminiwe kiotomatiki dhidi ya sera iliyoandikwa kuhusu udhaifu wa usalama na kuzuiliwa endapo kuna ukiukaji isipokuwa pale ilipotangazwa na kufichwa kama isiyoweza kutumika vibaya. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Unda ukaguzi wa hali katika mfumo wa kudhibiti toleo la mradi unaoendesha zana ya Upimaji wa Usalama wa Programu Tuli (SAST) kwenye mabadiliko yote ya msingi wa msimbo. Hitaji kwamba ukaguzi wa hali upite kabla mabadiliko kusanywa.

    All changes are evaluated automatically and blocked on violation. Static analysis of everything this repository actually authors: hadolint on the Dockerfile, shellcheck and shfmt on the two scripts, actionlint and zizmor at --persona=pedantic on the workflows, and CodeQL's actions analysis on the workflows — which is where this repository's real privilege lives, since that is what holds GHCR push, OIDC and cosign signing. Suppression is not available as a bypass: new words go in .codespellrc rather than a lint disable, by documented policy.



Unaweza kutumia zana na mifumo ya AI kupendekeza mabadiliko kupitia URL rahisi, kama vile https://www.bestpractices.dev/sw/projects/13998/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. Angalia mfumo wetu wa mapendekezo ya otomatiki kwa jinsi ya kufanya hivyo. Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Carl Allen na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Carl Allen.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-08-09 00:45:46 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-08-09 01:33:27 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-08-09 00:58:03 UTC.