chock

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 14155 ni silver Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14155/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14155)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14155"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14155/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 13/13

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    Governance-as-code for AI coding agents — write a policy once as reviewable committed files; a compiler emits enforcement per agent (pre-tool-use hooks, git hooks, CI gate, instruction files) with an honest per-agent coverage report.

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.
  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA ieleze kwa ufupi programu inafanya nini (inasuluhu tatizo gani?). [description_good]
    Hii LAZIMA iwe katika lugha ambayo watumiaji watarajiwa wanaweza kuelewa (k.m., inatumia lugha ya kiufundi kidogo).

    The README (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock#readme) and site (https://chock.sh) state it succinctly: Chock is governance-as-code for AI coding agents — write a rule once as reviewable files committed to the repo, and a compiler enforces it on every agent's strongest available surface (pre-tool-use hooks, git hooks, a CI gate, instruction files), with a per-agent coverage report that never claims more enforcement than is actually installed. It solves the problem that AI agents produce more code than maintainers can review, while their "guardrails" are typically prose the agent can ignore.



    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA itoe habari juu ya jinsi ya: kupata, kutoa maoni (kama ripoti za hitilafu au maboresho), na kuchangia kwenye programu. [interact]

    Obtain: README quick start — pip install chock (published on PyPI: https://pypi.org/project/chock/), plus a GitHub Action and source install documented in docs/installation.md. Feedback: GitHub Issues with templates (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/issues) and GitHub Discussions for questions/ideas; SUPPORT.md routes each. Contribute: CONTRIBUTING.md (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) documents the PR flow, DCO sign-off, style, and test expectations.



    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL inahitajika) [contribution]
    Tunafikiria kuwa miradi kwenye GitHub hutumia maswala na kuvuta maombi isipokuwa palipoonyeshwa vingine. Habari hii inaweza kuwa fupi, kwa mfano, ikisema kuwa mradi hutumia maombi ya kuvuta, msako wa suala, au machapisho kwenye orodha ya barua (ipi?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.



    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md — documents the requirements for acceptable contributions: DCO sign-off on every commit (enforced by a CI check), ruff for code style and formatting (enforced in CI and by the repo's own commit hooks), tests expected for behavior changes, and PR-only changes to main with required status checks.


  • Leseni ya FLOSS


    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itolewa kama FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS ni programu iliyotolewa kwa njia inayokidhi Ufafanuzi wa Chanzo Wazi au Ufafanuzi wa Programu Huria. Mifano ya leseni kama hizo ni pamoja na CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), na GNU General Public License (GPL). Kwa madhumuni yetu, hii inamaanisha kuwa leseni LAZIMA iwe: Programu YAWEZA pia kupatiwa leseni kwa njia nyingine (k.m., "GPLv2 au ya kibinafsi" inakubaliwa).

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    INAPENDEKEZA kwamba leseni yoyote inayohitajika kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi iwe imeidhinishwa na Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    OSI inatumia mchakato mgumu wa uidhinishaji kuamua ni leseni zipi ni OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    Mradi LAZIMA uweke leseni za matokeo yake mahali pa kawaida katika hazina yake ya chanzo. (URL inahitajika) [license_location]
    Desturi moja ni kuweka leseni kama faili ya ngazi ya juu inayoitwa LICENSE au COPYING, ambayo YAWEZA kufuatiwa na kiendelezi kama ".txt" au ".md". Desturi mbadala ni kuwa na saraka inayoitwa LICENSES inayohifadhi faili za leseni; faili hizi kwa kawaida zinaitwa kama kitambulisho chao cha leseni ya SPDX kikifuatiwa na kiendelezi kinachofaa, kama ilivyoelezwa katika Maelezo ya REUSE. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki ni mahitaji tu kwenye hazina ya chanzo. Huhitaji kuingiza faili ya leseni wakati wa kuzalisha kitu kutoka kwenye msimbo wa chanzo (kama programu inayotekelezeka, kifurushi, au chombo). Kwa mfano, wakati wa kuzalisha kifurushi cha R kwa Mtandao wa Kumbukumbu Kamili wa R (CRAN), fuata mazoea ya kawaida ya CRAN: ikiwa leseni ni leseni ya kawaida, tumia maelezo mafupi ya kawaida ya leseni (ili kuepuka kusakinisha nakala nyingine ya maandishi) na orodhesha faili ya LICENSE katika faili ya kutengwa kama .Rbuildignore. Vivyo hivyo, wakati wa kuunda kifurushi cha Debian, unaweza kuweka kiungo katika faili ya hakimiliki kwa maandishi ya leseni katika /usr/share/common-licenses, na utenge faili ya leseni kutoka kwenye kifurushi kilichoundwa (k.m., kwa kufuta faili baada ya kuita dh_auto_install). Tunashauri jumuisha maelezo ya leseni yanayoweza kusomwa na mashine katika miundo iliyozalishwa mahali inapofaa.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Nyaraka


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za msingi za programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_basics]
    Nyaraka hizi lazima ziwe katika vyombo fulani (kama maandishi au video) vinavyojumuisha: jinsi ya kuisakinisha, jinsi ya kuianzisha, jinsi ya kuitumia (huenda ikijumuisha mafunzo kwa kutumia mifano), na jinsi ya kuitumia kwa usalama (k.m., nini cha kufanya na nini cha kutofanya) ikiwa hiyo ni mada inayofaa kwa programu. Nyaraka za usalama lazima zisiwe ndefu. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    README quick start plus a full docs/ tree in the repository: docs/getting-started.md (guided first run), docs/adopting.md (adopting Chock in an existing repo, arming fresh clones), docs/cli-reference.md (every command documented), docs/architecture.md, docs/enforcement-surfaces.md (what each surface does and does not guarantee), docs/compatibility.md (versioning contract), and docs/installation.md (pip, pipx, GitHub Action, source). Index at https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/README.md



    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za marejeleo zinazofafanua kiolesura cha nje (ingizo na matokeo) cha programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_interface]
    Nyaraka za kiolesura cha nje zinaeleza kwa mtumiaji wa mwisho au msanidi jinsi ya kuitumia. Hii itajumuisha kiolesura chake cha programu ya programu (API) ikiwa programu ina. Ikiwa ni maktaba, andika madarasa/aina kuu na mbinu/vitendakazi vinavyoweza kuitwa. Ikiwa ni programu ya wavuti, fafanua kiolesura chake cha URL (mara nyingi kiolesura chake cha REST). Ikiwa ni kiolesura cha mstari wa amri, andika vigezo na chaguo zinazosaidia. Katika hali nyingi ni bora ikiwa nyingi ya nyaraka hizi zinazalishwa kiotomatiki, ili nyaraka hizi zibaki zikisawazishwa na programu inavyobadilika, lakini hii haihitajiki. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Nyaraka ZIWEZA kuzalishwa kiotomatiki (ambapo ni vitendo hii mara nyingi ndiyo njia bora ya kufanya hivyo). Nyaraka za kiolesura cha REST zinaweza kuzalishwa kwa kutumia Swagger/OpenAPI. Nyaraka za kiolesura cha msimbo ZINAWEZA kuzalishwa kwa kutumia zana kama vile JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), na Doxygen (nyingi). Kuwa na maoni tu katika msimbo wa utekelezaji haitoshi kutosheleza kigezo hiki; kunahitaji kuwa na njia rahisi ya kuona habari bila kusoma kupitia msimbo wote wa chanzo. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    The external interface is the CLI plus the policy file formats, and both are documented as reference material: docs/cli-reference.md covers every command, flag, and exit-code contract (exit codes are the documented output contract; docs/compatibility.md pins which surfaces are stable). The policy manifest input format is specified by a published JSON Schema (served at https://open-coder-ai.github.io/chock/ via the schemas workflow) and documented in the authoring docs; compiled outputs (gate.json structure, coverage.json taxonomy: enforced / enforced-at-commit / advisory) are described in docs/enforcement-surfaces.md and the compatibility page's breaking-change table.


  • Mengine


    Tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) LAZIMA zisaidie HTTPS kwa kutumia TLS. [sites_https]
    Hii inahitaji kwamba URL ya ukurasa wa nyumbani wa mradi na URL ya hifadhi ya udhibiti wa toleo vianze na "https:", si "http:". Unaweza kupata vyeti vya bure kutoka Let's Encrypt. Miradi YAWEZA kutekeleza kigezo hiki kwa kutumia (kwa mfano) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, au SourceForge project pages. Ikiwa unasaidia HTTP, tunakuhimiza uelekeze trafiki ya HTTP kwenda HTTPS.

    All project sites are HTTPS: https://chock.sh (website), https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock (repository), https://pypi.org/project/chock/ (distribution), and https://open-coder-ai.github.io/chock/ (published schemas). No HTTP-only surface exists.



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na taratibu moja au zaidi za majadiliano (ikiwa ni pamoja na mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa na masuala) yenye utafutaji, inaruhusu ujumbe na mada kuelekezwa kwa URL, inaruhusu watu wapya kushiriki katika baadhi ya majadiliano, na haihitaji usakinishaji wa upande wa mteja wa programu ya kibinafsi. [discussion]
    Mifano ya taratibu zinazokubalika ni pamoja na orodha za barua pepe zilizohifadhiwa, majadiliano ya suala la GitHub na ombi la kuvuta, Bugzilla, Mantis, na Trac. Taratibu za majadiliano yasiyo ya wakati mmoja (kama IRC) zinakubaliwa ikiwa zinakidhi vigezo hivi; hakikisha kuna utaratibu wa kuhifadhi unaoelekezwa kwa URL. JavaScript ya kibinafsi, ingawa haikubalika, inaruhusiwa.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kutoa nyaraka kwa Kiingereza na uweze kukubali ripoti za hitilafu na maoni kuhusu msimbo kwa Kiingereza. [english]
    Kiingereza kwa sasa ni lingua franca ya teknolojia ya kompyuta; kusaidia Kiingereza huongeza idadi ya wasanidi na wakaguzi tofauti wa uwezekano duniani kote. Mradi unaweza kukidhi kigezo hiki hata ikiwa lugha ya msingi ya wasanidi wake wakuu si Kiingereza.

    All documentation, code comments, commit messages, and issue templates are in English; bug reports and comments in English are accepted via GitHub Issues and Discussions.



    Mradi LAZIMA utunzwe. [maintained]
    Kama kiwango cha chini, mradi unapaswa kujaribu kujibu ripoti za tatizo muhimu na udhaifu. Mradi unaofuata kwa bidii nishani pengine unatengenezwa. Miradi yote na watu wana rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka, na miradi ya kawaida lazima ikatae baadhi ya mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, hivyo rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka na kukataa mapendekezo sio ishara ya mradi usiotekelezwa.

    Mradi unapojua kwamba hautatengenezwa tena, unapaswa kuweka kigezo hiki kama "Haikidhi" na utumie utaratibu sahihi ili kuwaonyesha wengine kwamba hautengenezwi. Kwa mfano, tumia "DEPRECATED" kama kichwa cha kwanza cha README yake, ongeza "DEPRECATED" karibu na mwanzo wa ukurasa wake wa nyumbani, ongeza "DEPRECATED" mwanzoni mwa maelezo ya mradi wa hifadhi ya msimbo, ongeza nishani isiyolindwa katika README yake na/au ukurasa wa nyumbani, iweke kama iliyolemewa katika hifadhi yoyote ya kifurushi (k.m., npm deprecate), na/au utumie mfumo wa alama wa hifadhi ya msimbo ili kuihifadhi (k.m., mpangilio wa "archive" wa GitHub, alama ya "archived" ya GitLab, hali ya "readonly" ya Gerrit, au hali ya mradi wa "abandoned" wa SourceForge). Majadiliano ya ziada yanaweza kupatikana hapa.

    Actively maintained by the project author: launched August 2026, commits and reviewed PRs landing weekly, all issues triaged, plus an automated weekly threat-intel process feeding the policy catalog. Vulnerability response commitments are documented in SECURITY.md.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 9/9

  • Hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ya hadharani


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ambayo inaweza kusomwa hadharani na ina URL. [repo_public]
    URL YAWEZA kuwa sawa na URL ya mradi. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia matawi ya faragha (yasiyo ya umma) katika hali maalum wakati mabadiliko hayajatolewa hadharani (k.m., kwa kurekebisha udhaifu kabla haujafichuliwa kwa umma).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.



    Hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ifuatilie mabadiliko yaliyofanywa, nani alifanya mabadiliko, na mabadiliko yalifanywa lini. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    Ili kuwezesha ukaguzi wa ushirikiano, hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ijumuishe matoleo ya kati kwa ukaguzi kati ya matoleo; HAIPASWA kujumuisha matoleo ya mwisho tu. [repo_interim]
    Miradi YAWEZA kuchagua kuondoa matoleo maalum ya kati kutoka hifadhi zao za chanzo za umma (k.m., zile zinazorekebi udhaifu maalum usiokuwa wa umma, huenda zisitolewe hadharani, au zijumuishe nyenzo ambazo haziwezi kuwekwa kisheria na haziko katika toleo la mwisho).

    The repository carries every interim change, not just releases: all development lands as individually reviewable pull requests on main (PR-only, enforced by branch protection), with the full commit history public between tagged releases. Releases (v0.1.0) are tags on that history, not code drops.



    INASHAURIWA kwamba programu ya kawaida ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyosambazwa itumike (k.m., git) kwa hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi. [repo_distributed]
    Git haihitajiki kihususa na miradi inaweza kutumia programu ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyokusanyika (kama subversion) na sababu.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unambari wa toleo wa kipekee


    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yawe na kitambulisho cha kipekee cha toleo kwa kila toleo linalokusudiwa kutumiwa na watumiaji. [version_unique]
    Hii YAWEZA kukidhi kwa njia mbalimbali ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha (kama kitambulisho cha kuwasilisha cha git au kitambulisho cha seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial) au nambari ya toleo (ikiwa ni pamoja na nambari za toleo zinazotumia uainishaji wa maana au mipango ya tarehe kama YYYYMMDD).

    Every release has a unique identifier: git tags (v0.1.0) and matching immutable PyPI versions (https://pypi.org/project/chock/#history — PyPI forbids re-uploading a version). A validator check additionally enforces that the CHANGELOG's top entry matches the pyproject version, so a release cannot ship with a mismatched identifier.



    INASHAURIWA kwamba muundo wa nambari ya toleo ya Semantic Versioning (SemVer) au Calendar Versioning (CalVer) itumike kwa matoleo. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo. [version_semver]
    Miradi kwa ujumla inapaswa kupendelea muundo wowote unaotarajiwa na watumiaji wao, k.m., kwa sababu ni muundo wa kawaida unaotumiwa na ikolojia yao. Ikolojia nyingi zinapendelea SemVer, na SemVer kwa ujumla hupendelewa kwa kiolesura cha programu ya programu (API) na zana za maendeleo ya programu (SDK). CalVer hutumiwa na miradi ambayo ni kubwa, ina idadi kubwa ya utegemezi ulioundwa kwa uhuru, ina upeo wa mara kwa mara unaobadilika, au ni ya muda muhimu. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo, kwa sababu kujumuisha kiwango cha mdogo kunasaidia matawi yaliyotunzwa kwa wakati mmoja wakati wowote hilo linakuwa lazima. Miundo mingine ya nambari ya toleo inaweza kutumiwa kama nambari za toleo, ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git au vitambulisho vya seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial, mradi tu vikitambulisha matoleo kwa kipekee. Hata hivyo, baadhi ya mbadala (kama vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git) vinaweza kusababisha matatizo kama vitambulisho vya toleo, kwa sababu watumiaji huenda wasiwe na uwezo wa kuamua kwa urahisi ikiwa wako na toleo la hivi karibuni. Muundo wa kitambulisho cha toleo unaweza kutokuwa wa maana kwa kutambulisha matoleo ya programu ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea).


    INASHAURIWA kwamba miradi itambulishe kila toleo ndani ya mfumo wao wa udhibiti wa toleo. Kwa mfano, INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia git watambulishe kila toleo kwa kutumia lebo za git. [version_tags]

    Every release is a git tag: v0.1.0 (the release), plus a v1 major tag tracking the latest compatible release for GitHub Action consumers (uses: open-coder-ai/chock@v1). Tags: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/tags


  • Maelezo ya kutolewa


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe, katika kila toleo, maelezo ya toleo ambayo ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu wa mabadiliko makuu katika toleo hilo ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa wanapaswa kusasisha na athari ya kusasisha itakuwa nini. Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yasiwe matokeo ghafi ya kumbukumbu ya udhibiti wa toleo (k.m., matokeo ya amri ya "git log" si maelezo ya toleo). Miradi ambayo matokeo yake hayakusudiwa kutumika tena katika maeneo mengi (kama programu kwa tovuti moja au huduma) NA wanaotumia utoaji wa kuendelea WAWEZA kuchagua "N/A". (URL inahitajika) [release_notes]
    Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa njia mbalimbali. Miradi mingi hutoa katika faili inayoitwa "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", au "ChangeLog", kwa hiari na viendelezi kama ".txt", ".md", au ".html". Kihistoria neno "change log" lilimaanisha kumbukumbu ya kila mabadiliko, lakini ili kukidhi vigezo hivi kinachohitajika ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu. Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA badala yake kutolewa na taratibu za mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo kama mtiririko wa Matoleo ya GitHub.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.



    Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yatambulishe kila udhaifu wa muda wa kutekeleza uliojulikana hadharani uliorekebishwa katika toleo hili ambao tayari ulikuwa na mgawanyo wa CVE au sawa wakati toleo lilipobuniwa. Kigezo hiki kinaweza kuwekwa alama kama haihusiki (N/A) ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe (k.m., kama inavyokuwa kweli mara nyingi kwa masasisho ya kernel). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Ikiwa hakuna maelezo ya toleo au hakujawa na udhaifu uliojulikana hadharani, chagua N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    Kigezo hiki kinawasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa sasisho fulani litarekebisha udhaifu ambao unajulikana hadharani, ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kufanya uamuzi wa habari kuhusu kusasisha. Ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe kwenye kompyuta zao, lakini badala yake lazima wategemee wapatanishi mmoja au zaidi kutekeleza sasisho (kama inavyokuwa mara nyingi kwa kernel na programu ya kiwango cha chini ambayo imefungwa na kernel), mradi unaweza kuchagua "haihusiki" (N/A) badala yake, kwani habari hii ya ziada haitakuwa ya msaada kwa watumiaji hao. Vivyo hivyo, mradi unaweza kuchagua N/A ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Kuorodhesha udhaifu wa utegemezi wote wa mpito wa mradi unakuwa mgumu kadiri utegemezi unavyoongezeka na kutofautiana, na haihitajiki kwani zana zinazochunguza na kufuatilia utegemezi zinaweza kufanya hivi kwa njia inayopanuka.

    No publicly known vulnerabilities (CVE or otherwise) have existed in any release to date (first public release v0.1.0, August 2026). SECURITY.md commits that future vulnerability fixes ship in patch releases and are identified in the CHANGELOG.


 Kuripoti 8/8

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mchakato kwa watumiaji kuwasilisha ripoti za hitilafu (k.m., kwa kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala au orodha ya barua pepe). (URL inahitajika) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]



    Mradi UNAPASWA kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues on the repository (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/issues), with issue templates, labels (good first issue, roadmap; the catalog repo adds policy wanted), and all current issues triaged.



    Mradi LAZIMA uthibitishe wengi wa ripoti za hitilafu zilizowasilishwa katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo); jibu halihitaji kuwa na marekebisho. [report_responses]

    The project is newly public (August 2026); every issue filed to date has been acknowledged and triaged, and the maintainer's practice is to acknowledge all bug reports — the current issue set is fully labeled and responded to (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/issues). SUPPORT.md sets response expectations.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujibu wengi (>50%) wa maombi ya maboresho katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo). [enhancement_responses]
    Jibu LIWEZA kuwa 'hapana' au majadiliano kuhusu manufaa yake. Lengo ni kwamba kuwe na jibu fulani kwa baadhi ya maombi, ambayo inaonyesha kwamba mradi bado unaishi. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, miradi haihitaji kuhesabu maombi ya bandia (k.m., kutoka kwa wafanyabiashara haramu au mifumo ya kiotomatiki). Ikiwa mradi hauendelei kufanya maboresho tena, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na jumuisha URL inayofanya hali hii kuwa wazi kwa watumiaji. Ikiwa mradi huwa na msongo wa maombi ya maboresho, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na eleza.

    All enhancement requests to date have been responded to — several became labeled roadmap issues with written rationale (e.g., the MCP-gateway surface and the rate-limit/budget gate kind), and GitHub Discussions is seeded for ideas. Same newly-public caveat: the practice is established, the volume is early.



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na kumbukumbu inayopatikana hadharani kwa ripoti na majibu kwa utaftaji wa baadaye. (URL inahitajika) [report_archive]

    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/issues?q= — GitHub Issues (including closed) is the public, searchable archive of reports and responses; Discussions (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/discussions) archives questions and answers the same way.


  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Mradi LAZIMA uchapishe mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu kwenye tovuti ya mradi. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Miradi iliyohifadhiwa kwenye GitHub INAPASWA kuzingatia kuwezesha kuripoti udhaifu wa usalama kwa faragha. Miradi kwenye GitLab INAPASWA kuzingatia kutumia uwezo wake wa kuripoti udhaifu kwa faragha. Miradi YAWEZA kutambulisha anwani ya barua pepe kwenye https://PROJECTSITE/security, mara nyingi katika muundo wa security@example.org. Mchakato huu wa kuripoti udhaifu UWEZA kuwa sawa na mchakato wake wa kuripoti hitilafu. Ripoti za udhaifu ZIWEZA kuwa za umma kila wakati, lakini miradi mingi ina utaratibu wa kuripoti udhaifu wa faragha.

    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/SECURITY.md — publishes the process: report privately via the GitHub security advisory form (direct link included: https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/security/advisories/new), never via public issues for exploitable findings; what to include in a report; acknowledgment within 7 days and initial assessment within 14;



    Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu wa faragha zinasaidiwa, mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe jinsi ya kutuma habari kwa njia ambayo inawekwa faragha. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Mifano ni pamoja na ripoti ya kasoro ya faragha iliyowasilishwa kwenye wavuti kwa kutumia HTTPS (TLS) au barua pepe iliyosimbwa kwa kutumia OpenPGP. Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu ni za umma kila wakati (kwa hiyo hakuna ripoti za udhaifu za faragha), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    Private reporting is supported and documented in SECURITY.md: GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository, and the advisory form (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/security/advisories/new) delivers the report privately to the maintainer — nothing transits a public channel. SECURITY.md explicitly instructs not to open public issues for exploitable findings.



    Muda wa majibu ya awali ya mradi kwa ripoti yoyote ya udhaifu iliyopokelewa katika miezi 6 iliyopita LAZIMA uwe chini ya au sawa na siku 14. [vulnerability_report_response]
    Ikiwa hakujawa na udhaifu ulioripotiwa katika miezi 6 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    No vulnerability reports have been received to date (project newly public, August 2026), so none has ever waited — and SECURITY.md commits the standard: acknowledgment within 7 days, initial assessment within 14.


 Ubora 13/13

  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]
    Mfumo wa kujenga huamua ni hatua gani zinahitaji kutendeka ili kujenga tena programu (na kwa mpangilio gani), na kisha kutekeleza hatua hizo. Kwa mfano, inaweza kuomba kikusanyaji kukusanya fumbo-chanzo. Ikiwa inayoweza kutekelezwa imeundwa kutoka kwa fumbo-chanzo, lazima iwezeshe marekebisho kwenye fumbo-chanzo ya mradi na kisha itengeneze msasisho inayoweza kutekelezwa na marekebisho hayo. Ikiwa programu iliyotolewa na mradi unategemea maktaba ya nje, mfumo wa kujenga haina haja ya kujenga maktaba hizo za nje. Ikiwa hakuna haja ya kujenga chochote kutumia programu baada ya fumbo-chanzo kubadilishwa, chagua "haitumiki" (N / A).

    Standard Python build: python -m build produces the sdist and wheel from source (PEP 517, pyproject.toml). CI rebuilds on every PR across Python 3.11 and 3.12, the release workflow builds the published PyPI artifacts the same way, and standalone binaries are built with PyInstaller on Linux/macOS/Windows. Anyone can rebuild from a clean checkout with stock FLOSS tooling.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]
    Kwa mfano, Maven, Ant, cmake, autotools, make, rake (Ruby), au devtools (R).

    Only ecosystem-standard tools: pip, python -m build (setuptools backend), pytest, ruff — nothing custom or exotic in the build path.



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

    Entirely buildable with FLOSS: Python, pip, setuptools/build, pytest, ruff, PyInstaller — all open source. No proprietary tool appears anywhere in the build, test, or release path.


  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau seti moja ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ambayo imetolewa hadharani kama FLOSS (seti hii ya majaribio inaweza kutunzwa kama mradi tofauti wa FLOSS). Mradi LAZIMA uonyeshe wazi au uandike jinsi ya kuendesha seti za majaribio (k.m., kupitia hati ya uingizaji wa kuendelea (CI) au kupitia nyaraka katika faili kama BUILD.md, README.md, au CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    Mradi YAWEZA kutumia seti nyingi za majaribio ya kiotomatiki (k.m., moja inayoendesha haraka, dhidi ya nyingine ambayo ni ya kina zaidi lakini inahitaji vifaa maalum). Kuna mifumo mingi ya majaribio na mifumo ya kusaidia majaribio inayopatikana, ikiwemo Selenium (uendeshaji kiotomatiki wa kivinjari cha wavuti), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The test suite ships in the repository under the same Apache-2.0 license: ~680 pytest tests plus a Gherkin acceptance tier (pytest-bdd) and replayed policy evals. How to run is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and demonstrated by CI itself (.github/workflows/ci.yml runs python -m pytest on Python 3.11 and 3.12 on every PR): pip install -e '.[dev]' && python -m pytest



    Seti ya majaribio INAPASWA kuwa inaweza kuitwa kwa njia ya kawaida kwa lugha hiyo. [test_invocation]
    Kwa mfano, "make check", "mvn test", au "rake test" (Ruby).

    python -m pytest — the standard Python invocation, from the repo root, exactly as CI runs it.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba seti ya majaribio ifuate wengi (au kwa kawaida wote) matawi ya msimbo, sehemu za kuingiza, na utendakazi. [test_most]

    Test-to-source ratio is above 1:1 (~680 tests over a deliberately small codebase). Coverage spans unit tests, an end-to-end Gherkin acceptance tier (init → add → sync → blocked commit), golden-file suites over compiled outputs, replayed evals for every published policy, Hypothesis property tests over the security-critical parsers, and coverage-guided fuzzing (atheris) in CI. Adversarial branches — the ones that matter here — are tested on purpose: gate bypto attempts, malformed manifests, injection-shaped ids.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utekeleze ujumuishaji wendeleo (ambapo msimbo mpya au uliobadiishwa unajumuishwa mara kwa mara katika hifadhi ya msimbo ya kati na majaribio otomatiki hufanyika kwenye matokeo). [test_continuous_integration]

    GitHub Actions CI runs the full test matrix (Python 3.11 + 3.12), lint, binary build, and acceptance tier on every pull request and every push to main; branch protection makes green CI a required condition to merge (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/actions/workflows/ci.yml). Additionally, the repo's own commit hooks run a fast subset locally before a commit is even created.


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera ya jumla (rasmi au la) kwamba utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, majaribio ya utendakazi huo unapaswa kuongezwa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki. [test_policy]
    Mradi uwe na sera tu, hata kwa maneno ya mdomo, inayosema wasanidi programu wanapaswa kuongeza majaribio kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya, chagua "Kukidhi."

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the policy: behavior changes are expected to come with tests, and CI (required to merge) enforces the suite stays green. The history demonstrates the practice — every feature PR to date has carried its tests (examples: the agent-selection regression suite added with the selection funnel, property-based tests added alongside the id-validation hardening).



    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ushahidi kwamba test_policy ya kuongeza majaribio imefuatwa katika mabadiliko makubwa ya hivi karibuni kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi. [tests_are_added]
    Utendakazi mkubwa kawaida ungetajwa katika maelezo ya toleo. Ukamilifu hauhitajiki, ni ushahidi tu kwamba majaribio kawaida huongezwa kimakosa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi.

    Recent major changes each carry their tests, visible in the repo history: the arm-on-clone feature landed with SessionStart-hook tests; the Cursor pre-tool-use surface landed with envelope-identity and end-to-end blocking tests; the sync-wires-guards change landed with a byte-stability regression suite; the id-validation hardening landed with the Hypothesis property suite (which itself found and fixed a real bug on first run). The test suite has grown in



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba sera hii ya kuongeza majaribio (angalia test_policy) iwe imeandikwa katika maelekezo ya mapendekezo ya mabadiliko. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    Documented in CONTRIBUTING.md, the instructions contributors are pointed at for change proposals: tests are expected for behavior changes, and required CI must pass before merge.


  • Bendera za maonyo


    Mradi LAZIMA uwashe bendera moja au zaidi za onyo la mkusanyaji, hali ya lugha "salama", au tumia zana tofauti ya "linter" kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inaweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [warnings]
    Mifano ya bendera za onyo la mkusanyaji ni pamoja na gcc/clang "-Wall". Mifano ya hali ya lugha "salama" ni pamoja na JavaScript "use strict" na perl5's "use warnings". Zana tofauti ya "linter" ni zana tu inayoangalia msimbo wa chanzo kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida. Hizi kawaida huwashwa ndani ya msimbo wa chanzo au maelekezo ya ujenzi.

    ruff (FLOSS) runs in two enforced places: ruff check plus ruff format --check gate CI on every PR, and the repository's own committed pre-commit policy runs them repo-wide before a commit is created. CodeQL additionally runs security-and-quality queries on every PR.



    Mradi LAZIMA ukabiliane na maonyo. [warnings_fixed]
    Haya ni maonyo yaliyotambuliwa na utekelezaji wa kigezo cha warnings. Mradi unapaswa kurekebisha maonyo au kuyaweka alama katika msimbo wa chanzo kama hasi za uwongo. Kwa kawaida pasingeweza kuwa na maonyo, lakini mradi YAWEZA kukubali baadhi ya maonyo (kawaida chini ya onyo 1 kwa mistari 100 au chini ya maonyo 10).

    Warnings block: CI fails on any ruff finding, so the tree is kept at zero — there is no suppressed baseline or warning backlog. CodeQL alerts are triaged publicly to zero actionable (each fixed or dismissed with a written reason on the alert).



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba miradi iwe na ukali mkubwa sana na maonyo katika programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, ambapo ni ya vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    The linters run at strict settings repo-wide with no ignore-baseline; the one deliberately pinned choice (ruff minor version) exists to keep formatting deterministic in CI, not to relax rules. Beyond linting, the project holds itself to stricter-than-typical machine-enforced contracts: byte-identical compiled outputs across PATCH releases (golden suite) and a documented line-budget/style check on its own sources.


 Usalama 16/16

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na angalau msanidi mmoja mkuu anayejua jinsi ya kuunda programu salama. (Angalia 'maelezo' kwa mahitaji halisi.) [know_secure_design]
    Hii inahitaji kuelewa kanuni zifuatazo za muundo, ikiwa ni pamoja na kanuni 8 kutoka Saltzer na Schroeder:
    • uchumi wa utaratibu (weka muundo kuwa rahisi na mdogo iwezekanavyo, k.m., kwa kupitisha urahisishaji wa kufunga)
    • mipangilio ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya kuingia yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa miradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi)
    • kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kuingia kote kunaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima kufanyiwa ukaguzi wa mamlaka na kutowezesha kuvukwa)
    • muundo wazi (taratibu za usalama hazipaswi kutegemea ujinga wa mshambuliaji wa muundo wake, lakini badala yake kwenye habari iliyolindwa na kubadilishwa kwa urahisi kama funguo na nywila)
    • kutenganisha kwa upendeleo (kwa kawaida, ufikiaji kwa vitu muhimu unapaswa kutegemea zaidi ya sharti moja, ili kushinda mfumo mmoja wa ulinzi hautawasha ufikiaji kamili. K.m., uthibitishaji wa vipengele vingi, kama vile kuhitaji nywila na ishara za vifaa, ni imara zaidi kuliko uthibitishaji wa kipengele kimoja)
    • upendeleo mdogo zaidi (michakato inapaswa kufanya kazi na upendeleo mdogo zaidi unaohitajika)
    • utaratibu wa kawaida mdogo zaidi (muundo unapaswa kupunguza utaratibu wa kawaida kwa zaidi ya mtumiaji mmoja na kutegemewa na watumiaji wote, k.m., saraka za mafaili ya muda)
    • kukubalika kwa kisaikolojia (kiolesura cha binadamu lazima kiwe kimeundwa kwa urahisi wa matumizi - kuunda kwa "mshangao mdogo" kunaweza kusaidia)
    • uso wa shambulio uliowekewa mipaka (uso wa shambulio - seti ya sehemu tofauti ambapo mshambuliaji anaweza kujaribu kuingia au kutoa data - unapaswa kuwekwa mipaka)
    • uthibitishaji wa ingizo na orodha zinazokubalika (pembejeo kawaida zinapaswa kuangaliwa ili kuamua kama ni halali kabla ya kukubalika; uthibitishaji huu unapaswa kutumia orodha zinazokubalika (zinazokubali tu thamani zinazojulikana-nzuri), siyo orodha zinazokana (zinaozojaribu kuorodhesha thamani zinazojulikana-mbaya)).
    "Msanidi mkuu" katika mradi ni mtu yeyote ambaye anajua msingi wa msimbo wa mradi, ana faraja kufanya mabadiliko kwake, na anatambuliwa hivyo na washiriki wengine wengi katika mradi. Msanidi mkuu kawaida atafanya michango mingi kwa mwaka uliopita (kupitia msimbo, nyaraka, au kujibu maswali). Wasanidi kawaida wangeweza kuchukuliwa wasanidi wakuu ikiwa walianzisha mradi (na hawajatoka kwenye mradi zaidi ya miaka mitatu iliyopita), wana chaguo la kupokea habari kwenye kituo cha kuripoti udhaifu wa kibinafsi (ikiwa kuna), wanaweza kukubali ahadi kwa niaba ya mradi, au kufanya matoleo ya mwisho ya programu ya mradi. Ikiwa kuna msanidi mmoja tu, mtu huyo ndiye msanidi mkuu. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili muundo. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    The sole developer (by the criterion's definition, the primary developer: initiated the project, accepts commits, performs releases, receives private vulnerability reports) understands and applies these principles; the project's own design is the evidence, principle by principle:

    • Economy of mechanism: stdlib-only vendored runtime, three declarative gate kinds instead of a policy language, deliberately small codebase.
    • Fail-safe defaults: a malformed policy manifest compiles to nothing rather than partial enforcement; atomic recompile means a failed sync can never strand a repo with its enforcement deleted; CI gate ranges fail closed.
    • Complete mediation: the coverage taxonomy exists precisely to document where mediation is and is not complete per agent — surfaces that can be bypassed are labeled, never assumed.
    • Open design: everything (policies, compiler, hooks, evals) is public source; the guarantees rest on hashes (chock.lock content pinning), not on secrecy of mechanism.
    • Separation of privilege: enforcement is layered so defeating one layer (deleting a local hook) does not defeat the CI gate; changes to agent-config protected paths additionally require an explicit diff-visible approval marker.
    • Least privilege: all CI workflows run with top-level read-only tokens; the one contents:write is job-scoped to release creation; PyPI publishing uses short-lived OIDC (Trusted Publishing), no long-lived tokens.
    • Least common mechanism: per-repo, per-agent compiled artifacts — no shared service, daemon, or global state between adopters.
    • Psychological acceptability: block messages carry the policy's reasoning and remediation; every hard guard has a documented, diff-visible escape hatch, because an unsatisfiable guard gets disabled by its users.
    • Limited attack surface: no network calls at enforcement time, no LLM in the decision path, no dynamic code loading; installing a policy is reviewed content, hash-pinned.
    • Input validation with allowlists: policy ids are validated against an allowlist pattern (fullmatch of [a-z][a-z0-9-]{2,63}) before ever becoming a path or shell token — enforced at the compiler choke point, with property-based tests proving acceptance implies shell/path safety.


    Angalau mmoja wa wasanidi wakuu wa mradi LAZIMA wajue aina za kawaida za makosa ambayo husababisha udhaifu katika aina hii ya programu, pamoja na angalau mbinu moja ya kukabiliana au kupunguza kila moja. [know_common_errors]
    Mifano (kulingana na aina ya programu) ni pamoja na uvamizi wa SQL, uvamizi wa OS, mtiririko wa kipengele cha kawaida, uandishi wa tovuti-tofauti, uthibitishaji unaokosekana, na uidhinishaji unaokosekana. Angalia CWE/SANS top 25 au OWASP Top 10 kwa orodha zinazotumika kawaida. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili makosa ya kawaida ya utekelezaji ambayo husababisha udhaifu. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    Countering these error classes is the project's subject matter, and the countermeasures are implemented, not just known:

    • Injection into generated shell/paths (the project's most relevant class): allowlist-validated identifiers at the compiler choke point; property tests and coverage-guided fuzzing prove acceptance implies shell/path safety; a real trailing-newline acceptance bug was found by these tests and fixed.
    • Credential leakage: secret scanning + push protection on the repo; the scan-secrets policy (with documented allowlist pragmas) guards staged content; no long-lived publish tokens (OIDC Trusted Publishing).
    • Supply-chain tampering: all CI actions pinned to commit SHAs; pip installs hash-pinned; catalog installs hash-verified before anything is written to disk (chock.lock); build-provenance attestation on releases.
    • Hidden-text/homoglyph attacks (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574): the block-invisible-unicode gate exists specifically for this class.
    • TOCTOU/partial-state failures: atomic recompile with post-swap verification.
    • Overclaiming as a security failure: the coverage honesty mechanism — treating an unenforced-but-reported control as the vulnerability it is.
      Each is documented in SECURITY.md's threat model or the enforcement-surfaces docs.

  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]
    Vigezo hivi vya kriptografia mara mingi havitumiki kwa sababu programu zingine hazina haja ya kutumia moja kwa moja uwezo wa kriptografia.

    The only cryptographic algorithm used anywhere is SHA-256 (publicly published, expert-reviewed, NIST FIPS 180-4), via Python's stdlib hashlib, for content pinning: chock.lock hashes policy sources and compiled artifacts, and catalog installs verify content hashes before writing. The project implements no cryptographic protocols of its own — TLS for delivery is provided by PyPI/GitHub infrastructure.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    Cryptography is never re-implemented: the single cryptographic operation (SHA-256 content hashing for chock.lock pinning and install verification) calls Python's stdlib hashlib exclusively.



    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]

    The only cryptography-dependent functionality (SHA-256 content hashing) uses Python's stdlib hashlib — FLOSS (PSF license) end to end. Nothing depends on proprietary cryptographic components.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]
    Vipimo hivi vya urefu wa charaza ni: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, na hash 224 (ufichuzi wa nywila haujashughulikiwa kwenye urefu wa charaza hii, maelezo zaidi ya ufichuzi wa nywila yanapatikana ndani ya kigezo cha crypto_password_storage). Ona https://www.keylength.com kwa mliganisho wa mapendekezo ya funguo-refu kutoka mashirika mbali mbali. Programu YAWEZA kubali funguo-refu ndogo katika usanidi (haifai kukubali, maana hii huwacha mashambulizi ya kushusha, lakini funguo-refu fupi wakati mwingine ina manufaa ya upatanifu).

    No keys exist anywhere in the software: no key generation, storage, exchange, or configuration. The sole cryptographic use is SHA-256 hashing for content pinning, which has no keylength parameter (and SHA-256 itself meets NIST's through-2030 requirements).



    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti zilizovunjika za kriptologia (k.m., MD4, MD5, DES moja, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), au kutumia hali za cipher ambazo si sahihi kwa muktadha, isipokuwa ni muhimu kutekeleza itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana (ambapo itifaki iliyotekelezwa ni toleo la hivi karibuni zaidi la kiwango hicho kinachotegemeana sana na mfumo wa mtandao, mfumo huo unahitaji matumizi ya algoriti au hali hiyo, na mfumo huo haupatii chaguo lolote salama zaidi). Nyaraka LAZIMA zieleze hatari zozote za usalama husika na upungufu wowote unaojulikana ikiwa algoriti hizi zilizovunjika au hali ni muhimu kwa itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana. [crypto_working]
    Hali ya ECB ni karibu kamwe haifai kwa sababu inaonyesha block zinazofanana ndani ya ciphertext kama ilivyoonyeshwa na penguin wa ECB, na hali ya CTR mara nyingi si sahihi kwa sababu haifanyi uthibitishaji na husababisha nakala ikiwa hali ya ingizo inarudiwa. Katika hali nyingi ni bora kuchagua hali ya algoriti ya block cipher iliyoundwa kuchanganya siri na uthibitishaji, k.m., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) na EAX. Miradi YAWEZA kuwaruhusu watumiaji kuwasha taratibu zilizovunjika (k.m., wakati wa usanidi) ambapo ni muhimu kwa upatanifu, lakini hapo watumiaji wanajua wanafanya hivyo.

    No broken algorithms or inappropriate cipher modes anywhere: the only cryptographic primitive in the codebase is SHA-256 (via stdlib hashlib) for content pinning. No MD4/MD5/DES/RC4/Dual_EC_DRBG, no cipher modes at all (nothing is encrypted), and no interoperability constraint forcing legacy algorithms.



    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No weakened algorithms either: SHA-256 only — no SHA-1, no CBC or any cipher modes (nothing is encrypted), no legacy fallbacks.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    No key-agreement protocols are implemented and no long-term keys exist; transport security is provided by the PyPI/GitHub TLS infrastructure, not by this software.



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]
    Kigezo hili linatumika tu wakati programu linatekeleza uthibitishaji wa watumiaji kutumia nywila kwa watumiaji wa nje (ambayo pia ni uthibitishaji unaelekezwa ndani), kama vile programu za tovuti zinazobakia seva). Haitumiki katika visa ambavyo programu inahifadhi nywila ili kudhibitisha ndani ya mifumo mingine (ambayo pia ni ithibitishaji unaelekezwa nje, k.m., programu inatekeleza teja la mfumo lingineyo), maana angalau sehemu za programu lazima ziwe na njia ya kupata hiyo nywila isigalifichwa.

    The software stores no passwords or authentication credentials of any kind — there are no user accounts, no authentication, and its own policies (scan-secrets) exist to keep credentials out of the repositories it governs.



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]
    Kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za vifaa, au kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama (CSPRNG) kwa kutumia algoriti kama vile Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, au Fortuna. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu salama ni pamoja na java.security.SecureRandom ya Java na window.crypto.getRandomValues ya JavaScript. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu zisizo salama ni pamoja na java.util.Random ya Java na Math.random ya JavaScript.

    No cryptographic keys or nonces are generated anywhere in the software — no security-relevant randomness exists (no tokens, session ids, or keys). The only cryptographic operation is deterministic SHA-256 content hashing.


  • Utoaji salama dhidi ya mashambulizi ya mtu-katikati (MITM)


    Mradi LAZIMA utumie utaratibu wa utoaji ambao unakabiliana na mashambulizi ya MITM. Kutumia https au ssh+scp ni inakubaliwa. [delivery_mitm]
    Utaratibu wenye nguvu zaidi ni kutoa programu na vifurushi vilivyosainiwa kidigitali, kwa kuwa hiyo inapunguza mashambulizi kwenye mfumo wa usambazaji, lakini hii inafanya kazi tu ikiwa watumiaji wanaweza kuwa na uhakika kwamba funguo za umma kwa saini ni sahihi na ikiwa watumiaji watakagua saini kweli kweli.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]



    Hash ya kriptologia (k.m., sha1sum) LAZIMA ISICHUKULIWE kupitia http na kutumika bila kuangalia saini ya kriptologia. [delivery_unsigned]
    Hash hizi zinaweza kurekebishwa wakati wa usafiri.

    No hash is ever retrieved over HTTP: catalog installs fetch over HTTPS (git clone of the catalog), and the expected hash is supplied out-of-band by the user (--verify-sha) or recorded in the committed chock.lock — content is verified against it BEFORE anything is written to disk. Delivery of the package itself is PyPI over HTTPS with pip's hash checking; CI dependencies are hash-pinned (--require-hashes) and workflow actions are pinned to commit SHAs.


  • Udhaifu uliofahamika hadharani umeshughulikiwa


    LAZIMA kuwe hakuna udhaifu usiorekebishwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ambao umejulikana hadharani kwa zaidi ya siku 60. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    Udhaifu lazima urekebishwe na kutolewa na mradi wenyewe (rekebisho zinaweza kutengenezwa mahali pengine). Udhaifu unakuwa unajulikana hadharani (kwa kusudi hili) mara tu unapata CVE yenye taarifa zilizotolewa hadharani zisizolipwa (zilizoripotiwa, kwa mfano, katika Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) au wakati mradi umefahamishwa na taarifa imetolewa kwa umma (labda na mradi). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka: hii inamaanisha kwamba watumiaji wanaweza kuachwa katika hatari kwa washambuliaji wote duniani kwa siku hadi 60. Kigezo hiki ni rahisi zaidi kukidhi kuliko yale Google inapendekeza katika Rebooting responsible disclosure, kwa sababu Google inapendekeza kwamba kipindi cha siku 60 kianze wakati mradi unafahamishwa hata ikiwa ripoti si ya umma. Pia kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki cha nishani, kama vigezo vingine, kinatumika kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Baadhi ya miradi ni sehemu ya mashirika makubwa ya mwavuli au miradi mikubwa, labda katika safu nyingi, na miradi mingi inatoa matokeo yao kwa mashirika mengine na miradi kama sehemu ya mnyororo wa usambazaji wenye utata. Mradi wa mtu binafsi mara nyingi hauwezi kudhibiti wengine, lakini mradi wa mtu binafsi unaweza kufanya kazi kutoa rekebisho ya udhaifu kwa wakati. Kwa hiyo, tunazingatia tu muda wa jibu wa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Mara tu rekebisho inapatikana kutoka kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi, wengine wanaweza kuamua jinsi ya kushughulikia rekebisho (k.m., wanaweza kusasisha kwenye toleo jipya au wanaweza kutumia rekebisho tu kama suluhisho lililochaguliwa-cherry).

    No publicly known vulnerabilities of any severity exist in the project (first public release August 2026; no CVEs, no advisories). Dependency alerts are monitored via Dependabot and GitHub security advisories; SECURITY.md commits fixes to patch releases well inside the 60-day window.



    Miradi INAPASWA kurekebisha udhaifu wote muhimu haraka baada ya kuripotiwa. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    None reported to date; the documented commitment (SECURITY.md) is acknowledgment within 7 days, assessment within 14, and critical fixes shipped as immediate patch releases. The project's demonstrated internal practice matches: security-relevant defects found by its own tooling (e.g., an identifier-validation bypass found by property tests) have been fixed within hours of discovery.


  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Hazina za umma LAZIMA ZISIVUJE uthibitisho halali wa faragha (k.m., nywila inayofanya kazi au funguo ya faragha) ambayo imekusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma. [no_leaked_credentials]
    Mradi UNAWEZA kuvuja uthibitisho wa "sampuli" kwa majaribio na hifadhidata zisizo muhimu, mradi tu hazikusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma.

    No valid credentials exist in the repository or its history: the public repo was created as a clean single-commit export, GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled, and releases publish via short-lived OIDC (Trusted Publishing) so no long-lived tokens exist to leak. The only secret-scanner hits ever raised were the scan-secrets policy's own synthetic, pattern-shaped eval fixtures (EXAMPLE/zeros bodies, marked with in-file


 Uchanganuzi 8/8

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (zaidi ya maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama") LAZIMA itumike kwa toleo lolote lililopendekezwa kubwa la uzalishaji wa programu kabla ya toleo lake, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayotekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli inachunguza msimbo wa programu (kama msimbo wa chanzo, msimbo wa kati, au utekelezaji) bila kuutekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama" hazihesabiwi kama zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (hizi kwa kawaida huepuka uchambuzi wa kina kwa sababu kasi ni muhimu). Baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli zinazingatia kugundua hitilafu za jumla, nyingine zinazingatia kupata aina fulani za hitilafu (kama vile udhaifu), na baadhi hufanya mchanganyiko. Mifano ya zana hizo za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli ni pamoja na cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (ikiwa ni pamoja na FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, na HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Orodha kubwa za zana zinaweza kupatikana katika maeneo kama vile orodha ya Wikipedia ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, taarifa za OWASP kuhusu uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, orodha ya NIST ya vichambua usalama wa msimbo wa chanzo, na orodha ya Wheeler ya zana za uchambuzi tuli. Ikiwa hakuna zana za uchambuzi tuli za FLOSS zinazopatikana kwa lugha za utekelezaji zilizotumika, unaweza kuchagua 'N/A'.

    CodeQL (FLOSS-implemented analysis for Python) runs on every pull request and every push to main — so every release, major or not, is analyzed before it ships (.github/workflows/codeql.yml). OpenSSF Scorecard runs weekly on top. Pre-release, bandit and pip-audit were also run over the full tree. All findings are triaged publicly: fixed, or dismissed with a written reason attached to the alert.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau moja ya zana za uchambuzi tuli zilizotumika kwa kigezo cha static_analysis ijumuishe sheria au njia za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochambuliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    CodeQL runs with its security query packs for Python — the queries specifically target common vulnerability classes (injection, path traversal, clear-text logging of sensitive data, uninitialized use). They have produced real findings here that were fixed (e.g., statically-unprovable parser exits, a dead re-export), not just noise.



    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [static_analysis_fixed]
    Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo cha vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days kinahitaji kwamba udhaifu wote kama huo urekebishwe ndani ya siku 60 baada ya kuwa wa umma.

    Every static-analysis finding to date was resolved within a day of confirmation: the error-level findings (uninitialized-variable class) were fixed the same day with a provably-terminating helper; the high-severity flagged items were analyzed, confirmed as false positives (diagnostics of repo-local files, no credential flow), and dismissed with individual written reasons on the alerts. Zero confirmed exploitable findings remain open.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba uchambuzi wa msimbo wa chanzo tuli ufanyike kwenye kila ahadi au angalau kila siku. [static_analysis_often]

    CodeQL runs on every pull request and every push to main — effectively every commit that matters (main is PR-only). ruff runs even earlier: on every local commit via the repo's own committed pre-commit policy.


  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa nguvu itumike kwenye toleo kubwa lolote la uzalishaji lililopendekezwa la programu kabla ya kutolewa kwake. [dynamic_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inachunguza programu kwa kuitekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa mfano, mradi YAWEZA kutumia zana ya fuzzing (k.m., American Fuzzy Lop) au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti (k.m., OWASP ZAP au w3af). Katika hali fulani mradi wa OSS-Fuzz unaweza kuwa tayari kutumia majaribio ya fuzz kwenye mradi wako. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inahitaji kubadilisha ingizo kwa njia fulani kutafuta aina mbalimbali za matatizo au kuwa seti kiotomatiki ya majaribio yenye angalau asilimia 80 ya ukaguzi wa tawi. Ukurasa wa Wikipedia kuhusu uchambuzi wa nguvu na ukurasa wa OWASP kuhusu fuzzing hutambulisha baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa nguvu. Zana za uchambuzi ZINAWEZA kuzingatia kutafuta udhaifu wa usalama, lakini hii haihitajiki.

    Two forms run continuously: coverage-guided fuzzing with atheris (fuzz/fuzz_policy_id.py via .github/workflows/fuzz.yml — weekly, on demand, and on any PR touching the parsers under test) and property-based testing with Hypothesis (tests/test_properties.py) in the main suite. The property suite found a real bug on its first run — the id validator accepted a trailing newline on an identifier spliced into generated bash — fixed the same hour.



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    N/A: the project is written entirely in Python, a memory-safe language, with no C/C++ extension modules. (Beyond what this criterion requires, the project does run coverage-guided fuzzing with atheris weekly against its id-validation and agent-selection parsers.)



    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utumie usanidi wa angalau baadhi ya uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio au fuzzing) ambao huwezesha madai mengi. Katika hali nyingi madai haya yasipaswi kuwa yamewezeshwa katika mijengo ya uzalishaji. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    Kigezo hiki hakipendekezi kuwezesha madai wakati wa uzalishaji; hilo ni kabisa kwa mradi na watumiaji wake kuamua. Lengo la kigezo hiki ni badala yake kuboresha ugunduzaji wa hitilafu wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu kabla ya kusambazwa. Kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni tofauti kabisa na kuwezesha madai wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio). Katika hali fulani kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni busara sana (hasa katika vipengele vya uadilifu wa juu). Kuna hoja nyingi dhidi ya kuwezesha madai katika uzalishaji, k.m., maktaba hazipaswi kuvuruga waita, uwepo wao unaweza kusababisha kukataliwa na maduka ya programu, na/au kuamilisha madai katika uzalishaji kunaweza kufunua data za faragha kama vile funguo za faragha. Kumbuka kwamba katika usambazaji mwingi wa Linux NDEBUG haijafafanuliwa, hivyo C/C++ assert() kwa chaguo-msingi itawezeshwa kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo. Inaweza kuwa muhimu kutumia utaratibu tofauti wa madai au kufafanua NDEBUG kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo.

    The dynamic analysis is assertion-driven by design: the atheris fuzz harness asserts the safety invariants on every input (an accepted id must contain only shell/path-safe characters; selections returned must be known, deduplicated, and idempotent), and the Hypothesis property suite asserts the same contracts across generated inputs. These assertions are test/fuzz-time constructs, not production-path code.



    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    Ikiwa haujafanya uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu na kwa hivyo hukupata udhaifu wowote kwa njia hii, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani.

    The single exploitable finding from dynamic analysis to date — the id validator accepting a trailing newline (Python's $ anchor matching before it) on an identifier spliced into generated bash — was confirmed and fixed within the hour of discovery, with a regression property added to the suite. Nothing found by dynamic analysis remains open.



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Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-08-19 13:59:52 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-08-21 02:29:59 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-08-19 14:49:16 UTC.