Basis CLI

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 14224 ni silver Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14224/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14224)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14224"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14224/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 17/17 ●

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    Basis CLI is the command-line client for Basis Network. This repository — and this badge entry — is what distributes and verifies it: the download script that checks every binary against a SHA-256 committed to git, the checksums themselves, the release workflow that verifies each published asset and then signs it with Sigstore in keyless mode, the test suite covering all of that, and the documentation. The compiled basis binary is built from basis-core, which is not public yet. Everything in this repository is Apache-2.0 with its source, and every file carries its copyright and licence, checked in CI against version 3.3 of the REUSE Specification.

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.

  • Mahitaji ya awali


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufikie nishani ya kiwango cha kuhitimu. [achieve_passing]

  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ijumuishe mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejea kwa kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha msimbo). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]

    The same document lists them: make check (the test suite) and make lint (shellcheck over both scripts, reuse lint over every file) must pass; a change to what download.sh does must come with a test; every new file needs an SPDX header or a REUSE.toml entry; every commit needs a Signed-off-by line. All of it is enforced by required CI checks on main, not just asked for. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#making-a-change


  • Usimamizi wa mradi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kuwa na utaratibu wa kisheria ambapo wasanidi wote wa kiasi kisicho kidogo cha programu ya mradi wanathibitisha kwamba wameruhusiwa kisheria kufanya michango hii. Mbinu ya kawaida na rahisi ya kutekeleza hii ni kwa kutumia Cheti cha Msanidi cha Asili (DCO), ambapo watumiaji huongeza "signed-off-by" katika ahadi zao na mradi unaunganisha kwenye tovuti ya DCO. Hata hivyo, hii YAWEZA kutekelezwa kama Makubaliano ya Leseni ya Mchangiaji (CLA), au utaratibu mwingine wa kisheria. (URL inahitajika) [dco]
    DCO ni utaratibu unaopendekeza kwa sababu ni rahisi kutekeleza, kufuatilia katika msimbo wa chanzo, na git inasaidia moja kwa moja kipengele cha "signed-off" kwa kutumia "commit -s". Ili kuwa na ufanisi zaidi ni bora ikiwa nyaraka za mradi zinaeleza maana ya "signed-off" kwa mradi huo. CLA ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayofafanua masharti ambayo kazi za kiakili zimetolewa leseni kwa shirika au mradi. Makubaliano ya mgawo wa mchangiaji (CAA) ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayohamisha haki katika kazi ya kiakili kwa chama kingine; miradi haihitajiki kuwa na CAA, kwa kuwa kuwa na CAA huongeza hatari kwamba wachangiaji watarajiwa hawatachangia, hasa ikiwa mpokeaji ni shirika la faida. Apache Software Foundation CLAs (leseni ya mchangiaji wa mtu binafsi na CLA ya kampuni) ni mifano ya CLA, kwa miradi ambayo inaamua kwamba hatari za aina hizi za CLA kwa mradi ni chini ya manufaa yao.

    The project uses the Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1. CONTRIBUTING.md has a section explaining what signing off means, that it is not a copyright assignment, that the contributor keeps their copyright, and that it asserts the right to contribute the code. It shows git commit -s and the Signed-off-by line it produces, asks for a real name and a working address, and states that commits without a sign-off cannot be merged. Every commit in this repository carries the line, maintainers included. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#sign-your-work--the-dco


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika muundo wake wa utawala wa mradi (njia ya kufanya maamuzi, ikiwa ni pamoja na majukumu muhimu). (URL inahitajika) [governance]
    Kunahitaji kuwa na njia fulani iliyowekwa vyema ya kuandikwa ya kufanya maamuzi na kutatua migogoro. Katika miradi midogo, hii inaweza kuwa rahisi kama "mmiliki wa mradi na kiongozi hufanya maamuzi yote ya mwisho". Kuna miundo mbalimbali ya utawala, ikiwa ni pamoja na dictator wa wema na meritocracy rasmi; kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Miundo ya utawala. Mbinu zote mbili za kati (k.m., mtunzaji mmoja) na zisizo za kati (k.m., watunzaji wa kikundi) zimetumika kwa mafanikio katika miradi. Habari za utawala hazihitajiki kuandika uwezekano wa kuunda uma wa mradi, kwa kuwa hiyo ni iwezekanavyo kila wakati kwa miradi ya FLOSS.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents the model. It is a small project with two maintainers, and it says so rather than describing a committee that does not exist. It names who has final say, how decisions are made for each class of change (documentation and script changes by pull request; anything that changes what the repository vouches for goes in the CHANGELOG with its reasoning), how someone becomes a maintainer, how releases are made, and how the document itself is changed. It is also explicit about what it cannot decide: the CLI's own behaviour is built from basis-core and that decision belongs to that team. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA upitishe kanuni ya mwenendo na kuiweka mahali pa kawaida. (URL inahitajika) [code_of_conduct]
    Miradi inaweza kuweza kuboresha uadilifu wa jamii yao na kuweka matarajio kuhusu tabia inayokubalika kwa kupitisha kanuni ya mwenendo. Hii inaweza kusaidia kuepuka matatizo kabla hayajatokea na kufanya mradi kuwa mahali pa kukaribishwa zaidi ili kuhimiza michango. Hii inapaswa kuzingatia tu tabia ndani ya jamii/mahali pa kazi pa mradi. Mifano ya kanuni za mwenendo ni kanuni ya mwenendo ya kernel ya Linux, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Agano la Mchangiaji, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Debian, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Ubuntu, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Fedora, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya GNOME, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya KDE, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya Python, Mwongozo wa Mwenendo wa Jamii ya Ruby, na Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Rust.

    Contributor Covenant 2.1, at the standard location in the repository root, so GitHub surfaces it in the community profile and in the contribution flow. CONTRIBUTING.md links to it and states that participating means agreeing to it. Enforcement contact is conduct@basisnetwork.com.co, a mailbox that exists only for this and is read by the maintainers. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika hadharani majukumu muhimu katika mradi na wajibu wao, ikiwa ni pamoja na kazi zozote ambazo majukumu hayo lazima yafanywe. Lazima iwe wazi ni nani ana jukumu lipi, ingawa hii haiwezi kuandikwa kwa njia ile ile. (URL inahitajika) [roles_responsibilities]
    Nyaraka kwa utawala na majukumu na wajibu zinaweza kuwa mahali pamoja.

    GOVERNANCE.md has a table of every role, who holds it, and what it obliges them to do: lead maintainer (final say, breaking ties), maintainer (reviewing and merging, committing checksums before a release is published, publishing releases, triaging issues), security contact (reading the private advisory queue, acknowledging within three working days, running the process in SECURITY.md to disclosure), licence compliance, and organisation owner. Both people are named with their GitHub accounts. One row is deliberately held by nobody — release signing — because it is keyless and performed by the release workflow under its own OIDC identity, so there is no key for a person to hold, lose, or be coerced into using. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#the-roles-and-who-holds-them


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kuendelea kwa usumbufu mdogo ikiwa mtu yeyote anakufa, anakuwa katika hali ya kudhoofika, au vinginevyo hawezi au hataki kuendelea kusaidia mradi. Hasa, mradi LAZIMA uweze kuunda na kufunga masuala, kukubali mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, na kutoa matoleo ya programu, ndani ya wiki moja ya uthibitishaji wa upotevu wa msaada kutoka kwa mtu yeyote mmoja. Hii INAWEZA kufanywa kwa kuhakikisha mtu mwingine ana funguo zozote zinazohitajika, nywila, na haki za kisheria ili kuendelea mradi. Watu binafsi wanaoendesha mradi wa FLOSS WANAWEZA kufanya hii kwa kuweka funguo katika sanduku la kufungia na wosia unaowezesha haki zozote zinazohitajika za kisheria (k.m., kwa majina ya DNS). (URL inahitajika) [access_continuity]

    There are two maintainers, and they are equal in access rather than one being a nominal backup. Both are owners of the basis-network GitHub organisation and both are administrators of this repository, so either can open and close issues, accept proposed changes and publish a release without the other. That is well inside the one-week requirement — it needs no handover at all. There is no separate key or credential that would need recovering: releases are signed keylessly by the release workflow's OIDC identity, so nothing about publishing depends on a secret any individual holds. Two-factor authentication is required organisation-wide, and either owner can restore the other's access. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#the-roles-and-who-holds-them


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi INAPASWA kuwa na "bus factor" ya 2 au zaidi. (URL inahitajika) [bus_factor]
    "Bus factor" (pia inajulikana kama "truck factor") ni idadi ya chini ya washiriki wa mradi ambao wanapaswa kutoweka ghafla kutoka kwenye mradi ("kupigwa na basi") kabla ya mradi kusimama kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa wafanyakazi wenye elimu au wenye uwezo. Zana ya truck-factor inaweza kukadiria hii kwa miradi kwenye GitHub. Kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Kutathmini Bus Factor ya Hifadhi za Git na Cosentino et al.

    Two. Both maintainers have identical repository and organisation access and either can release on their own, which is what the criterion measures. Being exact about what that buys is worth more than the number: it removes the single point of failure for access, for releases and for a vulnerability report going unread. It does not yet mean every change gets a second pair of eyes — that is two_person_review at gold level, and this project does not claim it. GOVERNANCE.md says both of those things in the same paragraph. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#who-decides


  • Nyaraka


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ramani ya barabara iliyoandikwa inayoeleza kile mradi unakusudia kufanya na kutofanya kwa angalau mwaka unaofuata. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_roadmap]
    Mradi huenda usitimiza ramani ya barabara, na hiyo ni sawa; kusudi la ramani ya barabara ni kusaidia watumiaji na wachangiaji watarajiwa kuelewa mwelekeo unaokusudiwa wa mradi. Haihitaji kuwa na maelezo mengi.

    docs/ROADMAP.md covers the next twelve months and is split by what this repository can actually control. Scheduled here: a macOS build in the release matrix, signed version tags, recorded provenance for every published platform, branch coverage if a FLOSS tool for shell appears, and keeping the four documented rough edges accurate. Reported but not scheduled: the four CLI defects, which live in basis-core and cannot be fixed from here. It also lists what the project will not do — no long-term support branches, no CLI source in this repository, no binaries in git, no package-manager distribution before macOS ships, and no bug bounty — because a roadmap that only lists ambitions is half a document. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/docs/ROADMAP.md


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe nyaraka za muundo (pia inajulikana kama muundo wa kiwango cha juu) wa programu inayozalishwa na mradi. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_architecture]
    Muundo wa programu unaeleza miundo ya msingi ya programu, yaani, vipengele vikuu vya programu, uhusiano kati yao, na mali muhimu za vipengele na uhusiano hivi.

    docs/ARCHITECTURE.md documents the major components (the download script, the committed checksums, the release workflow that verifies and signs, the CI workflows, the test suite), the relationships among them, and the key properties of those relationships. It includes the download data flow from both sources to the verified file on disk, the five load-bearing properties of that flow with the test case that guards each, and the four trust regions with the boundary crossing that matters. The design in one sentence: a release serves the binary and git serves the checksum, so no single party controls both. It also states what the architecture does not claim, which is anything about the binary's behaviour. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uandike kile mtumiaji anaweza na asiweze kutarajia kwa suala la usalama kutoka kwa programu inayozalishwa na mradi ("mahitaji yake ya usalama"). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_security]
    Haya ni mahitaji ya usalama ambayo programu inakusudiwa kukidhi.

    SECURITY.md has a "Security requirements" section stating what the tool guarantees and what it does not. Guarantees: integrity of what you download against a digest committed to git; fail-closed behaviour on any mismatch, missing checksum or missing hash tool; verification that does not depend on the network holding; Sigstore keyless signatures on every release asset with the certificate in the public Rekor log; and that nothing here touches a secret. Non-guarantees, stated just as plainly: nothing about the binary's behaviour, no protection against a compromised maintainer account, no availability guarantee, and nothing about the network the CLI talks to. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/SECURITY.md#security-requirements


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mwongozo wa "kuanza haraka" kwa watumiaji wapya kuwasaidia kufanya kitu haraka na programu. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_quick_start]
    Wazo ni kuonyesha watumiaji jinsi ya kuanza na kufanya programu ifanye chochote. Hii ni muhimu sana kwa watumiaji watarajiwa kuanza.

    The README's Install section is the quick start and it is the first thing after the description: clone, run ./download.sh, and you have a verified binary, with ./download.sh windows-x86_64 for the other platform. The by-hand equivalent with curl and sha256sum -c follows for readers who want to see what the script does before running it, and the section ends with the command that proves it worked. Three lines to something that runs. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/README.md#install


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufanye jitihada ya kuweka nyaraka kulingana na toleo la sasa la matokeo ya mradi (ikiwa ni pamoja na programu inayozalishwa na mradi). Kasoro yoyote inayojulikana ya nyaraka inayofanya isilingane LAZIMA irekebishwe. Ikiwa nyaraka kwa ujumla ni za sasa, lakini kwa makosa inajumuisha baadhi ya maelezo ya zamani ambayo sio ya kweli tena, ichukue tu kama kasoro, kisha ifuatilie na urekebishe kama kawaida. [documentation_current]
    Nyaraka ZINAWEZA kujumuisha habari kuhusu tofauti au mabadiliko kati ya matoleo ya programu na/au kuunganisha kwa matoleo ya zamani ya nyaraka. Kusudi la kigezo hiki ni kwamba jitihada inafanywa ili kuweka nyaraka kulingana, siyo kwamba nyaraka lazima ziwe kamili.

    Documentation is treated as part of the change, not as a follow-up. The review checklist in CONTRIBUTING.md makes it explicit: a change that makes a sentence in the README wrong includes the fix for that sentence, and a reviewer is expected to check it. The rough edges in the README are written against the running devnet rather than assumed, and the roadmap says they move to the CHANGELOG as they are fixed upstream instead of quietly disappearing. Two known documentation defects were found and fixed in the course of this review rather than left: .gitignore described binaries as served from a storage bucket when they are attached to GitHub releases, and the Makefile said CI ran two targets when it now runs three. The CHANGELOG records what changed and what it means for each release.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi ya mradi na/au tovuti LAZIMA utambulishe na kuunganisha kiungo kwa mafanikio yoyote, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani hii ya mazoea bora, ndani ya masaa 48 ya kutambua hadharani kwamba ufanikio umepatikana. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_achievements]
    Ufanikio ni seti yoyote ya vigezo vya nje ambavyo mradi umefanya kazi mahususi kukidhi, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani fulani. Habari hii haihitaji kuwa kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa tovuti ya mradi. Mradi unaotumia GitHub unaweza kuweka mafanikio kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi kwa kuyaongeza kwenye faili ya README.

    The README opens with badges for lint, test, OpenSSF Best Practices, OpenSSF Scorecard, REUSE and the licence, and has an Achievements section that links each certification to its report — the Best Practices entry, the Scorecard viewer result and the REUSE information page — rather than to a marketing page, so a reader can check the claim instead of trusting the badge. That section also states what the achievements cover: this repository, the distribution and verification tooling, not the compiled binary. The passing badge was added the day it was earned. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli#achievements


  • Ufikiaji na kimataifa


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi (tovuti zote za mradi na matokeo ya mradi) INAPASWA kufuata mazoea bora ya ufikiaji ili watu wenye ulemavu bado waweze kushiriki katika mradi na kutumia matokeo ya mradi ambapo ni busara kufanya hivyo. [accessibility_best_practices]
    Kwa programu za wavuti, angalia Miongozo ya Ufikiaji wa Maudhui ya Wavuti (WCAG 2.0) na hati yake inayosaidia Kuelewa WCAG 2.0; angalia pia habari za ufikiaji za W3C. Kwa programu za GUI, zingatia kutumia miongozo ya ufikiaji ya mazingira maalum (kama vile Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, na Windows). Baadhi ya programu za TUI (k.m., programu za `ncurses`) zinaweza kufanya mambo fulani ili kuzifanya kufikika zaidi (kama mpangilio wa `force-arrow-cursor` wa `alpine`). Programu nyingi za mstari wa amri zinafikika vizuri kama zilivyo. Kigezo hiki mara nyingi ni N/A, k.m., kwa maktaba za programu. Hapa kuna baadhi ya mifano ya hatua za kuchukua au masuala ya kuzingatia:
    • Toa mbadala za maandishi kwa maudhui yoyote yasiyo ya maandishi ili yaweze kubadilishwa kuwa aina nyingine watu wanahitaji, kama vile chapa kubwa, braille, hotuba, alama au lugha rahisi zaidi ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.1)
    • Rangi haitumiwi kama njia pekee ya kuona ya kuwasilisha habari, kuashiria kitendo, kuchochea jibu, au kutofautisha kipengele cha kuona. ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.1)
    • Uwasilishaji wa kuona wa maandishi na picha za maandishi una uwiano wa tofauti wa angalau 4.5:1, isipokuwa kwa maandishi makubwa, maandishi ya bahati mbaya, na nembo ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.3)
    • Fanya kazi zote zipatikane kutoka kwenye kibodi (mwongozo wa WCAG 2.1)
    • Mradi wa GUI au wa wavuti INAPASWA kupima na angalau kipaza sauti kimoja cha skrini kwenye jukwaa la lengo (k.m., NVDA, Jaws, au WindowEyes kwenye Windows; VoiceOver kwenye Mac & iOS; Orca kwenye Linux/BSD; TalkBack kwenye Android). Programu za TUI ZINAWEZA kufanya kazi kupunguza uchanganyiko wa ziada ili kuzuia usomaji wa ziada na vipaza sauti vya skrini.

    The project results are a command-line script and plain-text documentation, which the criterion notes are fairly accessible as-is, and the practices that do apply were followed rather than assumed. Output is plain text on stdout and stderr with no cursor addressing, no colour and no box drawing, so a screen reader gets it in order and nothing is conveyed by colour alone. Progress and results are short single lines rather than redrawn regions, so there is no overdraw for a screen reader to re-read. Errors state the problem in words on stderr and set a non-zero exit status, so the failure is available both to a person and to a program. The project sites are GitHub, whose accessibility we do not control but which is maintained to WCAG, and the documentation is Markdown with real headings, tables with header rows and descriptive link text rather than "click here".


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kuwa kimataifa ili kuwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa utamaduni, eneo, au lugha ya hadhira lengo. Ikiwa kimataifa (i18n) haihusiki (k.m., programu haizalishi maandishi yanayokusudiwa kwa watumiaji wa mwisho na haipangi maandishi yanayosomeka na binadamu), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Upatanifu wa lugha "unarejelea upatanifu wa bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ili kukidhi lugha, utamaduni na mahitaji mengine ya soko mahususi la lengo (eneo)." Kimataifa ni "muundo na maendeleo ya bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ambayo huwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa hadhira lengo zinazotofautiana katika utamaduni, eneo, au lugha." (Ona "Upatanifu wa Lugha dhidi ya Kimataifa" ya W3C.) Programu inakidhi kigezo hiki kwa kuwa kimataifa tu. Hakuna upatanifu wa lugha kwa lugha nyingine mahususi unaohitajika, kwa kuwa mara tu programu imekuwa kimataifa inawezekana kwa wengine kufanya kazi kwenye upatanifu wa lugha.

    The software produced by this project is a download-and-verify script whose entire output is a handful of operational status lines aimed at a developer at a terminal — the version and platform being fetched, the asset mapping, and the verification result. It generates no end-user-facing text, has no user interface, and sorts nothing human-readable: the only ordering it does is version sorting with sort -V, which is numeric and locale-independent by design. There is nothing here to localise, and internationalising status lines that exist to be read next to a stack trace would add a message catalogue and a dependency without helping anyone.


  • Mengine


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) zinahifadhi nywila kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kama mificho iliyorudiwa na chumvi kwa-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (iliyorudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, au PBKDF2). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi hazihifadhi nywila kwa kusudi hili, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Kumbuka kwamba matumizi ya GitHub yanakidhi kigezo hiki. Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa nywila zinazotumika kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje kwenye tovuti za mradi (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa ndani). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi lazima ziingie kwenye tovuti zingine (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa nje), zinaweza kuhitaji kuhifadhi ishara za uidhinishaji kwa kusudi hilo kwa njia tofauti (kwa kuwa kuhifadhi mficho hakuna maana). Hii inatumia kigezo cha crypto_password_storage kwa tovuti za mradi, sawa na sites_https.

    The project sites do not store passwords for authenticating external users. The website, the repository and the download URLs are all GitHub, which handles its own authentication — the criterion's own details note that using GitHub meets it. This project operates no login of its own, has no user accounts, and stores no credential of any kind: there is no database, no session, and no server-side code in this repository at all.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 1/1 ●

  • Matoleo ya awali


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utunze matoleo ya zamani yaliyotumika mara nyingi ya bidhaa au kutoa njia ya usasishaji kwa matoleo mapya. Ikiwa njia ya usasishaji ni ngumu, mradi LAZIMA uandike jinsi ya kufanya usasishaji (k.m., violesura vilivyobadilika na hatua zilizoanishwa kwa undani ili kusaidia usasishaji). [maintenance_or_update]

    Only the latest release is supported, and there is a documented upgrade path that is a single command: re-running ./download.sh fetches and verifies the newest version this repository knows about, because the version is resolved from checksums/ by version sort rather than pinned. SECURITY.md states the support policy and why — this tracks a development network that may be reset without notice, so pinning an old client to a chain that no longer exists helps nobody — and the roadmap repeats it as a deliberate non-goal rather than an omission. The upgrade is not difficult: there is no state to migrate, no configuration file, and no installed footprint beyond the binary itself. The CHANGELOG records what changed between versions and what it means.


 Kuripoti 3/3 ●

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa ajili ya kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/issues


  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe sifa kwa waripoti wa ripoti zote za udhaifu zilizotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, isipokuwa kwa waripoti wanaoomba kutojulikana. Ikiwa hakuna udhaifu uliotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerabilities have been reported or resolved in this repository in the last 12 months — the repository has existed since August 2026 and has had no vulnerability reports at all, so there is nobody to credit yet. The policy for when there is one is already written rather than improvised at the time: SECURITY.md states that reporters are credited in the release notes unless they ask not to be, and the documented handling process ends with the advisory published, the CHANGELOG saying what changed and why, and the reporter credited. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na mchakato ulioandikwa kwa ajili ya kujibu ripoti za udhaifu. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_response_process]
    Hii ina uhusiano mkubwa na vulnerability_report_process, ambayo inahitaji kuwa kuna njia iliyoandikwa ya kuripoti udhaifu. Pia inahusiana na vulnerability_report_response, ambayo inahitaji majibu kwa ripoti za udhaifu ndani ya kipindi fulani cha muda.

    SECURITY.md documents the process end to end in six steps: acknowledge the reporter and open a GitHub private security advisory (so an emailed report ends up in the same place, visible to the reporter); triage — reproduce, and decide whether it falls inside this repository's security boundary or belongs to basis-core or the network, forwarding it and saying where it went if it does not; record severity, scope and affected versions in the advisory; fix on a branch with a regression test where the defect is testable from here, reviewed before merge; release, with checksums committed before publication and assets verified and signed by the release workflow; disclose, with the advisory published, the CHANGELOG explaining the change and the reporter credited, timing agreed with them. A report that turns out not to be a vulnerability gets told why rather than left waiting. Committed timelines: acknowledgement within 3 working days, first assessment within 10, a fix or a stated plan within 90 days. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/SECURITY.md#how-a-report-is-handled


 Ubora 19/19 ●

  • Viwango vya msimbo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utambulishe miongozo mahususi ya mtindo wa kuandika msimbo kwa lugha kuu inazotumia, na uhitaji kwamba michango kwa ujumla ikidhi. (URL inahitajika) [coding_standards]
    Katika hali nyingi hii inafanywa kwa kurejelea baadhi ya miongozo ya mtindo iliyopo, huenda ikiorodhesha tofauti. Miongozo hii ya mtindo inaweza kujumuisha njia za kuboresha usomaji na njia za kupunguza uwezekano wa kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Lugha nyingi za programu zina miongozo moja au zaidi ya mtindo inayotumika sana. Mifano ya miongozo ya mtindo ni pamoja na miongozo ya mtindo ya Google na Viwango vya Kuandika Msimbo wa SEI CERT.

    The primary language is bash, and CONTRIBUTING.md names the Google Shell Style Guide as the standard contributions follow, with two deliberate differences stated rather than left to be discovered: comments explain why and not what, and indentation is two spaces to match the existing scripts. It also states the conventions for the other file types here — YAML workflows two-space indented with every action pinned to a commit SHA, Markdown wrapped at 80 columns — and requires that a silenced lint rule carries a # shellcheck disable= directive at the line it applies to with a reason, never file-wide. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-style


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kiotomatiki mtindo wake wa kuandika msimbo uliochaguliwa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kufanya hivyo katika lugha zilizochaguliwa. [coding_standards_enforced]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia zana za uchambuzi mkako na/au kwa kulazimisha msimbo kupitia vifaa vya kurekebisha msimbo. Katika hali nyingi usanidi wa zana umejumuishwa katika hifadhi ya mradi (kwa kuwa miradi tofauti inaweza kuchagua usanidi tofauti). Miradi INAWEZA kuruhusu vighairi vya mtindo (na kwa kawaida itaruhusu); ambapo vighairi vinatokea, LAZIMA viwe nadra na viandikwe katika msimbo katika maeneo yao, ili vighairi hivi viweze kukaguliwa na ili zana ziweze kuzishughulikia kiotomatiki baadaye. Mifano ya zana kama hizo ni pamoja na ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), na devtools check (R).

    shellcheck is the FLOSS tool for this language and it runs in CI on every push and every pull request, over download.sh, test/run.sh and test/coverage.sh. It is a required status check on the protected main branch, so a violation blocks the merge rather than producing a warning somebody may or may not read; the same command is available locally as make lint. Exceptions are allowed but must be per-line # shellcheck disable= directives with a reason at the point they apply, so they are reviewable and can be handled automatically later. There are currently none: the tree is clean with no suppressions at all.


  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya kujenga kwa binari za asili LAZIMA iheshimu vigezo (vya mazingira) vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi vilivyopitishwa kwao (k.m., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, na LDFLAGS) na kuvipitisha kwenye viito vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi. Mfumo wa kujenga UNAWEZA kuvipanua na bendera za ziada; LAZIMA USIBADILISHE thamani zilizotolewa na zake mwenyewe. Ikiwa hakuna binari za asili zinazozalishwa, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    Inapaswa kuwa rahisi kuwezesha vipengele maalum vya kujenga kama Address Sanitizer (ASAN), au kutii mazoea bora ya ugumu wa usambazaji (k.m., kwa kuwezesha kwa urahisi bendera za mkusanyaji kufanya hivyo).

    No native binaries are generated by this project. There is no compiler and no linker involved anywhere in this repository: the software it produces is bash read by an interpreter as it is, and the Makefile has no build target — only check, coverage and lint. The compiled basis binary is built elsewhere, from basis-core, which is outside this entry's declared scope. There are therefore no CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS or LDFLAGS for anything here to honour or override.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa kujenga na usakinishaji UNAPASWA kuhifadhi taarifa za utatuzi ikiwa zimeombwa katika bendera husika (k.m., "install -s" haitumiwa). Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    K.m., kuweka CFLAGS (C) au CXXFLAGS (C++) inapaswa kuunda taarifa husika za utatuzi ikiwa lugha hizo zinatumika, na hazipaswi kuondolewa wakati wa usakinishaji. Taarifa za utatuzi zinahitajika kwa msaada na uchambuzi, na pia ni muhimu kwa kupima uwepo wa vipengele vya ugumu katika binari zilizokusanywa.

    There is no build or installation system that could strip anything. Nothing is compiled, so no debugging information is generated in the first place, and download.sh copies bytes and verifies a digest rather than installing with install -s or anything like it. The script it produces is its own source and is fully readable at run time.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa kujenga kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA USIJENGA kwa njia ya kujirudia saraka ndogo ikiwa kuna utegemezi wa kukatana katika saraka ndogo. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    Taarifa ya utegemezi wa ndani ya mfumo wa kujenga wa mradi inahitaji kuwa sahihi, vinginevyo, mabadiliko ya mradi huenda yasijenge vizuri. Mijengo isiyo sahihi inaweza kusababisha kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Kosa la kawaida katika mifumo mikubwa ya kujenga ni kutumia "ujenzi wa kujirudia" au "make ya kujirudia", yaani, mlingano wa saraka ndogo zinazojumuisha faili za chanzo, ambapo kila saraka ndogo inajengwa kwa uhuru. Isipokuwa kila saraka ndogo ni huru kabisa, hii ni kosa, kwa sababu taarifa ya utegemezi si sahihi.

    There is no build system to be recursive. The Makefile is flat, has no build target, no subdirectory makefiles and no cross-directory dependencies: each target is a single command that runs a script in place. Nothing is compiled, so there is no dependency graph that could be got wrong.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kurudia mchakato wa kuzalisha taarifa kutoka faili za chanzo na kupata matokeo sawa ya biti-kwa-biti. Ikiwa hakuna ujenzi unaofanyika (k.m., lugha za uandishi ambapo msimbo wa chanzo unatumika moja kwa moja badala ya kukusanywa), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    Watumiaji wa GCC na clang wanaweza kupata chaguo la -frandom-seed kuwa na manufaa; katika hali fulani, hii inaweza kutatuliwa kwa kulazimisha aina fulani ya mpangilio. Mapendekezo zaidi yanaweza kupatikana kwenye tovuti ya ujenzi unaorudiwa.

    No building occurs. This is a scripting-language project: download.sh and test/run.sh are used directly by the interpreter, not compiled into anything, so there is no generated artefact whose bit-for-bit reproduction could be compared. Reproducibility of the compiled binary is a property of basis-core, outside this entry's scope, and is listed as a known gap in the assurance case rather than claimed here.


  • Mfumo wa usakinishaji


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia ya kusakinisha na kuondoa kwa urahisi programu iliyozalishwa na mradi kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_common]
    Mifano ni pamoja na kutumia meneja wa kifurushi (kwa mfumo au kiwango cha lugha), "make install/uninstall" (inasaidia DESTDIR), chombo katika muundo wa kawaida, au picha ya mashine pepe katika muundo wa kawaida. Mchakato wa usakinishaji na uondoaji (k.m., kifurushi chake) UNAWEZA kutekelezwa na mtu wa tatu mradi tu ni FLOSS.

    Installation is ./download.sh, which is the commonly-used convention for this kind of tool — a single verified-download script, the same pattern as rustup or the many curl | sh installers, except that this one refuses to proceed if it cannot verify what it fetched. The README documents it as the first thing after the description, along with the by-hand curl plus sha256sum -c equivalent for readers who want to do it themselves. Uninstallation is equally simple and is a real answer rather than a dodge: everything the script produces lives under bin/<platform>/ inside the clone, nothing is written outside it, no system directory is touched, no service is registered and no configuration file is created anywhere. Deleting the directory removes the tool completely.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa usakinishaji kwa watumiaji wa mwisho LAZIMA uheshimu mkataba wa kawaida kwa kuchagua eneo ambapo vitu vilivyojengwa vinaandikwa kwa wakati wa usakinishaji. Kwa mfano, ikiwa inasakinisha faili kwenye mfumo wa POSIX lazima iheshimu kigezo cha mazingira cha DESTDIR. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa usakinishaji au hakuna mkataba wa kawaida, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    There is no installation system that writes outside its own directory, so there is no standard convention to honour. download.sh writes only to bin/<platform>/ relative to the script's own location; it installs nothing into a system prefix, so DESTDIR and PREFIX have nothing to select. Where the binary goes afterwards is the user's choice, made with mv or by adding that directory to PATH.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia kwa wasanidi programu wanaoweza kusakinisha haraka matokeo yote ya mradi na mazingira ya msaada yanayohitajika kufanya mabadiliko, ikiwa ni pamoja na majaribio na mazingira ya majaribio. Hii LAZIMA ifanywe kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_development_quick]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia chombo kilichozalishwa na/au hati za usakinishaji. Utegemezi wa nje kwa kawaida utasakinishwa kwa kuita mfumo na/au meneja wa kifurushi cha lugha, kwa external_dependencies.

    Clone the repository and run make check. That is the whole development environment: the suite needs nothing that download.sh itself does not need — bash, curl and a SHA-256 tool, all present on a stock Linux or macOS — and it touches no network, because each case fabricates a throwaway release in a temporary directory and reaches it over file://. There is nothing to install, no language runtime to provision, no container to build and no fixture to download. make lint adds shellcheck and reuse, and make coverage adds bashcov (gem install bashcov); both are documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and neither is needed to make and test a change.


  • Vipengee vilivyotunzwa nje


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uorodheshe utegemezi wa nje kwa njia inayoweza kuchakatwa na kompyuta. (URL inahitajika) [external_dependencies]
    Kwa kawaida hii inafanywa kwa kutumia mkataba wa meneja wa kifurushi na/au mfumo wa ujenzi. Kumbuka kwamba hii inasaidia kutekeleza installation_development_quick.

    This repository ships no code dependencies — no package manifest, no vendored code, nothing from a language registry — and the two classes of external dependency it does have are both listed in a computer-processable way. The GitHub Actions the workflows call are declared in the workflow YAML with every action pinned to a commit SHA and the version in a trailing comment, which is the convention for that ecosystem and is what Dependabot reads; .github/dependabot.yml declares the github-actions ecosystem so those declarations are watched weekly. The run-time dependencies are the operating system's own bash, curl and sha256sum or shasum, which is why there is no manifest to add them to; the README and CONTRIBUTING.md both state them, and the script itself checks for the SHA-256 tool at run time and exits if it is missing. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Miradi LAZIMA ifuatilie au kwa muda mrefu iangalie utegemezi wao wa nje (ikiwa ni pamoja na nakala za urahisi) kugundua udhaifu unaojulikana, na kurekebisha udhaifu unaoweza kutumiwa vibaya au kuthibitisha kuwa hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya. [dependency_monitoring]
    Hii inaweza kufanywa kwa kutumia zana ya kichambua chanzo / zana ya kuangalia utegemezi / zana ya uchambuzi wa muundo wa programu kama OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, na Bundler-audit (kwa Ruby). Baadhi ya waendesha kifurushi wanajumuisha taratibu za kufanya hii. Ni kubaliwa ikiwa udhaifu wa vipengele hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya, lakini uchambuzi huu ni mgumu na wakati mwingine ni rahisi kusasisha au kurekebisha sehemu.

    Dependabot runs weekly over the github-actions ecosystem and opens a pull request when a pinned action moves, which is the whole point of the configuration: pinning to a commit SHA makes an action safe but not current, and without something watching, a pin quietly rots. Six such updates have already been merged. Those pull requests run the same required CI as any other change, so an update cannot land broken. GitHub's own vulnerability alerting is enabled on the repository, CodeQL analyses the workflows on every push and weekly, and OpenSSF Scorecard publishes a Vulnerabilities check result publicly on every push. There are no other external components: no language-registry dependencies and no convenience copies of anything.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA au:
    1. fanya iwe rahisi kutambua na kusasisha vipengele vinavyotumiwa tena vilivyotunzwa nje; au
    2. tumia vipengele vya kawaida vinavyotolewa na mfumo au lugha ya programu.
    Kisha, ikiwa udhaifu unapatikana katika kipengele kilichotumiwa tena, itakuwa rahisi kusasisha kipengele hicho. [updateable_reused_components]
    Njia ya kawaida ya kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kutumia mifumo ya usimamizi wa kifurushi ya mfumo na lugha ya programu. Programu nyingi za FLOSS zinasambazwa na "maktaba za urahisi" ambazo ni nakala za ndani za maktaba za kawaida (labda zilizoachana). Kwa yenyewe, hiyo ni sawa. Hata hivyo, ikiwa programu *lazima* itumie nakala hizi za ndani (zilizoachanishwa), basi kusasisha maktaba za "kawaida" kama sasisho la usalama litaacha nakala hizi za ziada bado zenye udhaifu. Hii ni suala hasa kwa mifumo ya wingu; ikiwa mtoa huduma ya wingu anasasisha maktaba zao za "kawaida" lakini programu haitazitumia, basi masasisho hayasaidii kweli. Angalia, k.m., "Chromium: Kwa nini bado haiko katika Fedora kama kifurushi sahihi" na Tom Callaway.

    Everything reused is the standard component provided by the system. The script uses the operating system's bash, curl and sha256sum or shasum, all updated by the system package manager, and there are no convenience copies, no vendored libraries and no forked standard components anywhere in the tree — so a security update to any of them takes effect immediately, with nothing here holding an old copy alive. The only other reused components are the GitHub Actions, which are pinned by commit SHA and therefore trivially identifiable, and Dependabot updates them weekly.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kuepuka kutumia vitendakazi na API zilizokubaliwa kuwa hazitumiki tena au zilizopitwa na wakati ambapo mbadala wa FLOSS zinapatikana katika seti ya teknolojia inayotumia ("kifurushi cha teknolojia" yake) na kwa wengi wa watumiaji ambao mradi unasaidia (ili watumiaji wawe na ufikiaji wa haraka wa mbadala). [interfaces_current]

    Nothing deprecated or obsolete is used. The script's entire external surface is POSIX-standard utilities and current curl options, with no shell builtin or flag that has been deprecated; shellcheck runs in CI specifically to catch constructs that are obsolete or fragile, and the tree is clean with no suppressions. The CI side is kept current by Dependabot: all GitHub Actions are on their current major versions, and when a whole family had to move together — every codeql-action reference from v3 to v4 — it was done in a single change rather than left half-migrated.


  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki LAZIMA itumike kwenye kila ukaguzi wa kuingia kwenye hifadhi iliyoshirikiwa kwa angalau tawi moja. Seti hii ya majaribio LAZIMA itoe ripoti ya mafanikio au kushindwa kwa majaribio. [automated_integration_testing]
    Mahitaji haya yanaweza kuonekana kama sehemu ndogo ya test_continuous_integration, lakini yanazingatia majaribio tu, bila kuhitaji uunganisho wa kuendelea.

    .github/workflows/test.yml runs the full suite on every push to main and every pull request targeting it, via make check. It reports success or failure as a GitHub status check — download.sh test suite — which is required on the protected branch, so a failing suite blocks the merge rather than being noticed later. The suite is nine cases and 28 assertions covering the whole download-and-verify path end to end, including the two failure paths that justify the repository. A second job in the same workflow measures statement coverage and fails below 90%.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uongeze majaribio ya kurudi nyuma kwa seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki kwa angalau 50% ya hitilafu zilizorekebisha ndani ya miezi sita iliyopita. [regression_tests_added50]

    No bugs have been fixed in this repository in the last six months, so there is no denominator: the repository was made public in August 2026, has had no bug reports against download.sh and no defect fixes to add regression tests for. The policy for when there is one is already in place rather than to be decided later — CONTRIBUTING.md requires that a change to what download.sh does comes with a test, the review checklist makes a behaviour change without a test a blocking comment, and SECURITY.md's handling process specifies a regression test as part of fixing a reported vulnerability. Two of the nine existing cases are failure paths written for exactly this purpose.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ya FLOSS inayotoa angalau 80% ya usakinishaji wa taarifa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kupima kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Zana nyingi za FLOSS zinapatikana kupima usakinishaji wa majaribio, ikiwa ni pamoja na gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, na covr (R). Kumbuka kwamba kutimiza kigezo hiki sio uhakika kwamba seti ya majaribio ni ya kina, badala yake, kushindwa kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kiashiria kizito cha seti ya majaribio mbaya.

    Measured, not estimated: 98.1% statement coverage of download.sh, 52 of 53 statements. make coverage runs the suite under bashcov, the FLOSS coverage tool for bash, and CI runs it as its own job on every push and every pull request, failing the job below a hard floor of 90% — so a regression shows up as a red check on the pull request that caused it. Getting an honest figure needed two things that are documented in test/coverage.sh: the suite deletes each sandbox when its case ends, taking the traced copy of the script with it, so BASIS_TEST_KEEP keeps them; and SimpleCov silently drops any path with a dot-prefixed component, which yields a confident 0% with no error. Each case traces its own copy of the same bytes, so the copies are summed per line. One line is reported uncovered and is not — the done carrying the loop's redirection, which bash attributes to the while — and it is left in the report rather than special-cased, because a coverage tool taught to lie about one line stops being evidence about the others.


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera rasmi iliyoandikwa kwamba kadri utendakazi mkubwa mpya unaongezwa, majaribio ya utendakazi mpya LAZIMA yaongezwe kwenye seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md states it as a rule, not a suggestion: "A change to what download.sh does comes with a test." It goes on to say why, which is what makes it stick — the script exists to refuse a download that does not match the committed checksum, and a refusal that stops working is silent. The same document requires make check to pass and asks contributors to say in the pull request which case covers their change, and the review checklist makes a behaviour change with no covering test a blocking comment. SECURITY.md applies the same rule to vulnerability fixes.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe, katika maelekezo yake yaliyoandikwa kwa mapendekezo ya mabadiliko, sera kwamba majaribio yataongezwa kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    It is written down in CONTRIBUTING.md, in the section a contributor reads before opening a pull request, and repeated as a checklist item in the pull request template. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests


  • Bendera za maonyo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Miradi LAZIMA iwe na ukali wa juu zaidi na maonyo katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi, iwezekanavyo vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    shellcheck runs at its default severity, which is the lowest one and therefore reports everything from style upwards, over every script in the repository, with no exclusions and no suppressions. Its optional --enable=all checks were reviewed and not adopted: they are formatting preferences (brace every variable reference, prefer [[ ]] to [ ]) rather than defect detection, and adopting them would mean rewriting working code to a house style it does not use.


 Usalama 13/13 ●

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kanuni za muundo salama (kutoka "know_secure_design"), pale inapohusika. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    Kwa mfano, matokeo ya mradi yanapaswa kuwa na mipangilio salama ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya ufikiaji yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa mradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi). Pia yanapaswa kuwa na kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kila ufikiaji ambao unaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima ufanyiwe ukaguzi wa mamlaka na usiweze kuvukwa). Kumbuka kwamba katika hali fulani kanuni zitagombana, na katika hali hiyo chaguo lazima lifanywe (k.m., taratibu nyingi zinaweza kufanya mambo kuwa magumu zaidi, kukiuka "uchumi wa utaratibu" / iweke rahisi).

    docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md works through Saltzer and Schroeder principle by principle with the concrete application in each row. The ones that carry the design: fail-safe defaults — every path denies by default, and no checksum file, no hash tool or a digest mismatch each end in a non-zero exit with the binary never made executable; separation of privilege — subverting a download requires control of both the release and the git history, two mechanisms with different failure modes and different audiences; economy of mechanism — about 110 lines of bash, no dependency manifest, no configuration file and no persistent state, so the whole verification argument fits on a page; complete mediation — every name in the checksum file is verified, not just the first, which the multi-entry test case guards; least privilege — workflows are read-all by default and elevated per job only where genuinely needed. Where principles conflict the choice is stated rather than hidden.


  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No SHA-1 and no CBC-mode SSH: the only hash is SHA-256 and the only transport is TLS as curl negotiates it. (git names its own objects with SHA-1, which is a property of the version control system rather than of anything this project produces or verifies with — the integrity guarantee this repository makes rests on the SHA-256 in checksums/, not on a commit id.)


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi INAPASWA kusaidia algoriti nyingi za kriptologia, ili watumiaji waweze kubadilisha haraka ikiwa moja imevunjwa. Algoriti za kawaida za funguo za simetria ni pamoja na AES, Twofish, na Serpent. Mbadala wa algoriti za hash za kriptologia za kawaida ni pamoja na SHA-2 (ikiwa ni pamoja na SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 NA SHA-512) na SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    The verification format is the standard sha256sum/shasum -c file, which is not tied to a single implementation and already runs through two interchangeable back ends selected at run time: sha256sum where it exists and shasum -a 256 where it does not, which is what macOS ships. The digest algorithm lives in the checksum files under checksums/<tag>/<platform>.sha256 rather than being compiled into logic, so moving to another algorithm is a new file set and a matching shasum -a selection, not a redesign. SHA-256 is a current SHA-2 algorithm with no known weakness relevant here, and there is no cipher suite or key exchange in this project to negotiate: the signatures on release assets are Sigstore's, whose algorithm agility is that project's.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA usaidie kuhifadhi vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji (kama vile nywila na ishara za nguvu) na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia katika mafaili ambayo yametengwa na habari nyingine (kama vile mafaili ya usanidi, hifadhidata, na kumbukumbu), na kuruhusu watumiaji kusasisha na kubadilisha bila ukusanyaji upya wa msimbo. Ikiwa mradi haufanyi usindikaji wa vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    This project never processes authentication credentials or private cryptographic keys. download.sh authenticates to nothing, sends no credential, reads no keystore, prompts for no passphrase, and stores nothing — it fetches a public release asset over HTTPS and hashes it. Release signing is Sigstore keyless: the identity is the release workflow's short-lived OIDC token and there is no private key in the repository, in CI, or anywhere for a person to hold. SECURITY.md states plainly that nothing here, download.sh included, touches key material of any kind.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kusaidia itifaki salama kwa mawasiliano yake yote ya mtandao, kama vile SSHv2 au zaidi, TLS1.2 au zaidi (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, na SNMPv3. Itifaki zisizo salama kama vile FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 au mapema zaidi, na SSHv1 ZINAPASWA kuzimwa kwa chaguo-msingi, na kuzimwa tu ikiwa mtumiaji anaisanidi mahususi. Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi haiesaidii mawasiliano ya mtandao, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network communication is HTTPS. download.sh fetches from https://github.com/<repo>/releases/download by default, and curl verifies the certificate chain by default with no flag anywhere in this project disabling it — there is no --insecure, no -k and no GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY-style escape hatch. The base URL can be overridden by BASIS_CLI_BASE_URL, which exists so the test suite can point at a local directory over file:// without touching the network; that is an explicit action by the user, which is exactly the condition the criterion allows. Nothing insecure is enabled by default and no plaintext protocol is used at all.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA, ikiwa inasaidia au inatumia TLS, kusaidia angalau toleo la TLS 1.2. Kumbuka kuwa kilichotangulia TLS kiliitwa SSL. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS is used through the system's curl and its TLS library, so the project supports whatever they do, which on any currently supported platform is TLS 1.2 and 1.3. The script pins no version, disables nothing and offers no option to downgrade, so a system hardened to 1.2-or-better stays that way. GitHub, the only host contacted by default, requires TLS 1.2 as a minimum on its side.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti cha TLS kwa chaguo-msingi inapotumia TLS, ikiwa ni pamoja na rasilimali ndogo. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Kumbuka kuwa uthibitishaji usio sahihi wa cheti cha TLS ni kosa la kawaida. Kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" na Martin Georgiev et al. na "Do you trust this application?" na Michael Catanzaro.

    Certificate verification is on, by default, and cannot be turned off from here. download.sh invokes curl -fSL --retry 3 --retry-delay 2, and curl verifies the certificate chain and hostname by default; this project passes no --insecure, no -k, no --cacert override and sets no environment variable that would weaken it. There are no subresources: one request per asset named in the checksum file, all to the same host. A failed verification makes curl exit non-zero, and with set -euo pipefail the script stops there. Worth noting that the integrity guarantee does not rest on this anyway: even a fully broken TLS connection cannot produce a binary matching a digest committed to git.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti kabla ya kutuma vichwa vya HTTP na habari ya kibinafsi (kama vile vidakuzi salama). Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The software sends no private information over TLS at all — no HTTP headers carrying credentials, no cookies, no tokens, no authentication of any kind. download.sh issues unauthenticated GET requests for public release assets; there is nothing private that could be sent before or after verification. The CLI's inability to send an Authorization header is documented in the README as one of its known limitations. Certificate verification is nonetheless on by default for every request, as answered in crypto_certificate_verification.


  • Kutolewa kwa usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweke saini kwa kriptologia matoleo ya matokeo ya mradi yanayokusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, na LAZIMA kuwe na mchakato ulioandikwa unaoweleza watumiaji jinsi wanaweza kupata funguo za umma za saini na kuthibitisha saini. Funguo ya kibinafsi kwa saini hizi LAZIMA ISIWE kwenye tovuti zinazosambaza moja kwa moja programu kwa umma. Ikiwa matoleo hayakusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    Matokeo ya mradi ni pamoja na msimbo wa chanzo na matokeo yoyote yaliyozalishwa pale inapohusika (k.m., mifumo inayotekelezeka, vifurushi, na vyombo). Matokeo yaliyozalishwa YANAWEZA kuwekwa saini tofauti na msimbo wa chanzo. Hizi ZINAWEZA kutekelezwa kama lebo za git zilizowekwa saini (kwa kutumia saini za kidijitali za kriptologia). Miradi YAWEZA kutoa matokeo yaliyozalishwa tofauti na zana kama vile git, lakini katika hali hizo, matokeo tofauti LAZIMA yawekwe saini tofauti.

    Every release asset is cryptographically signed with Sigstore cosign in keyless mode by .github/workflows/release.yml, which fires on release: published — deliberately not on a tag push — so what is signed is exactly what people download rather than a rebuild that resembles it. Before signing, the workflow verifies every published asset against the checksums committed to git, so a mismatch fails loudly instead of being signed. The private key requirement is met in the strongest available form: there is no private key at all. The signing identity is the workflow's short-lived OIDC token and the certificate is recorded in the public Rekor transparency log, so nothing persistent exists on the distribution site or anywhere else to be stolen. SECURITY.md documents verification with a complete cosign verify-blob command including the certificate identity and OIDC issuer to pin against, and the README links to it. Independently of the signatures, every release also has its SHA-256 committed to this repository before publication. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/SECURITY.md#signatures


    Kwa shida ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa katika mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo, kila lebo muhimu ya toleo (lebo ambayo ni sehemu ya toleo kuu, toleo dogo, au kurekebishwa udhaifu uliotangazwa hadharani) iwekwe saini kwa kriptologia na iweze kuthibitishwa kama ilivyoelezwa katika signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    The release assets are signed; the git tags they come from are not. This is answered honestly rather than stretched: signing tags needs a personal signing key held by a maintainer, and the project has deliberately avoided having one anywhere — asset signing is keyless precisely so that no individual holds a key that can be stolen or coerced. Adding tag signing is a real improvement and is on the roadmap as item 2, because it would close the gap between "this binary was published by our workflow" and "this tag is the one the maintainers made". Until it is done, the answer is Unmet.


  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yafanye ukaguzi wa pembejeo zote kutoka vyanzo visivyoaminika ili kuhakikisha ni halali (*orodha zinazokubalika*), na kukataa pembejeo zisizo halali, ikiwa kuna vizuizi vyovyote kwenye data kabisa. [input_validation]
    Kumbuka kuwa kulinganisha ingizo dhidi ya orodha ya "miundo mibaya" (aka *orodha za kukataza*) kwa kawaida haitoshi, kwa sababu washambuliaji mara nyingi wanaweza kuepuka orodha ya kukataza. Hasa, nambari zinabadilishwa kuwa miundo ya ndani na kisha kuangaliwa ikiwa ziko kati ya chini na juu zao (ikiwa ni pamoja), na vifungu vya maandishi vinaangaliwa ili kuhakikisha kuwa ni ruwaza halali za maandishi (k.m., UTF-8 halali, urefu, sintaksia, n.k.). Baadhi ya data inaweza kuhitaji kuwa "chochote kabisa" (k.m., kipakia faili), lakini hizi kwa kawaida zingekuwa nadra.

    Every input from a potentially untrusted source is checked against an allowlist before it is used, and rejected if it does not match. The platform argument is not interpolated into a URL on trust: it must correspond to an existing checksums/<version>/<platform>.sha256 file, and anything else exits 1 listing the versions and platforms that do exist — a test case covers exactly that. The version is resolved from the directories that exist in checksums/, so it cannot name something arbitrary. The checksum file is the input that matters most, and CI validates its format with an allowlist on both fields: each digest must be exactly 64 lowercase hex characters, and each file name must be basis or basis.exe — nothing else parses, which is also what stops a ../ name reaching the download loop. The downloaded bytes themselves are the untrusted input the whole project exists to check, and they are verified against the committed digest before anything is made executable. Every shell expansion is quoted, enforced by shellcheck in CI.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Taratibu za kuimarisha ZINAPASWA kutumiwa katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi ili kasoro za programu ziwe na uwezekano mdogo wa kusababisha udhaifu wa usalama. [hardening]
    Taratibu za kuimarisha zinaweza kujumuisha vichwa vya HTTP kama Sera ya Usalama wa Maudhui (CSP), bendera za mkusanyaji ili kupunguza mashambulizi (kama vile -fstack-protector), au bendera za mkusanyaji ili kuondoa tabia isiyofafanuliwa. Kwa madhumuni yetu upendeleo mdogo hauhesabiwi kuwa utaratibu wa kuimarisha (upendeleo mdogo ni muhimu, lakini tofauti).

    The hardening available to a shell script is applied. set -euo pipefail is the first executable line: an unset variable, a failing command or a failing pipeline stage aborts rather than continuing with a wrong value — the failure mode that turns a shell defect into a security problem. Every expansion is quoted and shellcheck enforces it in CI as a required check. The script asks for no privilege and writes only under its own bin/ directory, touching no system location. On the CI side, which is the part of this project with credentials: permissions: read-all at workflow level with elevation per job only where genuinely needed, persist-credentials: false on every checkout, and every action pinned to a commit SHA rather than a mutable tag. The project sites are GitHub, which serves Content-Security-Policy, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options and X-Frame-Options.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe kesi ya uhakika inayosababisha kwa nini mahitaji yake ya usalama yanakidhi. Kesi ya uhakika LAZIMA ijumuishe: maelezo ya muundo wa tishio, utambulisho wazi wa mipaka ya kuaminiwa, hoja kwamba kanuni za muundo salama zimetumika, na hoja kwamba udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama umekabiliana nao. (URL inahitajika) [assurance_case]
    Kesi ya uhakika ni "mwili wa ushahidi ulioandikwa unaotoa hoja inayoshawishi na halali kwamba seti maalum ya madai muhimu kuhusu mali za mfumo ziko na sababu za kutosha kwa programu maalum katika mazingira maalum" ("Uhakika wa Programu Kwa kutumia Miundo ya Kesi ya Uhakika Iliyopangwa", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Mipaka ya kuaminiwa ni mipaka ambapo data au utekelezaji hubadilisha kiwango chake cha kuaminiwa, k.m., mipaka ya seva katika programu ya kawaida ya wavuti. Ni ya kawaida kuorodhesha kanuni za muundo salama (kama vile Saltzer na Schroeer) na udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama (kama vile OWASP top 10 au CWE/SANS top 25), na kuonyesha jinsi kila moja unavyokabiliana. Kesi ya uhakika ya BadgeApp inaweza kuwa mfano wenye manufaa. Hii inahusiana na documentation_security, documentation_architecture, na implement_secure_design.

    docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md contains all four required parts. Threat model: six adversaries described by capability rather than identity — network attacker, release attacker, repository attacker, compromised CI, hostile user environment, and the tooling supply chain — each with the mechanism that counters it, the test case or workflow that evidences it, and the residual risk that remains. Trust boundaries: four regions, with the one security-relevant crossing identified as untrusted bytes entering a machine checked against a digest that came the other way. Secure design: Saltzer and Schroeder row by row with the concrete application of each. Implementation weaknesses: CWE-494, 347, 829, 78, 22 and 367 answered individually, with the inapplicable half of the OWASP list named as inapplicable rather than silently skipped. It also states the claim it does not make — nothing about the compiled binary's behaviour — and ends with the known gaps, including that single-maintainer review is the dominant residual risk. https://github.com/basis-network/basis-cli/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


 Uchanganuzi 2/2 ●

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau zana moja ya uchanganuzi tuli yenye sheria au mbinu za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochanganuliwa, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    CodeQL's Actions query pack is written for exactly the vulnerabilities of this environment — expression injection, excessive GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, artifact poisoning, unpinned actions. OpenSSF Scorecard also runs against the repository weekly and on every push to main. https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/basis-network/basis-cli


  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) LAZIMA itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    Nothing in this repository is written in a memory-unsafe language. It is shell, YAML and Markdown. (The CLI it distributes is Rust, and is outside the scope of this entry.)



Unaweza kutumia zana na mifumo ya AI kupendekeza mabadiliko kupitia URL rahisi, kama vile https://www.bestpractices.dev/sw/projects/14224/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. Angalia mfumo wetu wa mapendekezo ya otomatiki kwa jinsi ya kufanya hivyo. Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Sebastian na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Sebastian.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-08-24 15:57:55 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-08-26 02:10:48 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-08-24 16:56:42 UTC.