strongSwan

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 Basics 13/13

  • Identification

    strongSwan is an open source IPsec-based VPN solution. It features IKEv1 and IKEv2 keying capabilities and runs on Linux 2.6, 3.x and 4.x kernels, Android, FreeBSD, Mac OS X and Windows.

    What programming language(s) are used to implement the project?
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]

    The index page has a list of supported features.



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL required) [contribution]

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]
  • FLOSS license

    What license(s) is the project released under?



    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]

    strongSwan is licensed under the GPLv2 license, a commercial license is optionally available The GPL-2.0-only license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]

    The GPL-2.0-only license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]

    For the C code Doxygen is used (https://www.strongswan.org/apidoc/), the config files and tool are documented extensively on the wiki and for the low-level VICI interface documentation is also available (https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/blob/master/src/libcharon/plugins/vici/README.md).


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]

    All websites are using HTTPS, including the download page (https://download.strongswan.org).



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]

    We provide an issue tracker and mailing lists (both linked on https://www.strongswan.org/support.html), GitHub may be used for pull requests



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]

    All documentation is provided in English, the main language for the issue tracker and mailing lists is also English



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]


(Advanced) What other users have additional rights to edit this badge entry? Currently: []



  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]

    The main repository is on git.strongswan.org with a mirror on GitHub, which both provide public URLs



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    The project uses Git to track the changes, who made them, and when they were made Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]

    Release candidates and developer releases are tagged in the repository



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]

    Git is used Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]

    Each release has a unique version number of the form x.y.z and releases are tagged in the Git repository



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]

    strongSwan uses the same format, but the version numbers are not strictly semantic (e.g. versions with changes of the middle number may include breaking changes)



    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Each release is tagged in the Git repository (signed)


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]

    An extensive changelog is provided in our issue tracker (https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/roadmap?completed=1), a blog post is also released for each version (https://www.strongswan.org/blog/)



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]

    This information is provided in the changelog plus a separate advisory on our blog for each CVE (https://www.strongswan.org/blog/tags/security+fix)


  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Links to the issue tracker and mailing lists are provided on the support page (https://www.strongswan.org/support.html)



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]


    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]


    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    The issue tracker is searchable (https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/issues) and the for the mailing list an archive is provided (searchable with your favorite search engine)


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]

  • Working build system


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]

    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]

    The build system is based on autotools



    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]

    Unit tests and integration tests are provided with the source code



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]

    The unit tests can be via make check the integration tests need additional setup and separate script (described on https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/TestingEnvironment)



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Only the core library (libstrongswan) is currently thoroughly tested with unit tests, parts of other libraries (and plugins) are too, but the overall coverage is only slightly over 50%, the integration tests, however, cover more of the code base



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    Continuous integration is implemented via Travis CI (https://travis-ci.org/strongswan/strongswan) and AppVeyor (https://ci.appveyor.com/project/tobiasbrunner/strongswan-52lo9)


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]

    That's definitely the case for library functions, for larger new features integration tests are usually added



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]

    New integration tests are often mentioned in the release notes (to serve as examples that showcase the new features)



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]

    If appropriate we add tests if the submitter failed to do so


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]

    The default CFLAGS include -Wall, however, some warnings are explicitly disabled



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]

    On CI systems -Werror is used, so the build fails if there are any warnings



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]

    Currently used are -Wno-format and -Wno-format-security (causing lots of warnings due to the use of custom printf-specifiers), and -Wno-pointer-sign (does not seem necessary anymore with current compilers)


  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]


    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]


    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    A primary purpose is to implement cryptography, however, it's possible to delegate most cryptographic operations to third-party libraries



    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]


    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]


    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]

    Default IKE and IPsec proposals don't include such algorithms, potential issues are described e.g. on https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/IKEv2CipherSuites



    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]

    SHA-1 is required because the IKEv2 protocol relies it for some applications (e.g. NAT-D payloads), other than that stronger algorithms are preferred



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    IKE uses a separate DH exchange for every rekeying, for IPsec SAs PFS may additionally be enabled (to separate the keys from the IKE keys), however, the keys for the first IPsec SA negotiated with IKEv2 are always derived from the IKE keys



    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]

    As client the plaintext password must be available (if not entered manually), and as server, most authentication protocols used via IKE rely on plaintext passwords as the password is never transmitted but only challenges and their responses, which require the password for verification



    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]

    The releases and tags in the Git repository are signed with PGP, all websites are exclusively available via HTTPS



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]

    HTTPS is used exclusively


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]


    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]

    Coverity



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]


    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]


    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    Currently only run for release candidates


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]

    strongSwan's own memory check tool is used on CI, parts of the code are fuzzed on OSS-Fuzz



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]

    OSS-Fuzz is used for parts of the code



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]

    There are no asserts (as in those provided by assert.h), but there are obviously a lot of runtime checks (e.g. for valid inputs in functions), and error handling for return values of called functions



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]


This data is available under the Creative Commons Attribution version 3.0 or later license (CC-BY-3.0+). All are free to share and adapt the data, but must give appropriate credit. Please credit Tobias Brunner and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Tobias Brunner.
Entry created on 2018-09-04 09:37:50 UTC, last updated on 2018-09-04 10:58:07 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2018-09-04 10:58:07 UTC.

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