ccu-mcp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 16/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    MCP server for controlling HomeMatic smart home devices via the CCU JSON-RPC API

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    Contributions are accepted under the Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1, with sign-off required via "git commit -s". There is no CLA and no copyright assignment. Documented at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#certificate-of-origin-dco


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    Governance model (benevolent dictator, single maintainer), decision-making process and dispute handling are documented at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    Contributor Covenant 2.1, posted in the standard location and linked from the README. Scope covers the GitHub repository and maintainer-run HomeMatic forum threads, with an escalation path to GitHub if a report concerns the maintainer. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    Roles (Maintainer, Contributor, Reporter) and their responsibilities are tabulated, and it is stated explicitly who holds which role — currently one person in the Maintainer role. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/GOVERNANCE.md#roles


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    Answered honestly rather than aspirationally. One person holds every credential that matters: the GitHub account, npm publish rights, the MCP registry namespace, the Smithery listing, and the commit- and tag-signing key. Nobody else can merge a pull request or cut a release, so the project could not ship a fix within a week if the maintainer became unavailable. This is documented rather than glossed over — see https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity--a-known-gap — and closing it is the top continuity item on the roadmap. Partial mitigation: the full history is public, every release is a signed tag, the build has no private inputs, and the MIT licence permits anyone to fork and continue.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1. ccu-mcp has a single maintainer and no second person currently holds merge or publish rights. Documented at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity--a-known-gap ; raising it is the top continuity item on https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/ROADMAP.md


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    A roadmap covering roughly the next year, including an explicit "Not planned" section stating what the project will deliberately never do. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/ROADMAP.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    High-level design: components, the five layers and their responsibilities, a diagram of the trust path, the end-to-end flow of a tool call, and the write-safety model. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/docs/architecture.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    A "Security requirements" section stating plainly what users can and cannot expect, including the fact that CCU TLS verification is off by default. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/SECURITY.md#security-requirements


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    A "Quick start" section near the top of the README gets a user from nothing to a working connection in a few commands. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/README.md#quick-start


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation consistency is enforced mechanically, not by habit. test/unit/docs-drift.test.ts compares the registered tool set against both the in-server help text and the README's tool list in BOTH directions, so a tool added or renamed in one place and forgotten in another fails the build. test/unit/env-example-sync.test.ts does the same for environment variables against .env.example and the README configuration table, and scripts/check-version-sync.mjs keeps package.json, server.json and the source version in step. Known documentation defects are tracked as issues and fixed like any other bug.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The OpenSSF Best Practices badge is in the first five lines of the README, alongside the Glama badge, and links back to this project page. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    ccu-mcp has no user interface. It is a headless MCP server: it speaks JSON-RPC over stdio or HTTP to an MCP client, and produces no GUI, no web UI and no terminal UI. Accessibility is a property of the client that renders the output — Claude Desktop, Cursor, and so on. The project sites are GitHub and npm, whose accessibility is maintained by their operators. Documentation is Markdown with descriptive link text, table headers, and no information conveyed by colour alone.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The server's own strings — tool descriptions, error messages and hints, and the help text — are English only, with no message catalogue or locale mechanism, so it is not internationalized. In practice localization happens one layer up, because the consumer is a language model: a user asking in German gets a German answer, since the client translates the server's structured output. That makes i18n low-value here rather than genuinely not applicable, so this is recorded as unmet rather than N/A. Issues and pull requests are accepted in English or German.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project sites are GitHub (repository, issues, releases) and the npm registry (downloads). Neither is operated by this project, and this project stores no passwords for authenticating external users anywhere. Per this criterion's own guidance, use of GitHub satisfies it. The maintainer's accounts on both are protected with 2FA, and npm publishing uses trusted publishing (OIDC) with no long-lived token.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    ccu-mcp follows semantic versioning and provides an upgrade path rather than maintaining parallel older versions: fixes land in the current release line, and users upgrade with "npm install -g ccu-mcp@latest" or by bumping the pinned version. Older releases remain permanently available as signed git tags and as npm versions. CHANGELOG.md documents every release, and any release with a behaviour change carries an explicit "read before upgrading" section describing what changed and what to do about it — see v1.9.1. The supported-version table is in SECURITY.md.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerabilities have been reported or resolved in the last 12 months; the repository's security-advisory list is empty. The crediting policy exists and is published in advance: SECURITY.md states that reports are credited in the advisory and in CHANGELOG.md unless the reporter asks otherwise. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/SECURITY.md#what-to-expect


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    A documented response process with explicit stage targets — acknowledgement within 14 days, initial assessment within 30 days, and a fix as fast as severity warrants with a date given once assessment completes — presented honestly as targets for a single-maintainer project rather than as an SLA. Private reporting runs through GitHub Security Advisories. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/SECURITY.md#what-to-expect


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    The identified style guide is the Google TypeScript Style Guide, with two documented deviations: 120-column lines rather than 80, and double quotes. Contributions are required to comply. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    "npm run lint" runs oxlint (MIT, FLOSS) over src, test, scripts and fuzz before tsc, and CI runs the same command in the required build-and-test check — so a violation fails the build rather than waiting for review. The ruleset is oxlint's correctness, suspicious and perf categories, all as errors, pinned in .oxlintrc.json in the repository. Every exception is listed there with the reason it is off; per-line exceptions use an oxlint-disable-next-line comment stating why. The gate was mutation-tested before being enabled — deliberately planted no-eval and no-unused-vars violations to confirm it exits non-zero, then confirmed it exits zero once reverted. oxlint is used rather than typescript-eslint because typescript-eslint's peer range is >=4.8.4 <6.1.0 and this project builds on TypeScript 7; no release of it supports the compiler in use.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    No native binaries are produced. ccu-mcp is TypeScript compiled to JavaScript by tsc and executed by Node.js; there is no C/C++ compiler or linker in the build, so CC/CFLAGS/CXX/CXXFLAGS/LDFLAGS have nothing to apply to. There is also no native addon or FFI dependency.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    tsconfig.json sets sourceMap: true, declaration: true and declarationMap: true, and nothing in the build strips or minifies. The published npm package ships dist/ whole, so .js.map and .d.ts.map reach consumers and a stack trace from an installed copy maps back to the TypeScript source. The build additionally stamps dist/build-info.json with the commit it was built from, surfaced at runtime by the get_system_info tool.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The build is a single tsc invocation over the whole program (include: src/**/*), followed by one script that stamps build metadata. TypeScript resolves the complete module graph itself and there is no per-directory or recursive make-style build, so no subdirectory is built in isolation and cross-directory dependency information cannot be stale.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    Verified empirically, not assumed: building, deleting dist/ entirely, and building again from the same source produces byte-identical output — the SHA-256 over all emitted .js and .d.ts files matched exactly across both runs. The build has no private inputs and dependencies are pinned by package-lock.json ("npm ci"). The only file that varies is dist/build-info.json, which records the git commit and build timestamp on purpose so a running server can report which checkout it came from; it is generated metadata, not compiled output, and is a pure function of the commit apart from the timestamp.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Installed and uninstalled with the standard package manager for the language: "npm install -g ccu-mcp" / "npm uninstall -g ccu-mcp", or run without installing via "npx ccu-mcp". A Docker image is also provided, with a docker-compose.yml in the repository, so "docker compose up" / "docker compose down" works as an alternative. README.md documents both routes.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    There is no POSIX-style installation step to parameterise. npm decides the install location itself, honouring its own standard configuration ("npm config set prefix", --prefix, NPM_CONFIG_PREFIX); DESTDIR has no meaning for a package manager install, and the project neither writes files outside npm's control nor ships a "make install".


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    "git clone && npm ci && npm run lint && npm test" — three standard commands, no bespoke tooling, and the test environment is included: the unit and end-to-end suites run against a mocked CCU and need no hardware at all. The only prerequisite is Node.js >= 24, declared in package.json engines. Documented step by step at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#development-setup , including the live-integration suites, which are gated on CCU_HOST and skipped unless a real CCU is deliberately supplied.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Dependencies are declared in package.json in the standard computer-processable npm format, with exact resolution pinned in package-lock.json. Production dependencies are deliberately few — three: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, undici and zod. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/package.json


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Three independent layers, all automated. (1) Dependabot opens PRs for outdated dependencies, with auto-merge configured. (2) .github/workflows/audit.yml runs "npm audit --omit=dev" daily against production dependencies for high/critical advisories and maintains a single labelled tracking issue; it is green whenever the audit ran and red only when it could not run. (3) release-gate.yml's release-audit job is a required check on every pull request into "main", so no release can go out with an unresolved high or critical advisory in production dependencies. A dependency-review workflow also runs on pull requests. Scanning is deliberately kept out of the required per-commit check, because an advisory database changes with no diff and would make that check non-hermetic.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Every external component is a normal npm dependency resolved from the registry at install time. There are no vendored, bundled or forked convenience copies anywhere in the tree, and no source of a third-party library is checked in. Updating any component is "npm update" or a version bump in package.json, which is exactly what Dependabot automates.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    Verified rather than assumed: the source was swept for the deprecated Node.js APIs (new Buffer(), url.parse(), util.isArray(), crypto.createCipher(), fs.exists(), domain) and uses none of them. The project targets Node.js >= 24 and uses current APIs throughout — node:crypto with timingSafeEqual/scryptSync, node:fs/promises, WHATWG URL, and undici's fetch. "tsc --noEmit" runs over both src and test in CI, so a TypeScript-visible deprecation surfaces at build time.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The build-and-test job in .github/workflows/ci.yml runs on every push and every pull request to both long-lived branches, and is a required status check on "dev" and on "main". It runs lint, type check over src and test, the full unit and end-to-end suites, coverage measurement, the coverage-ratchet self-test and the coverage ratchet itself, and reports success or failure per run in the GitHub Checks UI — so a pull request cannot merge without a visible pass. Currently 469 passing tests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Measured from the git history rather than estimated: of the commits with a "fix:" subject in the last six months, roughly 72% touched files under test/ in the same commit — comfortably above the 50% threshold. The remainder are dependency bumps and documentation-only corrections, which have no behavioural regression to pin. The policy behind the number is written down and mandatory: CONTRIBUTING.md states that a bug fix must include a test that fails before the fix and passes after it, and that a fix without one is not considered complete. Recent examples: test/unit/prototype-key-handling.test.ts (v1.9.1) and the regression block in test/unit/utils-properties.test.ts.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    86.05% statements, enforced globally by vitest.config.ts and per-directory by .github/coverage-baseline.txt


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md contains a written, mandatory test policy: "Any pull request that adds or changes functionality must add or update tests covering it. This is not negotiable for major new functionality: a new tool, a new transport, a new configuration surface, or a change in how an existing tool behaves all require tests in the same PR." Documentation-only and formatting-only changes are the sole exemption. It is backed mechanically: coverage thresholds are enforced globally by vitest and per directory by scripts/coverage-ratchet.mjs in the required CI check, so a change that adds untested code fails the build even when every existing test passes. https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#test-policy


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md#test-policy


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict where it is practical. TypeScript strict is on with forceConsistentCasingInFileNames, and type checking covers the test sources as well as src — which "npm test" alone does not do. oxlint runs three rule categories as errors rather than warnings. The stricter categories oxlint also offers (pedantic, restriction) are deliberately not enabled: they include rules like no-optional-chaining and no-async-await that would fight the language rather than find defects, and turning them on would mean mass-suppressing them, which is worse than not claiming them.


 Security 11/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    Secure design principles are applied deliberately and documented criterion-by-criterion at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/docs/assurance-case.md , which maps each Saltzer and Schroeder principle to the mechanism implementing it. Concretely: FAIL-SAFE DEFAULTS — CORS is default-deny with an allowlisted origin reflected exactly and never as a wildcard, DNS-rebinding protection is unconditional, the HTTP transport requires a bearer token, and a malformed safety-gate variable (CCU_PROFILE_PROTECTED=yes) is a hard startup error rather than a silently unprotected CCU. COMPLETE MEDIATION — every tool call passes through the same wrapper: zod validation, then the write gate, then the rate limiter; there is no code path to the CCU that bypasses them. LEAST PRIVILEGE — the documented recommendation is a dedicated USER-level CCU account, and the container runs as non-root. SEPARATION OF PRIVILEGE — writing to a protected CCU requires both configuration and an explicit per-session confirmation, with run_script and delete_system_variable requiring it on every call. ECONOMY OF MECHANISM — one process, no database, three production dependencies. The one known deviation, CCU TLS verification being off by default, is stated openly in the same document rather than argued around.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No algorithm or mode with a known serious weakness is used by default. SHA-1 appears nowhere; digests are SHA-256. CBC-mode concerns do not arise, since cipher-suite selection is left entirely to Node/OpenSSL under a TLS 1.2 minimum, where AEAD suites (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305) are preferred. Password-equivalent material is handled with scrypt, a deliberately slow salted KDF, rather than any fast hash.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    The project implements no cryptography of its own; it uses Node.js/OpenSSL primitives, which support multiple algorithms and negotiate them. TLS to the CCU negotiates from OpenSSL's full modern cipher suite (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305; SHA-2 family), and no cipher list, secureProtocol or version is pinned in this project's code, so the platform's algorithm set applies and moves with it. Where the project selects a primitive itself the choice is isolated to one call site and replaceable without touching callers: scrypt for the credential fingerprint (src/ccu/session.ts) and SHA-256 for bearer-token digests and TLS fingerprint pinning.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    No credential or key is compiled in or stored in a configuration file mixed with other settings. CCU passwords, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, TLS certificate/key paths and the CA PEM path all come from environment variables, typically supplied through a .env file, a Docker environment block, or a systemd unit — files separate from code, from logs and from the caches. Changing any of them requires only a restart, never a rebuild: the package ships compiled JavaScript and reads configuration at process start. Bearer tokens additionally support live rotation with an overlap window (MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_PREVIOUS, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_GRACE_HOURS) so a key can be replaced without dropping clients. .env is gitignored, and .env.example documents every variable without values.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Answered honestly, for the same underlying reason as crypto_certificate_verification. Both secure options are fully supported and documented — HTTPS to the CCU (CCU_HTTPS=true, TLS 1.2+, with fingerprint pinning or a CA), and TLS on the MCP HTTP transport (MCP_TLS_CERT/MCP_TLS_KEY) — but neither is the DEFAULT. CCU_HTTPS defaults to false because a stock CCU serves plain HTTP on port 80, and the MCP HTTP listener serves plaintext unless certificates are supplied, which suits its intended loopback and container-network deployment. The server logs a startup warning when serving plain HTTP on a non-loopback address. Since the criterion asks that insecure protocols be disabled by default, this is recorded as unmet rather than justified away; moving the defaults is on https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/ROADMAP.md for a major version.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS 1.2 is the floor and TLS 1.3 is used where the peer supports it. The project sets no minVersion, maxVersion, secureProtocol or cipher list anywhere in src/, so Node.js's defaults apply unmodified — tls.DEFAULT_MIN_VERSION is TLSv1.2 on the supported runtime (Node >= 24), meaning SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 cannot be negotiated at all. Verified against the runtime rather than assumed.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    CCU_TLS_VERIFY defaults to false, so an HTTPS connection to a CCU is encrypted but NOT authenticated unless the operator pins a fingerprint or supplies a CA. Verification is fully implemented and tested on three paths — SHA-256 leaf-fingerprint pinning (which also disables TLS session resumption, because a resumed handshake returns an empty peer certificate and would let the pin silently pass), a supplied CA/self-signed PEM, and the system trust store — and a warning naming all three is logged at startup when none is in use. It is off by default because virtually every CCU ships a self-signed certificate, and refusing to connect to a stock box would push users to abandon TLS entirely. That is an explanation, not a justification: the default genuinely does not verify, so this is answered unmet rather than argued around. It is stated in SECURITY.md's security requirements, analysed at https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/docs/assurance-case.md under "the known violation of fail-safe defaults", and scheduled on https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/ROADMAP.md for a major version where the migration can be handled properly. Current recommendation to all users: pin with CCU_TLS_FINGERPRINT.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    Answered consistently with crypto_certificate_verification. The CCU session ID is private information and travels in the request body over the same connection, so with verification off by default the guarantee cannot be claimed. When verification is enabled — fingerprint pin, supplied CA, or system trust store — it happens during the TLS handshake in the undici connector, strictly before any request is written, so no header or body reaches an unverified peer. The gap is the default, not the ordering.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/ccu-mcp@1.9.1 — published via npm trusted publishing (OIDC) from GitHub Actions; SLSA provenance, predicateType https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Tags are SSH-signed; GitHub reports v1.9.1 as verified: true


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    Every tool input is declared as a zod schema — an allowlist of shape, type, enum and range — and the MCP SDK rejects anything that does not match before a handler runs; there is no denylist anywhere. This matters more than usual here because the caller is a language model whose arguments may be derived from device or room names an attacker could have written into the CCU, so tool arguments are treated as untrusted regardless of source. Beyond schema validation: configuration values are parsed strictly and fail closed (CCU_PROD_PROTECTED=yes throws rather than reading as false); HM Script fragments are escaped by escapeHmScript(), whose correctness is checked by property tests against an independent unescape oracle and by a nightly coverage-guided fuzzer; caller-supplied object keys are written with Object.fromEntries and read behind Object.hasOwn, so proto cannot reach Object.prototype; and bearer-token parsing uses a linear pattern after a polynomial one was found and removed.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Applied at the transport, resource and runtime layers. TRANSPORT: CORS is default-deny and an allowlisted origin is reflected exactly rather than as a wildcard; DNS-rebinding protection is enabled unconditionally and validates the Host header against an allowlist; bearer tokens are compared as fixed-width SHA-256 digests through timingSafeEqual; WWW-Authenticate is sent on 401; the health endpoint answers liveness only before authentication so it cannot be used to probe CCU state. RESOURCE: a token-bucket rate limiter with a bounded queue, a bounded session map with idle reaping, and a retry budget that re-acquires a token per attempt so a timeout storm cannot double the request rate. RUNTIME: the Docker image runs as a dedicated non-root user; the persisted session cache is written 0600; the credential fingerprint is derived with scrypt and a random salt rather than a fast hash; fail2ban filter and jail definitions are shipped for HTTP deployments. eval is absent from the codebase and now mechanically prohibited by the lint gate.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    An assurance case covering the required elements: a top-level claim with its bounding assumptions stated up front, an asset list, four explicitly drawn trust boundaries, five security requirements each with an argument and named file/test evidence plus a residual-risk note, a Saltzer and Schroeder principle table including its one known violation, and a table of implementation weakness classes countered (injection, prototype pollution, broken authentication, sensitive data exposure, improper certificate validation, ReDoS, path traversal, resource exhaustion, vulnerable dependencies). https://github.com/claymore666/ccu-mcp/blob/dev/docs/assurance-case.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL is enabled via GitHub default setup (state: configured, default query suite) over javascript-typescript and actions; its default suite includes security queries.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project produces no software written in a memory-unsafe language. ccu-mcp is TypeScript running on Node.js, with no C/C++ source, no native addon and no FFI dependency, so there is no buffer-overwrite class of defect for a memory-safety tool to detect. Dynamic analysis is nevertheless applied for other defect classes: nightly coverage-guided fuzzing with Jazzer.js against a seeded corpus, plus property-based testing with fast-check on every commit.



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Project badge entry owned by: Chris.
Entry created on 2026-08-01 09:15:35 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-02 10:35:30 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-01 10:23:04 UTC.