Enum Member Name Binding

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    One enum contract, honoured on every input channel — not just the request body. Since .NET 9, System.Text.Json lets you give an enum member an explicit public name. That name is honoured in the request body, and nowhere else. ASP.NET Core binds route values, query strings, form fields and headers through System.ComponentModel, which has never heard of System.Text.Json. This package closes that gap.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.
  • Basic project website content


    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The README opens with a one-line statement of purpose — "One enum contract, honoured on every input channel — not just the request body." — followed by a worked before/after example showing the exact problem the library solves: the same enum value accepted in a request body and refused on a query string. A French translation is maintained at docs/README.fr.md.



    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The repository front page carries all three: how to obtain (README, "dotnet add package AspNetCore.EnumMemberNameBinding"), how to give feedback (the public issue tracker at https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/issues, with SECURITY.md routing suspected vulnerabilities to a private advisory instead), and how to contribute (CONTRIBUTING.md, linked from GitHub's Contribute panel).



    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md documents the whole process: local setup, the build and test commands, branch naming, Conventional Commits (checked by a shared script run both as a commit-msg hook and in CI), the pull-request template, and the checks that gate a merge. A French translation is maintained at docs/CONTRIBUTING.fr.md.



    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md states the acceptable standards: the coding style (with a checker, tools/style/lint-layout.sh, that CI runs after running its own test), the commit-message grammar, the requirement that any change to the public surface update the committed API baseline, the requirement that every documentation page change in both English and French, and the policy for answering an analyzer finding. Almost every rule is enforced by a test, a git hook or a workflow rather than by review alone.


  • FLOSS license


    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    Apache License 2.0, declared in LICENSE at the repository root, in the package metadata as PackageLicenseExpression=Apache-2.0, and detected as such by GitHub.



    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).



    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/LICENSE — the standard location at the repository root, where GitHub picks it up and displays it as the repository licence.


  • Documentation


    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The README covers installation, the single registration call, and a worked example per input channel. docs/ adds four reference pages: contract-rules (what is accepted, request by request), analyzers (EMN0001–EMN0006), openapi (the companion package) and limitations. Every page exists in English and French, and the pair is compared structurally by the test suite so a translation cannot quietly fall behind. Every C# sample in the documentation is compiled against the shipped packages and run through the analyzers, so a sample that stopped working fails the build.



    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    The external interface is documented in three places. docs/contract-rules.en.md describes the entry point AddEnumMemberNameBinding(), its options, and exactly which inputs are accepted or refused on each channel (route, query string, form field, header), request by request. docs/analyzers.en.md documents the six diagnostics the package ships and how to configure their severity, with one page per rule under docs/rules/. docs/openapi.en.md documents the companion package. The exact public surface is additionally committed as a machine-checked baseline in PublicAPI.Shipped.txt / PublicAPI.Unshipped.txt beside each packable project, and XML documentation is generated into the packages.


  • Other


    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    Every site this project uses is HTTPS-only and none of them is project-operated: github.com (repository, issues, releases, security advisories), nuget.org (packages), sonarcloud.io (quality and coverage reports) and bestpractices.dev. There is no separate project website to secure.



    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    GitHub Issues and pull-request review threads: https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/issues. Both are public, full-text searchable, addressable by URL down to the individual comment, open to anyone with a free GitHub account, and readable in any browser without proprietary client software. Pull requests are where proposed changes are discussed, and review threads must be resolved before a merge.



    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    English is the primary language: the README, the docs/ pages, the code, the commit messages and the pull requests are all written in English, and both CONTRIBUTING.md and the pull-request template say so explicitly. A French translation is maintained beside every page and checked structurally by the test suite. Bug reports and enhancement requests in English are welcome and are answered in English.



    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    Actively maintained. The repository is under continuous development with green CI on every change, and the maintainer monitors both the public issue tracker and the private advisory channel. SECURITY.md commits to concrete response times: an acknowledgement within 3 business days, an initial assessment within 7, and a status update at least every 14 days while a report is open.


 Change Control 9/9

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding — a public Git repository, readable and clonable without an account.



    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Git records the author, the timestamp and a message for every change. Message quality is enforced rather than hoped for: Conventional Commits are checked by tools/commit-lint/lint-commit-message.sh, the one script run both by the commit-msg hook and by CI, so the two cannot drift apart.



    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    main carries the full development history, not only released versions: every change lands through a pull request, squashed or rebased, and is public from the moment it is pushed. A repository ruleset refuses direct pushes, force pushes and merge commits on main, so the branch is a reviewable linear record of the work between releases. Nothing is withheld from the public repository.



    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unique version numbering


    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    The Git tag is the single source of truth for a version. The release workflow derives the package version from the tag name (v<X.Y.Z>), validates it against a SemVer 2.0.0 allowlist before anything is built, and refuses build metadata because nuget.org would drop it and publish a version other than the one the tag names. Local builds carry 0.0.0-dev and are never published, and nuget.org refuses a version that already exists. No version has been released yet; the first one will follow this scheme.



    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).


    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    A release is triggered by pushing a v* tag, and the workflow additionally refuses to publish unless that tag points at a commit already on main — so a released version is identified by a tag on reviewed history, by construction. No tag exists yet; the first release will create one.


  • Release notes


    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md — a written, human-readable summary following Keep a Changelog 1.1.0 and Semantic Versioning, not the raw output of a version-control log: each entry explains what changed and why it matters to a consumer. A French counterpart is maintained at docs/CHANGELOG.fr.md and the pair is compared structurally by the test suite. The release workflow additionally creates a GitHub release for each tag and attaches the packages. No version has been released yet.



    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    No version has been released and no vulnerability in this project has ever been publicly known, so there is nothing for release notes to identify. The criterion's own guidance says to choose N/A when there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities. SECURITY.md commits to publishing an advisory once a report is confirmed and fixed, naming the affected and corrected versions and carrying a CVE identifier where one is appropriate.


 Reporting 8/8

  • Bug-reporting process


    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Bugs are reported as GitHub issues at https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/issues. SECURITY.md draws the line explicitly: a suspected vulnerability goes through a private advisory and must not be filed as a public issue, while everything else — ordinary bugs with no security impact, feature requests, documentation mistakes, and problems only reproducible on an unsupported version — is welcome as a public issue.



    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, one issue per problem, with labels, assignment and cross-referencing to the pull request that closes it.



    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The project is new — the repository was created on 5 August 2026 — and no bug report has been received yet, so there is no unanswered report of any kind. The tracker is open and monitored by the maintainer, and SECURITY.md sets an explicit acknowledgement target of 3 business days for reports arriving on the private channel.



    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    No enhancement request has been received yet — the project is new and the tracker is empty, so none is outstanding. Requests will be answered on the issue itself, including when the answer is no; the README already states the two known limitations and why one of them is a platform constraint rather than an implementation gap.



    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/issues?q=is%3Aissue — GitHub's issue archive. It is public, permanent, full-text searchable, readable without an account, and closed issues stay readable with their whole discussion. Published security advisories are archived separately at https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/security/advisories.


  • Vulnerability report process


    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/SECURITY.md gives the channel (a GitHub private security advisory), what a report should contain, which versions are supported, what is in scope and what is not, the response times committed to, and how disclosure is coordinated. A French counterpart is maintained at docs/SECURITY.fr.md.



    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private reports are supported through GitHub private security advisories, over HTTPS, visible only to the maintainer until an advisory is published: https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/security/advisories/new. SECURITY.md asks explicitly that a suspected vulnerability not be filed as a public issue, discussion or pull request, and that the report stay confidential until a fix or a mitigation is available.



    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability has been reported in the last 6 months — none has ever been reported. The criterion's own guidance says to choose N/A in that case. SECURITY.md commits to an acknowledgement within 3 business days, well inside the 14 days this criterion asks for.


 Quality 13/13

  • Working build system


    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    dotnet build -c Release, from the solution EnumMemberNameBinding.slnx. The SDK floor is declared in global.json with rollForward, and CI proves the build on that floor and on the latest 10.0.x, because a disagreement between analyzer versions belongs in this repository rather than in a consumer's build.



    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    The standard .NET toolchain and nothing else: the .NET SDK, MSBuild, Roslyn and NuGet for dependency restore. No custom build tooling and no code generation step.



    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The .NET SDK, MSBuild, Roslyn and NuGet are all MIT-licensed and available on Linux, and the test dependencies (xUnit v3, NFluent, coverlet) are FLOSS too. CI builds, tests, packs and smoke-tests on ubuntu-latest, so the whole pipeline is demonstrated to work on free software.


  • Automated test suite


    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    Four automated test projects under tests/ — xUnit v3 with NFluent assertions — covering the binding library, the analyzers, the OpenAPI companion and the documentation samples, plus a package smoke test that packs into a local feed, compiles a consumer against the result and drives it over HTTP. They live in the same public repository under the same Apache-2.0 licence: https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/tree/main/tests



    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    dotnet test -c Release, the standard invocation for a .NET solution, documented in CONTRIBUTING.md. The slower package smoke test is a single script: tests/PackageSmokeTest/run.sh.



    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    SonarQube Cloud measures 100% line coverage and 95.8% branch coverage over both libraries: https://sonarcloud.io/summary/new_code?id=reefact_enum-member-name-binding. Coverage is not the whole of it. A parity suite uses JsonSerializer itself as the oracle — for each candidate input, the HTTP outcome must equal the request-body outcome — so the accepted vocabulary cannot drift from the platform's. The forbidden-character set behind EMN0006 was established by sending each character over all five channels against a running server rather than read off a specification, and that measurement is pinned by tests. Every C# sample in the documentation is compiled and analysed, and a package smoke test exercises the packed artifact end to end.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    GitHub Actions runs the build, the tests, the package smoke test and the layout checker on every push and every pull request to main, across two SDK versions; CodeQL and SonarQube Cloud run on the same events. A single aggregate job named CI is the required check on main, written with if: always() so that a skipped or cancelled leg fails the gate instead of silently satisfying it. Workflows: https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/actions


  • New functionality testing


    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the policy: major new functionality lands with tests in the automated suite, in the same pull request. Adjacent parts of the same rule are enforced by the build rather than left to review — a change to the public surface fails until the committed API baseline records it, a documentation sample that no longer compiles or that the shipped analyzers reject fails like any other test, and the aggregate CI job is a required check on main.



    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Every feature listed in the CHANGELOG landed with its tests: the parity suite for the binding rules, dedicated tests per analyzer diagnostic (EMN0001–EMN0006), the OpenAPI transformer tests, and a documentation suite that compiles every sample and runs the analyzers over it. The two most recent commits on main are "test: reach every line of both libraries, and all but nine branches" and "test: compile the documentation's samples, and run the rules over them". SonarQube Cloud measures the result at 100% line and 95.8% branch coverage.



    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The policy is written in CONTRIBUTING.md, on the same page that documents how to build the project and run the suite, so a contributor reads it where they read everything else that gates a merge: https://github.com/Reefact/enum-member-name-binding/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    TreatWarningsAsErrors is on repository-wide in Directory.Build.props, together with AnalysisLevel=latest-recommended, EnforceCodeStyleInBuild=true and nullable reference types enabled, so Roslyn analyzer findings and code-style findings are compiler errors rather than advice. .editorconfig raises specific rules further — CA1062 argument-null checking is extended to the internal surface, because the boundary is the type and not the assembly. A separate checker, tools/style/lint-layout.sh, covers three layout conventions no analyzer can express, and CI runs the checker's own test first so that "nothing to report" means something.



    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    Warnings are errors, so a build carrying an unfixed warning does not exist: CI cannot go green with one, on either SDK in the matrix, and CI is the required check on main. SonarQube Cloud independently reports 0 bugs, 0 vulnerabilities and 0 code smells with the quality gate passing.



    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict where it is practical: warnings as errors on every project, nullable reference types enabled, latest-recommended analysis level, code style enforced in the build, and a public API baseline analyzer that fails any undeclared change to the published surface. The two deliberate relaxations are written down with their reasons rather than left implicit — IDE0028 in test code (.editorconfig, because the rule's fix trips CA1825 on the SDK floor) and the warning ratchet during the Sonar-instrumented build only (sonar.yml, because an injected analyzer warning would otherwise abort the run before the analysis uploads, turning "Sonar found something" into "the analysis crashed"). The ratchet stays enforced in CI on both SDKs.


 Security 16/16

  • Secure development knowledge


    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The maintainer is the sole primary developer and is familiar with the Saltzer and Schroeder design principles. They are visible in the design of the library itself: input validation with an allowlist (only names the contract declares are accepted; numeric values and undeclared names are refused on every channel), fail-safe defaults (an enum that declares no contract is left completely untouched, and registration is all-or-nothing so a malformed contract cannot leave the process half-configured behind an exception that reads as though nothing had happened), economy of mechanism (no model binder is replaced; one converter per contract enum rather than a global factory), a limited attack surface (a committed public API baseline, and a single supported entry point with the TypeConverter kept an implementation detail), and least privilege throughout the delivery chain (per-job GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, actions pinned by full commit SHA, a credential-free checkout where a token is not needed, and OIDC trusted publishing instead of a long-lived API key).



    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The relevant error class for this library is input handling: it turns untrusted text arriving on a route, a query string, a form field or a header into an enum value, so improper input validation and injection through a permissive parser are the risks that matter, alongside supply-chain weaknesses in how the package is built and published. The countermeasures are in place and tested: allowlist validation, refusal of numeric and undeclared values, argument guards on every public and internal boundary, and a parity suite that uses JsonSerializer as an oracle so the accepted vocabulary cannot drift. In the pipeline, a tag name is validated against a SemVer allowlist before it becomes an MSBuild property, and values reach shell steps through the environment rather than through template interpolation, so a ref named v1.0.0;whoami is data and not script. CodeQL runs the C# security queries on every push and pull request and weekly; the maintainer tracks the OWASP Top 10 and the CWE/SANS Top 25, and SECURITY.md names the boundary and the classes of report that matter for this project.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.


    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]


    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).


    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.


    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]


    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.


    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    Packages are published to nuget.org over HTTPS and installed over HTTPS; the source repository is served over HTTPS and cloned over HTTPS or SSH. Delivery is hardened beyond that. Publication uses NuGet trusted publishing, so the credential is a short-lived OIDC token rather than a long-lived API key sitting in secrets. A build-provenance attestation is signed for every .nupkg and stored publicly, so a consumer can tie the exact bytes to this workflow and this commit: gh attestation verify AspNetCore.EnumMemberNameBinding.<version>.nupkg --repo Reefact/enum-member-name-binding. And the release workflow refuses to publish a tag that does not point at a commit already on main, so a tag pushed onto unreviewed history cannot become a release.



    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    The project publishes no hashes for manual verification and retrieves none over HTTP. Dependencies are restored by NuGet over HTTPS with its own package signature validation, every GitHub Action is pinned to a full commit SHA rather than a moving tag, and the published packages carry a signed build-provenance attestation rather than a bare checksum.


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    No vulnerability in this project has ever been publicly known, so none is unpatched. CodeQL and SonarQube Cloud run continuously and report none — SonarQube Cloud shows a security rating of A with 0 vulnerabilities. On the dependency side, Dependabot keeps packages and actions current and a dependency-review check fails any pull request that would introduce a known-vulnerable dependency at moderate severity or above.



    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    None has been reported. SECURITY.md sets the commitment in advance rather than after the fact: an acknowledgement within 3 business days, an initial assessment within 7, a status update at least every 14 days while a report is open, and a fix with coordinated disclosure within 90 days where that is reasonably possible — with severity and the availability of a safe fix allowed to move those dates, discussed with the reporter rather than decided silently.


  • Other security issues


    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The repository holds no credentials. Publication uses OIDC trusted publishing, so there is no NuGet API key to store in the first place, and the one repository secret, SONAR_TOKEN, is passed to steps through the environment rather than interpolated into a workflow's generated script, where an unlucky set -x could spill it. The issued short-lived key is checked for presence only, never echoed. GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled on the repository, and CodeQL runs on every change.


 Analysis 8/8

  • Static code analysis


    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Two tools beyond compiler warnings, both on every push and every pull request to main. CodeQL analyses the C# sources and uploads to the code-scanning dashboard, with a weekly scheduled run so that queries published after a change still run against it. SonarQube Cloud runs a full instrumented build with coverage, and the workflow passes sonar.qualitygate.wait=true so a failing Quality Gate actually fails the check rather than merely reporting that the analysis ran. OpenSSF Scorecard additionally grades the repository itself weekly and on every branch-protection change. Reports: https://sonarcloud.io/summary/new_code?id=reefact_enum-member-name-binding



    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL's C# query suite covers the common vulnerability classes for the language — injection, unsafe deserialization, improper input validation, information exposure — and SonarQube Cloud adds its own security rules on top. Both are the standard rule sets rather than a narrowed subset. For a library whose whole job is to accept enum names off a route, a query string, a form field and a header, whether a value arriving from outside reaches somewhere it should not is the question worth asking on every change, which is why CodeQL is wired to every push and pull request rather than to releases only.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    Nothing is outstanding: SonarQube Cloud reports 0 vulnerabilities, 0 bugs and 0 code smells with the quality gate passing, and the code-scanning dashboard carries no open CodeQL alert. How a finding is answered is itself written down, in CLAUDE.md: fix it, suppress it at the one site with a Justification saying why the rule's premise does not hold there, decline the rule for a whole category in .editorconfig (a decision to raise with the maintainer first, because it also silences the rule where obeying it would have been right), or leave it visible as known debt. The reason always lives in the repository — in an attribute, a comment or a workflow — never as a click in a tool's UI that a reader of the repository cannot see.



    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    On every commit: CodeQL and SonarQube Cloud both run on every push and every pull request to main, so no change reaches the default branch unanalysed. CodeQL also runs weekly on a schedule, because most findings arrive that way — the code did not change, the analysis did.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    The automated test suite qualifies under this criterion's own definition, which accepts a suite with at least 80% branch coverage: SonarQube Cloud measures 95.8% branch coverage and 100% line coverage. It also varies its inputs in the way the criterion describes. The parity suite sweeps candidate strings across all five input channels and requires the HTTP outcome to equal what JsonSerializer does with the same value in a request body, so the oracle is the platform rather than an expectation written by hand; the character-portability set behind EMN0006 was established the same way, by sending each character over every channel against a running server. The package smoke test starts at dotnet pack and ends at a real HTTP response against a live Kestrel server.



    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The project produces no software written in a memory-unsafe language. It is entirely C# on a managed runtime, with nullable reference types enabled and no unsafe blocks anywhere in the sources.



    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The suite is assertion-driven throughout — xUnit v3 with NFluent — and the library's own runtime checks are active in the code under test rather than compiled out: argument guards on every public and internal boundary raise ArgumentNullException naming the parameter, and start-up validation raises EnumContractException for a duplicate public name, surrounding whitespace or a comma inside a [Flags] member name. Tests run in Release, the same configuration that ships, so what the suite exercises is what a consumer gets.



    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    No vulnerability has been found through dynamic analysis. Failures the suite does find are fixed before the change merges: the aggregate CI job is the required check on main, and it is written so that a skipped or cancelled leg fails the gate rather than satisfying it.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Sylvain Aurat and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Sylvain Aurat.
Entry created on 2026-08-09 07:40:46 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-10 11:41:41 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-10 11:18:54 UTC.