hMailServer

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 14949 is gold Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14949/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14949)
or by embedding this in your HTML:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14949"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14949/badge"></a>


These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    hMailServer is a free, open-source mail server for Windows and Linux, implementing SMTP, IMAP and POP3, with webmail, a REST API and a Control Panel. It is a maintained fork of Martin Knafve's hMailServer, brought up to date with a current toolchain, current cryptography, and the transport-security and authentication standards expected of a mail server in 2026.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

    This entry replaces https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14187, which was made through a GitHub login. GitHub suspended the project account on 18 September 2026, so that entry can no longer be edited. The project has lived on GitLab since 22 September 2026: https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver. Every answer here was checked again against the project on 26 September 2026.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md and the merge request template state what an acceptable contribution needs: one logical change from the current master, a warning-free build (/WX, -warnaserror), a regression test for new behaviour, parameterised SQL only, the coding style and licence header, and a Signed-off-by (DCO) on every commit from an outside contributor. The Code of Conduct also applies. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    CONTRIBUTING.md's Sign-off section links the Developer Certificate of Origin, says what the Signed-off-by trailer means, and requires it (git commit -s) on every commit of a merge request from outside the project; the maintainers' own commits are exempt, and there is no CLA. The sign-off job in .gitlab-ci.yml checks those merge requests; none has arrived yet, so it has not run. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#sign-off


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents the model: two maintainers (Christopher Holloway and Zain Ul Abidin), stewarded by Progressive Robot Ltd, who decide in the open on the issue tracker. When they disagree, both positions are written on the issue and Christopher Holloway decides, giving his reason. The document also covers roles, how to become a maintainer, critical assets and continuity. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project adopts the Contributor Covenant 2.1, in the standard location CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md at the repository root and linked from CONTRIBUTING.md. It applies to the GitLab project and says how to report privately (a confidential issue, or the Service Desk address). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    GOVERNANCE.md defines the roles and their duties: Maintainer (accepting changes, releasing per RELEASE.md, security response per SECURITY.md, direction, infrastructure), Contributor and Reporter. A table says who holds which duty: Christopher Holloway (Progressiverobot on GitLab) holds all of them, and Zain Ul Abidin shares accepting changes and direction. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    GOVERNANCE.md (Critical assets, Continuity) lists the credentials whose loss would stop the project - project ownership, the release and code-signing path, and the build and test environment recipes - and says the owner keeps them in a managed arrangement that a trusted person can reach on confirmed unavailability, with the legal authority to use them, so issues, changes and releases can continue within days. The second maintainer is a Developer member of the GitLab project and can triage and close issues; RELEASE.md documents every release step. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    GOVERNANCE.md names two maintainers but says the record of knowing the codebase is still one person's. In the past year all but one human commit on master are Christopher Holloway's; the second maintainer, Zain Ul Abidin (a Developer on GitLab), has one. Only the owner's account can push master or create release tags. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    Roadmap.md records what the project intends to do and deliberately will not do, with a status and reason for each item, and Roadmap2.md plans the current programme of work. Roadmap items are also tracked as issues with the roadmap label. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/Roadmap.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    ARCHITECTURE.md documents the high-level design: the repository's shape, the server's components (COM API as the management seam, Common, SMTP, IMAP/POP3, SQL persistence with parameterised queries), the tools, the tests, and the constraints between them. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/ARCHITECTURE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    SECURITY.md states what users can and cannot expect: the supported versions, the classes of issue treated as vulnerabilities, an explicit out-of-scope list (administrator-level access, deliberately unencrypted listeners, unsubstantiated scanner output), and how to verify a release. ASSURANCE-CASE.md argues why the security requirements are met. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The README's Installing section and the wiki's Installing-hMailServer and Your-First-Domain-and-Mailbox pages take a new user from the single installer (or the .deb/.rpm) to a working domain and mailbox. The Control Deck's first-hour checklist can also create a sample domain to try things on. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/wikis/Your-First-Domain-and-Mailbox


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    The documentation is revised with the code, and known defects in it are filed as GitLab issues with the documentation label (for example #15, documents that still name 6.3.3 as the latest release). Before 6.3.4, its CHANGELOG section was checked against the code and thirteen statements were corrected: https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/commit/40c7d3e0c


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The README opens with the OpenSSF Best Practices badge, hyperlinked to the project's entry on bestpractices.dev. It still points at the old entry (14187), so it must be changed to this entry's number when this entry reaches passing. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The Control Panel gives every control an accessible name and never carries a status by colour alone (hmailserver/docs/ControlPanelDesign.md); AccessibleNamesTests in ControlPanel.Tests checks the naming. The webmail is built to be used with a screen reader (landmarks, a skip link, focus that follows navigation; README). The project's documents are Markdown rendered by GitLab. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/tree/master/hmailserver/source/Tools/ControlPanel.Tests


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    User-facing text is served through language layers. The server has Languages.cpp and the COM Languages API, with per-language files that the installer's section_languages.iss offers. The Control Panel has resource files for 17 languages besides English (Resources/Strings.<lang>.resx). The self-service portal has 23 language files (Server/Common/Util/PortalLanguages). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/Util/Languages.cpp


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The repository, issue tracker and downloads are on GitLab, which stores users' passwords as salted bcrypt hashes. The project forum, https://www.hmailserver.co.uk/, runs NodeBB and has local accounts; NodeBB stores each password as a bcrypt hash with a per-user salt and a work factor.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    An upgrade path is provided from every earlier hMailServer version. Installing over an existing deployment keeps the configuration and the mail, and the database upgrade chain is continuous: hmailserver/source/DBScripts, applied by the installer and by DBUpdater. SECURITY.md states that the 6.3 line is supported and that the answer for older versions is this in-place upgrade. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitLab issues is the project's issue tracker, with labels for area, type and workflow state: https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    The vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months (among them the REST settings routes in 6.3.3, the COM access checks in 6.2.10 and the JScript escaping flaw in 6.3.4) were all found by the project's own review or analysis, and none came from an outside report, so no reporter is uncredited; SECURITY.md commits to crediting reporters in the release notes unless they ask not to be named. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md documents the response: private report by confidential issue or Service Desk email, acknowledgement within 5 working days, assessment within 10, a fix with a regression test within 90 days, coordinated disclosure at 90 days, credit in the release notes, and a CVE ID requested through GitLab, which is a CNA. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md (Code style and licence headers) sets the rules contributions must follow. .editorconfig requires spaces with three to an indent in C++ and C#, a final newline and no trailing whitespace. C++ builds at warning level 3 with /WX, and dotnet format formats C#. SQL is parameterised only, a new setting goes in the database, and every source file carries the licence header. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style-and-licence-headers


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    The style is declared in .editorconfig, and the editorconfig job of .gitlab-ci.yml runs editorconfig-checker (FLOSS) over every text file, with a negative control. No GitLab pipeline has run that job yet. Until 18 September 2026, GitHub's style workflow ran the same check on every push. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/.gitlab-ci.yml


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The Linux build is CMake, which takes CC, CXX, CFLAGS, CXXFLAGS and LDFLAGS from the environment and passes them to the compiler and linker. CMakeLists.txt only appends its own options (add_compile_options) and never replaces CMAKE_C_FLAGS or CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS; build/ci/linux-build.sh chooses the compiler through CC and CXX. The Windows MSBuild build has no such variables and takes Configuration, Platform and PlatformToolset instead. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The Windows projects set DebugInformationFormat ProgramDatabase and GenerateDebugInformation true, so every Release build writes a .pdb beside the binary. The CMake build honours CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE (Debug, RelWithDebInfo) and -g in CXXFLAGS, and cmake --install does not strip. The .deb and .rpm that CPack makes are stripped (CPACK_STRIP_FILES). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/hMailServer/hMailServer.vcxproj


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    No build is recursive. On Windows, one MSBuild solution (hMailServer.sln) resolves build order from the project references. On Linux, one CMakeLists.txt with no add_subdirectory builds the core library, the server and its test programs from a single dependency graph. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    The Windows server compiles and links with /Brepro, /d1trimfile and /pdbaltpath, with OPENSSL_NO_FILENAMES defined. Two clean Release builds of the same tree on one machine gave a byte-identical hMailServer.exe (first on 22 August 2026, recorded in Roadmap.md), and RELEASE.md step 8 requires that check for every release. The Linux build uses -ffile-prefix-map and SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/RELEASE.md


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    On Windows, one Inno Setup installer (hMailServer-x.y.z-x64.exe) installs, upgrades in place and uninstalls from Apps and Features, and supports unattended install. On Linux, a .deb and an .rpm install and remove with the system package manager. The installer smoke test (install, upgrade, uninstall) is run by hand on a throwaway Windows Server 2025 VM, first on 25 September 2026, not in CI. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/README.md#installing


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    The Windows installer defaults to Program Files and honours Inno Setup's standard /DIR= switch (documented in the README's Unattended install table). The Linux install is CMake's install() with GNUInstallDirs, so it honours DESTDIR, and the .deb and .rpm are built through it. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/README.md#unattended-install


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    CONTRIBUTING.md lists every prerequisite with its pinned version and one command per component: scripts that download and build the external libraries with checked hashes, build.ps1, build-tools.ps1, build-tests.ps1, and the CMake/Ninja commands with the Debian/Ubuntu package list for Linux. The CI image build/ci/linux.Dockerfile is a ready-made Linux build and test environment. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#prerequisites


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Dependencies are listed in machine-readable form: the .NET projects' committed NuGet lock files (packages.lock.json), the native libraries' pinned versions in the project files, and every vendored or fetched binary with its version, origin and SHA-256 in hmailserver/docs/third-party-binaries.json. SPDX and CycloneDX SBOMs were attached to the releases up to 6.3.3. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/third-party-binaries.json


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    The dependency-scan job in .gitlab-ci.yml (Trivy over the lock files and the CI image, OSV over the vendored libraries) was run by hand on the project's runner on 25 September 2026. What it found (zlib 1.3.1's CVE-2026-27171, and a 7-Zip 19.00 that OSV cannot match) was fixed the same day by moving to zlib 1.3.2 and 7-Zip 26.03; a finding that does not affect the project is dismissed with its reason in the VEX document. The job has not yet run in a GitLab pipeline; Renovate (renovate.json) waits for the owner's token and schedule, and Dependabot ran on GitHub until 18 September 2026. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/ContinuousIntegration.md#security-scanning


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Reused components are named and pinned where they can be updated: the .NET packages in committed NuGet lock files restored with --locked-mode, OpenSSL, Boost and libpq by version and source hash in the libraries/ build scripts, and every third-party binary by SHA-256 in hmailserver/docs/third-party-binaries.json, inventoried in ThirdPartyBinaries.md. Renovate (renovate.json) is configured to propose updates but waits for the owner's token and schedule. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/ThirdPartyBinaries.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The fork is built on current interfaces: Visual Studio 2026 (toolset v145), OpenSSL 4.0.x, Boost 1.92 and .NET 10 for the Control Panel and tools. The README's technology table records these versions, along with the plan to move OpenSSL to the next LTS. Deprecated protocol behaviour is kept only where a mail server must interoperate, and then behind a setting. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/README.md


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    Every code change reaches master only after the maintainer's full regression gate has passed on the tree that lands: the whole Windows regression suite (NUnit), split across two machines, and the whole Linux suite, each reporting the tests that passed and failed (CONTRIBUTING.md, Merge requests); documentation-only commits may follow a gated tree. GitHub Actions ran the automated suites on every push until 18 September 2026; the GitLab CI that replaces them is defined in .gitlab-ci.yml but has not yet run a full pipeline. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/ContinuousIntegration.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    A bug is fixed with a regression test that fails against the build before the fix, as SECURITY.md and SUPPORT.md state. Examples: the 6.3.4 JScript escaping fix is pinned in RegressionTests/API/Events.cs, and the CVE-2023-51764 smuggling rule in SMTP/BareLineFeedEndOfData.cs. The automated NUnit suite has 495 C# files. Every change lands only after the maintainer runs the whole Windows suite, split across two machines, and the whole Linux suite. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/tree/master/hmailserver/test/RegressionTests


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The native server's coverage was measured once, on 15 September 2026: 73.48% of its lines (67,790 of 92,260 under hmailserver/source/Server) over the whole Windows regression suite, with OpenCppCoverage 0.9.9. That is below 80%. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    The policy is written in CONTRIBUTING.md: 'Add or update regression tests for a change of behaviour', and 'A fix ships with a test that fails against the build before it'; the merge-request template's checklist repeats it for new behaviour. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#merge-requests


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The instructions for change proposals, CONTRIBUTING.md's 'Merge requests' section, say to add or update regression tests for a change of behaviour, and the merge-request template's checklist asks that new behaviour be covered by a regression test. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#merge-requests


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The Windows build holds the server's own code to MSVC /W3 with /WX (vendored zlib alone is compiled at /W1), and the .NET projects are built with -warnaserror; moving a codebase of this age to /W4 would need mass suppression, and the Linux build adds no warning flags of its own. Beyond compiler warnings, cppcheck and clang-tidy (bugprone, cert, clang-analyzer and concurrency checks) were run over the sources on 25 September 2026 and their findings committed as a baseline, against which the CI job reports any new finding (allow_failure until the baseline is triaged). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md#code-style-and-licence-headers


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The server fails safe: a new installation is given a certificate, STARTTLS on every listener and TLS required for authentication from other hosts before it first listens. TLS peers are verified by default, and unsafe password-hash schemes are refused. Mediation is complete: all management goes through one API seam (COM, with REST on top), and SQL is parameterised by rule. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/SecureDefaults.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The defaults do not depend on seriously weak algorithms. The default cipher list excludes DES, 3DES, MD5, export and null ciphers and lists ECDHE with AES-GCM first; TLS 1.3 is AEAD only; and the AEAD-ONLY preset removes the remaining CBC and SHA-1 HMAC suites. DKIM signs with SHA-256 by default and treats rsa-sha1 signatures as failing (RFC 8301) unless DkimAcceptSha1 is set. Passwords are hashed with PBKDF2 by default. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/AntiSpam/DKIM/DKIM.cpp


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Algorithms are settings, not constants. Password hashing is PBKDF2 (the default), Argon2id or scrypt through PreferredHashAlgorithm, with a minimum accepted scheme. The TLS 1.2 cipher list (SslCipherList, with an AEAD-ONLY preset), the TLS 1.3 suites (TlsCipherSuites13) and the key-exchange groups (TlsKeyExchangeGroups) are all configurable, and DKIM signs with RSA-SHA256 or Ed25519. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/Application/IniFileSettings.cpp


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    TLS certificates and private keys, and DKIM private keys, are separate PEM files referenced by path from the configuration, and can be replaced without recompiling. Account passwords are stored only as hashes; credentials the server uses to sign in elsewhere (route relays, external accounts) are settings in the database, protected at rest, and changed without recompiling. No credential is compiled into the program. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/TCPIP/SslContextInitializer.cpp


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    SMTP, IMAP and POP3 support STARTTLS and implicit TLS. A new installation gets a certificate, offers STARTTLS on 25, 587, 110 and 143, and requires TLS for authentication from the Internet (SecureDefaults.md); a database that is upgraded or attached keeps its previous settings. The REST API (bound to 127.0.0.1) and the web-services listeners are off by default. The SNMP agent is off by default and speaks SNMPv3 authPriv, with v2c a separate opt-in. Outbound delivery supports DANE, MTA-STS and per-domain TLS policy. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/SecureDefaults.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are the versions a new database enables (SslVersions 24). SSLv2 and SSLv3 cannot be enabled, and TLS 1.0 and 1.1 only by an explicit setting. The regression suite runs TLS 1.2 and 1.3 handshakes (RegressionTests/SSL/SslTlsVersionTests.cs). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/TCPIP/SslContextInitializer.cpp


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    Outbound TLS verifies certificates by default: a new database sets VerifyRemoteSslCertificate to 1. TCPConnection.cpp then sets verify_peer and verify_fail_if_no_peer_cert and installs a callback that checks the chain and the expected host name, with DANE-EE matching where TLSA records apply and MTA-STS forcing verification. Inbound client-certificate verification can be set per port. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/TCPIP/TCPConnection.cpp


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The verify mode and callback are set on the socket before the handshake, and a failed verification fails the handshake. So the server, as a client, sends SMTP AUTH credentials or any other private data only over a connection that has already been verified. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/Common/TCPIP/TCPConnection.cpp


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Every release published on GitLab is signed, and SECURITY.md documents how to get the public keys and verify each signature: https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md#verifying-a-release. Release tags are SSH-signed with the key listed in the repository's allowed_signers file (also on the maintainer's GitLab account). Every asset of the releases from 6.2.19 to 6.3.3 carries a keyless Sigstore bundle recorded in the public Rekor log. The Windows installer is Authenticode-signed (Progressive Robot Ltd) since 6.3.1. From 6.3.4, the release's SHA256SUMS file, which lists the hash of every asset, is signed with the same SSH key (ssh-keygen -Y sign, verified with ssh-keygen -Y verify against allowed_signers). No private key is on a distribution site: Sigstore signing is keyless, the tag key stays on the maintainer's own machine, and the Authenticode key is held in Azure Artifact Signing.


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Every release tag from v6.2.23-alpha2 on is an annotated tag signed with a maintainer's SSH key, and each verifies with git verify-tag against the allow list in the repository (.github/allowed_signers on master today, .gitlab/allowed_signers once the next batch lands); SECURITY.md's 'Verifying a release' gives the command. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/SECURITY.md#verifying-a-release


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    Untrusted protocol input is checked at the boundary: SMTP, IMAP and POP3 commands are parsed against their grammar and anything else is refused. A bare LF before the end-of-data dot is refused (the SMTP smuggling rule, CVE-2023-51764), pinned by SMTP/BareLineFeedEndOfData.cs. SQL is parameterised by rule, and the MIME parser is fuzzed (fuzz/). https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/tree/master/fuzz


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The Windows server is built with the MSVC hardening defaults left on (/GS, DEP, ASLR) and with Control Flow Guard (/guard:cf) in every configuration of hMailServer.vcxproj. The web pages it serves send Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame-Options: DENY, and unsafe password-hash schemes are refused for new secrets. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/source/Server/hMailServer/hMailServer.vcxproj


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    ASSURANCE-CASE.md states the security requirements as seven claims (C1-C7). It covers the threat model (actors A1-A6, assets, attack surfaces) and the trust boundaries B1-B6 with a diagram, argues that secure design principles are applied, maps the countermeasures for common weaknesses to CWE classes (injection, memory corruption, smuggling, credential storage, randomness, certificate validation, resource exhaustion, supply chain), and gives evidence per claim and the residual risks. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    clang-tidy runs the cert-, bugprone- and clang-analyzer-* check families (build/ci/clang-tidy.yaml), which look for common C and C++ weaknesses such as memory errors, unchecked conversions and unsafe functions, and Semgrep runs its open rule packs for C#, Python, JavaScript and shell, which include security rules. Until 18 September 2026 CodeQL's security queries also ran on GitHub. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/build/ci/clang-tidy.yaml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The C++ MIME parser is fuzzed with libFuzzer under AddressSanitizer before every minor release (RELEASE.md step 8c; fuzz/, docs/Fuzzing.md). Before each release, the whole regression suite also runs on the assertion build, with a crash oracle that fails a test on any swallowed access violation. The nightly fuzz job (linux-fuzz) and an ASan/UBSan job over snmp-tests (linux-sanitize) are defined in .gitlab-ci.yml but have not yet run on GitLab; nightly fuzzing ran on GitHub until 18 September 2026. https://gitlab.com/Progressiverobot/hmailserver/-/blob/master/hmailserver/docs/Fuzzing.md



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14949/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit christopher holloway and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: christopher holloway.
Entry created on 2026-09-26 05:28:20 UTC, last updated on 2026-09-26 06:16:51 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-09-26 05:45:21 UTC.