qttune

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 15816 is passing Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Cross-platform ECU reader/logger. Qt-free C++ core with stable C ABI; replaceable QML front end. J2534 transport with x86 surrogate host for 32-bit vendor DLLs and architecture-aware routing.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Project oversight


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    The project maintains a documented roadmap in STATUS.md covering versioned milestones (v0.3.x "next": request engine, PID-support probe, generic UDS reads, record-replay transport; v0.4.0 "planned": security access discovery, flash capability; v0.5.0+: manufacturer plugin modules), with a summary table in README.md and a detailed section for each phase including what is deliberately deferred (e.g., the editing and write path explicitly labeled "nothing below is scheduled"). The roadmap also states what the project will NOT do, at least short-term — write-path features require regulatory design work first. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/STATUS.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/README.md#roadmap


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    he project documents its architecture in docs/architecture.md ("how the parts fit together and why"), complemented by the README's architecture overview showing the layering (QML pages → QtTuneBridge → C ABI → ecuio-core → transports), three foundational rules (Qt-free core, final display values at the UI, C ABI as the boundary), and an ADR series (docs/adr/) recording each architectural decision with rationale. Major components and their relationships, including threading and data flow from transport to screen, are all described. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/architecture.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/adr/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    QtTune's security requirements are documented in SECURITY.md (what to report, response commitments, supported versions) and docs/security-assurance.md (threat model, trust boundaries, secure design principles, weaknesses countered). Users are told explicitly what the software does not protect against: the assurance case scopes out ECU writing/flashing (read-only design) and network attacks (local-only operation), and the threat model names what IS defended (malformed CAN frames via bounds checks and fuzzing, untrusted vendor DLLs via the surrogate's job-object isolation, supply chain via Dependabot and pinned actions) versus what is out of scope. SECURITY.md also lists "Security Features in Progress" so users know signed releases and credential storage are not yet present. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/security-assurance.md


    Unknown required information, not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is kept current with the project results through an enforced contribution workflow: every pull request must "update what the change touches — STATUS.md test counts, docs/testing.md, and an engineering-log row if the change taught a lesson" (CONTRIBUTING.md, Pull requests section), and STATUS.md tracks current state, known issues and verified-vs-unverified claims explicitly. Documentation defects are treated as bugs: STATUS.md's Known Issues section catalogs open defects (numbered, never reused) and resolutions are folded back into the docs. CI builds validate the build instructions on Windows, Linux and macOS every push, so the documented build and test procedures cannot silently drift from the actual repository state. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/STATUS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository README front page identifies and hyperlinks to achieved badges: CI status badge, OpenSSF Scorecard badge, and OpenSSF Best Practices (Passing) badge, each linked to its verification page. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    QtTune is a GUI application with user-facing text and color-coded status indicators (ok/quiet/fault/disconnected shown in green/amber/red), but no documented accessibility testing or WCAG compliance. The QML UI uses hardcoded English strings with no screen-reader testing reported, and color is used as the primary means to convey link health states without redundant indicators (icons or text labels per state). No accessibility plan exists in STATUS.md or contributing docs. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/testing.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    QtTune generates substantial user-facing text (QML pages, status banners, error messages, activity log) with no internationalization: QML strings are not wrapped in qsTr(), bridge strings use QStringLiteral rather than tr(), and QtTuneBridge exposes hardcoded English (e.g., "Link: recovered", "Requests failing"). The UI has a single hardcoded language (English), and the bridge's statusString maps codes to English text directly. Since the software does display human-readable text, i18n applies but is not implemented. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/app/qttunebridge.cpp


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    QtTune has no external user authentication system. The repository is hosted on GitHub (which manages password authentication per their security standards); there is no separate website with user accounts, and downloads occur via GitHub Releases or app stores without project-side login. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    QtTune is pre-release (v0.1.0–v0.3.0) with no production or widely-used older versions; the current development line supersedes prior tags, as stated in the version support table (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md). Upgrade compatibility is managed by design: the public C ABI is append-only so newer cores remain source-compatible with existing consumers, and deliberate breaks are flagged with feat!: commits, the ECUIO_SIGNAL_SET_LAYOUT version guard (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/adr/0016-signal-definition-layout.md), and documented in ADRs under docs/adr/.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub's issue tracker is used for tracking individual issues: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    QtTune is in pre-release development (v0.1.0–v0.3.0) with no production-deployed versions in the wild. No vulnerability reports have been received and resolved in the last 12 months per the security policy (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The project has a public reporting channel via GitHub Security Advisories, but as of this assessment date, no CVEs or security advisories have been issued.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md documents the full response process: intake via GitHub Security Advisories (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/security/advisories/new), acknowledgment within 7 days and status updates within 30 days, coordinated public disclosure after mitigation, and category-specific response paths distinguishing code-security findings (CVE assignment if severe) from supply-chain, privacy and intentional protocol-analysis behavior. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md.


 Quality 16/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    Coding standards are identified per primary language and required of contributions: LLVM-based .clang-format for C/C++ (with documented deviations), SEI CERT C as the reference for the strict-C ABI headers, Qt's QML Coding Conventions for the front end, and the tree's CMake conventions, with zero-warning builds enforced for every first-party target. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/.clang-format


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The project builds with CMake, which honors the standard environment variables by design: CC/CXX select the compiler and CFLAGS/CXXFLAGS/LDFLAGS are absorbed into the initial CMAKE_<LANG>_FLAGS cache at configure time and applied to every compiler and linker invocation, rather than replaced. The project's own flags (-Wall -Wextra, hardening) are appended per-target via target_compile_options and never overwrite the incoming values. Sanitizer builds (ASan/UBSan) are enabled in CI through CMake options, so distribution hardening and instrumentation features can be turned on without editing the build files. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    The build system is CMake with no stripping anywhere in the build: there is no install -s, no --strip linker flag, and no post-build strip step in any target or CI job. Debugging information follows the standard CMake mechanism — -g arrives via CXXFLAGS/CFLAGS or CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug/RelWithDebInfo and is passed through to every compiler invocation, with no toolchain file or target property overriding it. Sanitizer and fuzz builds in CI compile with full symbol information. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The build uses CMake, which is not a recursive build system: add_subdirectory scopes variables and targets but does not invoke an independent build per directory. CMake generates one unified dependency graph for the whole project, so cross-directory dependencies are expressed accurately — the app target links ecuio-core, tests link both, and the root-level Qt-link check reads ecuio-core's link properties after every subdirectory has been processed, which only works because the graph is global. No recursive make invocation exists anywhere in the tree. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    The project does not document or verify reproducible builds, and no CI job compares two independent builds for bit-for-bit equality. Potential nondeterminism sources are unexamined: embedded build paths in debug info and any use of DATE/TIME. Without a demonstrated repeated identical build, this criterion cannot be marked Met. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    QtTune is pre-release software with no distributed artifacts: there are no releases, downloads, or packages intended for installation, and per SECURITY.md no supported production versions exist yet. The project distributes only source, built locally by users from the repository, so no commonly-used installation convention applies. Formal installation and packaging (including signed release artifacts) are planned for v1.0 as documented in SECURITY.md. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    QtTune has no installation system: it is pre-release source-only software with no make install, packaging, or distributed artifacts, so no installation-location convention applies. Users build and run from their own build trees. Packaging with standard conventions is planned for v1.0 (see SECURITY.md's release plans). See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    Potential developers get a documented, quick setup path: CONTRIBUTING.md's "Building" section gives the complete three-command flow (cmake configure with CMAKE_PREFIX_PATH, build, ctest), with exact compiler and CMake minimums stated up front. docs/development.md extends this with platform-specific instructions, including installing Qt via aqtinstall (with the documented workaround), the two-tree Windows layout for the surrogate and fake DLLs, and troubleshooting. Every test tier that can run without real hardware (Unit, Bridge, QML, HARNESS, Fuzzing) executes through the same ctest invocation, so the test environment comes with the standard build. The CI workflows demonstrate the setup is fully automatable: GitHub Actions installs Qt, configures, builds and runs the whole suite on all three desktop platforms from the repository alone. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/development.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    The project's external dependencies are declared in the build system's computer-processable form: root and per-directory CMakeLists.txt files use find_package(Qt6 6.12 REQUIRED COMPONENTS Core Gui Quick ...) with the required components and minimum version stated, and each first-party target links against the imported targets by name. The compiler/CMake minimums are likewise machine-checked via cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.21) and the C++17 standard setting, so a configure step fails loudly and early when a dependency is missing or too old. CI workflows additionally encode the dependency acquisition (Qt via aqtinstall with a pinned version) in executable YAML. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/app/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    The repository monitors external dependencies with Dependabot (.github/dependabot.yml), which performs version and vulnerability monitoring on the dependency surface declared in the repository — GitHub Actions workflows — and opens pull requests when updates or vulnerable versions are detected. GitHub additionally surfaces Dependabot alerts for any dependency in a recognized manifest. The project's runtime dependency surface is deliberately minimal: Qt is a system-provided library rather than a vendored or manifest-pinned component, and the C ABI design keeps convenience copies of third-party code out of the tree. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    QtTune uses system/provided components rather than bundling them: Qt is resolved via find_package(Qt6) against the user's or distro's Qt installation and linked dynamically (LGPL), with no vendored or forked convenience copies anywhere in the tree. The only externally-maintained components consumed at build/runtime are Qt and the Windows VC redistributable, both obtained from their upstream providers through their standard distribution mechanisms (system Qt packages, aqtinstall in CI, VS redist installer). CI pins Qt's version at acquisition, so updating to a patched Qt release is a one-line change in the workflow file. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The project's technology stack is current throughout: C++17 with CMake 3.21+ targeting Qt 6.12 (the current Qt release line), MSVC 2022+/GCC 10+/Xcode 16+ as minimums — all matching Qt 6's own requirements. No deprecated API usage is apparent, and several documented decisions explicitly chose modern alternatives: UTF-8/UTF-16 conversion via the established pattern in win_utf8 instead of Annex K functions, Win32 registry enumeration via RegOpenKeyExW/RegEnumKeyExW with explicit wide-char forms rather than the legacy ANSI variants, and GetProcAddress-based dynamic resolution instead of deprecated import mechanisms. The build enforces currency mechanically: every first-party target compiles with /W4 or -Wall -Wextra at zero warnings, so deprecation warnings (a standard category in both compilers) cannot accumulate silently. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The project runs its full test suite in CI on every push and pull request via .github/workflows/ci.yml: GitHub Actions builds and runs the ctest suite on Windows, Linux and macOS for each commit to main and each PR, producing pass/fail reports on the Actions run page. Reports detail every test case and outcome per platform. Additional jobs run the Qt-free core-only configuration, sanitizer builds (ASan/UBSan), libFuzzer harnesses, and the iOS Simulator smoke on PRs. The commit history shows CI has been consistently applied since its introduction. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/actions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Every bug fixed in the last six months receives a regression test as a matter of documented policy: CONTRIBUTING.md's pull-request checklist requires tests for bug fixes, and the project's testing tiers exist to pin bug behavior at the level where it occurred. The closed Known Issues (#21, #25, #26, #31, #32, #33, #34, and others in STATUS.md's history) correspond to test coverage in the suite — e.g., the write-latch behavior (#33's async teardown) is pinned by bridge tests, and the backoff-growth test (BackoffGrowsUnderSustainedHardFailure) exists specifically to prevent the sustained-failure regression from returning. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    The project has substantial FLOSS test suites (GoogleTest-based unit, bridge, QML and harness tiers plus libFuzzer harnesses, all FLOSS), but statement coverage has not been measured: no coverage flags (--coverage/-fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage), no lcov/gcovr run, and no coverage report exists in CI or documentation. Without a measured figure, claiming ≥80% would be unsupported. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/testing.md


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    The project has a documented, enforced policy that new functionality requires tests: CONTRIBUTING.md's Testing section states "a change is only done when tested at the right tier" and mandates the appropriate tier per change type — with the strengthened rule that "changes to timing, threading, callbacks or streaming state need at least a Bridge- or HARNESS-tier test even if a unit test passes." Pull requests must describe how the change is tested (the // File/layer: and // Testing: headers every changed file carries), and CI gates merging on a green suite ("A pull request that isn't green on CI won't be merged"). Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The testing policy for changes is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md, the project's instructions for contributions (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): it requires tests at the appropriate tier for each change, defines the tiers, and states that pull requests failing CI are not merged.


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The project enables warnings for all first-party targets (via qttune_enable_warnings()) and keeps builds clean at zero warnings on MSVC, as documented in STATUS.md and the README. The sole exception is a documented MSVC pragma suppressing C4702 (unreachable code) inside Qt's own inline headers — a vendor-supplied third party that the project cannot modify, noted as such in the build configuration. This is maximal strictness given the external dependency.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    QtTune implements secure design principles through: (1) read-only vehicle interaction by default, eliminating write-side attack surfaces; (2) strict URI scheme validation rejecting unknown transports; (3) append-only C ABI preventing accidental interface mutation; (4) tiered test coverage including libFuzzer harnesses and ASan/UBSan in CI; (5) thread-isolation rules ensuring callbacks cannot block or destroy sessions. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No security mechanism in the software depends on algorithms with known weaknesses. The only cryptographic operations are SHA-256 for the surrogate ABI fingerprint and the Windows CSPRNG (BCryptGenRandom); no cipher modes are used, as the software implements no encrypted protocols.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    QtTune is an ECU reader/logger, not a security library; it performs no encryption or hashing of user data. Vehicle communication uses OBD-II/J2534 standard protocols with no cryptographic layer controlled by the project. Signed release artifacts are noted as future work in SECURITY.md (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md), at which point algorithm selection would become relevant.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    QtTune processes no authentication credentials or private cryptographic keys. Per SECURITY.md, the project stores no credentials ("currently: none stored"), and vehicle communication via OBD-II/J2534 requires no user authentication. Signed release artifacts are future work noted in SECURITY.md (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md), making this criterion inapplicable until then.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    QtTune does not support network communications. It communicates locally via J2534 hardware adapters (CAN bus diagnostic protocol) and mock:// transport, not network stacks. All vehicle I/O is direct-to-adapter; no TCP/IP, HTTP, SSH, or similar protocols are used. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/j2534.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    QtTune does not use TLS. All communication is local: J2534 adapter I/O via USB and mock:// in-process transport. No TLS or SSL is involved anywhere in the project.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    QtTune does not use TLS for any communications. Vehicle I/O occurs over J2534 hardware adapters (USB-CAN) and mock:// in-process transport; no TLS/SSL certificates are validated or loaded anywhere in the project.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    QtTune does not use TLS and sends no HTTP traffic. There are no cookies, HTTP headers, or remote endpoints. All vehicle I/O is local via J2534 hardware adapters and mock:// in-process transport.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    QtTune is in pre-release development (v0.1.0–v0.3.0) and distributes no releases intended for widespread use — no binaries, packages, or signed artifacts are published. Per SECURITY.md, signed release artifacts are planned for the v1.0 release (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md). Until releases are published, this criterion does not apply.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    QtTune's version tags (v0.1.0–v0.3.0) are lightweight, unsigned tags. As a pre-release project with no releases intended for widespread use, this SUGGESTED criterion is not currently applied. Adopting signed tags (git tag -s + git push --sign-tag) with the public key published in the repository would satisfy it at negligible cost.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    All external inputs are validated against allowlists before use: transport URIs accept only the enumerated schemes mock:// and j2534://, with all others rejected; frame payloads are limited to the 64-byte CAN FD maximum; numeric fields are range-checked against documented OBD-II parameter limits; and signal identifiers are matched against the enumerated signal definitions, with unknown IDs rejected. Validation order is documented and enforced in the Qt-free core, and the validators are continuously exercised by libFuzzer harnesses in CI. See https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md (Input validation section) and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/fuzz/README.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    All first-party targets compile with compiler hardening: -fstack-protector-strong, -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 (MSVC /GS, /guard:cf) and linker hardening (-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now) via the shared qttune_enable_warnings function in root CMakeLists.txt. Builds on Windows, Linux and macOS complete with zero warnings. Evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/CMakeLists.txt


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    QtTune's assurance case is documented at docs/security-assurance.md (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/security-assurance.md). It identifies the threat model (adversaries: malicious J2534 vendor DLLs, compromised adapters, hostile vehicles, supply-chain compromise; assets: host integrity, vehicle safety, user privacy), marks trust boundaries (adapter→worker, worker→core decode, core→bridge, surrogate parent→child IPC, build→runtime) with the control enforced at each, maps secure design principles to specific implementation evidence (economy of mechanism via read-only Mode-01 operation, fail-safe defaults via strict profile rejection, complete mediation via allowlist input validation, defense in depth via the tiered test matrix with ASan/UBSan and libFuzzer in CI), and counters common implementation weaknesses (buffer overflows via the 64-byte frame cap and sanitizers, use-after-free via closed-before-destroy session lifecycle and callback snapshotting, unsafe deserialization via signal-set validation, dependency risk via Dependabot and pinned actions). Supporting evidence: https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/SECURITY.md and https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/docs/testing.md.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL, the static analysis tool used, is specifically a vulnerability-focused analyzer: its C/C++ query suites target common vulnerability classes including memory corruption, use-after-free, integer overflow, and injection paths. Alerts surface at https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/security/code-scanning.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The software is C/C++, and the project routinely combines fuzzing with memory-safety detection: the libFuzzer harnesses run under AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer in CI on every push (https://github.com/erickramer42/qttune/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml), and a dedicated CI job additionally runs the entire test suite under ASan/UBSan/LeakSanitizer. Both mechanisms are exercised continuously, not ad hoc.



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Project badge entry owned by: Eric Kramer.
Entry created on 2026-10-23 04:56:49 UTC, last updated on 2026-10-23 22:50:07 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-10-23 06:18:59 UTC.