docker-net-dhcp

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Gold level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Silver level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 2/5 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Docker network plugin: containers get DHCP leases from the LAN. Modernized fork of devplayer0/docker-net-dhcp with macvlan attachment mode.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST achieve a silver level badge. [achieve_silver]

  • Project oversight


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1. This is stated openly rather than glossed at https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md — the project is single-maintainer today and explicitly invites co-maintainers.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have at least two unassociated significant contributors. (URL required) [contributors_unassociated]
    Contributors are associated if they are paid to work by the same organization (as an employee or contractor) and the organization stands to benefit from the project's results. Financial grants do not count as being from the same organization if they pass through other organizations (e.g., science grants paid to different organizations from a common government or NGO source do not cause contributors to be associated). Someone is a significant contributor if they have made non-trivial contributions to the project in the past year. Examples of good indicators of a significant contributor are: written at least 1,000 lines of code, contributed 50 commits, or contributed at least 20 pages of documentation.

    The fork has one significant contributor. Outside contributions arrive as issues and occasional pull requests, but not at the level of two significant unassociated contributors.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include a license statement in each source file. This MAY be done by including the following inside a comment near the beginning of each file: SPDX-License-Identifier: [SPDX license expression for project]. [license_per_file]
    This MAY also be done by including a statement in natural language identifying the license. The project MAY also include a stable URL pointing to the license text, or the full license text. Note that the criterion license_location requires the project license be in a standard location. See this SPDX tutorial for more information about SPDX license expressions. Note the relationship with copyright_per_file, whose content would typically precede the license information.

    Every source file in the repository carries "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only" as its second comment line. The same gate, scripts/check-license-headers.sh, enforces it over the same set of files and rejects any other SPDX expression. The expression is GPL-3.0-only and not GPL-3.0-or-later because neither LICENSE.md here nor in devplayer0/docker-net-dhcp, the project this one succeeds, says "or any later version"; under GPLv3 section 14 that silence means only version 3 applies, and adopting -or-later would extend a permission the original authors never granted.


 Change Control 3/4 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST use a common distributed version control software (e.g., git or mercurial). [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST clearly identify small tasks that can be performed by new or casual contributors. (URL required) [small_tasks]
    This identification is typically done by marking selected issues in an issue tracker with one or more tags the project uses for the purpose, e.g., up-for-grabs, first-timers-only, "Small fix", microtask, or IdealFirstBug. These new tasks need not involve adding functionality; they can be improving documentation, adding test cases, or anything else that aids the project and helps the contributor understand more about the project.

    Unmet today. The tracker carries a good first issue label and it was seeded with self-contained starter tasks, each stating the gap, the file to look at and the command that verifies the fix. Those were closed as the work they described landed, and no unclaimed work currently qualifies: the project's own standard is that a starter task is a real gap found during ordinary work, not one invented to carry the label, and inventing three would satisfy this criterion by making the claim false in a different way. The README's Contributing section says so plainly and, instead of linking a filter that returns nothing, sends a newcomer to the repository's Q&A discussions, which is a route that exists: it is published as a contact link on the new-issue chooser, and neither issue form fits the request because each stamps a type label that would be wrong for it. This answer is enforced, not remembered: scripts/check-good-first-issues.sh binds the status, the README's promise, the ask route and the label's open count to each other in both directions, so it goes red the day a genuine starter task is filed and this answer becomes Met again, and red too if the route the README names stops being one the repository offers.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST require two-factor authentication (2FA) for developers for changing a central repository or accessing sensitive data (such as private vulnerability reports). This 2FA mechanism MAY use mechanisms without cryptographic mechanisms such as SMS, though that is not recommended. [require_2FA]

    Two-factor authentication is enabled and enforced on the only account with write access to the repository and with access to private vulnerability reports; the GitHub API reports two_factor_authentication as true. Two factors are registered: a WebAuthn passkey and a TOTP application. No bot or machine account bypasses it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's two-factor authentication (2FA) SHOULD use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent impersonation. Short Message Service (SMS) based 2FA, by itself, does NOT meet this criterion, since it is not encrypted. [secure_2FA]
    A 2FA mechanism that meets this criterion would be a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) application that automatically generates an authentication code that changes after a certain period of time. Note that GitHub supports TOTP.

    Both registered factors use cryptographic mechanisms. The primary is a WebAuthn passkey, which is public-key based and phishing-resistant; a TOTP application is registered as the fallback, which the criterion also accepts. SMS-based 2FA is not used.


 Quality 4/7 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document its code review requirements, including how code review is conducted, what must be checked, and what is required to be acceptable. (URL required) [code_review_standards]
    See also two_person_review and contribution_requirements.

    What a change must satisfy to be acceptable is documented for contributors — target branch, coding standard, test expectations, authorship rule, and the full set of checks that must be green before merge — at https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp#contributing, with a pull request template that restates the checklist. Branch protection enforces the mechanical half of that review on every pull request.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have at least 50% of all proposed modifications reviewed before release by a person other than the author, to determine if it is a worthwhile modification and free of known issues which would argue against its inclusion [two_person_review]

    Honestly unmet: with a single maintainer, changes cannot be reviewed before release by a person other than the author. Automated review substitutes as far as it can — required unit, staticcheck, live integration, govulncheck, actionlint, and attribution checks on every pull request, plus CodeQL — but that is not a second human reviewer.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a reproducible build. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [build_reproducible]
    A reproducible build means that multiple parties can independently redo the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. In some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. JavaScript developers may consider using npm shrinkwrap and webpack OccurrenceOrderPlugin. GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful. The build environment (including the toolset) can often be defined for external parties by specifying the cryptographic hash of a specific container or virtual machine that they can use for rebuilding. The reproducible builds project has documentation on how to do this.

    A published procedure lets anyone reproduce the build and check a release against it: https://claymore666.github.io/docker-net-dhcp/verifying-releases/#rebuilding-the-binaries-yourself . Verified end to end rather than self-checked: rebuilding the v1.4.0 tag from a clean git archive, on a BuildKit builder created fresh so no cache mount could be shared, produced binaries whose SHA-256 exactly match the ones inside the published v1.4.0 release tarball (net-dhcp 0ac36b87391c5bd5ea7a4b268183ca3fd86c686bf9b5d0505b97c4e0780d710b, dhcp-handler 0eb5b698698f2d8f4e997062c77f295726915c9ba31125db1800e602edfa4bf8). Determinism rests on digest-pinned base images, version-pinned Alpine packages, a fixed in-container build path, and no timestamp or VCS stamping. It is enforced, not asserted: the Reproducible build workflow builds the same commit twice on two cold builders and fails if the binaries differ, weekly and on any pull request touching the Dockerfile or the Go module files. Scope, stated plainly: the reproducible outputs are the compiled binaries. The release tarball itself is not byte-reproducible because tar and gzip record modification times, so the documented procedure compares the binaries extracted from that tarball rather than the tarball digest.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite MUST be invocable in a standard way for that language. (URL required) [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    The unit suite is invoked the standard Go way: go test ./.... That is literally what CI runs (as go test -race -count=1 ./...); see the test job in https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/blob/main/.github/workflows/test.yaml . The live integration suites cannot be invoked that way, because they need root and a real Docker daemon to install the plugin against; they are invoked as sudo make integration-local, which rebuilds the plugin, installs it and runs both the main and the failure suite; see the integration-local target in https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/blob/main/Makefile . Both invocations are documented for contributors under "Running the tests": https://claymore666.github.io/docker-net-dhcp/latest/internals/#running-the-tests .


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement continuous integration, where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result. (URL required) [test_continuous_integration]
    In most cases this means that each developer who works full-time on the project integrates at least daily.

    Every push and every pull request to the integration branches runs the full gate on GitHub Actions: unit tests with the race detector, staticcheck, actionlint, govulncheck, CodeQL, a dependency review, and the live integration suites against a real DHCP server on a self-hosted runner. Workflow definitions: https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/tree/main/.github/workflows ; run history: https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/actions . The checks are required by branch protection on both integration branches, so a change cannot merge without them, and release pull requests additionally run a coverage ratchet that fails on any per-package regression. A weekly scheduled run repeats the gate so vulnerabilities published between commits surface without waiting for the next push.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 90% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage90]

    Measured merged unit-plus-integration statement coverage is 85.8 percent as a statement-weighted total over the shipped packages (pkg/plugin 85.0 percent of 1811 statements, pkg/dhcp 89.9 of 338, pkg/util 98.5 of 78, cmd/net-dhcp 76.4 of 72, cmd/dhcp-handler 75.0 of 16). That clears the silver threshold of 80 percent but not the gold threshold of 90. Per-package floors are enforced by a coverage ratchet at release time and are raised as error-path tests land.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% branch coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_branch_coverage80]

    Branch coverage is not measured. The Go toolchain's coverage support reports statement coverage, which is what the project's ratchet gate enforces; no branch-coverage figure is available to substantiate this criterion.


 Security 3/5 ●

  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Not enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project MUST support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 MUST be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Honestly unmet, and structurally so: the plugin's purpose is to obtain addresses from the LAN's existing DHCP server, and DHCP (v4 and v6) has no encrypted variant to prefer or fall back to. Its other communication channel is the local Docker Unix socket, which does not traverse a network. SECURITY.md documents the resulting residual risk — a hostile DHCP server can hand out bad addressing — as accepted and outside the plugin's control.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The software neither supports nor uses TLS.


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project website, repository (if accessible via the web), and download site (if separate) MUST include key hardening headers with nonpermissive values. (URL required) [hardened_site]
    Note that GitHub and GitLab are known to meet this. Sites such as https://securityheaders.com/ can quickly check this. The key hardening headers are: Content Security Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options (as "nosniff"), and X-Frame-Options. Fully static web sites with no ability to log in via the web pages could omit some hardening headers with less risk, but there's no reliable way to detect such sites, so we require these headers even if they are fully static sites.

    The repository and release download sites are GitHub and GHCR, which do send hardening headers including CSP and HSTS. The project documentation site is GitHub Pages, which serves static content without configurable response headers, so the project cannot add hardening headers there. Unmet rather than N/A, because the shortfall is real even though it is not fixable on the current hosting.


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have performed a security review within the last 5 years. This review MUST consider the security requirements and security boundary. [security_review]
    This MAY be done by the project members and/or an independent evaluation. This evaluation MAY be supported by static and dynamic analysis tools, but there also must be human review to identify problems (particularly in design) that tools cannot detect.

    A security review of this fork was performed and written up as the assurance case in https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#security-assurance-case — it states the security goals, enumerates the adversaries (malicious container, hostile LAN DHCP server, supply-chain tampering), identifies the trust boundary around DHCP-server-supplied bytes and the privileged plugin process, and argues why the mitigations suffice, closing with the accepted residual risk. It is re-read as part of the release documentation review. Continuous automated review runs alongside it: CodeQL, govulncheck, staticcheck, and Dependency Review on every pull request.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms MUST be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. (URL required) [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The plugin is written in Go, a memory-safe language, and imports the unsafe package in zero source files, so entire classes of memory-corruption defects cannot occur. The race detector runs over the unit suite in CI, the untrusted parsers are fuzzed on every pull request, and the plugin requests an explicit, minimal capability set in config.json rather than running fully privileged — the daemon shows that set to the user before installation. See https://github.com/claymore666/docker-net-dhcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md#security-assurance-case


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST apply at least one dynamic analysis tool to any proposed major production release of the software produced by the project before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    live integration suite + -race + native fuzzing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD include many run-time assertions in the software it produces and check those assertions during dynamic analysis. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    -race detector + fuzz targets are runtime-assertion mechanisms



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Project badge entry owned by: Chris.
Entry created on 2026-06-14 12:10:55 UTC, last updated on 2026-09-28 18:09:32 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-06-14 13:17:33 UTC.