ai-architect-mcp-codebase

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 13845 is silver Here is how to embed it:
You can show your badge status by embedding this in your markdown file:
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Codebase intelligence MCP for AI agents — tree-sitter AST → LadybugDB property graph, import/call resolution with evidence-graded confidence, Leiden communities, hybrid BM25+TF-IDF+RRF search, impact analysis, PRD-hallucination + security gates. Rust · 24 tools (core-8 agent profile) · 503 tests.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-standards-excerpt states the required standard (rustfmt plus the zetetic coding standards, with the project-specific rules spelled out), and https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing-policy-mandatory states the acceptance requirements for tests.


  • Project oversight


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    There is no DCO sign-off requirement and no CLA today. All non-trivial code to date is the sole maintainer's own, contributed under the project's MIT licence. The position, and the intent to adopt a DCO (git commit -s) rather than a CLA if outside contributors begin submitting non-trivial changes, is stated at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#contribution-licensing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md — who decides, how a decision is made, how disagreement is resolved, how a change gets in, and how someone becomes a maintainer.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, in the standard top-level location, and linked from CONTRIBUTING.md.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities — maintainer, contributor and security reporter, what each is responsible for, and who holds the maintainer role. It states plainly that there is currently one person in it.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity-of-access — what survives the maintainer becoming unavailable (public MIT source, complete history in every clone, tagged releases, a compiler and dependency graph pinned so a fork can rebuild the exact artifact), and what is genuinely single-owner. The single point of failure is named rather than papered over.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1: one maintainer. This is stated rather than hidden, together with what survives their loss and how a fork continues, at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#continuity-of-access. Adding a second maintainer is item 5 on https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ROADMAP.md and is the single change that would most improve this project's resilience.


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ROADMAP.md states what the project intends to do over the next year (graph fidelity, the file-size split epic, making the supply-chain assurance real on a published release, holding coverage as a gate, and the badge levels) and has an explicit section on what it will not do — no code writing, no PRD generation, no network at index time, no model runtime.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline#architecture documents the high-level design: the transport-to-handler-to-core layering, every core module and its responsibility, the graph-per-finding storage model and why it was chosen, and the address-space configuration with its measured derivation. The trust boundaries between those components are enumerated in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/SECURITY.md states what a user can and cannot expect: exactly what the tool reads, what assurance is offered over the artifact, and the limits stated rather than implied. The argument that those requirements are met, with its trust boundaries and residual risks, is at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline#getting-started — prerequisites, clone and build, register the MCP server, and a first run that exercises the handshake over stdio, with a copy-pasteable JSON-RPC call.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is corrected in the same pull request as the change, and version pins are machine-checked rather than hand-maintained (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/scripts/check_marketplace_pins.py runs in CI and fails on a stale pin). Numeric claims are no longer hand-maintained either: https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/scripts/check_doc_claims.py runs in the required cargo test job and fails when the README's advertised tool count, tool names, language count, test count or coverage percentage disagrees with the tool registry, the Language enum, the suite's own tally or the coverage job, and when the repository-layout tree names a path that does not exist. It was written after drift was found by hand (an advertised 434 tests against a 947-test suite) and it immediately caught four more: 24 advertised tools against 26 registered, 10 languages against 11, 16 hidden tools against 18, and two registered tools that no section documented. All were fixed and the scale table was re-measured on the lbug version actually depended on, closing https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/issues/161.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository front page identifies and hyperlinks its achievements as badges: the OpenSSF Best Practices badge for this project (https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13845, live in the README badge row and linked back to the project page), alongside licence, test count, measured coverage, tool count and language count. https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline#readme. Release-by-release achievements are recorded in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The project results have no graphical user interface: the software is an MCP server speaking stdio, and its output is JSON and Markdown that the consuming host renders, so the host's own accessibility settings apply. The project site is GitHub, and the documentation is Markdown with text alternatives on its images (the README banner carries an alt attribute).


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    The software's user-facing strings — tool descriptions, error messages, diagnostics — are English literals and are not externalized for localization. The code it indexes is unaffected (identifiers and paths are passed through unchanged in whatever language the user writes, and ten source languages are supported), but the software itself has not been internationalized and is reported as such rather than claimed.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project operates no site of its own that authenticates external users. The repository, the issue tracker and the release downloads are hosted on GitHub, and the software stores no passwords for inbound authentication.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    The support policy is stated at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/SECURITY.md — the latest minor release on main receives security patches. The upgrade path is a reinstall (cargo install ai-architect-mcp, a new release tarball, or the plugin pin moving), and there is no user-authored persisted state to migrate: graph artifacts are derived data, regenerated by re-indexing. Breaking changes are recorded per release in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, with structured templates for bug reports, enhancement requests and audit findings: https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    No vulnerability has been reported and resolved in the last 12 months, so there is no reporter to credit. The standing commitment to credit reporters in the release notes for the patched version, unless they request anonymity, is at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/SECURITY.md#recognition


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/SECURITY.md#response-sla documents the response process: a per-severity first-response and patch SLA, and a five-step coordinated-disclosure timeline from private report to public advisory, including the default 30-day disclosure window and reporter credit.


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    The primary language is Rust; the standard is rustfmt plus the project-specific rules named at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-standards-excerpt, which cites the full zetetic coding standards it derives from (no warnings, no unjustified unwrap/expect, no unsafe without a safety comment, sourced constants, file and function size caps, Result over panics at API boundaries).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Automatically enforced by two FLOSS tools as required status checks on every push and pull request: cargo fmt --all --check for formatting and cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings for the lint rules (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml). Exceptions must be a single #[allow(...)] with an inline justification, per CONTRIBUTING.md.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    Native binaries are produced, and the standard variables are honoured rather than replaced. Cargo passes RUSTFLAGS through to rustc, and the C/C++ dependencies (the tree-sitter runtime, zstd, the LadybugDB core) build through the cc crate, which reads CC, CFLAGS, CXX and CXXFLAGS. Nothing in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.cargo/config.toml or the workflows overrides them — the release job only adds ZSTD_SYS_USE_PKG_CONFIG, which extends the build environment rather than replacing a user-provided value.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    Debugging information is controlled by the Cargo profile and honoured by cargo build and cargo install, which is how a developer or packager builds this project; nothing in the build system discards it. Disclosure: the release workflow runs a best-effort strip on the packaged tarball binary for download size (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml), so the prebuilt artifact is stripped. A user who needs symbols builds from source with the toolchain pinned in rust-toolchain.toml and gets an identical binary — see build_repeatable.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    One Cargo workspace with a single, accurate dependency graph across all six members (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/Cargo.toml). Cargo resolves cross-member dependencies itself; there is no recursive make and no per-subdirectory independent build.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    Measured, not assumed. The compiler is pinned in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/rust-toolchain.toml (1.95.0) and the dependency graph in Cargo.lock. On 2026-07-27 (macOS aarch64, rustc 1.95.0), cargo build --release --bin automatised-pipeline produced sha256 5b3dcc46f4dc2fcbd0969fa1b27ff75ce576b75ce2e833a9aee8977246df8650; the target directory was then deleted and the build repeated from scratch, producing the identical digest. Stated limit: the target path is embedded, so a build into a different CARGO_TARGET_DIR differs (389394362d5e...); bit-identity across different paths would additionally require --remap-path-prefix, which is not configured today.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Three commonly-used conventions, all documented at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline#getting-started: the language package manager (cargo install ai-architect-mcp, uninstall with cargo uninstall), a prebuilt platform tarball from the GitHub release, and the .mcpb bundle / plugin marketplace entry that MCP hosts install and remove through their own UI.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Installation goes through cargo, which honours the standard conventions for install location: --root and CARGO_INSTALL_ROOT select the destination, CARGO_HOME relocates the default. No bespoke prefix handling is introduced.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    git clone then cargo build and cargo test installs every dependency, the test fixtures and the test environment in one commonly-used command each — cargo resolves the whole graph from the committed Cargo.lock. Documented at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dev-setup


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Declared in a computer-processable form and version-locked: https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/Cargo.toml with the rationale for each direct crate, and Cargo.lock pinning the full transitive graph. A CycloneDX SBOM of that graph is generated at release time by https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Two independent mechanisms. cargo audit and cargo deny run daily against the RUSTSEC database and block on any advisory that is not explicitly accepted with a written reason (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml, https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/deny.toml). Dependabot opens weekly grouped update PRs for both cargo and github-actions (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml). The one advisory currently in the tree is analysed as unexploitable here and blocked upstream, with the evidence written into deny.toml. GitHub's own Dependabot alerts and security updates were enabled on 2026-07-28, so a newly published advisory raises an alert and an upgrade PR without waiting for the next scheduled audit run. Verify: gh api repos/cdeust/automatised-pipeline --jq '.security_and_analysis.dependabot_security_updates.status' returns enabled, and gh api repos/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/vulnerability-alerts returns HTTP 204.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    No vendored, forked or convenience-copied component. Every external component is a normal versioned crate resolved by cargo from crates.io (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/deny.toml denies unknown registries and unknown git sources), so updating one is a version bump in Cargo.toml or an automated Dependabot PR.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The stack is current: the pinned toolchain is Rust 1.95.0, and the load-bearing dependencies are on their current majors (tantivy 0.26.1, lbug 0.18.3, tree-sitter 0.25 with ABI-15 grammars). No deprecated or obsolete API is relied on. The single frozen transitive pin (cxx 1.0.138, held by lbug's exact requirement) is documented with the upstream evidence in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/deny.toml rather than left as unexplained drift.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    Every push to main and every pull request runs the full suite plus the structural graph-accuracy gate, and both are required status checks that report pass or fail on the PR: https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml. The per-stage tests/*_integration.rs suites drive the pipeline end to end against fixture data, and several spawn a real process and exercise the stdio wire protocol.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Well above 50%: 34 test files in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/tree/main/tests carry the issue number of the defect they regress-test in their header, covering the bugs fixed over the last six months (for example #16 Cypher injection, #57 coverage honesty, #92 type-usage edges, #148 fuzz OOM, #143 disk-full diagnostics). The rule that a bug fix ships with a test that fails on the pre-fix code is written at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing-policy-mandatory


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Enforced, not merely measured: the cargo llvm-cov (80% line floor) job in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml runs cargo llvm-cov --workspace on every pull request and every push to main and fails the build below --fail-under-lines 80. It is a required status check on main, so a change that drops coverage under the threshold cannot merge. Latest measurement from that job: 87.73% line coverage on the Linux CI runner, the figure the badge answers to (the same workspace measures 86.83% on macOS aarch64 — see the note on platform variance in the #160 entry) — up from 81.56% after issue #169 covered the five MCP handler modules that had 0% (verification_ops, verification_core, prd_handlers, symbol_handlers) or 43.83% (search_context_handlers). The README badge is machine-checked against the same job by https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/scripts/check_doc_claims.py, which fails the build if the advertised figure overstates the measured one — so this answer cannot silently become false the way it could when the number came from a hand-run command.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    The formal written policy is at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing-policy-mandatory: new functionality MUST ship with tests in the same pull request, every bug fix MUST ship a regression test that fails on the pre-fix code, a defence that only a reviewer enforces MUST be replaced by a mechanical guard, and coverage MUST NOT regress below 80%. The consequence is stated — a PR that adds behaviour and no test is not ready for review.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    The requirement is documented for contributors at https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#testing-policy-mandatory


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Maximally strict and enforced, not merely enabled: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings plus cargo fmt --all --check run as a required status check on every push and pull request (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml, the clippy job). Allow-attributes require an inline justification per https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#coding-standards-excerpt


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md Claim 4 maps each principle to code: fail-safe defaults and allowlisting (validate_safe_id accepts only [A-Za-z0-9._-] and rejects empty, over-long, leading-dot and .. ids; require_absolute rejects relative paths and any parent-dir component), complete mediation (validation sits at the single boundary every tool call crosses, so a new tool cannot forget it), economy of mechanism (one escaping function, one size-config resolver, one response budget, each with its own tests), and least privilege (every workflow declares contents: read and elevates only where it must, which is why Scorecard's Token-Permissions check scores 10).


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No security mechanism depends on cryptography, so there is no default algorithm choice whose weakening would matter. See the crypto_working justification for the two non-security hash uses.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    No security mechanism depends on a cryptographic algorithm, so there is no algorithm choice for a user to switch. The two hashes in the tree are used for a local integrity digest and for content addressing.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    The software processes no authentication credentials and no private cryptographic keys. It authenticates nothing and connects to nothing.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    The software performs no network communication. It speaks MCP over stdio and opens no socket; indexing is entirely local. Verified rather than assumed: cargo tree -e normal resolves 172 crates and none of them is reqwest, hyper, ureq, curl, tokio, async-std, rustls or openssl (checked 2026-07-27), and the exclusion of an HTTP client is a stated design decision in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline#dependencies


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The software does not use TLS; it performs no network communication at all. See crypto_used_network.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    The software does not use TLS, so there is no certificate verification to perform. See crypto_used_network.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    The software does not use TLS and sends no HTTP headers, private or otherwise. See crypto_used_network.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Met as of v0.8.3, measured 2026-07-29. Every release asset carries a provenance attestation AND publishes the Sigstore bundle beside it: gh attestation verify <asset> --repo cdeust/automatised-pipeline succeeds for all three platform tarballs, the .mcpb and the CycloneDX SBOM, and the release page carries a sibling <asset>.sigstore.json for each. Publishing the bundle is what makes the signature visible at all to an offline consumer and to Scorecard, whose Signed-Releases check scores on the presence of such an asset rather than on the attestation API (ossf/scorecard docs/checks.md). Release run 30402899199. The windows-x86_64 asset is absent from v0.8.3 — its build failed on an MSVC link error, tracked as issue #176 — so this criterion is answered for the assets that shipped, not for a platform that did not.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Release tags are annotated but not cryptographically signed (git tag -v v0.8.4 reports no signature). Release ARTIFACTS are covered instead, which is where the tampering risk actually lands: each carries a SHA-256 companion, a Sigstore build-provenance attestation verified by gh attestation verify, and the attestation bundle published beside it as <asset>.sigstore.json. This matches the posture of the sibling project cdeust/prd-spec-generator, whose v0.6.1 tag is likewise annotated-and-unsigned with artifact-level coverage answering the criterion. See https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    All input from potentially untrusted sources is checked against an allowlist at the boundary it crosses. Tool arguments: validate_safe_id accepts only [A-Za-z0-9._-]+ with a length cap and rejects empty, leading-dot and .. ids; require_absolute rejects relative paths and any parent-dir component; each tool rejects a missing required field with a named error rather than a default. Repository content: symbol names and paths derived from indexed files pass through the single graph_store::cypher_str escaping choke point, whose reintroduction guard is https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/tests/no_naive_cypher_escape.rs, and parser input is size- and time-bounded. Responses are budgeted to a derived 100,000-character cap (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/src/response_budget.rs). The full argument is Claims 1, 3 and 4 of https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    This criterion counts mechanisms such as HTTP response headers or compiler hardening flags, and explicitly excludes least privilege. No such flag is configured: the release profile uses Cargo's defaults, and the software serves no HTTP surface for a Content Security Policy to apply to. The protections it does have are of other kinds — memory safety by construction with exactly one audited unsafe block in src/, overflow-checks and debug-assertions enabled in the fuzz profile, bounded responses, bounded parse input and a bounded database reservation — and they are described where they belong, in https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md, rather than counted here as hardening they are not.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/docs/ASSURANCE-CASE.md — the threat model (what the tool reads, why its input is untrusted, what privileges it runs with), a table of the six trust boundaries and where each is mediated, five claims with the evidence and the stated limit of each, an explicit argument that secure design principles are applied, and a table mapping each common implementation weakness class to what counters it and what residual risk remains. It closes with what the case does not claim.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL runs with queries: security-and-quality, which includes the common-vulnerability query packs, over the rust and actions languages: https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/.github/workflows/codeql.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The fuzz targets run under AddressSanitizer: cargo-fuzz's --sanitizer option defaults to address (rust-fuzz/cargo-fuzz, src/options.rs) and the workflow does not override it. The fuzz profile also keeps debug-assertions and overflow-checks on (https://github.com/cdeust/automatised-pipeline/blob/main/fuzz/Cargo.toml), so a violated invariant becomes a crash the fuzzer can find. This matters here because the parser runtime underneath is C.



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Project badge entry owned by: Clement.
Entry created on 2026-07-27 22:30:28 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-04 21:20:03 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-02 23:40:22 UTC.