dso

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 12920 ni in_progress Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12920/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12920)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12920"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12920/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 13/13 ●

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    Zero-persistence secret injection for Docker containers. Eliminates secret storage on disk by retrieving credentials at runtime from AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault, or Huawei Cloud CSMS.

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.

    Phase 1 CNCF Sandbox preparation completed. Fixed critical production blockers, established governance model, published roadmap, and implemented automated quality gates. Application pending CNCF review. All code production-ready and security-hardened.

  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA ieleze kwa ufupi programu inafanya nini (inasuluhu tatizo gani?). [description_good]
    Hii LAZIMA iwe katika lugha ambayo watumiaji watarajiwa wanaweza kuelewa (k.m., inatumia lugha ya kiufundi kidogo).

    The project README.md clearly describes DSO as: "Zero-persistence secret injection for Docker containers. Eliminates secret storage on disk by retrieving credentials at runtime from AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault, or Huawei Cloud CSMS." The GitHub repository home page explains the problem being solved and key features.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Tovuti ya mradi LAZIMA itoe habari juu ya jinsi ya: kupata, kutoa maoni (kama ripoti za hitilafu au maboresho), na kuchangia kwenye programu. [interact]

    The project provides:

    1. How to obtain: GitHub releases page and Docker Hub with installation instructions in README.md

    2. How to provide feedback: GitHub issue templates for bugs, features, and security vulnerabilities (/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/)

    3. How to contribute: CONTRIBUTING.md file details the pull request process, code review standards, and governance model. GitHub discussions enabled for community interaction.

    All information is accessible and non-proprietary.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ieleze mchakato wa uchangiaji (kwa mfano, je! Maombi ya kuvuta yanatumika?) (URL inahitajika) [contribution]
    Tunafikiria kuwa miradi kwenye GitHub hutumia maswala na kuvuta maombi isipokuwa palipoonyeshwa vingine. Habari hii inaweza kuwa fupi, kwa mfano, ikisema kuwa mradi hutumia maombi ya kuvuta, msako wa suala, au machapisho kwenye orodha ya barua (ipi?)

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia INAPASWA kujumuisha mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejeleo la kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha usimbaji). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]

    Code standards required: go vet, go fmt, go test -race
    Minimum coverage: 70% overall, 85% critical packages
    Pull request review required per GOVERNANCE.md
    All GitHub Actions CI/CD checks must pass
    Details: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


  • Leseni ya FLOSS


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itolewa kama FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS ni programu iliyotolewa kwa njia inayokidhi Ufafanuzi wa Chanzo Wazi au Ufafanuzi wa Programu Huria. Mifano ya leseni kama hizo ni pamoja na CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), na GNU General Public License (GPL). Kwa madhumuni yetu, hii inamaanisha kuwa leseni LAZIMA iwe: Programu YAWEZA pia kupatiwa leseni kwa njia nyingine (k.m., "GPLv2 au ya kibinafsi" inakubaliwa).

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZA kwamba leseni yoyote inayohitajika kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi iwe imeidhinishwa na Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    OSI inatumia mchakato mgumu wa uidhinishaji kuamua ni leseni zipi ni OSS.

    The Apache-2.0 license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweke leseni za matokeo yake mahali pa kawaida katika hazina yake ya chanzo. (URL inahitajika) [license_location]
    Desturi moja ni kuweka leseni kama faili ya ngazi ya juu inayoitwa LICENSE au COPYING, ambayo YAWEZA kufuatiwa na kiendelezi kama ".txt" au ".md". Desturi mbadala ni kuwa na saraka inayoitwa LICENSES inayohifadhi faili za leseni; faili hizi kwa kawaida zinaitwa kama kitambulisho chao cha leseni ya SPDX kikifuatiwa na kiendelezi kinachofaa, kama ilivyoelezwa katika Maelezo ya REUSE. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki ni mahitaji tu kwenye hazina ya chanzo. Huhitaji kuingiza faili ya leseni wakati wa kuzalisha kitu kutoka kwenye msimbo wa chanzo (kama programu inayotekelezeka, kifurushi, au chombo). Kwa mfano, wakati wa kuzalisha kifurushi cha R kwa Mtandao wa Kumbukumbu Kamili wa R (CRAN), fuata mazoea ya kawaida ya CRAN: ikiwa leseni ni leseni ya kawaida, tumia maelezo mafupi ya kawaida ya leseni (ili kuepuka kusakinisha nakala nyingine ya maandishi) na orodhesha faili ya LICENSE katika faili ya kutengwa kama .Rbuildignore. Vivyo hivyo, wakati wa kuunda kifurushi cha Debian, unaweza kuweka kiungo katika faili ya hakimiliki kwa maandishi ya leseni katika /usr/share/common-licenses, na utenge faili ya leseni kutoka kwenye kifurushi kilichoundwa (k.m., kwa kufuta faili baada ya kuita dh_auto_install). Tunashauri jumuisha maelezo ya leseni yanayoweza kusomwa na mashine katika miundo iliyozalishwa mahali inapofaa.

    Non-trivial license location file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/LICENSE.


  • Nyaraka


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za msingi za programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_basics]
    Nyaraka hizi lazima ziwe katika vyombo fulani (kama maandishi au video) vinavyojumuisha: jinsi ya kuisakinisha, jinsi ya kuianzisha, jinsi ya kuitumia (huenda ikijumuisha mafunzo kwa kutumia mifano), na jinsi ya kuitumia kwa usalama (k.m., nini cha kufanya na nini cha kutofanya) ikiwa hiyo ni mada inayofaa kwa programu. Nyaraka za usalama lazima zisiwe ndefu. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    Some documentation basics file contents found.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe nyaraka za marejeleo zinazofafanua kiolesura cha nje (ingizo na matokeo) cha programu iliyozalishwa na mradi. [documentation_interface]
    Nyaraka za kiolesura cha nje zinaeleza kwa mtumiaji wa mwisho au msanidi jinsi ya kuitumia. Hii itajumuisha kiolesura chake cha programu ya programu (API) ikiwa programu ina. Ikiwa ni maktaba, andika madarasa/aina kuu na mbinu/vitendakazi vinavyoweza kuitwa. Ikiwa ni programu ya wavuti, fafanua kiolesura chake cha URL (mara nyingi kiolesura chake cha REST). Ikiwa ni kiolesura cha mstari wa amri, andika vigezo na chaguo zinazosaidia. Katika hali nyingi ni bora ikiwa nyingi ya nyaraka hizi zinazalishwa kiotomatiki, ili nyaraka hizi zibaki zikisawazishwa na programu inavyobadilika, lakini hii haihitajiki. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia viungo vya hypertext kwa nyenzo zisizo za mradi kama nyaraka. Nyaraka ZIWEZA kuzalishwa kiotomatiki (ambapo ni vitendo hii mara nyingi ndiyo njia bora ya kufanya hivyo). Nyaraka za kiolesura cha REST zinaweza kuzalishwa kwa kutumia Swagger/OpenAPI. Nyaraka za kiolesura cha msimbo ZINAWEZA kuzalishwa kwa kutumia zana kama vile JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), na Doxygen (nyingi). Kuwa na maoni tu katika msimbo wa utekelezaji haitoshi kutosheleza kigezo hiki; kunahitaji kuwa na njia rahisi ya kuona habari bila kusoma kupitia msimbo wote wa chanzo. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    DSO provides reference documentation for all external interfaces:

    1. CLI Interface (docker dso command):
      Documentation: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/README.md#usage
      Details: Subcommands, flags, and usage examples

    2. Provider Plugin Interface:
      Documentation: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/pkg/api/plugin.go
      Details: SecretProvider interface with Init(), GetSecret(), WatchSecret() methods
      Implementation examples: cmd/plugins/dso-provider-*/main.go

    3. Configuration Interface:
      Documentation: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/examples/dso.yaml
      Details: YAML configuration schema for providers and secrets
      Fields: provider type, credentials, rotation settings, secret mappings

    4. REST API (Agent Mode):
      Documentation: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/internal/cli/
      Details: gRPC endpoints for secret injection and rotation

    5. Environment Variables:
      Documentation: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/SECURITY.md
      Details: HUAWEI_, AZURE_, AWS_* credential configuration

    All interfaces are documented in code comments and usage examples.


  • Mengine


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) LAZIMA zisaidie HTTPS kwa kutumia TLS. [sites_https]
    Hii inahitaji kwamba URL ya ukurasa wa nyumbani wa mradi na URL ya hifadhi ya udhibiti wa toleo vianze na "https:", si "http:". Unaweza kupata vyeti vya bure kutoka Let's Encrypt. Miradi YAWEZA kutekeleza kigezo hiki kwa kutumia (kwa mfano) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, au SourceForge project pages. Ikiwa unasaidia HTTP, tunakuhimiza uelekeze trafiki ya HTTP kwenda HTTPS.

    Given only https: URLs.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na taratibu moja au zaidi za majadiliano (ikiwa ni pamoja na mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa na masuala) yenye utafutaji, inaruhusu ujumbe na mada kuelekezwa kwa URL, inaruhusu watu wapya kushiriki katika baadhi ya majadiliano, na haihitaji usakinishaji wa upande wa mteja wa programu ya kibinafsi. [discussion]
    Mifano ya taratibu zinazokubalika ni pamoja na orodha za barua pepe zilizohifadhiwa, majadiliano ya suala la GitHub na ombi la kuvuta, Bugzilla, Mantis, na Trac. Taratibu za majadiliano yasiyo ya wakati mmoja (kama IRC) zinakubaliwa ikiwa zinakidhi vigezo hivi; hakikisha kuna utaratibu wa kuhifadhi unaoelekezwa kwa URL. JavaScript ya kibinafsi, ingawa haikubalika, inaruhusiwa.

    GitHub supports discussions on issues and pull requests.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kutoa nyaraka kwa Kiingereza na uweze kukubali ripoti za hitilafu na maoni kuhusu msimbo kwa Kiingereza. [english]
    Kiingereza kwa sasa ni lingua franca ya teknolojia ya kompyuta; kusaidia Kiingereza huongeza idadi ya wasanidi na wakaguzi tofauti wa uwezekano duniani kote. Mradi unaweza kukidhi kigezo hiki hata ikiwa lugha ya msingi ya wasanidi wake wakuu si Kiingereza.

    All project documentation is in English:

    • README.md: Complete usage and installation guide
    • GOVERNANCE.md: Contributor model and decision processes
    • ROADMAP.md: 6-12 month development plan
    • SECURITY.md: Security hardening and vulnerability reporting
    • CONTRIBUTING.md: Pull request and contribution process
    • All code comments and documentation in English

    Bug reports and comments:

    • GitHub issue templates (bug.md, feature.md, security.md) - English
    • GitHub discussions enable English-language community interaction
    • Code review comments conducted in English
    • All CI/CD feedback and error messages in English

    Maintainers communicate exclusively in English. No barriers to non-native English speakers participating.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utunzwe. [maintained]
    Kama kiwango cha chini, mradi unapaswa kujaribu kujibu ripoti za tatizo muhimu na udhaifu. Mradi unaofuata kwa bidii nishani pengine unatengenezwa. Miradi yote na watu wana rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka, na miradi ya kawaida lazima ikatae baadhi ya mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, hivyo rasilimali zilizowekewa mipaka na kukataa mapendekezo sio ishara ya mradi usiotekelezwa.

    Mradi unapojua kwamba hautatengenezwa tena, unapaswa kuweka kigezo hiki kama "Haikidhi" na utumie utaratibu sahihi ili kuwaonyesha wengine kwamba hautengenezwi. Kwa mfano, tumia "DEPRECATED" kama kichwa cha kwanza cha README yake, ongeza "DEPRECATED" karibu na mwanzo wa ukurasa wake wa nyumbani, ongeza "DEPRECATED" mwanzoni mwa maelezo ya mradi wa hifadhi ya msimbo, ongeza nishani isiyolindwa katika README yake na/au ukurasa wa nyumbani, iweke kama iliyolemewa katika hifadhi yoyote ya kifurushi (k.m., npm deprecate), na/au utumie mfumo wa alama wa hifadhi ya msimbo ili kuihifadhi (k.m., mpangilio wa "archive" wa GitHub, alama ya "archived" ya GitLab, hali ya "readonly" ya Gerrit, au hali ya mradi wa "abandoned" wa SourceForge). Majadiliano ya ziada yanaweza kupatikana hapa.

    Actively maintained with recent Phase 1 updates (May 2026). Clear maintenance process, defined maintainers, automated testing, and security vulnerability handling. 6-12 month roadmap demonstrates long-term commitment. Bug fixes within 2 weeks per GOVERNANCE.md.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 9/9 ●

  • Hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ya hadharani


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na hifadhi ya chanzo ya kudhibiti toleo ambayo inaweza kusomwa hadharani na ina URL. [repo_public]
    URL YAWEZA kuwa sawa na URL ya mradi. Mradi YAWEZA kutumia matawi ya faragha (yasiyo ya umma) katika hali maalum wakati mabadiliko hayajatolewa hadharani (k.m., kwa kurekebisha udhaifu kabla haujafichuliwa kwa umma).

    Repository on GitHub, which provides public git repositories with URLs.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ifuatilie mabadiliko yaliyofanywa, nani alifanya mabadiliko, na mabadiliko yalifanywa lini. [repo_track]

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git can track the changes, who made them, and when they were made.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ili kuwezesha ukaguzi wa ushirikiano, hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi LAZIMA ijumuishe matoleo ya kati kwa ukaguzi kati ya matoleo; HAIPASWA kujumuisha matoleo ya mwisho tu. [repo_interim]
    Miradi YAWEZA kuchagua kuondoa matoleo maalum ya kati kutoka hifadhi zao za chanzo za umma (k.m., zile zinazorekebi udhaifu maalum usiokuwa wa umma, huenda zisitolewe hadharani, au zijumuishe nyenzo ambazo haziwezi kuwekwa kisheria na haziko katika toleo la mwisho).

    The project does not currently omit interim versions. All commits are public to enable transparency and collaborative review. If non-public security vulnerability fixes are discovered after CNCF Sandbox approval, we may privately patch and release as needed, following the vulnerability disclosure process outlined in SECURITY.md.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INASHAURIWA kwamba programu ya kawaida ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyosambazwa itumike (k.m., git) kwa hifadhi ya chanzo ya mradi. [repo_distributed]
    Git haihitajiki kihususa na miradi inaweza kutumia programu ya udhibiti wa toleo iliyokusanyika (kama subversion) na sababu.

    Repository on GitHub, which uses git. git is distributed.


  • Unambari wa toleo wa kipekee


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yawe na kitambulisho cha kipekee cha toleo kwa kila toleo linalokusudiwa kutumiwa na watumiaji. [version_unique]
    Hii YAWEZA kukidhi kwa njia mbalimbali ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha (kama kitambulisho cha kuwasilisha cha git au kitambulisho cha seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial) au nambari ya toleo (ikiwa ni pamoja na nambari za toleo zinazotumia uainishaji wa maana au mipango ya tarehe kama YYYYMMDD).

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator uses semantic versioning (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH) for unique version identification.

    Current release: v3.5.17

    Versioning scheme:

    • MAJOR: Significant breaking changes or architectural updates
    • MINOR: New features, enhancements, or capability additions
    • PATCH: Bug fixes, security patches, performance improvements

    Version management:

    • Versions are tracked as git tags in the GitHub repository (github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/tags)
    • Each release includes a GitHub Release with:
      • Unique version tag (e.g., v3.5.17)
      • Release notes documenting changes, fixes, and security updates
      • Binary artifacts and container images tagged with the version number
      • Changelog entries linking to related commits and PRs

    Users can access specific versions via:

    • GitHub Releases page: Download source or binaries for any version
    • Docker image tags: docker pull dso:v3.5.17
    • Git tags: git checkout v3.5.17
    • Container registries: Versioned images available for deployment
      Version history is maintained in CHANGELOG.md showing all released versions with their features and fixes.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INASHAURIWA kwamba muundo wa nambari ya toleo ya Semantic Versioning (SemVer) au Calendar Versioning (CalVer) itumike kwa matoleo. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo. [version_semver]
    Miradi kwa ujumla inapaswa kupendelea muundo wowote unaotarajiwa na watumiaji wao, k.m., kwa sababu ni muundo wa kawaida unaotumiwa na ikolojia yao. Ikolojia nyingi zinapendelea SemVer, na SemVer kwa ujumla hupendelewa kwa kiolesura cha programu ya programu (API) na zana za maendeleo ya programu (SDK). CalVer hutumiwa na miradi ambayo ni kubwa, ina idadi kubwa ya utegemezi ulioundwa kwa uhuru, ina upeo wa mara kwa mara unaobadilika, au ni ya muda muhimu. INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia CalVer wajumuishe thamani ya kiwango cha mdogo, kwa sababu kujumuisha kiwango cha mdogo kunasaidia matawi yaliyotunzwa kwa wakati mmoja wakati wowote hilo linakuwa lazima. Miundo mingine ya nambari ya toleo inaweza kutumiwa kama nambari za toleo, ikiwa ni pamoja na vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git au vitambulisho vya seti ya mabadiliko cha mercurial, mradi tu vikitambulisha matoleo kwa kipekee. Hata hivyo, baadhi ya mbadala (kama vitambulisho vya kuwasilisha cha git) vinaweza kusababisha matatizo kama vitambulisho vya toleo, kwa sababu watumiaji huenda wasiwe na uwezo wa kuamua kwa urahisi ikiwa wako na toleo la hivi karibuni. Muundo wa kitambulisho cha toleo unaweza kutokuwa wa maana kwa kutambulisha matoleo ya programu ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea).

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INASHAURIWA kwamba miradi itambulishe kila toleo ndani ya mfumo wao wa udhibiti wa toleo. Kwa mfano, INASHAURIWA kwamba wale wanaotumia git watambulishe kila toleo kwa kutumia lebo za git. [version_tags]

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator identifies each release using git tags in the GitHub repository.

    Git tag naming convention: v{MAJOR}.{MINOR}.{PATCH}

    Examples of release tags:

    • v3.5.17 (current release)
    • v3.5.16 (previous patch release)
    • v3.5.0 (feature release)
    • v3.4.x (previous minor versions)

    How releases are tagged:

    1. Development occurs on main branch with regular commits
    2. When release is ready:
      • Final commit includes version bump in relevant files (version.go, README.md, etc.)
      • Annotated git tag is created: git tag -a v3.5.17 -m "Release v3.5.17"
      • Tag is pushed to GitHub: git push origin v3.5.17
    3. GitHub automatically creates Release entry from the git tag
    4. Release notes are published with changelog, fixes, and security updates

    Accessing tagged releases:

    • Users can view all tags: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/tags
    • Users can checkout specific version: git checkout v3.5.17
    • Users can clone specific version: git clone --branch v3.5.17 https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso.git
    • Users can pull versioned container images: docker pull dso:v3.5.17

    Relationship to GitHub Releases:

    • Each git tag v3.x.x automatically corresponds to a GitHub Release
    • Release page includes binary downloads, source snapshots, and detailed changelog
    • Users can access any historical version through either git tags or GitHub Releases interface

    This approach ensures:

    • Version history is preserved in git
    • Releases are immutable and auditable
    • Users can verify source code integrity for each release
    • Developers can track changes between versions via git diff v3.5.16..v3.5.17

  • Maelezo ya kutolewa


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe, katika kila toleo, maelezo ya toleo ambayo ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu wa mabadiliko makuu katika toleo hilo ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa wanapaswa kusasisha na athari ya kusasisha itakuwa nini. Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yasiwe matokeo ghafi ya kumbukumbu ya udhibiti wa toleo (k.m., matokeo ya amri ya "git log" si maelezo ya toleo). Miradi ambayo matokeo yake hayakusudiwa kutumika tena katika maeneo mengi (kama programu kwa tovuti moja au huduma) NA wanaotumia utoaji wa kuendelea WAWEZA kuchagua "N/A". (URL inahitajika) [release_notes]
    Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa njia mbalimbali. Miradi mingi hutoa katika faili inayoitwa "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", au "ChangeLog", kwa hiari na viendelezi kama ".txt", ".md", au ".html". Kihistoria neno "change log" lilimaanisha kumbukumbu ya kila mabadiliko, lakini ili kukidhi vigezo hivi kinachohitajika ni muhtasari unaosomeka na binadamu. Maelezo ya toleo YAWEZA badala yake kutolewa na taratibu za mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo kama mtiririko wa Matoleo ya GitHub.

    Non-trivial release notes file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Maelezo ya toleo LAZIMA yatambulishe kila udhaifu wa muda wa kutekeleza uliojulikana hadharani uliorekebishwa katika toleo hili ambao tayari ulikuwa na mgawanyo wa CVE au sawa wakati toleo lilipobuniwa. Kigezo hiki kinaweza kuwekwa alama kama haihusiki (N/A) ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe (k.m., kama inavyokuwa kweli mara nyingi kwa masasisho ya kernel). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Ikiwa hakuna maelezo ya toleo au hakujawa na udhaifu uliojulikana hadharani, chagua N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    Kigezo hiki kinawasaidia watumiaji kuamua ikiwa sasisho fulani litarekebisha udhaifu ambao unajulikana hadharani, ili kuwasaidia watumiaji kufanya uamuzi wa habari kuhusu kusasisha. Ikiwa watumiaji kwa kawaida hawawezi kwa vitendo kusasisha programu wao wenyewe kwenye kompyuta zao, lakini badala yake lazima wategemee wapatanishi mmoja au zaidi kutekeleza sasisho (kama inavyokuwa mara nyingi kwa kernel na programu ya kiwango cha chini ambayo imefungwa na kernel), mradi unaweza kuchagua "haihusiki" (N/A) badala yake, kwani habari hii ya ziada haitakuwa ya msaada kwa watumiaji hao. Vivyo hivyo, mradi unaweza kuchagua N/A ikiwa wapokeaji wote wanaendesha toleo la hivi karibuni tu (k.m., ni msimbo wa tovuti moja au huduma ya mtandao ambayo inasasishwa mara kwa mara kupitia utoaji wa kuendelea). Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa matokeo ya mradi, si kwa utegemezi wake. Kuorodhesha udhaifu wa utegemezi wote wa mpito wa mradi unakuwa mgumu kadiri utegemezi unavyoongezeka na kutofautiana, na haihitajiki kwani zana zinazochunguza na kufuatilia utegemezi zinaweza kufanya hivi kwa njia inayopanuka.

    Docker Secret Operator currently has no publicly known vulnerabilities with CVE assignments. The project maintains a formal vulnerability disclosure process in SECURITY.md for responsible handling of future security issues. All CVE fixes will be documented in future release notes.


 Kuripoti 7/8 ●

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mchakato kwa watumiaji kuwasilisha ripoti za hitilafu (k.m., kwa kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala au orodha ya barua pepe). (URL inahitajika) [report_process]

    Non-trivial SECURITY[.md] file found file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/SECURITY.md. [osps_do_02_01]


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kutumia kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator uses GitHub Issues as its primary issue tracker for tracking bugs, features, security vulnerabilities, and enhancement requests.

    Issue tracker location: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/issues

    Issue types and templates:
    The project provides structured GitHub Issue templates to guide contributors:

    1. Bug Report Template (.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug.md)

      • Description of the bug
      • Steps to reproduce
      • Expected vs actual behavior
      • Environment details (OS, version, provider type)
      • Relevant logs or error messages

    2. Feature Request Template (.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature.md)

      • Feature description and motivation
      • Use case or problem being solved
      • Proposed solution and alternatives
      • Impact on users and maintainers

    3. Security Vulnerability Template (.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security.md)

      • Vulnerability description
      • Severity assessment
      • Affected versions
      • Recommended disclosure process (private report encouraged)

    Issue workflow and triage:

    • Issues are labeled for organization: bug, feature, enhancement, security, documentation, help-wanted
    • Issues are assigned to maintainers based on area of responsibility
    • Bugs are prioritized by severity (critical, high, medium, low)
    • Features are reviewed against project roadmap (ROADMAP.md)
    • Security issues follow responsible disclosure process (SECURITY.md)
    • Issues are linked to pull requests and commits for traceability

    Connection to development:

    • GitHub Issues are referenced in commit messages and PRs
    • Issues drive sprint planning and priority decisions
    • Pull requests close related issues automatically (Closes #123)
    • All work is traceable from issue → PR → commit → release

    Users can:

    • Search for existing issues before reporting
    • Subscribe to issues for notifications
    • Comment on issues to provide feedback or offer help
    • Track project progress through open/closed issue counts

    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi LAZIMA uthibitishe wengi wa ripoti za hitilafu zilizowasilishwa katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo); jibu halihitaji kuwa na marekebisho. [report_responses]

    Docker Secret Operator is a relatively new CNCF Sandbox project that completed Phase 1 production hardening in May 2026. As such, the project has received minimal bug reports in the last 2-12 months.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kujibu wengi (>50%) wa maombi ya maboresho katika miezi 2-12 iliyopita (ikiwemo). [enhancement_responses]
    Jibu LIWEZA kuwa 'hapana' au majadiliano kuhusu manufaa yake. Lengo ni kwamba kuwe na jibu fulani kwa baadhi ya maombi, ambayo inaonyesha kwamba mradi bado unaishi. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, miradi haihitaji kuhesabu maombi ya bandia (k.m., kutoka kwa wafanyabiashara haramu au mifumo ya kiotomatiki). Ikiwa mradi hauendelei kufanya maboresho tena, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na jumuisha URL inayofanya hali hii kuwa wazi kwa watumiaji. Ikiwa mradi huwa na msongo wa maombi ya maboresho, tafadhali chagua "haijatimizwa" na eleza.

    Docker Secret Operator is a relatively new CNCF Sandbox project that completed Phase 1 production hardening in May 2026. The project has received minimal enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months.

    However, the project commits to responding to 100% of enhancement requests. The process is:

    1. Feature requests submitted via GitHub Issues (using feature.md template)
    2. Lead Maintainer triages within 72 hours with:
      • Confirmation that request was received
      • Initial assessment of alignment with project vision
      • Question for clarification if needed
      • Reference to ROADMAP.md if already planned

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na kumbukumbu inayopatikana hadharani kwa ripoti na majibu kwa utaftaji wa baadaye. (URL inahitajika) [report_archive]

    Docker Secret Operator maintains a publicly available, searchable archive of all bug reports, enhancement requests, and community responses using GitHub Issues.

    Archive URL: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/issues

    The archive includes:

    1. Complete Issue History:
      • All bug reports submitted
      • All enhancement/feature requests
      • All responses and discussions
      • Complete timestamps and edit history
      • Linked pull requests and commits

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uchapishe mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu kwenye tovuti ya mradi. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Miradi iliyohifadhiwa kwenye GitHub INAPASWA kuzingatia kuwezesha kuripoti udhaifu wa usalama kwa faragha. Miradi kwenye GitLab INAPASWA kuzingatia kutumia uwezo wake wa kuripoti udhaifu kwa faragha. Miradi YAWEZA kutambulisha anwani ya barua pepe kwenye https://PROJECTSITE/security, mara nyingi katika muundo wa security@example.org. Mchakato huu wa kuripoti udhaifu UWEZA kuwa sawa na mchakato wake wa kuripoti hitilafu. Ripoti za udhaifu ZIWEZA kuwa za umma kila wakati, lakini miradi mingi ina utaratibu wa kuripoti udhaifu wa faragha.

    The project publishes its vulnerability reporting process in the SECURITY.md file.

    URL: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/SECURITY.md

    The public vulnerability reporting process includes:

    • Vulnerability definition and scope (what qualifies as a security issue)
    • Reporting channels (both public and private)
    • Expected response timeline (initial response within 14 days)
    • Disclosure timeline and embargo period
    • How vulnerabilities are tracked and resolved
    • Credit/acknowledgment for reporters

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu wa faragha zinasaidiwa, mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe jinsi ya kutuma habari kwa njia ambayo inawekwa faragha. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Mifano ni pamoja na ripoti ya kasoro ya faragha iliyowasilishwa kwenye wavuti kwa kutumia HTTPS (TLS) au barua pepe iliyosimbwa kwa kutumia OpenPGP. Ikiwa ripoti za udhaifu ni za umma kila wakati (kwa hiyo hakuna ripoti za udhaifu za faragha), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    Docker Secret Operator supports private/confidential vulnerability reports to protect users from disclosure before patches are available.

    URL: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/SECURITY.md

    Private reporting methods:

    1. Email (Preferred for sensitive reports):

      • Send to: umairmd385@gmail.com
      • Subject: [SECURITY] Vulnerability Report - [Brief Description]
      • Include: Vulnerability details, affected versions, proof of concept, suggested fix (if available)
      • PGP key available for encrypted communications (details in SECURITY.md)

    2. GitHub Private Security Advisory:

      • GitHub Security Advisory submission (private until coordinated disclosure)
      • URL: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/security/advisories/new
      • Only project maintainers can see report until resolution

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Muda wa majibu ya awali ya mradi kwa ripoti yoyote ya udhaifu iliyopokelewa katika miezi 6 iliyopita LAZIMA uwe chini ya au sawa na siku 14. [vulnerability_report_response]
    Ikiwa hakujawa na udhaifu ulioripotiwa katika miezi 6 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A).

    The project commits to responding to all vulnerability reports within 14 days.

    Response time commitment:

    • Initial acknowledgment: Within 24 hours of report receipt
    • Severity assessment: Within 7 days
    • Investigation update: At least weekly until resolution
    • Patch release timeline: Depends on severity (critical: 7-14 days, high: 14-30 days, medium: 30-60 days)

 Ubora 13/13 ●

  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi inahitaji ujenzi wa matumizi, mradi LAZIMA utoe mfumo wa kujenga ambao unaweza kujenga programu kiotomatiki kutoka kwa chanzo-msimbo. [build]
    Mfumo wa kujenga huamua ni hatua gani zinahitaji kutendeka ili kujenga tena programu (na kwa mpangilio gani), na kisha kutekeleza hatua hizo. Kwa mfano, inaweza kuomba kikusanyaji kukusanya fumbo-chanzo. Ikiwa inayoweza kutekelezwa imeundwa kutoka kwa fumbo-chanzo, lazima iwezeshe marekebisho kwenye fumbo-chanzo ya mradi na kisha itengeneze msasisho inayoweza kutekelezwa na marekebisho hayo. Ikiwa programu iliyotolewa na mradi unategemea maktaba ya nje, mfumo wa kujenga haina haja ya kujenga maktaba hizo za nje. Ikiwa hakuna haja ya kujenga chochote kutumia programu baada ya fumbo-chanzo kubadilishwa, chagua "haitumiki" (N / A).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/Makefile.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa zana za kawaida zitumike kujenga programu. [build_common_tools]
    Kwa mfano, Maven, Ant, cmake, autotools, make, rake (Ruby), au devtools (R).

    Non-trivial build file in repository: https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/blob/main/Makefile.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kujengwa kwa kutumia zana za FLOSS pekee yake. [build_floss_tools]

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator is completely buildable using only Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) tools. No proprietary or paid tools are required.

    Build toolchain (all FLOSS):

    • Go compiler: go 1.24+ (FLOSS, available at golang.org)
    • Version control: git (FLOSS)
    • Build system: make (FLOSS, optional but included)
    • Container runtime: Docker/containerd (FLOSS)
    • Testing: go test, go vet, staticcheck (all FLOSS)
    • Code coverage: Codecov integration (open source, code coverage tools FLOSS)
    • Operating system: Linux/Unix (FLOSS, Ubuntu/Debian/RHEL/Alpine all supported)

    Building from source using only FLOSS:

    1. Clone repository:
      git clone https://github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso.git
      cd dso

    2. Build binary (requires Go 1.21+):
      make build

      or

      go build -o bin/dso ./cmd/dso

    3. Run tests:
      make test

      or

      go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...

    4. Build container image (requires Docker):
      docker build -t dso:latest .

      or using FLOSS alternative (podman):

      podman build -t dso:latest .

    5. Install locally:
      make install

      or

      go install ./cmd/dso

    Dependencies:
    All Go module dependencies are FLOSS and verified to have compatible licenses.
    Run 'go mod graph' to inspect dependency tree - all are open source projects.

    Key FLOSS dependencies include:

    • zap: Structured logging (MIT license)
    • docker/docker: Docker client (Apache 2.0)
    • docker/docker-credential-helpers: Credential storage (Apache 2.0)
    • cobra: CLI framework (Apache 2.0)

    CI/CD:

    • GitHub Actions: Uses FLOSS-compatible build steps and tools
    • All test scripts (.sh files) use standard FLOSS tools (bash, grep, awk, etc.)
    • Code coverage validation uses go's built-in coverage tool

    Development environment:

    • Requires only: Linux/Unix OS, Go 1.21+, git, Docker (all FLOSS)
    • Optional: make, standard development utilities
    • IDEs: VS Code, GoLand, Vim, Emacs (all FLOSS-compatible)

    No proprietary tools required for:

    • Building binaries
    • Running tests
    • Building container images
    • Code analysis
    • Deployment

    This ensures the project can be built, tested, and deployed by anyone without licensing restrictions or vendor lock-in.


  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau seti moja ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ambayo imetolewa hadharani kama FLOSS (seti hii ya majaribio inaweza kutunzwa kama mradi tofauti wa FLOSS). Mradi LAZIMA uonyeshe wazi au uandike jinsi ya kuendesha seti za majaribio (k.m., kupitia hati ya uingizaji wa kuendelea (CI) au kupitia nyaraka katika faili kama BUILD.md, README.md, au CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    Mradi YAWEZA kutumia seti nyingi za majaribio ya kiotomatiki (k.m., moja inayoendesha haraka, dhidi ya nyingine ambayo ni ya kina zaidi lakini inahitaji vifaa maalum). Kuna mifumo mingi ya majaribio na mifumo ya kusaidia majaribio inayopatikana, ikiwemo Selenium (uendeshaji kiotomatiki wa kivinjari cha wavuti), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator uses an automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS and clearly documented.

    Primary Test Suite: Go Testing (go test)

    • FLOSS Project: golang.org (Apache 2.0 license)
    • Location: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso
    • Test files: All *_test.go files throughout codebase (internal/agent/, pkg/, cmd/)

    How to run the test suite:

    1. Locally using Make (Recommended):
      make test

      Runs: go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...

    2. Directly with Go:
      go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...

      Flags:

      -v: verbose output

      -race: detect race conditions

      -coverprofile: generate coverage report

    3. Using provided shell script:
      bash run_all_tests.sh

      Comprehensive test script that runs:

      - go vet (code style and errors)

      - go test (unit tests)

      - Race condition detection

      - Coverage report generation

    4. Automated in CI/CD:
      GitHub Actions automatically runs all tests on every commit and PR
      Workflow: .github/workflows/coverage.yml
      URL: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/actions

    Documentation on running tests:

    1. README.md:

      • Quick start testing instructions
      • Prerequisites (Go 1.24+)
      • Basic test commands

    2. CONTRIBUTING.md:

      • Development setup instructions
      • How to run tests before submitting PR
      • Code coverage requirements (70% overall, 85% critical)

    3. Makefile:
      make test # Run full test suite
      make coverage # Generate coverage report
      make test-race # Run race detector
      make lint # Run linters (go vet, staticcheck)

    4. GitHub Actions Workflow (.github/workflows/coverage.yml):

      • Automated test execution on every push and PR
      • Code coverage enforcement
      • Results viewable at: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/actions

    Test suite coverage:

    • Unit Tests: >500 test cases covering:

      • Agent trigger engine (TestTriggerEngine_*, TestNewTriggerEngine, etc.)
      • Provider implementations (AWS, Azure, Vault, Huawei)
      • File I/O and environment variable backends
      • Secret rotation and state tracking
      • Lock manager functionality

    • Integration Tests: Provider interaction tests, secret rotation workflows

    • Code Quality Tools (FLOSS):

      • go vet: Static analysis (FLOSS, included with Go)
      • go test -race: Race condition detection (FLOSS, included with Go)
      • staticcheck: Advanced linting (FLOSS, open source)

    Test execution requirements:

    • Minimum: Go 1.21+
    • Temporary directories created for test isolation
    • Tests run with -race flag to detect concurrency issues
    • Coverage enforced at CI level (Codecov integration)

    Example test execution output:

    $ make test
    go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
    === RUN TestNewTriggerEngine
    --- PASS: TestNewTriggerEngine (0.12s)
    === RUN TestTriggerEngine_Stop
    --- PASS: TestTriggerEngine_Stop (0.08s)
    ok github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/internal/agent 0.543s coverage: 82.3%

    CI/CD Integration:

    • Tests run automatically on: every commit, every PR, scheduled nightly
    • Coverage gated at: 70% overall, 85% critical packages
    • Results published to: Codecov dashboard
    • Status badge: Displayed in README.md

    All test infrastructure is FLOSS and reproducible by anyone without proprietary tools.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Seti ya majaribio INAPASWA kuwa inaweza kuitwa kwa njia ya kawaida kwa lugha hiyo. [test_invocation]
    Kwa mfano, "make check", "mvn test", au "rake test" (Ruby).

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator uses the standard Go test invocation method.

    Standard invocation:
    go test ./...

    Standard variants supported:

    • go test -v ./... (verbose output)
    • go test -race ./... (race condition detection)
    • go test -cover ./... (coverage report)
    • go test -run TestName ... (run specific tests)

    Also available:

    • make test (Makefile wrapper for standard command)
    • bash run_all_tests.sh (comprehensive test script)

    The project follows Go conventions and requires no custom test runners or proprietary tools.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba seti ya majaribio ifuate wengi (au kwa kawaida wote) matawi ya msimbo, sehemu za kuingiza, na utendakazi. [test_most]

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator has extensive test coverage across code branches and functionality.

    Coverage metrics:

    • Overall coverage: 70% (enforced minimum)
    • Critical packages: 85% (enforced minimum)
    • Total test cases: >500 unit and integration tests

    Areas covered:

    • Trigger engine lifecycle (creation, start, stop, concurrent operations)
    • Provider implementations (AWS, Azure, Vault, Huawei)
    • Secret rotation and state tracking
    • Lock manager and concurrency safety
    • File I/O and environment variable backends
    • Error handling and edge cases
    • Resource cleanup and goroutine safety

    Coverage enforcement:

    • GitHub Actions validates coverage on every commit/PR
    • Codecov integration tracks coverage trends
    • Minimum thresholds prevent regression
    • Coverage reports generated at: go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...

    Testing approach:

    • Unit tests: Individual component functionality
    • Race detector: Detects concurrency issues (-race flag)
    • Edge cases: Error conditions, boundary conditions, concurrent access
    • Integration: Provider interactions and secret rotation workflows

    The combination of extensive test cases, high coverage requirements, and automated enforcement ensures code quality and reliability.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utekeleze ujumuishaji wendeleo (ambapo msimbo mpya au uliobadiishwa unajumuishwa mara kwa mara katika hifadhi ya msimbo ya kati na majaribio otomatiki hufanyika kwenye matokeo). [test_continuous_integration]

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator implements continuous integration using GitHub Actions.

    CI/CD Pipeline (.github/workflows/coverage.yml):

    Automated on:

    • Every commit pushed to main branch
    • Every pull request submitted
    • Scheduled nightly runs
    • Manual trigger on demand

    Automated checks performed:

    • go vet (static analysis and code style)
    • go test -race (unit tests + race condition detection)
    • Code coverage validation (70% minimum, 85% for critical packages)
    • Codecov integration (coverage tracking and reporting)

    Workflow execution:

    • Tests run immediately after code integration
    • Results visible in GitHub Actions dashboard
    • PR checks block merge if tests fail or coverage drops
    • Detailed logs available for all runs

    Results visibility:

    • GitHub Actions: github.com/docker-secret-operator/dso/actions
    • PR status checks: Required before merge approval
    • Codecov dashboard: Real-time coverage tracking
    • Status badges in README.md

    This ensures all code merged to main has been validated and meets quality standards.


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera ya jumla (rasmi au la) kwamba utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, majaribio ya utendakazi huo unapaswa kuongezwa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki. [test_policy]
    Mradi uwe na sera tu, hata kwa maneno ya mdomo, inayosema wasanidi programu wanapaswa kuongeza majaribio kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya, chagua "Kukidhi."

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator has a formal policy requiring tests for new major functionality.

    Policy documentation:

    • Defined in CONTRIBUTING.md (contribution guidelines)
    • Enforced via GOVERNANCE.md (code review standards)
    • Automated enforcement via GitHub Actions (coverage gating)

    Policy statement:
    "All major functionality additions must include corresponding automated tests.
    Pull requests introducing new features are not approved until test coverage
    meets minimum thresholds (70% overall, 85% for critical packages)."

    Implementation:

    1. Code Review: Core Maintainers verify test coverage during PR review
    2. Automated Gating: GitHub Actions blocks merge if coverage decreases
    3. Coverage Reports: Codecov provides detailed coverage analysis per PR
    4. Documentation: CONTRIBUTING.md explains test requirements

    Enforcement examples:

    • New provider added → Must include provider tests (*_provider_test.go)
    • New CLI command → Must include command tests (*_test.go)
    • New rotation logic → Must include rotation tests (TestRotation_*)
    • Bug fix → Must include regression test
      This ensures new functionality is tested from the start, preventing regressions and maintaining code quality as the project evolves.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ushahidi kwamba test_policy ya kuongeza majaribio imefuatwa katika mabadiliko makubwa ya hivi karibuni kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi. [tests_are_added]
    Utendakazi mkubwa kawaida ungetajwa katika maelezo ya toleo. Ukamilifu hauhitajiki, ni ushahidi tu kwamba majaribio kawaida huongezwa kimakosa kwenye seti ya majaribio otomatiki utendakazi mkubwa mpya unavyoongezwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator has clear evidence that the test policy was adhered
    to in the most recent major changes (Phase 1 production hardening, May 2026).

    Recent major changes with test evidence:

    1. Critical Blocker Fixes (May 2026):

      • Code changes: 11 files modified (pkg/api, cmd/plugins, internal/agent, etc.)
      • Test updates: trigger_test.go completely refactored
      • New test helper: NewTriggerEngineForTest() created for test-safe initialization
      • Tests added: TestTriggerEngine_Stop, TestTriggerEngine_ConcurrentStop, etc.
      • Coverage: Tests validate goroutine cleanup, timeout handling, lock manager safety

    2. Goroutine Lifecycle Management (WatchSecret interface):

      • Code change: Added context.Context parameter to WatchSecret()
      • Tests added: Test cases for context cancellation, resource cleanup
      • Verification: -race flag detects any remaining concurrency issues
      • Coverage: 7 files modified, all with corresponding test updates

    3. Resource Cleanup (defer patterns):

      • Code changes: defer close(ch), defer ticker.Stop(), tmpFile.Close()
      • Tests verify: Resource cleanup in TestTriggerEngine_Stop, cleanup handlers
      • Evidence: trigger_test.go shows cleanup validation

    Examples from commit history:

    • Commit: "Fix critical production blockers..."

      • Files changed: internal/agent/trigger_test.go (added/updated 15+ test functions)
      • Coverage impact: Maintained 85% critical package coverage

    • Commit: "Add context support to WatchSecret..."

      • Files changed: pkg/api/plugin.go, cmd/plugins/*/main.go
      • Tests added: Provider-specific test cases for context handling

    Verification: All code merged to main passed coverage gates (70% overall, 85% critical)


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba sera hii ya kuongeza majaribio (angalia test_policy) iwe imeandikwa katika maelekezo ya mapendekezo ya mabadiliko. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    Yes, the project documents test requirements for change proposals.

    Documentation locations:

    1. CONTRIBUTING.md (Primary source):

      • Section: "Testing Requirements"
      • States: "All pull requests must include tests for new functionality"
      • Links to: test suite documentation, coverage requirements
      • Specifies: Minimum 70% overall, 85% critical packages

    2. GOVERNANCE.md (Code Review Standards):

      • Section: "Code Review Process"
      • Requirement: "PRs without adequate test coverage are not approved"
      • Referenced in: PR review checklist for Core Maintainers

    3. Pull Request Template (Optional but recommended to add):

      • Can include: "[ ] Tests added for this change"
      • Can include: "[ ] Coverage maintained at required levels"

    4. Automated messaging in CI:

      • GitHub Actions displays coverage report on every PR
      • Blocks merge if coverage requirements not met
      • Provides clear feedback: "Coverage decreased from 82% to 79%"

    Current state:

    • CONTRIBUTING.md documents test expectations ✓
    • GOVERNANCE.md defines review standards ✓
    • GitHub Actions enforces via automation ✓
    • PR comments show coverage details ✓

    Recommendation: Add explicit PR template with test checklist for clarity.


  • Bendera za maonyo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwashe bendera moja au zaidi za onyo la mkusanyaji, hali ya lugha "salama", au tumia zana tofauti ya "linter" kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inaweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [warnings]
    Mifano ya bendera za onyo la mkusanyaji ni pamoja na gcc/clang "-Wall". Mifano ya hali ya lugha "salama" ni pamoja na JavaScript "use strict" na perl5's "use warnings". Zana tofauti ya "linter" ni zana tu inayoangalia msimbo wa chanzo kutafuta makosa ya ubora wa msimbo au makosa rahisi ya kawaida. Hizi kawaida huwashwa ndani ya msimbo wa chanzo au maelekezo ya ujenzi.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator uses multiple FLOSS linting tools to detect code quality errors.

    Linter tools used:

    1. go vet (built-in, FLOSS) - Detects suspicious code patterns
    2. go test -race (built-in, FLOSS) - Detects race conditions
    3. staticcheck (FLOSS) - Advanced static analysis

    Invocation:

    • make lint (runs go vet + staticcheck)
    • make test (includes -race flag)
    • GitHub Actions (automated on every commit/PR)

    Configuration: .github/workflows/coverage.yml

    This catches:

    • Race conditions (goroutine safety)
    • Unused variables
    • Type mismatches
    • Suspicious patterns
    • Memory leaks
    • Resource cleanup issues

    All tools are open source with no proprietary dependencies.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ukabiliane na maonyo. [warnings_fixed]
    Haya ni maonyo yaliyotambuliwa na utekelezaji wa kigezo cha warnings. Mradi unapaswa kurekebisha maonyo au kuyaweka alama katika msimbo wa chanzo kama hasi za uwongo. Kwa kawaida pasingeweza kuwa na maonyo, lakini mradi YAWEZA kukubali baadhi ya maonyo (kawaida chini ya onyo 1 kwa mistari 100 au chini ya maonyo 10).

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator addresses all linter warnings.

    Process:

    • go vet warnings: Fixed immediately, block merge if present
    • Race condition warnings: Fixed, tested with -race flag
    • staticcheck warnings: Addressed or documented as false positives
    • GitHub Actions: CI fails if any warnings detected

    Evidence from Phase 1 (May 2026):

    • Fixed goroutine leaks (go vet)
    • Fixed resource cleanup issues (unclosed channels, tickers)
    • Fixed concurrent access issues (-race detector)
    • All critical blockers passed linter checks before merge

    Current status: Zero outstanding linter warnings in main branch


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba miradi iwe na ukali mkubwa sana na maonyo katika programu inayotengenezwa na mradi, ambapo ni ya vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator enforces strict warning settings.

    Strictness measures:

    • go vet: All checks enabled (no exceptions)
    • go test -race: Required on all test runs
    • staticcheck: All checks enabled, blocks merge if violations found
    • Unused variables/imports: Rejected in code review
    • Error handling: Checked rigorously (nil returns, missing error checks)

    Enforcement: GitHub Actions CI prevents code with warnings from merging

    This ensures high code quality standards are maintained as the project grows.


 Usalama 14/16 ●

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na angalau msanidi mmoja mkuu anayejua jinsi ya kuunda programu salama. (Angalia 'maelezo' kwa mahitaji halisi.) [know_secure_design]
    Hii inahitaji kuelewa kanuni zifuatazo za muundo, ikiwa ni pamoja na kanuni 8 kutoka Saltzer na Schroeder:
    • uchumi wa utaratibu (weka muundo kuwa rahisi na mdogo iwezekanavyo, k.m., kwa kupitisha urahisishaji wa kufunga)
    • mipangilio ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya kuingia yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa miradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi)
    • kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kuingia kote kunaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima kufanyiwa ukaguzi wa mamlaka na kutowezesha kuvukwa)
    • muundo wazi (taratibu za usalama hazipaswi kutegemea ujinga wa mshambuliaji wa muundo wake, lakini badala yake kwenye habari iliyolindwa na kubadilishwa kwa urahisi kama funguo na nywila)
    • kutenganisha kwa upendeleo (kwa kawaida, ufikiaji kwa vitu muhimu unapaswa kutegemea zaidi ya sharti moja, ili kushinda mfumo mmoja wa ulinzi hautawasha ufikiaji kamili. K.m., uthibitishaji wa vipengele vingi, kama vile kuhitaji nywila na ishara za vifaa, ni imara zaidi kuliko uthibitishaji wa kipengele kimoja)
    • upendeleo mdogo zaidi (michakato inapaswa kufanya kazi na upendeleo mdogo zaidi unaohitajika)
    • utaratibu wa kawaida mdogo zaidi (muundo unapaswa kupunguza utaratibu wa kawaida kwa zaidi ya mtumiaji mmoja na kutegemewa na watumiaji wote, k.m., saraka za mafaili ya muda)
    • kukubalika kwa kisaikolojia (kiolesura cha binadamu lazima kiwe kimeundwa kwa urahisi wa matumizi - kuunda kwa "mshangao mdogo" kunaweza kusaidia)
    • uso wa shambulio uliowekewa mipaka (uso wa shambulio - seti ya sehemu tofauti ambapo mshambuliaji anaweza kujaribu kuingia au kutoa data - unapaswa kuwekwa mipaka)
    • uthibitishaji wa ingizo na orodha zinazokubalika (pembejeo kawaida zinapaswa kuangaliwa ili kuamua kama ni halali kabla ya kukubalika; uthibitishaji huu unapaswa kutumia orodha zinazokubalika (zinazokubali tu thamani zinazojulikana-nzuri), siyo orodha zinazokana (zinaozojaribu kuorodhesha thamani zinazojulikana-mbaya)).
    "Msanidi mkuu" katika mradi ni mtu yeyote ambaye anajua msingi wa msimbo wa mradi, ana faraja kufanya mabadiliko kwake, na anatambuliwa hivyo na washiriki wengine wengi katika mradi. Msanidi mkuu kawaida atafanya michango mingi kwa mwaka uliopita (kupitia msimbo, nyaraka, au kujibu maswali). Wasanidi kawaida wangeweza kuchukuliwa wasanidi wakuu ikiwa walianzisha mradi (na hawajatoka kwenye mradi zaidi ya miaka mitatu iliyopita), wana chaguo la kupokea habari kwenye kituo cha kuripoti udhaifu wa kibinafsi (ikiwa kuna), wanaweza kukubali ahadi kwa niaba ya mradi, au kufanya matoleo ya mwisho ya programu ya mradi. Ikiwa kuna msanidi mmoja tu, mtu huyo ndiye msanidi mkuu. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili muundo. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator has a primary developer (Lead Maintainer) with
    expertise in secure software design.
    Primary Developer:

    Evidence of secure design knowledge:

    1. Security Documentation (SECURITY.md):

      • Threat model and attack surface analysis
      • Zero-trust principles implemented
      • Vulnerability disclosure process designed
      • Secure fallback behavior defined

    2. Security Architecture Decisions:

      • Context-based goroutine lifecycle (prevents resource leaks)
      • Lock manager fail-fast design (prevents silent data corruption)
      • Socket permissions enforced (0660 with gid verification)
      • Race condition detection in all tests (-race flag)
      • Timeout controls on critical I/O (prevents indefinite hangs)

    3. Critical Security Fixes (Phase 1):

      • Fixed goroutine leaks (DoS prevention)
      • Fixed resource cleanup issues (prevents file descriptor exhaustion)
      • Implemented proper context cancellation (prevents zombie processes)
      • Fixed lock manager initialization (prevents concurrent rotation corruption)

    4. Code Review and Governance:

      • Defined code review standards in GOVERNANCE.md
      • Security-focused PR review criteria
      • Vulnerability response timeline (14 days max)
        All security decisions documented and implemented in production code.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Angalau mmoja wa wasanidi wakuu wa mradi LAZIMA wajue aina za kawaida za makosa ambayo husababisha udhaifu katika aina hii ya programu, pamoja na angalau mbinu moja ya kukabiliana au kupunguza kila moja. [know_common_errors]
    Mifano (kulingana na aina ya programu) ni pamoja na uvamizi wa SQL, uvamizi wa OS, mtiririko wa kipengele cha kawaida, uandishi wa tovuti-tofauti, uthibitishaji unaokosekana, na uidhinishaji unaokosekana. Angalia CWE/SANS top 25 au OWASP Top 10 kwa orodha zinazotumika kawaida. Vitabu vingi na kozi zinapatikana kukusaidia kuelewa jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi na kujadili makosa ya kawaida ya utekelezaji ambayo husababisha udhaifu. Kwa mfano, kozi ya Misingi ya Maendeleo ya Programu Salama ni seti huru ya kozi tatu zinazoeleza jinsi ya kuunda programu salama zaidi (ni bure ukiifanyia ukaguzi; kwa ada ya ziada unaweza kupata cheti kuthibitisha ulijifunza nyenzo).

    Yes, Umair (Lead Maintainer) demonstrates knowledge of common vulnerabilities
    in secret injection/rotation software and their mitigations.

    Common vulnerability types addressed in DSO:

    1. Information Disclosure (Secret Leaks)

      • Risk: Secrets exposed in logs, memory, error messages
      • Mitigation: Implemented in code review standards; secrets never logged
      • Evidence: SECURITY.md threat model, code review guidelines

    2. Race Conditions (Concurrent Access)

      • Risk: Secrets corrupted by concurrent rotation/injection
      • Mitigation: Lock manager with fail-fast design, -race testing
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fix - lock manager initialization, concurrent test cases

    3. Resource Exhaustion (Goroutine Leaks)

      • Risk: DoS via unbounded goroutine spawning
      • Mitigation: Context-based lifecycle, defer cleanup patterns
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fix - defer close(ch), defer ticker.Stop()

    4. Privilege Escalation

      • Risk: Non-root users accessing secrets
      • Mitigation: Socket permissions enforced (0660 with gid verification)
      • Evidence: SECURITY.md socket security section, permission checks

    5. Denial of Service (Hangs)

      • Risk: Indefinite hangs on I/O operations
      • Mitigation: 30-second context timeouts on critical operations
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fix - resolver timeout, proxy scan timeout

    6. File Descriptor Leaks

      • Risk: File descriptor exhaustion
      • Mitigation: Defer close() patterns before file removal
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fix - tmpFile.Close() in up.go

    7. Provider Failures

      • Risk: Silent provider failures causing missing secret injection
      • Mitigation: Fail-fast panic on critical errors
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fix - lock manager panic on initialization failure

    All mitigations implemented and tested in production code.


  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie, kwa chaguo-msingi, tu itifaki za kriptografia na mifumbo ambazo zimechapishwa hadharani na kukaguliwa na wataalam (ikiwa itifaki za kriptografia na mafumbo imetumika). [crypto_published]
    Vigezo hivi vya kriptografia mara mingi havitumiki kwa sababu programu zingine hazina haja ya kutumia moja kwa moja uwezo wa kriptografia.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ni programu au maktaba, na kusudi lake la msingi sio kutekeleza usimbuaji, basi INAPASWA tu kuita programu iliyoundwa kihususa kutekeleza kazi za kielelezo; HAIPASWI kutekeleza-upya shughuli hiyo. [crypto_call]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Utendaji wote katika programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi ambayo inategemea usimbuaji LAZIMA iweze kutekelezwa kwa kutumia FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    Tazama Mahitaji ya Viwango wazi ya Programu kupitia Open Source Initiative.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA itumie kwa msingi keylengths ambazo angalau zinakidhi mahitaji ya chini ya NIST kufikia mwaka wa 2030 (kama ilivyoelezwa mnamo 2012). LAZIMA iwe rahisi kusanidi programu ili keylengths ndogo zimezimwa kabisa. [crypto_keylength]
    Vipimo hivi vya urefu wa charaza ni: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, na hash 224 (ufichuzi wa nywila haujashughulikiwa kwenye urefu wa charaza hii, maelezo zaidi ya ufichuzi wa nywila yanapatikana ndani ya kigezo cha crypto_password_storage). Ona https://www.keylength.com kwa mliganisho wa mapendekezo ya funguo-refu kutoka mashirika mbali mbali. Programu YAWEZA kubali funguo-refu ndogo katika usanidi (haifai kukubali, maana hii huwacha mashambulizi ya kushusha, lakini funguo-refu fupi wakati mwingine ina manufaa ya upatanifu).

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti zilizovunjika za kriptologia (k.m., MD4, MD5, DES moja, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), au kutumia hali za cipher ambazo si sahihi kwa muktadha, isipokuwa ni muhimu kutekeleza itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana (ambapo itifaki iliyotekelezwa ni toleo la hivi karibuni zaidi la kiwango hicho kinachotegemeana sana na mfumo wa mtandao, mfumo huo unahitaji matumizi ya algoriti au hali hiyo, na mfumo huo haupatii chaguo lolote salama zaidi). Nyaraka LAZIMA zieleze hatari zozote za usalama husika na upungufu wowote unaojulikana ikiwa algoriti hizi zilizovunjika au hali ni muhimu kwa itifaki inayoweza kushirikiana. [crypto_working]
    Hali ya ECB ni karibu kamwe haifai kwa sababu inaonyesha block zinazofanana ndani ya ciphertext kama ilivyoonyeshwa na penguin wa ECB, na hali ya CTR mara nyingi si sahihi kwa sababu haifanyi uthibitishaji na husababisha nakala ikiwa hali ya ingizo inarudiwa. Katika hali nyingi ni bora kuchagua hali ya algoriti ya block cipher iliyoundwa kuchanganya siri na uthibitishaji, k.m., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) na EAX. Miradi YAWEZA kuwaruhusu watumiaji kuwasha taratibu zilizovunjika (k.m., wakati wa usanidi) ambapo ni muhimu kwa upatanifu, lakini hapo watumiaji wanajua wanafanya hivyo.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi INAPASWA kutekeleza kwa ukamilifu usiri wa umbele ya itifaki za makubaliano ya funguo ili funguo la kipindi kilicho tokana na kikao cha vifungo muda-mrefu haziwezi kuridhi mabaya ikiwa mojawapo ya vifunguo vya muda-mrefu imeridhi mabaya katika usoni. [crypto_pfs]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi imesababisha uhifadhi wa nywila kwa minajili ya uthibitishaji ya watumiaji wa kutoka nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kwa mficho uliorudiarudia na chumvi kwa kila-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (rudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). Ona pia Kurasadogo ya Uhifadhi wa Nywila la OWASP). [crypto_password_storage]
    Kigezo hili linatumika tu wakati programu linatekeleza uthibitishaji wa watumiaji kutumia nywila kwa watumiaji wa nje (ambayo pia ni uthibitishaji unaelekezwa ndani), kama vile programu za tovuti zinazobakia seva). Haitumiki katika visa ambavyo programu inahifadhi nywila ili kudhibitisha ndani ya mifumo mingine (ambayo pia ni ithibitishaji unaelekezwa nje, k.m., programu inatekeleza teja la mfumo lingineyo), maana angalau sehemu za programu lazima ziwe na njia ya kupata hiyo nywila isigalifichwa.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ndani ya programu iliyotengenezwa na mradi LAZIMA itoe funguo zote za kriptologia na nonces kwa kutumia kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati kuptia kriptologia salama, na ISIWEZE kufanya hivo kutumia vitengenezi zisizo salama kikriptologia. [crypto_random]
    Kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za vifaa, au kinaweza kuwa kitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu za kriptologia salama (CSPRNG) kwa kutumia algoriti kama vile Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, au Fortuna. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu salama ni pamoja na java.security.SecureRandom ya Java na window.crypto.getRandomValues ya JavaScript. Mifano ya simu kwa vitengeneza cha nambari za bahati nasibu zisizo salama ni pamoja na java.util.Random ya Java na Math.random ya JavaScript.

  • Utoaji salama dhidi ya mashambulizi ya mtu-katikati (MITM)


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie utaratibu wa utoaji ambao unakabiliana na mashambulizi ya MITM. Kutumia https au ssh+scp ni inakubaliwa. [delivery_mitm]
    Utaratibu wenye nguvu zaidi ni kutoa programu na vifurushi vilivyosainiwa kidigitali, kwa kuwa hiyo inapunguza mashambulizi kwenye mfumo wa usambazaji, lakini hii inafanya kazi tu ikiwa watumiaji wanaweza kuwa na uhakika kwamba funguo za umma kwa saini ni sahihi na ikiwa watumiaji watakagua saini kweli kweli.

    Distribution channels use HTTPS exclusively. [osps_br_03_02]


    Taarifa inayohitajika haijulikani, si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Hash ya kriptologia (k.m., sha1sum) LAZIMA ISICHUKULIWE kupitia http na kutumika bila kuangalia saini ya kriptologia. [delivery_unsigned]
    Hash hizi zinaweza kurekebishwa wakati wa usafiri.

  • Udhaifu uliofahamika hadharani umeshughulikiwa


    Taarifa inayohitajika haijulikani, si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    LAZIMA kuwe hakuna udhaifu usiorekebishwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ambao umejulikana hadharani kwa zaidi ya siku 60. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    Udhaifu lazima urekebishwe na kutolewa na mradi wenyewe (rekebisho zinaweza kutengenezwa mahali pengine). Udhaifu unakuwa unajulikana hadharani (kwa kusudi hili) mara tu unapata CVE yenye taarifa zilizotolewa hadharani zisizolipwa (zilizoripotiwa, kwa mfano, katika Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) au wakati mradi umefahamishwa na taarifa imetolewa kwa umma (labda na mradi). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka: hii inamaanisha kwamba watumiaji wanaweza kuachwa katika hatari kwa washambuliaji wote duniani kwa siku hadi 60. Kigezo hiki ni rahisi zaidi kukidhi kuliko yale Google inapendekeza katika Rebooting responsible disclosure, kwa sababu Google inapendekeza kwamba kipindi cha siku 60 kianze wakati mradi unafahamishwa hata ikiwa ripoti si ya umma. Pia kumbuka kwamba kigezo hiki cha nishani, kama vigezo vingine, kinatumika kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Baadhi ya miradi ni sehemu ya mashirika makubwa ya mwavuli au miradi mikubwa, labda katika safu nyingi, na miradi mingi inatoa matokeo yao kwa mashirika mengine na miradi kama sehemu ya mnyororo wa usambazaji wenye utata. Mradi wa mtu binafsi mara nyingi hauwezi kudhibiti wengine, lakini mradi wa mtu binafsi unaweza kufanya kazi kutoa rekebisho ya udhaifu kwa wakati. Kwa hiyo, tunazingatia tu muda wa jibu wa mradi wa mtu binafsi. Mara tu rekebisho inapatikana kutoka kwa mradi wa mtu binafsi, wengine wanaweza kuamua jinsi ya kushughulikia rekebisho (k.m., wanaweza kusasisha kwenye toleo jipya au wanaweza kutumia rekebisho tu kama suluhisho lililochaguliwa-cherry).

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Miradi INAPASWA kurekebisha udhaifu wote muhimu haraka baada ya kuripotiwa. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Hazina za umma LAZIMA ZISIVUJE uthibitisho halali wa faragha (k.m., nywila inayofanya kazi au funguo ya faragha) ambayo imekusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma. [no_leaked_credentials]
    Mradi UNAWEZA kuvuja uthibitisho wa "sampuli" kwa majaribio na hifadhidata zisizo muhimu, mradi tu hazikusudiwa kupunguza upatikanaji wa umma.

 Uchanganuzi 7/8 ●

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (zaidi ya maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama") LAZIMA itumike kwa toleo lolote lililopendekezwa kubwa la uzalishaji wa programu kabla ya toleo lake, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayotekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli inachunguza msimbo wa programu (kama msimbo wa chanzo, msimbo wa kati, au utekelezaji) bila kuutekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki, maonyo ya mkusanyaji na hali za lugha "salama" hazihesabiwi kama zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli (hizi kwa kawaida huepuka uchambuzi wa kina kwa sababu kasi ni muhimu). Baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli zinazingatia kugundua hitilafu za jumla, nyingine zinazingatia kupata aina fulani za hitilafu (kama vile udhaifu), na baadhi hufanya mchanganyiko. Mifano ya zana hizo za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli ni pamoja na cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (ikiwa ni pamoja na FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, na HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Orodha kubwa za zana zinaweza kupatikana katika maeneo kama vile orodha ya Wikipedia ya zana za uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, taarifa za OWASP kuhusu uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli, orodha ya NIST ya vichambua usalama wa msimbo wa chanzo, na orodha ya Wheeler ya zana za uchambuzi tuli. Ikiwa hakuna zana za uchambuzi tuli za FLOSS zinazopatikana kwa lugha za utekelezaji zilizotumika, unaweza kuchagua 'N/A'.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator applies staticcheck (FLOSS) for advanced static analysis before releases. Runs via GitHub Actions CI/CD, blocks merge if violations found.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau moja ya zana za uchambuzi tuli zilizotumika kwa kigezo cha static_analysis ijumuishe sheria au njia za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochambuliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator applies gosec (FLOSS, MIT license) for security-focused
    static analysis before releases.

    gosec detects common vulnerabilities:

    • Hardcoded secrets/credentials
    • Weak cryptographic usage
    • Insecure random number generation
    • Insecure temporary file handling
    • SQL injection risks
    • Command injection risks

    Applied via GitHub Actions CI/CD (.github/workflows/coverage.yml)
    Blocks merge if vulnerabilities found.

    Combined with staticcheck (general analysis) provides comprehensive coverage.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo tuli LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [static_analysis_fixed]
    Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani. Kumbuka kwamba kigezo cha vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days kinahitaji kwamba udhaifu wote kama huo urekebishwe ndani ya siku 60 baada ya kuwa wa umma.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator fixes all medium and higher severity vulnerabilities
    discovered by static analysis in a timely manner.

    Process:

    1. Static analysis tool (staticcheck/gosec) finds issue
    2. CI/CD blocks merge if medium+ severity detected
    3. Developer confirms vulnerability (false positives rejected)
    4. Lead Maintainer assigns priority
    5. Fix implemented and tested
    6. Pull request reviewed and merged
    7. Released in next patch version

    Timeline by severity:

    • Critical: Fixed within 7 days, emergency release
    • High: Fixed within 14 days, included in next scheduled release
    • Medium: Fixed within 30 days, included in regular release cycle

    Evidence from Phase 1 (May 2026):

    • Critical blocker fixes: Goroutine leaks (resource exhaustion),
      race conditions, unclosed file descriptors
    • All identified via static analysis and testing
    • All fixed before release v3.5.17
    • Zero outstanding medium+ vulnerabilities in main branch

    Tracking:

    • GitHub Issues track all vulnerabilities
    • Linked to PRs and commits
    • Closure documented in release notes
    • SECURITY.md documents response timeline

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba uchambuzi wa msimbo wa chanzo tuli ufanyike kwenye kila ahadi au angalau kila siku. [static_analysis_often]

  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba angalau zana moja ya uchambuzi wa nguvu itumike kwenye toleo kubwa lolote la uzalishaji lililopendekezwa la programu kabla ya kutolewa kwake. [dynamic_analysis]
    Zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inachunguza programu kwa kuitekeleza na ingizo maalum. Kwa mfano, mradi YAWEZA kutumia zana ya fuzzing (k.m., American Fuzzy Lop) au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti (k.m., OWASP ZAP au w3af). Katika hali fulani mradi wa OSS-Fuzz unaweza kuwa tayari kutumia majaribio ya fuzz kwenye mradi wako. Kwa madhumuni ya kigezo hiki zana ya uchambuzi wa nguvu inahitaji kubadilisha ingizo kwa njia fulani kutafuta aina mbalimbali za matatizo au kuwa seti kiotomatiki ya majaribio yenye angalau asilimia 80 ya ukaguzi wa tawi. Ukurasa wa Wikipedia kuhusu uchambuzi wa nguvu na ukurasa wa OWASP kuhusu fuzzing hutambulisha baadhi ya zana za uchambuzi wa nguvu. Zana za uchambuzi ZINAWEZA kuzingatia kutafuta udhaifu wa usalama, lakini hii haihitajiki.

    Yes, Docker Secret Operator applies dynamic analysis tools before major releases.

    Primary tool: go test -race (FLOSS)

    • Detects race conditions at runtime (concurrent access bugs)
    • Runs actual code execution to find real issues
    • Applied on every commit via GitHub Actions

    Dynamic analysis applied:

    1. go test -race ./...

      • Detects goroutine races
      • Finds unsafe concurrent access
      • Evidence: Phase 1 fixed goroutine leaks detected via race detector

    2. go test -cover

      • Measures code execution coverage
      • Ensures all code paths tested
      • Enforced minimum: 70% overall, 85% critical packages

    3. GitHub Actions CI/CD

      • All tests run before release
      • Blocks merge if race conditions or coverage drops
      • Automatic validation on every commit

    Before v3.5.17 release:

    • Passed all race detector tests
    • 85%+ coverage on critical packages
    • All integration tests passed
    • Zero runtime issues detected
      This catches bugs that static analysis misses (concurrency, race conditions,
      execution flow issues).

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    Taarifa inayohitajika haijulikani, si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    INAPENDEKEZWA kwamba mradi utumie usanidi wa angalau baadhi ya uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio au fuzzing) ambao huwezesha madai mengi. Katika hali nyingi madai haya yasipaswi kuwa yamewezeshwa katika mijengo ya uzalishaji. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    Kigezo hiki hakipendekezi kuwezesha madai wakati wa uzalishaji; hilo ni kabisa kwa mradi na watumiaji wake kuamua. Lengo la kigezo hiki ni badala yake kuboresha ugunduzaji wa hitilafu wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu kabla ya kusambazwa. Kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni tofauti kabisa na kuwezesha madai wakati wa uchambuzi wa nguvu (kama vile majaribio). Katika hali fulani kuwezesha madai katika matumizi ya uzalishaji ni busara sana (hasa katika vipengele vya uadilifu wa juu). Kuna hoja nyingi dhidi ya kuwezesha madai katika uzalishaji, k.m., maktaba hazipaswi kuvuruga waita, uwepo wao unaweza kusababisha kukataliwa na maduka ya programu, na/au kuamilisha madai katika uzalishaji kunaweza kufunua data za faragha kama vile funguo za faragha. Kumbuka kwamba katika usambazaji mwingi wa Linux NDEBUG haijafafanuliwa, hivyo C/C++ assert() kwa chaguo-msingi itawezeshwa kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo. Inaweza kuwa muhimu kutumia utaratibu tofauti wa madai au kufafanua NDEBUG kwa uzalishaji katika mazingira hayo.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Udhaifu wote wenye ukali wa kati na juu zaidi unaoweza kudhoofishwa uliogundulika kupitia uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu LAZIMA urekebishwe kwa wakati baada ya kuthibitishwa. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    Ikiwa haujafanya uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu na kwa hivyo hukupata udhaifu wowote kwa njia hii, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). Udhaifu unazingatiwa kuwa wa kiwango cha kati au juu zaidi ikiwa alama yake ya Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) ya msingi ya ubora ni kati au juu. Katika matoleo ya CVSS 2.0 hadi 3.1, hii ni sawa na alama ya CVSS ya 4.0 au zaidi. Miradi inaweza kutumia alama ya CVSS kama ilivyochapishwa katika hifadhidata ya udhaifu inayotumika sana (kama vile Hifadhidata ya Taifa ya Udhaifu) kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS lililoripotiwa katika hifadhidata hiyo. Miradi badala yake inaweza kuhesabu ukali wao wenyewe kwa kutumia toleo la hivi karibuni la CVSS wakati wa ufunuzi wa udhaifu, ikiwa ingizo la hesabu linatangazwa hadharani mara tu udhaifu unajulikana hadharani.


Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Md Umair na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Md Umair.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-05-20 13:05:05 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-05-21 04:44:32 UTC.