sentinel

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Baseline Level 3 criteria. These are criteria version v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    The security update management platform for SUSE and openSUSE Linux distributions

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

 Controls 12/21 ●

  • Controls


    Enough for a badge!

    When a job is assigned permissions in a CI/CD pipeline, the source code or configuration MUST only assign the minimum privileges necessary for the corresponding activity. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Configure the project's CI/CD pipelines to assign the lowest available permissions to users and services by default, elevating permissions only when necessary for specific tasks. In some version control systems, this may be possible at the organizational or repository level. If not, set permissions at the top level of the pipeline.

    Every workflow declares permissions at either the top level or per-job, restricted to the minimum required for that specific activity. Examples: ci.yml uses only contents: read; build-images.yml grants packages: write only to the publish job; deploy-api-docs.yml splits permissions per job (contents: read for build, pages: write + id-token: write only for the deploy job); release-please.yml sets top-level permissions: {} and grants contents: write, issues: write, pull-requests: write only to the single job that needs them. The repository default workflow permissions are set to read, ensuring any job without explicit permissions receives the minimum.


    Enough for a badge!

    CI/CD pipelines which accept trusted collaborator input MUST sanitize and validate that input prior to use in the pipeline. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    CI/CD pipelines should sanitize (quote, escape or exit on expected values) all collaborator inputs on explicit workflow executions. While collaborators are generally trusted, manual inputs to a workflow cannot be reviewed and could be abused by an account takeover or insider threat.

    All workflows that consume collaborator-controlled input (PR title, PR body, branch names) pass those values exclusively through environment variables (env:) rather than inline ${{ }} interpolation in run: blocks — preventing shell injection. The pr-metadata.yml workflow (the only one that processes attacker-controllable input like PR titles and bodies) explicitly uses env: PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} and then references "${PR_TITLE}" with proper quoting in the shell script. The build-images.yml workflow similarly passes image tags via env: IMAGE_TAGS with an inline comment explaining this is done "to avoid shell-injection risk from untrusted ref/tag content." No workflow interpolates untrusted input directly into a run: script.


    Enough for a badge!

    When an official release is created, all assets within that release MUST be clearly associated with the release identifier or another unique identifier for the asset. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Assign a unique version identifier to each software asset produced by the project, following a consistent naming convention or numbering scheme. Examples include SemVer, CalVer, or git commit id.

    Each GitHub Release is associated with its unique version tag (v0.3.0, etc.). The container images published to ghcr.io are tagged with the corresponding semver release tag (e.g., ghcr.io/staypirate/sentinel:0.3.0) alongside latest, ensuring the OCI artifact is clearly tied to the release identifier. The release changelog in the GitHub Release body references the exact Git commits (SHAs) included in that version. The uv.lock file is version-bumped by release-please as part of the release commit, associating the locked dependency set with the release.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST define a policy for managing secrets and credentials used by the project. The policy should include guidelines for storing, accessing, and rotating secrets and credentials. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems.

    The project defines a multi-layered secrets management policy across its documentation:

    • Storage: docs/deployment.md (No secrets in workflow files) mandates that CI credentials are stored exclusively in GitHub Secrets (${{ secrets.* }}), never as literals in workflow files. The Repository Secrets section documents each secret's purpose and required permissions.
    • Access: docs/conventions.md (Secret Field Typing) requires all secret configuration fields to use Pydantic SecretStr, preventing accidental exposure via repr/logging/serialization. Log statements are forbidden from including secrets (Secrets and PII Discipline in logging.md).
    • Rotation: docs/deployment.md documents JWT_SECRET_KEY rotation impact (session invalidation, off-peak maintenance window). Environment-variable injection ensures secrets are never baked into images.
    • Prevention: gitleaks pre-commit hook scans for accidentally committed secrets; GitHub Push Protection is enabled at the repository level.

    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the integrity and authenticity of the release assets. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Instructions in the project should contain information about the technology used, the commands to run, and the expected output. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    There are no instructions in the project documentation for verifying the integrity or authenticity of release assets. No cryptographic signatures, checksums, or signed manifests are published alongside releases (as noted in the earlier signing criterion). Without signed assets, there is nothing for a consumer to verify. This is the counterpart to the earlier "release MUST be signed" criterion — both are currently unmet.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST contain instructions to verify the expected identity of the person or process authoring the software release. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    The expected identity may be in the form of key IDs used to sign, issuer and identity from a sigstore certificate, or other similar forms. When possible, avoid storing this documentation in the same location as the build and release pipeline to avoid a single breach compromising both the software and the documentation for verifying the integrity of the software.

    The project does not document how to verify who authored a release. Releases are created by the release-please automation using a RELEASE_TOKEN PAT, but there are no instructions for consumers to verify that a given release was produced by an authorized project maintainer (e.g., via GPG-signed tags, Sigstore identity verification, or GitHub's commit signing verification). The Git tags are unsigned, and no provenance attestation links the release to a specific verified identity.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST include a descriptive statement about the scope and duration of support for each release. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for the project's released software assets, the project should have a SUPPORT.md file, a "Support" section in SECURITY.md, or other documentation explaining the support lifecycle, including the expected duration of support for each release, the types of support provided (e.g., bug fixes, security updates), and any relevant policies or procedures for obtaining support.

    The project documentation does not include a support policy stating which releases receive security patches, bug fixes, or how long each release is supported. The versioning section in docs/conventions.md defines SemVer interpretation and pre-1.0 rules, but does not state whether only the latest release is supported, whether older minor versions receive backports, or what the expected support duration is for any given release.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, the project documentation MUST provide a descriptive statement when releases or versions will no longer receive security updates. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    In order to communicate the scope and duration of support for security fixes, the project should have a SUPPORT.md or other documentation explaining the project's policy for security updates.

    Same gap as above — there is no end-of-life (EOL) or end-of-support policy documented. The project does not state when a given release will stop receiving security updates, nor does it define the conditions under which a version transitions from "supported" to "unsupported."


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST have a policy that code collaborators are reviewed prior to granting escalated permissions to sensitive resources. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Publish an enforceable policy in the project documentation that requires code collaborators to be reviewed and approved before being granted escalated permissions to sensitive resources, such as merge approval or access to secrets. It is recommended that vetting includes establishing a justifiable lineage of identity such as confirming the contributor's association with a known trusted organization.

    The repository is currently single-maintainer (sole owner of all repository permissions). GitHub's built-in access model requires the repository owner to explicitly grant collaborator access — no one can self-escalate. Branch protection rules enforce PR review requirements for all code reaching master. The CONTRIBUTING.md documents the contribution workflow (fork, PR, CI must pass), and the repository owner is the sole merge authority. For a single-maintainer project, this satisfies the criterion — there is no delegation of sensitive access without the owner's explicit action.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When the project has made a release, all compiled released software assets MUST be delivered with a software bill of materials. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    It is recommended to auto-generate SBOMs at build time using a tool that has been vetted for accuracy. This enables users to ingest this data in a standardized approach alongside other projects in their environment.

    No SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is generated or published with releases. The build-images.yml workflow builds and pushes the container image to ghcr.io but does not generate an SBOM (e.g., via docker/build-push-action's sbom option, syft, or trivy). GitHub Releases contain no attached assets at all — no SPDX, CycloneDX, or other SBOM format is produced or distributed alongside the OCI image or the source release.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release comprising multiple source code repositories, all subprojects MUST enforce security requirements that are as strict or stricter than the primary codebase. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Any additional subproject code repositories produced by the project and compiled into a release must enforce security requirements as applicable to the status and intent of the respective codebase. In addition to following the corresponding OSPS Baseline requirements, this may include requiring a security review, ensuring that it is free of vulnerabilities, and ensuring that it is free of known security issues.

    Sentinel is a single-repository project. There is no multi-repo release comprising subprojects — the backend, migrations, task definitions, and specifications all live in this single repository and ship as one OCI image. The frontend will be developed in a separate repository but is not yet released. This criterion does not apply until a release spans mul


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST clearly document when and how tests are run. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains how to run the tests locally and how to run the tests in the CI/CD pipeline. The documentation should explain what the tests are testing and how to interpret the results.

    docs/features/platform/testing-strategy.md is the authoritative document for the testing strategy, including when and how tests are run. It defines the test pyramid (unit, integration, e2e), the CI pipeline gate composition, required markers (@pytest.mark.unit, @pytest.mark.integration, @pytest.mark.e2e), and execution model. docs/deployment.md (Workflow Inventory) documents that the CI workflow runs on every push to master and every pull request. CONTRIBUTING.md documents how developers run tests locally (make test, uv run pytest). The pre-commit hook automatically runs the unit test subset on every commit.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that all major changes to the software produced by the project should add or update tests of the functionality in an automated test suite. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Add a section to the contributing documentation that explains the policy for adding or updating tests. The policy should explain what constitutes a major change and what tests should be added or updated.

    AGENTS.md (Guardrail 6, Mandatory Testing) defines an explicit policy: "Every code change (new feature or modification) MUST include tests." It requires tests for new API endpoints (happy path, validation, auth), new models (creation, constraints, relationships), new services (business logic, edge cases, error handling), and bug fixes (regression tests). The policy explicitly states "NEVER skip tests" and instructs that if asked to skip, the developer must be reminded of the requirement. CONTRIBUTING.md reinforces this under the "Pull Request Checklist" — all PRs must include tests and CI must pass before merge.


    Not enough for a badge.

    When a commit is made to the primary branch, the project's version control system MUST require at least one non-author human approval of the changes before merging. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Configure the project's version control system to require at least one non-author human approval of changes before merging into the release or primary branch. This can be achieved by requiring a pull request to be reviewed and approved by at least one other collaborator before it can be merged.

    Branch protection on master requires a pull request before merge, but the required approvals count is set to 0. This means a PR author can merge their own changes without any non-author human review. The project is currently single-maintainer, which makes enforcing non-author approval impractical (there is no second person to approve), but the criterion as stated is not satisfied by the current configuration.


    Enough for a badge!

    When the project has made a release, the project MUST perform a threat modeling and attack surface analysis to understand and protect against attacks on critical code paths, functions, and interactions within the system. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Threat modeling is an activity where the project looks at the codebase, associated processes and infrastructure, interfaces, key components and "thinks like a hacker" and brainstorms how the system be be broken or compromised. Each identified threat is listed out so the project can then think about how to proactively avoid or close off any gaps/vulnerabilities that could arise. Ensure this is updated for new features or breaking changes.

    The project performs systematic threat modeling and attack surface analysis through its mandatory @security-reviewer invocations (Guardrail 10) on every security-sensitive change. The docs/reviews/ directory contains 50+ review documents with explicit threat model assessments for critical code paths — authentication (local-authentication.md documents brute-force resistance, offline attack models), networking (networking.md documents trusted-upstream assumptions, connection security), RBAC (rbac.md documents pre-disclosure data exposure), and all external integrations. Specifications themselves document threat considerations inline (e.g., API key self-replication prevention, JWT secret minimum length enforcement, session fixation protections, rate limiting requirements). The attack surface is analyzed per-component rather than in a single monolithic document, with each review recording findings, risk acceptance decisions with rationale, and residual risk.


    Not enough for a badge.

    Any vulnerabilities in the software components not affecting the project MUST be accounted for in a VEX document, augmenting the vulnerability report with non-exploitability details. [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Establish a VEX feed communicating the exploitability status of known vulnerabilities, including assessment details or any mitigations in place preventing vulnerable code from being executed.

    The project does not produce or publish VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) documents. While image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans and opens tracking issues for OS-level vulnerabilities, and pip-audit gates Python dependencies on every merge, neither produces a VEX document that formally accounts for non-exploitable vulnerabilities with justification (e.g., "not affected", "false positive", "component not reachable"). There is no CSAF/VEX or OpenVEX artifact generated as part of the release or scanning process.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of SCA findings related to vulnerabilities and licenses. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    The project does not document a policy defining remediation timeframes for SCA (Software Composition Analysis) findings. While pip-audit gates every PR (blocking merge if a known-vulnerable dependency is present) and image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans with tracking issues, there is no documented policy specifying:

    • Maximum time allowed to remediate critical/high/medium/low vulnerability findings
    • How license compliance findings are handled (no license scanning is configured)
    • Thresholds or SLAs for when a vulnerability must be addressed vs. accepted as risk

    Enough for a badge!

    The project documentation MUST include a policy to address SCA violations prior to any release. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Document a policy in the project to address applicable Software Composition Analysis results before any release, and add status checks that verify compliance with that policy prior to release.

    The CI pipeline enforces a strict gate: pip-audit runs on every pull request and blocks merge if any known-vulnerable dependency is detected (backend-security job in ci.yml). This means no release can be created with a known Python dependency vulnerability — the release path requires CI to pass on master, and release-please.yml only triggers after a successful CI run. Additionally, image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans against the published container image for OS-level vulnerabilities and opens tracking issues. The combination ensures SCA violations are addressed (Python deps) or tracked (OS-level) prior to and between releases.


    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for malicious dependencies and known vulnerabilities in dependencies, then blocked in the event of violations, except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Software Composition Analysis tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    Every change to the codebase is automatically evaluated by the CI pipeline before merge: pip-audit (in the backend-security job of ci.yml) checks all Python dependencies against known vulnerability databases and blocks the PR if a violation is found. bandit runs static security analysis in the same job. Branch protection requires the "Backend Security Scan" status check to pass — no code reaches master without passing these gates. Dependabot is configured to propose dependency updates weekly, providing proactive notification of vulnerable or outdated dependencies. The suppression mechanism exists via pip-audit's --ignore-vuln flag (though currently unused), which would require explicit declaration of non-exploitability.


    Not enough for a badge.

    The project documentation MUST include a policy that defines a threshold for remediation of SAST findings. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Document a policy in the project that defines a threshold for remediation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) findings. Include the process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating these findings.

    The project does not document a policy defining remediation timeframes or thresholds for SAST (Static Application Security Testing) findings. While bandit runs on every PR as part of the backend-security CI job and blocks merge on findings, there is no documented policy specifying:

    • Severity thresholds for blocking vs. non-blocking findings
    • Maximum remediation timeframes by severity level
    • Suppression/acceptance process for false positives (e.g., required justification format for # nosec annotations)

    Enough for a badge!

    All changes to the project's codebase MUST be automatically evaluated against a documented policy for security weaknesses and blocked in the event of violations except when declared and suppressed as non-exploitable. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Create a status check in the project's version control system that runs a Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool on all changes to the codebase. Require that the status check passes before changes can be merged.

    All changes to the codebase are automatically evaluated for security weaknesses before merge: bandit (SAST) runs in the backend-security job of ci.yml and blocks the PR on findings. mypy --strict (static type checking) catches type-safety issues that can lead to security weaknesses. Branch protection requires "Backend Security Scan" and "Backend Type Check" to pass — no code reaches master without passing these gates. Suppression is supported via bandit's # nosec inline annotations for declared false positives, and mypy's per-line type-ignore with required error codes (blanket suppressions are forbidden per docs/conventions.md).



You can use tools and AI systems to propose changes via a simple URL, such as https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/14063/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. See our automation proposals system for how to do that. This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Gianluca Gabrielli and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Gianluca Gabrielli.
Entry created on 2026-08-13 13:55:49 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-14 06:09:03 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-13 16:48:08 UTC.