sentinel

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hali ya nishani yako ya msingi kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hali ya nishani ya msingi inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani ya msingi kwa mradi 14063 ni baseline-1 Huu ndiyo jinsi ya kuweka nishani ya msingi:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako ya msingi kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Baseline](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14063/baseline)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14063)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14063"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14063/baseline"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya Kiwango cha Msingi 3. Hizi ni vigezo vya toleo v2026.08.28.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    The security update management platform for SUSE and openSUSE Linux distributions

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.

 Udhibiti 12/21 ●

  • Udhibiti


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ruhusa zinapopeana kwa kazi katika mfumo wa CI/CD, msimbo wa chanzo au usanidi LAZIMA upee tu ruhusa za chini zaidi zinazohitajika kwa shughuli zinazohusiana. [OSPS-AC-04.02]
    Sanidi mifumo ya CI/CD ya mradi ili kupea ruhusa za chini zinazopatikana kwa watumiaji na huduma kwa chaguomsingi, ukipandisha ruhusa tu inapohitajika kwa kazi maalum. Katika baadhi ya mifumo ya udhibiti wa toleo, hii inaweza kufanyika katika kiwango cha shirika au hifadhi. Ikiwa sivyo, weka ruhusa katika kiwango cha juu cha mfumo.

    Every workflow declares permissions at either the top level or per-job, restricted to the minimum required for that specific activity. Examples: ci.yml uses only contents: read; build-images.yml grants packages: write only to the publish job; deploy-api-docs.yml splits permissions per job (contents: read for build, pages: write + id-token: write only for the deploy job); release-please.yml sets top-level permissions: {} and grants contents: write, issues: write, pull-requests: write only to the single job that needs them. The repository default workflow permissions are set to read, ensuring any job without explicit permissions receives the minimum.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifuko ya CI/CD inayokubali pembejeo za mshirika anayeaminika LAZIMA isafishe na kuthibitisha pembejeo hiyo kabla ya kutumia katika mfuko. [OSPS-BR-01.04]
    Mifuko ya CI/CD inapaswa kusafisha (kunukuu, kutoroka au kutoka kwa maadili yanayotarajiwa) pembejeo zote za mshirika kwenye utekelezaji wa mtiririko wa kazi wa wazi. Ingawa washirika kwa ujumla wanaaminika, pembejeo za mwongozo kwa mtiririko wa kazi haiwezi kukaguliwa na inaweza kutumiwa vibaya na utekaji wa akaunti au tishio la ndani.

    All workflows that consume collaborator-controlled input (PR title, PR body, branch names) pass those values exclusively through environment variables (env:) rather than inline ${{ }} interpolation in run: blocks — preventing shell injection. The pr-metadata.yml workflow (the only one that processes attacker-controllable input like PR titles and bodies) explicitly uses env: PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} and then references "${PR_TITLE}" with proper quoting in the shell script. The build-images.yml workflow similarly passes image tags via env: IMAGE_TAGS with an inline comment explaining this is done "to avoid shell-injection risk from untrusted ref/tag content." No workflow interpolates untrusted input directly into a run: script.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Toleo rasmi linapobuniwa, mali zote ndani ya toleo hilo LAZIMA zihusianishwe wazi na kitambulisho cha toleo au kitambulisho kingine cha kipekee kwa mali hiyo. [OSPS-BR-02.02]
    Panga kitambulisho cha kipekee cha toleo kwa kila mali ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi, ukifuata kawaida ya uainishaji thabiti au mpango wa nambari. Mifano ni pamoja na SemVer, CalVer, au kitambulisho cha git commit.

    Each GitHub Release is associated with its unique version tag (v0.3.0, etc.). The container images published to ghcr.io are tagged with the corresponding semver release tag (e.g., ghcr.io/staypirate/sentinel:0.3.0) alongside latest, ensuring the OCI artifact is clearly tied to the release identifier. The release changelog in the GitHub Release body references the exact Git commits (SHAs) included in that version. The uv.lock file is version-bumped by release-please as part of the release commit, associating the locked dependency set with the release.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue sera ya kudhibiti siri na ushahidi unaotumika na mradi. Sera inapaswa kujumuisha mwongozo wa kuhifadhi, kufikia, na kuzungusha siri na ushahidi. [OSPS-BR-07.02]
    Eleza jinsi siri na ushahidi vinavyodhibitiwa na kutumika ndani ya mradi. Hii inapaswa kujumuisha maelezo ya jinsi siri zinavyohifadhiwa (k.m., kwa kutumia zana ya usimamizi wa siri), jinsi ufikiaji unavyodhibitiwa, na jinsi siri zinavyozungushwa au kusasishwa. Hakikisha kwamba habari nyeti haziingizwi kwa msimbo katika msimbo wa chanzo au kuhifadhiwa katika mifumo ya udhibiti wa toleo.

    The project defines a multi-layered secrets management policy across its documentation:

    • Storage: docs/deployment.md (No secrets in workflow files) mandates that CI credentials are stored exclusively in GitHub Secrets (${{ secrets.* }}), never as literals in workflow files. The Repository Secrets section documents each secret's purpose and required permissions.
    • Access: docs/conventions.md (Secret Field Typing) requires all secret configuration fields to use Pydantic SecretStr, preventing accidental exposure via repr/logging/serialization. Log statements are forbidden from including secrets (Secrets and PII Discipline in logging.md).
    • Rotation: docs/deployment.md documents JWT_SECRET_KEY rotation impact (session invalidation, off-peak maintenance window). Environment-variable injection ensures secrets are never baked into images.
    • Prevention: gitleaks pre-commit hook scans for accidentally committed secrets; GitHub Push Protection is enabled at the repository level.

    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi ulipotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na maelekezo ya kuthibitisha uadilifu na uhalali wa mali za toleo. [OSPS-DO-03.01]
    Maelekezo katika mradi yanapaswa kuwa na habari kuhusu teknolojia iliyotumika, amri za kuendesha, na matokeo yanayotarajiwa. Inapowezekana, epuka kuhifadhi nyaraka hizi katika mahali pamoja na mfumo wa ujenzi na utoaji wa toleo ili kuepuka ukiukaji mmoja kuhatarisha programu na nyaraka za kuthibitisha uadilifu wa programu.

    There are no instructions in the project documentation for verifying the integrity or authenticity of release assets. No cryptographic signatures, checksums, or signed manifests are published alongside releases (as noted in the earlier signing criterion). Without signed assets, there is nothing for a consumer to verify. This is the counterpart to the earlier "release MUST be signed" criterion — both are currently unmet.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na maelekezo ya kuthibitisha utambulisho unaotarajiwa wa mtu au mchakato unaothibitisha toleo la programu. [OSPS-DO-03.02]
    Utambulisho unaotarajiwa unaweza kuwa katika muundo wa vitambulisho vya funguo vilivyotumika kusaini, mtoa na utambulisho kutoka cheti cha sigstore, au aina nyingine zinazofanana. Inapowezekana, epuka kuhifadhi nyaraka hii mahali palipo sawa na mirija ya kujenga na kutoa ili kuepuka ukiukaji mmoja kuhatarisha programu na nyaraka za kuthibitisha uadilifu wa programu.

    The project does not document how to verify who authored a release. Releases are created by the release-please automation using a RELEASE_TOKEN PAT, but there are no instructions for consumers to verify that a given release was produced by an authorized project maintainer (e.g., via GPG-signed tags, Sigstore identity verification, or GitHub's commit signing verification). The Git tags are unsigned, and no provenance attestation links the release to a specific verified identity.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe kauli ya maelezo kuhusu wigo na muda wa msaada kwa kila toleo. [OSPS-DO-04.01]
    Ili kuwasilisha wigo na muda wa msaada kwa rasilimali za programu zilizotolewa za mradi, mradi unapaswa kuwa na faili ya SUPPORT.md, sehemu ya "Msaada" katika SECURITY.md, au nyaraka nyingine zinazoweka wazi mzunguko wa maisha wa msaada, ikijumuisha muda unaotarajiwa wa msaada kwa kila toleo, aina za msaada zinazotolewa (k.m., marekebisho ya hitilafu, sasisho za usalama), na sera au taratibu yoyote husika ya kupata msaada.

    The project documentation does not include a support policy stating which releases receive security patches, bug fixes, or how long each release is supported. The versioning section in docs/conventions.md defines SemVer interpretation and pre-1.0 rules, but does not state whether only the latest release is supported, whether older minor versions receive backports, or what the expected support duration is for any given release.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zitoe kauli ya maelezo ya wakati matoleo au matoleo hayatapokea tena sasisho za usalama. [OSPS-DO-05.01]
    Ili kuwasilisha wigo na muda wa msaada kwa marekebisho ya usalama, mradi unapaswa kuwa na SUPPORT.md au nyaraka nyingine zinazoweka wazi sera ya mradi ya sasisho za usalama.

    Same gap as above — there is no end-of-life (EOL) or end-of-support policy documented. The project does not state when a given release will stop receiving security updates, nor does it define the conditions under which a version transitions from "supported" to "unsupported."


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA ziwe na sera kwamba washirikiano wa msimbo wanakaguliwa kabla ya kupewa ruhusa za juu zaidi za rasilimali nyeti. [OSPS-GV-04.01]
    Chapisha sera inayoweza kutekelezwa katika nyaraka za mradi inayohitaji washirikiano wa msimbo kupimwa na kuidhinishwa kabla ya kupewa ruhusa zilizopandishwa kwa rasilimali nyeti, kama vile idhini ya kuunganisha au ufikiaji kwa siri. Inashauriwa kwamba upimaji ujumuishe kuanzisha mfululizo wa utambulisho unaoweza kuhalalishwa kama vile kuthibitisha ushirikiano wa mchangiaji na shirika linalojulikana na kuaminika.

    The repository is currently single-maintainer (sole owner of all repository permissions). GitHub's built-in access model requires the repository owner to explicitly grant collaborator access — no one can self-escalate. Branch protection rules enforce PR review requirements for all code reaching master. The CONTRIBUTING.md documents the contribution workflow (fork, PR, CI must pass), and the repository owner is the sole merge authority. For a single-maintainer project, this satisfies the criterion — there is no delegation of sensitive access without the owner's explicit action.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, rasilimali zote za programu zilizotolewa na zilizokusanywa LAZIMA zikabidhi pamoja na orodha ya bili ya programu. [OSPS-QA-02.02]
    Inashauriwa kuzalisha SBOM kiotomatiki wakati wa kujenga kwa kutumia zana ambayo imepimwa kwa usahihi. Hii huwezesha watumiaji kuingiza data hii kwa njia ya kiwango pamoja na miradi mingine katika mazingira yao.

    No SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) is generated or published with releases. The build-images.yml workflow builds and pushes the container image to ghcr.io but does not generate an SBOM (e.g., via docker/build-push-action's sbom option, syft, or trivy). GitHub Releases contain no attached assets at all — no SPDX, CycloneDX, or other SBOM format is produced or distributed alongside the OCI image or the source release.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo linalojumuisha hifadhi nyingi za chanzo cha msimbo, miradi yote midogo LAZIMA ilazimishe mahitaji ya usalama ambayo ni kali au kali zaidi kuliko msimbo wa msingi. [OSPS-QA-04.02]
    Hifadhi yoyote ya ziada ya msimbo wa miradi midogo iliyozalishwa na mradi na kukusanywa katika toleo lazima ilazimishe mahitaji ya usalama kama inavyolingana na hali na nia ya msimbo husika. Kwa kuongeza kufuata mahitaji ya msingi wa OSPS yanayolingana, hii inaweza kujumuisha kuhitaji ukaguzi wa usalama, kuhakikisha kuwa haina udhaifu, na kuhakikisha kuwa haina masuala ya usalama yanayojulikana.

    Sentinel is a single-repository project. There is no multi-repo release comprising subprojects — the backend, migrations, task definitions, and specifications all live in this single repository and ship as one OCI image. The frontend will be developed in a separate repository but is not yet released. This criterion does not apply until a release spans mul


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zieleze kwa uwazi ni lini na jinsi gani majaribio yanaendeshwa. [OSPS-QA-06.02]
    Ongeza sehemu kwenye nyaraka za kuchangia inayoweka wazi jinsi ya kutekeleza majaribio kienyeji na jinsi ya kutekeleza majaribio katika mirija ya CI/CD. Nyaraka zinapaswa kuweka wazi majaribio yanajaribu nini na jinsi ya kutafsiri matokeo.

    docs/features/platform/testing-strategy.md is the authoritative document for the testing strategy, including when and how tests are run. It defines the test pyramid (unit, integration, e2e), the CI pipeline gate composition, required markers (@pytest.mark.unit, @pytest.mark.integration, @pytest.mark.e2e), and execution model. docs/deployment.md (Workflow Inventory) documents that the CI workflow runs on every push to master and every pull request. CONTRIBUTING.md documents how developers run tests locally (make test, uv run pytest). The pre-commit hook automatically runs the unit test subset on every commit.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera kwamba mabadiliko yote makubwa kwenye programu inayotengenezwa na mradi yanapaswa kuongeza au kusasisha majaribio ya utendaji katika seti ya majaribio otomatiki. [OSPS-QA-06.03]
    Ongeza sehemu kwenye nyaraka za kuchangia inayoweka wazi sera ya kuongeza au kusasisha majaribio. Sera inapaswa kuweka wazi ni nini kinachojumuisha mabadiliko makubwa na majaribio yapi yanapaswa kuongezwa au kusasishwa.

    AGENTS.md (Guardrail 6, Mandatory Testing) defines an explicit policy: "Every code change (new feature or modification) MUST include tests." It requires tests for new API endpoints (happy path, validation, auth), new models (creation, constraints, relationships), new services (business logic, edge cases, error handling), and bug fixes (regression tests). The policy explicitly states "NEVER skip tests" and instructs that if asked to skip, the developer must be reminded of the requirement. CONTRIBUTING.md reinforces this under the "Pull Request Checklist" — all PRs must include tests and CI must pass before merge.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Wakati kuruhusu kumefanywa kwa tawi kuu, mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo la mradi LAZIMA uhitaji angalau idhini moja ya binadamu asiye mwandishi ya mabadiliko kabla ya kuunganisha. [OSPS-QA-07.01]
    Sanidi mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo la mradi kuhitaji angalau idhini moja ya binadamu asiye mwandishi ya mabadiliko kabla ya kuunganisha katika toleo au tawi kuu. Hii inaweza kupatikana kwa kuhitaji ombi la kuvuta kupimwa na kuidhinishwa na angalau mshirikiano mmoja mwingine kabla ya kunaweza kuunganishwa.

    Branch protection on master requires a pull request before merge, but the required approvals count is set to 0. This means a PR author can merge their own changes without any non-author human review. The project is currently single-maintainer, which makes enforcing non-author approval impractical (there is no second person to approve), but the criterion as stated is not satisfied by the current configuration.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi unapotoa toleo, mradi LAZIMA ufanye ufuatiliaji wa tisho na uchambuzi wa uso wa shambulio ili kuelewa na kulinda dhidi ya mashambulizi kwenye njia za msimbo muhimu, majukumu, na mwingiliano ndani ya mfumo. [OSPS-SA-03.02]
    Ufuatiliaji wa tisho ni shughuli ambapo mradi unaangalia msimbo, michakato na miundombinu inayohusiana, viunganishi, vipengele muhimu na "kufikiria kama kibogoyo" na kufanya mapendekezo ya jinsi mfumo unaweza kuvunjwa au kuhatarisha. Kila tisho iliyotambuliwa imeorodheshwa ili mradi uweze kufikiria jinsi ya kuepuka au kufunga pengo/udhaifu wowote unaoweza kutokea kwa kujihadhari. Hakikisha hii imesasishwa kwa vipengele vipya au mabadiliko ya kuvunja.

    The project performs systematic threat modeling and attack surface analysis through its mandatory @security-reviewer invocations (Guardrail 10) on every security-sensitive change. The docs/reviews/ directory contains 50+ review documents with explicit threat model assessments for critical code paths — authentication (local-authentication.md documents brute-force resistance, offline attack models), networking (networking.md documents trusted-upstream assumptions, connection security), RBAC (rbac.md documents pre-disclosure data exposure), and all external integrations. Specifications themselves document threat considerations inline (e.g., API key self-replication prevention, JWT secret minimum length enforcement, session fixation protections, rate limiting requirements). The attack surface is analyzed per-component rather than in a single monolithic document, with each review recording findings, risk acceptance decisions with rationale, and residual risk.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Udhaifu wowote katika vipengele vya programu usioathiri mradi LAZIMA uzingatiwe katika hati ya VEX, ikiongeza kwenye ripoti ya udhaifu maelezo ya kutoweza kutumika vibaya (non-exploitability). [OSPS-VM-04.02]
    Weka mfumo wa mlisho wa VEX unaowasiliana hali ya utumiaji vibaya wa udhaifu unaojulikana, ikiwa ni pamoja na maelezo ya tathmini au marekebisho yoyote yaliyowekwa kusimamisha msimbo ulio na udhaifu usiotekelezwa.

    The project does not produce or publish VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) documents. While image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans and opens tracking issues for OS-level vulnerabilities, and pip-audit gates Python dependencies on every merge, neither produces a VEX document that formally accounts for non-exploitable vulnerabilities with justification (e.g., "not affected", "false positive", "component not reachable"). There is no CSAF/VEX or OpenVEX artifact generated as part of the release or scanning process.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera inayofafanua kiwango cha chini cha kurekebisha matokeo ya SCA yanayohusiana na udhaifu na leseni. [OSPS-VM-05.01]
    Andika sera katika mradi inayofafanua kiwango cha marekebisho ya matokeo ya SCA yanayohusiana na udhaifu na leseni. Jumuisha mchakato wa kutambua, kutanguliza, na kurekebisha matokeo haya.

    The project does not document a policy defining remediation timeframes for SCA (Software Composition Analysis) findings. While pip-audit gates every PR (blocking merge if a known-vulnerable dependency is present) and image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans with tracking issues, there is no documented policy specifying:

    • Maximum time allowed to remediate critical/high/medium/low vulnerability findings
    • How license compliance findings are handled (no license scanning is configured)
    • Thresholds or SLAs for when a vulnerability must be addressed vs. accepted as risk

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera ya kushughulikia ukiukaji wa SCA kabla ya toleo lolote. [OSPS-VM-05.02]
    Andika sera katika mradi wa kushughulikia matokeo ya Uchambuzi wa Muundo wa Programu yanayotumika kabla ya toleo lolote, na ongeza ukaguzi wa hali unaothibitisha kufuata sera hiyo kabla ya toleo.

    The CI pipeline enforces a strict gate: pip-audit runs on every pull request and blocks merge if any known-vulnerable dependency is detected (backend-security job in ci.yml). This means no release can be created with a known Python dependency vulnerability — the release path requires CI to pass on master, and release-please.yml only triggers after a successful CI run. Additionally, image-scan.yml runs weekly Trivy scans against the published container image for OS-level vulnerabilities and opens tracking issues. The combination ensures SCA violations are addressed (Python deps) or tracked (OS-level) prior to and between releases.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mabadiliko yote kwenye msingi wa msimbo wa mradi LAZIMA yatathminiwe kiotomatiki dhidi ya sera iliyoandikwa kuhusu utegemezi hasidi na udhaifu unaojulikana katika utegemezi, kisha kuzuiliwa endapo kuna ukiukaji, isipokuwa pale ilipotangazwa na kufichwa kama isiyoweza kutumika vibaya. [OSPS-VM-05.03]
    Unda ukaguzi wa hali katika mfumo wa kudhibiti toleo la mradi unaoendesha zana ya Uchambuzi wa Muundo wa Programu kwenye mabadiliko yote ya msingi wa msimbo. Hitaji kwamba ukaguzi wa hali upite kabla mabadiliko kusanywa.

    Every change to the codebase is automatically evaluated by the CI pipeline before merge: pip-audit (in the backend-security job of ci.yml) checks all Python dependencies against known vulnerability databases and blocks the PR if a violation is found. bandit runs static security analysis in the same job. Branch protection requires the "Backend Security Scan" status check to pass — no code reaches master without passing these gates. Dependabot is configured to propose dependency updates weekly, providing proactive notification of vulnerable or outdated dependencies. The suppression mechanism exists via pip-audit's --ignore-vuln flag (though currently unused), which would require explicit declaration of non-exploitability.


    Si ya kutosha kwa nishani.

    Nyaraka za mradi LAZIMA zijumuishe sera inayofafanua kiwango cha chini cha kurekebisha matokeo ya SAST. [OSPS-VM-06.01]
    Andika sera katika mradi inayofafanua kiwango cha marekebisho ya matokeo ya Upimaji wa Usalama wa Programu Tuli (SAST). Jumuisha mchakato wa kutambua, kutanguliza, na kurekebisha matokeo haya.

    The project does not document a policy defining remediation timeframes or thresholds for SAST (Static Application Security Testing) findings. While bandit runs on every PR as part of the backend-security CI job and blocks merge on findings, there is no documented policy specifying:

    • Severity thresholds for blocking vs. non-blocking findings
    • Maximum remediation timeframes by severity level
    • Suppression/acceptance process for false positives (e.g., required justification format for # nosec annotations)

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mabadiliko yote kwenye msingi wa msimbo wa mradi LAZIMA yatathminiwe kiotomatiki dhidi ya sera iliyoandikwa kuhusu udhaifu wa usalama na kuzuiliwa endapo kuna ukiukaji isipokuwa pale ilipotangazwa na kufichwa kama isiyoweza kutumika vibaya. [OSPS-VM-06.02]
    Unda ukaguzi wa hali katika mfumo wa kudhibiti toleo la mradi unaoendesha zana ya Upimaji wa Usalama wa Programu Tuli (SAST) kwenye mabadiliko yote ya msingi wa msimbo. Hitaji kwamba ukaguzi wa hali upite kabla mabadiliko kusanywa.

    All changes to the codebase are automatically evaluated for security weaknesses before merge: bandit (SAST) runs in the backend-security job of ci.yml and blocks the PR on findings. mypy --strict (static type checking) catches type-safety issues that can lead to security weaknesses. Branch protection requires "Backend Security Scan" and "Backend Type Check" to pass — no code reaches master without passing these gates. Suppression is supported via bandit's # nosec inline annotations for declared false positives, and mypy's per-line type-ignore with required error codes (blanket suppressions are forbidden per docs/conventions.md).



Unaweza kutumia zana na mifumo ya AI kupendekeza mabadiliko kupitia URL rahisi, kama vile https://www.bestpractices.dev/sw/projects/14063/choose/edit?osps_ac_01_01_status=Met&osps_ac_01_01_justification=GitHub+enforced. Angalia mfumo wetu wa mapendekezo ya otomatiki kwa jinsi ya kufanya hivyo. Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Gianluca Gabrielli na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Gianluca Gabrielli.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-08-13 13:55:49 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-08-14 06:09:03 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-08-13 16:48:08 UTC.