maalik-e-makaan

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 16503 is passing Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Passing level criteria. You can also view the Silver or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 13/13 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Tenant and property management for Pakistani landlords, in English and Urdu: rent, receipts, deposits, late fees and WhatsApp reminders. Flutter (Android, iOS, web) on Supabase, with an Astro website and TLA+, Lean and Z3 models of the money and concurrency code.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST succinctly describe what the software does (what problem does it solve?). [description_good]
    This MUST be in language that potential users can understand (e.g., it uses minimal jargon).

    The README opens by saying in plain words what the software is for. It is tenant and property management for Pakistani landlords, in English and Urdu, that replaces registers, spreadsheets and WhatsApp threads with one ledger, and it lists the problems it handles: cash rent with numbered receipts, dues and late fees, caretakers who collect for overseas owners, police registration, tax-year statements and reminders. The website's home page says the same in English and Urdu ("Rent, receipts and records for Pakistani landlords").

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project website MUST provide information on how to: obtain, provide feedback (as bug reports or enhancements), and contribute to the software. [interact]

    The source is in the public GitHub repository, which every page of the website links to in its footer, and the README's Getting started section explains how to build and run it. From v1.0.0, release-please publishes GitHub Releases carrying the Android, web and unsigned iOS builds, SHA256SUMS and signed build-provenance attestations. Feedback goes through the bug-report and feature-request issue forms (blank issues are turned off, and security reports go to private advisories), and the README's Contributing section links to CONTRIBUTING.md.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan#readme


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST explain the contribution process (e.g., are pull requests used?) (URL required) [contribution]
    We presume that projects on GitHub use issues and pull requests unless otherwise noted. This information can be short, e.g., stating that the project uses pull requests, an issue tracker, or posts to a mailing list (which one?)

    CONTRIBUTING.md describes the process. Bugs and ideas go through the GitHub issue forms. Changes come as pull requests that must pass the same make targets CI runs. Pull requests are squash-merged, so the title must follow Conventional Commits with a scope from commitlint.config.mjs, and the pull-request template lists what each one must describe and check.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute SHOULD include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md sets the requirements. A change must pass make format-check analyze lint, and make test (very_good_analysis for Dart, deno lint for the Edge Functions); commits follow Conventional Commits; and database changes come as new migrations with pgTAP tests that keep the lock order. Money must be whole paisa, and user-facing text must exist in English and Urdu. Changes must meet WCAG 2.2 AA, contain no real personal data, and record dependency changes in THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md. The pull-request template repeats these as a checklist.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • FLOSS license


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST be released as FLOSS. [floss_license]
    FLOSS is software released in a way that meets the Open Source Definition or Free Software Definition. Examples of such licenses include the CC0, MIT, BSD 2-clause, BSD 3-clause revised, Apache 2.0, Lesser GNU General Public License (LGPL), and the GNU General Public License (GPL). For our purposes, this means that the license MUST be: The software MAY also be licensed other ways (e.g., "GPLv2 or proprietary" is acceptable).

    Everything the project produces is released under the MIT licence, as LICENSE and the package LICENSE files state. That covers the app, the mm_core and mm_ui packages, the database migrations, the Edge Functions, the website and the tooling. Third-party packages and fonts keep their own licences, which THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md lists.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/LICENSE

    The MIT license is approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that any required license(s) for the software produced by the project be approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI). [floss_license_osi]
    The OSI uses a rigorous approval process to determine which licenses are OSS.

    The project uses the MIT licence, which the Open Source Initiative has approved.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/LICENSE


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST post the license(s) of its results in a standard location in their source repository. (URL required) [license_location]
    One convention is posting the license as a top-level file named LICENSE or COPYING, which MAY be followed by an extension such as ".txt" or ".md". An alternative convention is to have a directory named LICENSES containing license file(s); these files are typically named as their SPDX license identifier followed by an appropriate file extension, as described in the REUSE Specification. Note that this criterion is only a requirement on the source repository. You do NOT need to include the license file when generating something from the source code (such as an executable, package, or container). For example, when generating an R package for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN), follow standard CRAN practice: if the license is a standard license, use the standard short license specification (to avoid installing yet another copy of the text) and list the LICENSE file in an exclusion file such as .Rbuildignore. Similarly, when creating a Debian package, you may put a link in the copyright file to the license text in /usr/share/common-licenses, and exclude the license file from the created package (e.g., by deleting the file after calling dh_auto_install). We encourage including machine-readable license information in generated formats where practical.

    The licence is in the standard place: a top-level LICENSE file (MIT, copyright 2026 Ahmed Rehan). The Dart packages carry their own copies in packages/mm_core/LICENSE and packages/mm_ui/LICENSE, and the README's Licence section links to it.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/LICENSE


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide basic documentation for the software produced by the project. [documentation_basics]
    This documentation must be in some media (such as text or video) that includes: how to install it, how to start it, how to use it (possibly with a tutorial using examples), and how to use it securely (e.g., what to do and what not to do) if that is an appropriate topic for the software. The security documentation need not be long. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Installing and starting the software is covered in two places. The README's Getting started section lists the prerequisites, make bootstrap and how to run the app against a local Supabase stack, and docs/operations.md covers running it in production (secrets, health checks, hosting, deployment, backups). The website's How it works, Features and FAQ pages explain how to use it, and docs/uat.md walks through 14 landlord journeys with screenshots. Secure use is covered by the FAQ (roles, masked CNICs, private document storage), the README's Security section, SECURITY.md (the app refuses to start with a secret key) and docs/operations.md's Edge Function secrets and token handling.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/README.md#getting-started


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide reference documentation that describes the external interface (both input and output) of the software produced by the project. [documentation_interface]
    The documentation of an external interface explains to an end-user or developer how to use it. This would include its application program interface (API) if the software has one. If it is a library, document the major classes/types and methods/functions that can be called. If it is a web application, define its URL interface (often its REST interface). If it is a command-line interface, document the parameters and options it supports. In many cases it's best if most of this documentation is automatically generated, so that this documentation stays synchronized with the software as it changes, but this isn't required. The project MAY use hypertext links to non-project material as documentation. Documentation MAY be automatically generated (where practical this is often the best way to do so). Documentation of a REST interface may be generated using Swagger/OpenAPI. Code interface documentation MAY be generated using tools such as JSDoc (JavaScript), ESDoc (JavaScript), pydoc (Python), devtools (R), pkgdown (R), and Doxygen (many). Merely having comments in implementation code is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion; there needs to be an easy way to see the information without reading through all the source code. If the project does not produce software, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    End users work through the app's screens, which the website's How it works and Features pages describe step by step. The backend API is documented in docs/architecture/permissions.md, which maps each action to the roles allowed to perform it and the RPC or row-level-security rule behind it (for example record_payment, void_payment). The generated supabase/functions/_shared/database.types.ts gives every RPC's arguments and return type. docs/operations.md documents the Edge Function endpoints, such as GET /functions/v1/health and its 200 and 503 responses, and packages/mm_core/README.md lists the domain library's modules.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/docs/architecture/permissions.md


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    The project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) MUST support HTTPS using TLS. [sites_https]
    This requires that the project home page URL and the version control repository URL begin with "https:", not "http:". You can get free certificates from Let's Encrypt. Projects MAY implement this criterion using (for example) GitHub pages, GitLab pages, or SourceForge project pages. If you support HTTP, we urge you to redirect the HTTP traffic to HTTPS.

    The repository, its issues and its release downloads are on GitHub, which serves only HTTPS. Vercel serves the website (maalik-e-makaan-site.vercel.app) and the web app (maalik-e-makaan.vercel.app) over HTTPS. website/vercel.json adds Strict-Transport-Security and a CSP with upgrade-insecure-requests, and the website build rejects any SITE_URL or PUBLIC_APP_URL that is not https (website/src/config/urls.ts).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/website/vercel.json


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion (including proposed changes and issues) that are searchable, allow messages and topics to be addressed by URL, enable new people to participate in some of the discussions, and do not require client-side installation of proprietary software. [discussion]
    Examples of acceptable mechanisms include archived mailing list(s), GitHub issue and pull request discussions, Bugzilla, Mantis, and Trac. Asynchronous discussion mechanisms (like IRC) are acceptable if they meet these criteria; make sure there is a URL-addressable archiving mechanism. Proprietary JavaScript, while discouraged, is permitted.

    Discussion happens in GitHub issues (bug-report and feature-request forms) and pull requests. Both are public, searchable and addressable by URL, open to anyone with a free GitHub account, and usable in any browser with no proprietary client software. The website's FAQ, privacy and terms pages point readers to the issue tracker.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/discussions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD provide documentation in English and be able to accept bug reports and comments about code in English. [english]
    English is currently the lingua franca of computer technology; supporting English increases the number of different potential developers and reviewers worldwide. A project can meet this criterion even if its core developers' primary language is not English.

    All project and developer documentation is in English: the README, CONTRIBUTING.md, SECURITY.md, docs/, code comments and the issue and pull-request forms. Bug reports and comments about code are accepted in English. User-facing text is also provided in Urdu.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be maintained. [maintained]
    As a minimum, the project should attempt to respond to significant problem and vulnerability reports. A project that is actively pursuing a badge is probably maintained. All projects and people have limited resources, and typical projects must reject some proposed changes, so limited resources and proposal rejections do not by themselves indicate an unmaintained project.

    When a project knows that it will no longer be maintained, it should set this criterion to "Unmet" and use the appropriate mechanism(s) to indicate to others that it is not being maintained. For example, use “DEPRECATED” as the first heading of its README, add “DEPRECATED” near the beginning of its home page, add “DEPRECATED” to the beginning of its code repository project description, add a no-maintenance-intended badge in its README and/or home page, mark it as deprecated in any package repositories (e.g., npm deprecate), and/or use the code repository's marking system to archive it (e.g., GitHub's "archive" setting, GitLab’s "archived" marking, Gerrit's "readonly" status, or SourceForge’s "abandoned" project status). Additional discussion can be found here.

    The project is under active development. Pull requests are being merged (for example #13 and #14 in November 2026), Dependabot updates are reviewed and landed, and release-please has opened the 1.0.0 release pull request (#2). SECURITY.md commits to acknowledging a vulnerability report within 3 working days and assessing it within 10.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/pulls?q=is%3Apr


 Change Control 9/9 ●

  • Public version-controlled source repository


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a version-controlled source repository that is publicly readable and has a URL. [repo_public]
    The URL MAY be the same as the project URL. The project MAY use private (non-public) branches in specific cases while the change is not publicly released (e.g., for fixing a vulnerability before it is revealed to the public).

    The source is in a public Git repository on GitHub that anyone can read and clone without signing in. It holds the Flutter app, the Supabase migrations and Edge Functions, the Astro website, the formal models and the CI workflows.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's source repository MUST track what changes were made, who made the changes, and when the changes were made. [repo_track]

    Git records what changed, who made the change and when for every commit, and GitHub keeps the pull request, review and CI history for each one. After the initial commit, every change has reached main through a pull request. The project's convention is a squash merge with a Conventional Commit title, which commitlint checks in a lefthook commit-msg hook and in CI, and pr-title.yml checks the pull request title.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/commits/main


    Enough for a badge!

    To enable collaborative review, the project's source repository MUST include interim versions for review between releases; it MUST NOT include only final releases. [repo_interim]
    Projects MAY choose to omit specific interim versions from their public source repositories (e.g., ones that fix specific non-public security vulnerabilities, may never be publicly released, or include material that cannot be legally posted and are not in the final release).

    The repository holds work between releases, not only final releases. Every change is a public pull request whose individual commits and CI runs stay visible (PR #1 has 107 commits), and main already has several merged changes (#1, #13, #14) before the first release is cut by its own release pull request.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/pull/1/commits


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common distributed version control software be used (e.g., git) for the project's source repository. [repo_distributed]
    Git is not specifically required and projects can use centralized version control software (such as subversion) with justification.

    The project uses Git, a distributed version control system, hosted on GitHub.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan


  • Unique version numbering


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST have a unique version identifier for each release intended to be used by users. [version_unique]
    This MAY be met in a variety of ways including a commit IDs (such as git commit id or mercurial changeset id) or a version number (including version numbers that use semantic versioning or date-based schemes like YYYYMMDD).

    Each release gets a unique version number, vX.Y.Z, from release-please, starting with v1.0.0. The release pull request writes the number into app/pubspec.yaml and website/package.json. The Release workflow builds with it (--build-name) and names each artefact with the tag, for example maalik-e-makaan-v1.0.0-web.zip.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/release-please-config.json


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the Semantic Versioning (SemVer) or Calendar Versioning (CalVer) version numbering format be used for releases. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value. [version_semver]
    Projects should generally prefer whatever format is expected by their users, e.g., because it is the normal format used by their ecosystem. Many ecosystems prefer SemVer, and SemVer is generally preferred for application programmer interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs). CalVer tends to be used by projects that are large, have an unusually large number of independently-developed dependencies, have a constantly-changing scope, or are time-sensitive. It is SUGGESTED that those who use CalVer include a micro level value, because including a micro level supports simultaneously-maintained branches whenever that becomes necessary. Other version numbering formats may be used as version numbers, including git commit IDs or mercurial changeset IDs, as long as they uniquely identify versions. However, some alternatives (such as git commit IDs) can cause problems as release identifiers, because users may not be able to easily determine if they are up-to-date. The version ID format may be unimportant for identifying software releases if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery).

    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects identify each release within their version control system. For example, it is SUGGESTED that those using git identify each release using git tags. [version_tags]

    Each release is marked with a Git tag, vX.Y.Z (include-v-in-tag in release-please-config.json). Merging the release pull request creates the tag and the GitHub release, and the Release workflow builds and attaches that tag's artefacts with provenance attestations.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/tags


  • Release notes


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide, in each release, release notes that are a human-readable summary of major changes in that release to help users determine if they should upgrade and what the upgrade impact will be. The release notes MUST NOT be the raw output of a version control log (e.g., the "git log" command results are not release notes). Projects whose results are not intended for reuse in multiple locations (such as the software for a single website or service) AND employ continuous delivery MAY select "N/A". (URL required) [release_notes]
    The release notes MAY be implemented in a variety of ways. Many projects provide them in a file named "NEWS", "CHANGELOG", or "ChangeLog", optionally with extensions such as ".txt", ".md", or ".html". Historically the term "change log" meant a log of every change, but to meet these criteria what is needed is a human-readable summary. The release notes MAY instead be provided by version control system mechanisms such as the GitHub Releases workflow.

    Each release has human-readable release notes: release-please writes CHANGELOG.md and the GitHub release from Conventional Commit titles, grouped by kind. The v1.0.0 notes list the release's main features (portfolios and team roles, the rent ledger, receipts, caretakers, police registration, tax-year statements, WhatsApp reminders, the bilingual app and website).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The release notes MUST identify every publicly known run-time vulnerability fixed in this release that already had a CVE assignment or similar when the release was created. This criterion may be marked as not applicable (N/A) if users typically cannot practically update the software themselves (e.g., as is often true for kernel updates). This criterion applies only to the project results, not to its dependencies. If there are no release notes or there have been no publicly known vulnerabilities, choose N/A. [release_notes_vulns]
    This criterion helps users determine if a given update will fix a vulnerability that is publicly known, to help users make an informed decision about updating. If users typically cannot practically update the software themselves on their computers, but must instead depend on one or more intermediaries to perform the update (as is often the case for a kernel and low-level software that is intertwined with a kernel), the project may choose "not applicable" (N/A) instead, since this additional information will not be helpful to those users. Similarly, a project may choose N/A if all recipients only run the latest version (e.g., it is the code for a single website or internet service that is constantly updated via continuous delivery). This criterion only applies to the project results, not its dependencies. Listing the vulnerabilities of all transitive dependencies of a project becomes unwieldy as dependencies increase and vary, and is unnecessary since tools that examine and track dependencies can do this in a more scalable way.

    No publicly known run-time vulnerability has been fixed in the project's own code: it has no CVE assignments, and its list of GitHub security advisories is empty. Vulnerabilities are reported privately through GitHub security advisories (SECURITY.md). When a release fixes a published advisory, its release notes will name the GHSA or CVE ID.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/security/policy


 Reporting 8/8 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a process for users to submit bug reports (e.g., using an issue tracker or a mailing list). (URL required) [report_process]

    Bugs are reported through GitHub Issues using a structured bug-report form (what happened, steps to reproduce, where it happened, app language, app version); blank issues are turned off so reporters are guided to the form. README.md (Contributing) and CONTRIBUTING.md (Reporting problems) point to the issue forms, and the website's privacy, terms and FAQ pages link to the issue tracker.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    The project tracks individual issues in GitHub Issues, with bug-report and feature-request forms that apply the 'bug' and 'enhancement' labels automatically; pull requests are tracked in the same place.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST acknowledge a majority of bug reports submitted in the last 2-12 months (inclusive); the response need not include a fix. [report_responses]

    The repository was created on 3 November 2026 and no bug reports have been filed yet: every item in the tracker so far is a pull request, so there are no unacknowledged reports. Bug reports come in through the bug-report form, which labels them 'bug', and the maintainer will acknowledge each one.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/issues?q=is%3Aissue


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD respond to a majority (>50%) of enhancement requests in the last 2-12 months (inclusive). [enhancement_responses]
    The response MAY be 'no' or a discussion about its merits. The goal is simply that there be some response to some requests, which indicates that the project is still alive. For purposes of this criterion, projects need not count fake requests (e.g., from spammers or automated systems). If a project is no longer making enhancements, please select "unmet" and include the URL that makes this situation clear to users. If a project tends to be overwhelmed by the number of enhancement requests, please select "unmet" and explain.

    No enhancement requests have been filed since the repository was created on 3 November 2026, so none are waiting for a response. Requests come in through the feature-request form, which applies the 'enhancement' label, and the maintainer will respond to each one, even if the answer is no.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a publicly available archive for reports and responses for later searching. (URL required) [report_archive]

    All issues and pull requests, open and closed, with their comments, stay publicly available and searchable in the GitHub issue tracker of this public repository.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/issues?q=


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST publish the process for reporting vulnerabilities on the project site. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_process]
    Projects hosted on GitHub SHOULD consider enabling privately reporting a security vulnerability. Projects on GitLab SHOULD consider using its ability for privately reporting a vulnerability. Projects MAY identify a mailing address on https://PROJECTSITE/security, often in the form security@example.org. This vulnerability reporting process MAY be the same as its bug reporting process. Vulnerability reports MAY always be public, but many projects have a private vulnerability reporting mechanism.

    SECURITY.md, which GitHub shows as the repository's security policy, explains how to report a vulnerability: privately through GitHub security advisories, never in a public issue. It also covers what to include, response times, supported versions, scope and safe harbour. CONTRIBUTING.md and the website's privacy page (English and Urdu) link to the policy, and the issue chooser sends security reports to the private advisory form.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/security/policy


    Enough for a badge!

    If private vulnerability reports are supported, the project MUST include how to send the information in a way that is kept private. (URL required) [vulnerability_report_private]
    Examples include a private defect report submitted on the web using HTTPS (TLS) or an email encrypted using OpenPGP. If vulnerability reports are always public (so there are never private vulnerability reports), choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    Private reports are supported: GitHub private vulnerability reporting is turned on for the repository, and SECURITY.md links directly to the private advisory form (security/advisories/new). Reports sent there go over HTTPS, and only the reporter and the repository's maintainers can see them. The issue chooser also sends security reports to this form, not to a public issue.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project's initial response time for any vulnerability report received in the last 6 months MUST be less than or equal to 14 days. [vulnerability_report_response]
    If there have been no vulnerabilities reported in the last 6 months, choose "not applicable" (N/A).

    No vulnerability reports have been received in the last 6 months: the repository has no security advisories in any state (triage, draft, published or closed), and it dates from November 2026. SECURITY.md commits to acknowledging a report within 3 working days, well inside the 14-day limit.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/security/advisories


 Quality 13/13 ●

  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project requires building for use, the project MUST provide a working build system that can automatically rebuild the software from source code. [build]
    A build system determines what actions need to occur to rebuild the software (and in what order), and then performs those steps. For example, it can invoke a compiler to compile the source code. If an executable is created from source code, it must be possible to modify the project's source code and then generate an updated executable with those modifications. If the software produced by the project depends on external libraries, the build system does not need to build those external libraries. If there is no need to build anything to use the software after its source code is modified, select "not applicable" (N/A).

    Every deliverable is rebuilt from source by scripted commands: the root Makefile's make build-web-app (Flutter web release) and make build-apk (Android), npm run build in website/ (Astro), and flutter build ios for the unsigned iOS app. CI rebuilds all of them on every push and pull request (the web-build, android-build, ios-build and website jobs in ci.yml).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that common tools be used for building the software. [build_common_tools]
    For example, Maven, Ant, cmake, the autotools, make, rake (Ruby), or devtools (R).

    The build uses common, standard tools: GNU Make as the single entry point, the Flutter/Dart CLI for the app and packages, npm scripts with Astro for the website, and Deno tasks for the Edge Functions.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD be buildable using only FLOSS tools. [build_floss_tools]

    The web app, website, Edge Functions, and database build and test with FLOSS tools only: Make, Flutter and Dart (BSD-3), Node, Astro, Deno, PostgreSQL and Python. Two native builds are exceptions. The Android APK uses Google's prebuilt Android SDK, which is released under Google's SDK licence, and the optional iOS build needs Apple's Xcode.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Automated test suite


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    The project MUST use at least one automated test suite that is publicly released as FLOSS (this test suite may be maintained as a separate FLOSS project). The project MUST clearly show or document how to run the test suite(s) (e.g., via a continuous integration (CI) script or via documentation in files such as BUILD.md, README.md, or CONTRIBUTING.md). [test]
    The project MAY use multiple automated test suites (e.g., one that runs quickly, vs. another that is more thorough but requires special equipment). There are many test frameworks and test support systems available, including Selenium (web browser automation), Junit (JVM, Java), RUnit (R), testthat (R).

    The repository includes its automated test suites under the MIT licence: Dart unit, widget and golden tests; 21 pgTAP database suites and concurrency scenarios; Deno Edge Function tests; Vitest and Playwright website tests; Playwright browser UAT; and Python tooling tests. README.md and CONTRIBUTING.md document Make test and the per-area targets, and ci.yml runs them.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    A test suite SHOULD be invocable in a standard way for that language. [test_invocation]
    For example, "make check", "mvn test", or "rake test" (Ruby).

    Make test runs every fast suite. Each area also has its own target (make test-core, test-app, test-db, test-functions, test-web, test-uat), and these targets call each language's standard runner (dart test, flutter test, deno task test, npm test with Vitest, python -m unittest).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the test suite cover most (or ideally all) the code branches, input fields, and functionality. [test_most]

    Coverage gates in CI enforce high coverage: 100% line coverage for the mm_core domain library, 100% of lines, branches and functions for the Edge Functions, 95% of lines for the mm_ui design system and 90% for the app. Twenty-one pgTAP suites cover the database, including an RLS matrix and contract vectors shared with Dart. The website's Vitest and Playwright suites run in CI but have no numeric coverage gate.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/Makefile


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that the project implement continuous integration (where new or changed code is frequently integrated into a central code repository and automated tests are run on the result). [test_continuous_integration]

    GitHub Actions CI (ci.yml) runs on every push to main, on every pull request and in the merge queue. It runs formatting, linting, and analysis; every test suite with its coverage gate, pgTAP on PostgreSQL and on a full Supabase stack; Edge Function end-to-end tests; browser UAT; formal-model checks; and release builds. A single "CI passed" check, which needs every job, gates merges.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/actions/workflows/ci.yml


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a general policy (formal or not) that as major new functionality is added to the software produced by the project, tests of that functionality should be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy]
    As long as a policy is in place, even by word of mouth, that says developers should add tests to the automated test suite for major new functionality, select "Met."

    The policy is that new or changed functionality comes with automated tests. The pull request template requires "Tests cover the change, including edge cases and failure paths", and CONTRIBUTING.md requires pgTAP tests (and concurrency scenarios) for database changes. In the Dart packages, the app and the Edge Functions, CI's coverage gates also fail a change that adds code without tests.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/pull_request_template.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have evidence that the test_policy for adding tests has been adhered to in the most recent major changes to the software produced by the project. [tests_are_added]
    Major functionality would typically be mentioned in the release notes. Perfection is not required, merely evidence that tests are typically being added in practice to the automated test suite when new major functionality is added to the software produced by the project.

    Recent major changes added tests along with the code. The v1.0 pull request (#1) shipped the app, backend and website with their unit, widget, golden, pgTAP, Edge Function, website and UAT suites. The iOS packaging change (#14) added tool/ios/test_package_unsigned_ipa.py next to the new script and updated the UAT journeys.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/pull/14


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that this policy on adding tests (see test_policy) be documented in the instructions for change proposals. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Every change proposal fills in the pull request template, which says "Tests cover the change, including edge cases and failure paths". CONTRIBUTING.md requires pgTAP tests and concurrency scenarios for database changes, and docs/agents/workflows.md lists the tests to add for each kind of change.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/pull_request_template.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST enable one or more compiler warning flags, a "safe" language mode, or use a separate "linter" tool to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [warnings]
    Examples of compiler warning flags include gcc/clang "-Wall". Examples of a "safe" language mode include JavaScript "use strict" and perl5's "use warnings". A separate "linter" tool is simply a tool that examines the source code to look for code quality errors or common simple mistakes. These are typically enabled within the source code or build instructions.

    Each language has a linter or a strict mode enabled. Dart and Flutter use very_good_analysis with strict-casts, strict-inference and strict-raw-types. The website uses TypeScript (Astro's strictest config), ESLint (typescript-eslint strictTypeChecked, jsx-a11y) and Stylelint. Edge Functions use Deno strict mode and deno lint, Python uses ruff, shell uses shellcheck, workflows use actionlint and migrations use squawk.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/app/analysis_options.yaml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST address warnings. [warnings_fixed]
    These are the warnings identified by the implementation of the warnings criterion. The project should fix warnings or mark them in the source code as false positives. Ideally there would be no warnings, but a project MAY accept some warnings (typically less than 1 warning per 100 lines or less than 10 warnings).

    Any warning fails CI, so warnings are fixed before a change merges: analyze --fatal-infos for Dart, --max-warnings=0 for ESLint and Stylelint, and deno lint, ruff and shellcheck all as gates. About 40 suppression comments are left outside generated code, each naming the specific rule and most giving a reason; 14 are reviewed squawk ignores in a single migration. ESLint reports unused disable directives as errors.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that projects be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The analysers run at maximum or near-maximum strictness. Info-level Dart diagnostics are fatal under very_good_analysis plus the strict language modes, and TypeScript uses Astro's strictest config with typescript-eslint strictTypeChecked and stylisticTypeChecked. Deno runs with strict and noUncheckedIndexedAccess plus extra lint rules (eqeqeq, no-non-null-assertion), and ruff enables bugbear, bandit security checks and other rule sets.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/website/eslint.config.js


 Security 16/16 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have at least one primary developer who knows how to design secure software. (See ‘details’ for the exact requirements.) [know_secure_design]
    This requires understanding the following design principles, including the 8 principles from Saltzer and Schroeder:
    • economy of mechanism (keep the design as simple and small as practical, e.g., by adopting sweeping simplifications)
    • fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default)
    • complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable)
    • open design (security mechanisms should not depend on attacker ignorance of its design, but instead on more easily protected and changed information like keys and passwords)
    • separation of privilege (ideally, access to important objects should depend on more than one condition, so that defeating one protection system won't enable complete access. E.G., multi-factor authentication, such as requiring both a password and a hardware token, is stronger than single-factor authentication)
    • least privilege (processes should operate with the least privilege necessary)
    • least common mechanism (the design should minimize the mechanisms common to more than one user and depended on by all users, e.g., directories for temporary files)
    • psychological acceptability (the human interface must be designed for ease of use - designing for "least astonishment" can help)
    • limited attack surface (the attack surface - the set of the different points where an attacker can try to enter or extract data - should be limited)
    • input validation with allowlists (inputs should typically be checked to determine if they are valid before they are accepted; this validation should use allowlists (which only accept known-good values), not denylists (which attempt to list known-bad values)).
    A "primary developer" in a project is anyone who is familiar with the project's code base, is comfortable making changes to it, and is acknowledged as such by most other participants in the project. A primary developer would typically make a number of contributions over the past year (via code, documentation, or answering questions). Developers would typically be considered primary developers if they initiated the project (and have not left the project more than three years ago), have the option of receiving information on a private vulnerability reporting channel (if there is one), can accept commits on behalf of the project, or perform final releases of the project software. If there is only one developer, that individual is the primary developer. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss design. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project's only developer is its primary developer, and the design is recorded in docs/architecture/permissions.md. All authorisation is enforced in one place, the database, so every request is checked whichever client sends it (economy of mechanism, complete mediation). Access is denied by default: every table has row-level security and the anon role holds no privilege on any relation, which pgTAP checks in supabase/tests/database/01_schema_security.test.sql (fail-safe defaults). Clients hold only the publishable key, and column grants keep system-owned columns unwritable (least privilege). Supabase Auth offers TOTP multi-factor sign-in (separation of privilege). Stored values and invitation tokens must match allowlist formats (CHECK constraints and regular expressions). The design is public and depends only on keys and per-invitation random secrets (open design).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/docs/architecture/permissions.md


    Enough for a badge!

    At least one of the project's primary developers MUST know of common kinds of errors that lead to vulnerabilities in this kind of software, as well as at least one method to counter or mitigate each of them. [know_common_errors]
    Examples (depending on the type of software) include SQL injection, OS injection, classic buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, missing authentication, and missing authorization. See the CWE/SANS top 25 or OWASP Top 10 for commonly used lists. Many books and courses are available to help you understand how to develop more secure software and discuss common implementation errors that lead to vulnerabilities. For example, the Secure Software Development Fundamentals course is a free set of three courses that explain how to develop more secure software (it's free if you audit it; for an extra fee you can earn a certificate to prove you learned the material).

    The project counters the common errors for a web and mobile app on a database API, as its code and docs show. Missing authorisation: row-level security on every table, tested by the pgTAP RLS matrix (03_rls_matrix.test.sql). SQL injection: parameterised PostgREST and RPC calls, and every function pins search_path. Cross-site scripting: a strict Content-Security-Policy without inline scripts (website/vercel.json, docs/operations.md). Leaked secrets: the app refuses a secret key, and gitleaks scans the history in CI. Timing attacks: tokens are compared in constant time. Brute force: rate limits per user and per action. CSV formula injection: exported cells are guarded (app/lib/src/features/insights/presentation/csv.dart). CodeQL runs its security-and-quality queries on every change.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used). [crypto_published]
    These cryptographic criteria do not always apply because some software has no need to directly use cryptographic capabilities.

    The project uses only published algorithms and protocols that experts have reviewed. These are SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-256 through Web Crypto in the Edge Functions (supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts), PostgreSQL's built-in sha256() and pgcrypto's gen_random_bytes in the database, and bcrypt in Supabase Auth. JWTs are checked against the project's JWKS by Supabase's own library (@supabase/server). All transport is TLS (HTTPS), provided by Supabase and Vercel.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own. [crypto_call]

    The project implements no cryptographic primitive of its own. It calls Web Crypto (crypto.subtle) in the Edge Functions and PostgreSQL's sha256() and pgcrypto's gen_random_bytes in the database. Its own crypto-related code is only a constant-time comparison of digests. Passwords, sessions and JWT signing are handled by Supabase Auth, and TLS by Supabase and Vercel.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts


    Enough for a badge!

    All functionality in the software produced by the project that depends on cryptography MUST be implementable using FLOSS. [crypto_floss]
    See the Open Standards Requirement for Software by the Open Source Initiative.

    Everything that depends on cryptography is free and open-source software. That includes Deno's Web Crypto, PostgreSQL with pgcrypto, Supabase Auth (GoTrue, MIT licence) with bcrypt, the Dart SDK, age for encrypted backups, and standard TLS. No proprietary or patent-encumbered algorithm is needed.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely disabled. [crypto_keylength]
    These minimum bitlengths are: symmetric key 112, factoring modulus 2048, discrete logarithm key 224, discrete logarithmic group 2048, elliptic curve 224, and hash 224 (password hashing is not covered by this bitlength, more information on password hashing can be found in the crypto_password_storage criterion). See https://www.keylength.com for a comparison of keylength recommendations from various organizations. The software MAY allow smaller keylengths in some configurations (ideally it would not, since this allows downgrade attacks, but shorter keylengths are sometimes necessary for interoperability).

    The project's own mechanisms use fixed sizes above the NIST 2030 minimums, and none can be set smaller. Invitation secrets are 256 random bits from gen_random_bytes(32), stored as SHA-256 (supabase/migrations/20261108082804_invitation_findings.sql). Comparisons and digests use HMAC-SHA-256 and SHA-256. The Edge Functions refuse an operator-set bearer token shorter than 32 characters (MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH in supabase/functions/_shared/config.ts). TLS and JWT signing keys are managed by Supabase and Vercel.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/migrations/20261108082804_invitation_findings.sql


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG), or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context, unless they are necessary to implement an interoperable protocol (where the protocol implemented is the most recent version of that standard broadly supported by the network ecosystem, that ecosystem requires the use of such an algorithm or mode, and that ecosystem does not offer any more secure alternative). The documentation MUST describe any relevant security risks and any known mitigations if these broken algorithms or modes are necessary for an interoperable protocol. [crypto_working]
    ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated. In many cases it's best to choose a block cipher algorithm mode designed to combine secrecy and authentication, e.g., Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and EAX. Projects MAY allow users to enable broken mechanisms (e.g., during configuration) where necessary for compatibility, but then users know they're doing it.

    No security mechanism uses MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG or an unsuitable cipher mode. Hashes are SHA-256 and MACs are HMAC-SHA-256. The backup workflow (.github/workflows/backup.yml) encrypts with age, which uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption. MD5 appears only in tool/db/schema_fingerprint.sql, which compares schema definitions to detect drift. It is not a security control.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts


    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    The default mechanisms use neither SHA-1 nor CBC mode in SSH. They use SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-256 and 256-bit random secrets, age (ChaCha20-Poly1305) for encrypted backups; and the TLS provided by Supabase and Vercel.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/functions/_shared/crypto.ts


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future. [crypto_pfs]

    The software implements no key-agreement protocol of its own. All traffic is HTTPS, terminated by Vercel (website and web app) and Supabase (API, Auth, Storage). The app refuses a Supabase or app URL that is not HTTPS, except for loopback addresses in local development (app/lib/src/config/app_config.dart).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/app/lib/src/config/app_config.dart


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). See also OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet. [crypto_password_storage]
    This criterion applies only when the software is enforcing authentication of users using passwords for external users (aka inbound authentication), such as server-side web applications. It does not apply in cases where the software stores passwords for authenticating into other systems (aka outbound authentication, e.g., the software implements a client for some other system), since at least parts of that software must have often access to the unhashed password.

    The project does not hash passwords itself. Sign-in uses Supabase Auth (GoTrue), which stores each password as a bcrypt hash with a per-user salt. supabase/config.toml requires passwords of at least 10 characters with upper-case and lower-case letters and digits, and enables TOTP multi-factor authentication. The local demo seed also stores its demo password with crypt(..., gen_salt('bf')).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/config.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure. [crypto_random]
    A cryptographically secure random number generator may be a hardware random number generator, or it may be a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) using an algorithm such as Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, Yarrow, or Fortuna. Examples of calls to secure random number generators include Java's java.security.SecureRandom and JavaScript's window.crypto.getRandomValues. Examples of calls to insecure random number generators include Java's java.util.Random and JavaScript's Math.random.

    Every secret is generated by a cryptographically secure generator. Invitation verifiers come from pgcrypto's gen_random_bytes(32), and the Edge Functions create HMAC keys with crypto.subtle.generateKey. Identifiers are also drawn from secure sources: Dart's Random.secure in the app (app/lib/src/data/ids.dart) and crypto.randomUUID or gen_random_uuid elsewhere. Seeded Random appears only in tests, and Math.random only in a browser test script, where it makes up a path that does not exist.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/migrations/20261108082804_invitation_findings.sql


  • Secured delivery against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use a delivery mechanism that counters MITM attacks. Using https or ssh+scp is acceptable. [delivery_mitm]
    An even stronger mechanism is releasing the software with digitally signed packages, since that mitigates attacks on the distribution system, but this only works if the users can be confident that the public keys for signatures are correct and if the users will actually check the signature.

    GitHub delivers the source over HTTPS or SSH. The website and web app are served over HTTPS on Vercel with HSTS (website/vercel.json, tool/web/package_vercel.py). For each release, starting with v1.0.0, release.yml uploads the builds to GitHub Releases over HTTPS. It adds a SHA256SUMS file and a Sigstore-signed build provenance attestation (actions/attest-build-provenance), which gh attestation verify can check.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    A cryptographic hash (e.g., a sha1sum) MUST NOT be retrieved over http and used without checking for a cryptographic signature. [delivery_unsigned]
    These hashes can be modified in transit.

    No hash is fetched over plain HTTP. Checksums for downloaded tools are pinned in the repository and checked after an HTTPS download: gitleaks in security.yml, and the formal toolchain in tool/formal/install.sh, which uses curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2. Release SHA256SUMS files are served over HTTPS next to a signed provenance attestation.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


  • Publicly known vulnerabilities fixed


    Enough for a badge!

    There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days. [vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days]
    The vulnerability must be patched and released by the project itself (patches may be developed elsewhere). A vulnerability becomes publicly known (for this purpose) once it has a CVE with publicly released non-paywalled information (reported, for example, in the National Vulnerability Database) or when the project has been informed and the information has been released to the public (possibly by the project). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note: this means that users might be left vulnerable to all attackers worldwide for up to 60 days. This criterion is often much easier to meet than what Google recommends in Rebooting responsible disclosure, because Google recommends that the 60-day period start when the project is notified even if the report is not public. Also note that this badge criterion, like other criteria, applies to the individual project. Some projects are part of larger umbrella organizations or larger projects, possibly in multiple layers, and many projects feed their results to other organizations and projects as part of a potentially-complex supply chain. An individual project often cannot control the rest, but an individual project can work to release a vulnerability patch in a timely way. Therefore, we focus solely on the individual project's response time. Once a patch is available from the individual project, others can determine how to deal with the patch (e.g., they can update to the newer version or they can apply just the patch as a cherry-picked solution).

    No vulnerability has been reported or published against the project: it has no security advisories and no CVEs, and the repository is less than 60 days old (first commit on 3 November 2026). Private vulnerability reporting is enabled. OSV-Scanner checks every lockfile on each change and weekly; Dependabot keeps dependencies current, and the Security workflow passes on main.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/security/policy


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects SHOULD fix all critical vulnerabilities rapidly after they are reported. [vulnerabilities_critical_fixed]

    SECURITY.md commits to acknowledging a report within 3 working days and assessing its severity within 10 working days. It also says confirmed issues are fixed before anything else, and that only the latest release and main receive fixes. No critical vulnerability has been reported so far.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/SECURITY.md


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The public repositories MUST NOT leak a valid private credential (e.g., a working password or private key) that is intended to limit public access. [no_leaked_credentials]
    A project MAY leak "sample" credentials for testing and unimportant databases, as long as they are not intended to limit public access.

    The repository contains no working credential. Gitleaks scans the whole history on every change (security.yml). Its allowlist (.gitleaks.toml) admits only three named fake test-fixture values, and only inside test directories. The only other credential is the demo password in supabase/seed.sql, which is for local development and CI only and is never applied to the hosted project. Real secrets live in the GitHub, Supabase and Vercel secret stores. The two committed .env.example files hold only URLs, no secrets.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.gitleaks.toml


 Analysis 8/8 ●

  • Static code analysis


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    At least one static code analysis tool (beyond compiler warnings and "safe" language modes) MUST be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that implements this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis]
    A static code analysis tool examines the software code (as source code, intermediate code, or executable) without executing it with specific inputs. For purposes of this criterion, compiler warnings and "safe" language modes do not count as static code analysis tools (these typically avoid deep analysis because speed is vital). Some static analysis tools focus on detecting generic defects, others focus on finding specific kinds of defects (such as vulnerabilities), and some do a combination. Examples of such static code analysis tools include cppcheck (C, C++), clang static analyzer (C, C++), SpotBugs (Java), FindBugs (Java) (including FindSecurityBugs), PMD (Java), Brakeman (Ruby on Rails), lintr (R), goodpractice (R), Coverity Quality Analyzer, SonarQube, Codacy, and HP Enterprise Fortify Static Code Analyzer. Larger lists of tools can be found in places such as the Wikipedia list of tools for static code analysis, OWASP information on static code analysis, NIST list of source code security analyzers, and Wheeler's list of static analysis tools. If there are no FLOSS static analysis tools available for the implementation language(s) used, you may select 'N/A'.

    Every pull request and every push to main runs CodeQL with the security-and-quality queries on the TypeScript/JavaScript (website and Edge Functions) and on the GitHub Actions workflows, and zizmor on the workflows (.github/workflows/security.yml), so the commit each release is tagged from has been analysed. CI also runs the Dart analyzer with very_good_analysis and --fatal-infos, deno lint, ESLint with typescript-eslint strictTypeChecked and --max-warnings=0, plpgsql_check (supabase db lint --fail-on error), squawk on new migrations, ruff, shellcheck and actionlint (.github/workflows/ci.yml; Makefile targets analyze and lint). Dart has no CodeQL extractor, so the Dart code is covered by the analyzer rules and the tests.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


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    It is SUGGESTED that at least one of the static analysis tools used for the static_analysis criterion include rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL runs its security-and-quality query suite, which includes the security (CWE) queries for JavaScript/TypeScript, such as injection and cross-site scripting, and for GitHub Actions, such as code injection and untrusted checkout. Zizmor audits the workflows for known Actions vulnerability patterns, and Gitleaks scans the whole Git history for leaked secrets (.github/workflows/security.yml).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


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    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with static code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [static_analysis_fixed]
    A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known. Note that criterion vulnerabilities_fixed_60_days requires that all such vulnerabilities be fixed within 60 days of being made public.

    CodeQL and zizmor send their results to GitHub code scanning on every pull request and push to main, and the CI analyzers block merging on any finding through the required "CI passed" check (--fatal-infos, --max-warnings=0, plpgsql_check --fail-on error). Confirmed security issues are fixed before other work, as SECURITY.md says, and no medium or higher static-analysis finding is open.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


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    It is SUGGESTED that static source code analysis occur on every commit or at least daily. [static_analysis_often]

    The Security workflow (CodeQL, zizmor, gitleaks, OSV-Scanner) runs on every push to main, on every pull request and weekly on a schedule (.github/workflows/security.yml). The CI workflow runs the analyzers and linters on every pull request and every push to main, and "CI passed" is the required check for merging (.github/workflows/ci.yml).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/security.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


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    It is SUGGESTED that at least one dynamic analysis tool be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release. [dynamic_analysis]
    A dynamic analysis tool examines the software by executing it with specific inputs. For example, the project MAY use a fuzzing tool (e.g., American Fuzzy Lop) or a web application scanner (e.g., OWASP ZAP or w3af). In some cases the OSS-Fuzz project may be willing to apply fuzz testing to your project. For purposes of this criterion the dynamic analysis tool needs to vary the inputs in some way to look for various kinds of problems or be an automated test suite with at least 80% branch coverage. The Wikipedia page on dynamic analysis and the OWASP page on fuzzing identify some dynamic analysis tools. The analysis tool(s) MAY be focused on looking for security vulnerabilities, but this is not required.

    CI runs on every pull request and every push to main, so before each release it runs test suites that execute the code with varied inputs. The Edge Function tests must reach 100% line, branch and function coverage (make test-functions). Seeded randomised property tests run thousands of cases on the money and rent arithmetic in mm_core (money_test.dart, allocation_test.dart) and on the website (tests/unit/money.test.ts, rent-math.test.ts). tool/db/concurrency_test.sh runs 30 parallel race scenarios on real PostgreSQL and then checks the ledger and ownership invariants. Playwright UAT takes the built web app through every user journey on a local Supabase stack, and the website's Playwright tests run axe. fast-check property tests are being added to the website.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/tool/db/concurrency_test.sh


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    It is SUGGESTED that if the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    The software the project releases is written in memory-safe languages: Dart (the app and packages), TypeScript (the Edge Functions and website) and SQL/PL/pgSQL, with small amounts of Kotlin and Swift platform glue. The only C/C++ in the repository is Flutter's generated Linux desktop runners (app/linux/runner and packages/mm_ui/example/linux/runner), which are used only to run tests locally and are never built for release. Releases contain only the Android, iOS and web builds (.github/workflows/release.yml).

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/.github/workflows/release.yml


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    It is SUGGESTED that the project use a configuration for at least some dynamic analysis (such as testing or fuzzing) which enables many assertions. In many cases these assertions should not be enabled in production builds. [dynamic_analysis_enable_assertions]
    This criterion does not suggest enabling assertions during production; that is entirely up to the project and its users to decide. This criterion's focus is instead to improve fault detection during dynamic analysis before deployment. Enabling assertions in production use is completely different from enabling assertions during dynamic analysis (such as testing). In some cases enabling assertions in production use is extremely unwise (especially in high-integrity components). There are many arguments against enabling assertions in production, e.g., libraries should not crash callers, their presence may cause rejection by app stores, and/or activating an assertion in production may expose private data such as private keys. Beware that in many Linux distributions NDEBUG is not defined, so C/C++ assert() will by default be enabled for production in those environments. It may be important to use a different assertion mechanism or defining NDEBUG for production in those environments.

    The Dart and Flutter tests (dart test, flutter test in the Makefile) run in debug mode with assertions on. This enables the assert() checks in mm_ui and the app, and Flutter's own framework assertions, and release builds strip them. mm_core checks its arguments with exceptions that are always on (ArgumentError). Each scenario in tool/db/concurrency_test.sh checks its own expected outcome, and the run ends by checking the ledger and ownership invariants.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/Makefile


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    All medium and higher severity exploitable vulnerabilities discovered with dynamic code analysis MUST be fixed in a timely way after they are confirmed. [dynamic_analysis_fixed]
    If you are not running dynamic code analysis and thus have not found any vulnerabilities in this way, choose "not applicable" (N/A). A vulnerability is considered medium or higher severity if its Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base qualitative score is medium or higher. In CVSS versions 2.0 through 3.1, this is equivalent to a CVSS score of 4.0 or higher. Projects may use the CVSS score as published in a widely-used vulnerability database (such as the National Vulnerability Database) using the most-recent version of CVSS reported in that database. Projects may instead calculate the severity themselves using the latest version of CVSS at the time of the vulnerability disclosure, if the calculation inputs are publicly revealed once the vulnerability is publicly known.

    No medium or higher exploitable vulnerability found by dynamic analysis is open. A failing test blocks merging through the required "CI passed" check. Races found before 1.0.0 were fixed by new migrations, for example, supabase/migrations/20261105170557_concurrency_findings.sql (a race could leave a document without its file, and writes are now authorised again after taking the lock). Each fix has a regression scenario in tool/db/concurrency_test.sh that fails without it.

    URL: https://github.com/ar27111994/maalik-e-makaan/blob/main/supabase/migrations/20261105170557_concurrency_findings.sql



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Project badge entry owned by: Ahmed Rehan.
Entry created on 2026-11-09 16:41:37 UTC, last updated on 2026-11-09 18:17:32 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-11-09 18:17:32 UTC.