pic-standard

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/migration-trust-sanitization.md

The project follows Semantic Versioning and provides a documented upgrade path to newer versions. Per SECURITY.md, only the latest minor release on the v0.x line receives security fixes; older versions are end-of-life, and users are expected to upgrade. To support that upgrade path, the project provides:
(1) CHANGELOG.md — a detailed per-release log following semver, with explicit Added / Deprecated / Changed / Notes sections noting wire-format compatibility on every release.
(2) docs/migration-trust-sanitization.md — a dedicated migration guide for the v0.7.x → v0.8.x → v1.0 trust-model migration, covering: what is changing and why, a per-version timeline table (v0.7.x, v0.8.0, v0.8.1, v1.0), the deprecation warnings producers will see (PICTrustFutureWarning, PICSemiTrustedDeprecationWarning), and step-by-step migration instructions (audit → add evidence → enable evidence verification → opt in to strict_trust=True early).
(3) ROADMAP.md §"How spec normative freezes are sequenced" — documents the trajectory of every spec artifact (DRAFT → cross-implementation conformance → normative) and the release ladder showing exactly what changes between versions.
Wire-format compatibility is explicitly tracked: v0.8.1 release notes confirm "Existing v0.8.0 proposals continue to parse, verify, and produce the same allow/block verdicts under v0.8.1," and a verdict-regression matrix in tests/test_trust_deprecation_warning.py is a permanent CI guard against silent behavior changes.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/issues

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/security/advisories

No vulnerabilities have been resolved in the last 12 months. The project's first commit was 2026-01-08 and no security advisories have been filed via the GitHub Security Advisories channel as of submission. The repository's Security Advisories page is publicly viewable at the URL above. SECURITY.md commits the project to crediting reporters in published advisories unless they explicitly request anonymity ("Reporters are credited in the published advisory unless they explicitly request anonymity").

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/SECURITY.md

The vulnerability response process is documented in SECURITY.md and covers: (1) reporting channel — GitHub Security Advisories private vulnerability reporting, with a step-by-step submission path and explicit instruction not to file public issues; (2) what to include — affected versions, component, reproduction, impact assessment, optional suggested mitigation; (3) disclosure timeline — acknowledgment within 7 days, initial triage within 30 days, fix release targeted within 90 days for High/Critical issues, coordinated public disclosure default 90 days from acknowledgment; (4) scope — in-scope components (Python SDK, canonicalization implementation, verifier, pipeline, evidence, keyring, integration adapters, conformance suite, OpenClaw plugin, specs under docs/) and out-of-scope (downstream code, third-party plugins, hosted services, end-of-life pre-v0.8.0 releases); (5) reporter credit policy — credited in advisory unless anonymity requested; (6) supported-versions table aligning with the SemVer release line.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

Python contributions follow PEP 8 as stated in CONTRIBUTING.md §"Requirements for Acceptable Contributions" ("Python code should follow PEP 8 style"). TypeScript contributions in integrations/openclaw use TypeScript's strict mode ("strict": true in tsconfig.json) with NodeNext module resolution and ES2022 target, type-checked in CI via tsc --noEmit.

Python style enforced by Ruff (config in pyproject.toml; rule set E F W I N B SIM RUF). TypeScript style enforced by ESLint v9 flat config + Prettier (config in integrations/openclaw/eslint.config.mjs and .prettierrc.json). Both gated in CI via .github/workflows/ci.yml. Documented for contributors in CONTRIBUTING.md.

PIC produces no native binaries. The Python package builds via setuptools to a pure-Python wheel; the TypeScript plugin builds via tsc to JavaScript. No C/C++ compiler or linker is invoked.

No native build occurs. Python sources are distributed as-is in the wheel; TypeScript compiles to JavaScript with sourcemap-capable settings in tsconfig.json. No stripping step exists.

Build is handled by setuptools (Python) and tsc (TypeScript). Neither performs recursive Make-style subdirectory builds; both resolve the full dependency graph in a single pass before producing artifacts.

PIC is a Python package distributed as source plus a pure-Python wheel; source files are used directly and no compilation occurs. The Dockerfile pins the base image by SHA-256 digest (python:3.12-slim@sha256:3d5ed9...) and installs pinned dependency versions for reproducible container builds, but the underlying Python package itself does not have a compilation step subject to bit-for-bit reproducibility.

PIC is published to PyPI and installable via the standard Python convention pip install pic-standard (or with extras: pip install "pic-standard[langgraph,mcp,crypto]"). Uninstall via pip uninstall pic-standard. Documented in README §Quickstart. A Docker image is also available via the included Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml.

Installation uses pip, which honors standard Python packaging install-location conventions including --prefix, --root (the Python equivalent of DESTDIR for staged installs), --user, and --target. The project does not override or replace these mechanisms; setuptools handles them via the standard Python build backend declared in pyproject.toml.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard#quickstart

README §Quickstart documents the standard editable-install convention: git clone ... && cd pic-standard && pip install -e ".[langgraph,mcp,crypto]" && pytest -q. This installs the package in development mode with all optional integrations and runs the full test suite (24 test files in tests/) plus the conformance suite via python -m conformance.run.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/pyproject.toml

External dependencies are declared in computer-processable form in pyproject.toml ([project] dependencies and [project.optional-dependencies] for langgraph/crypto/mcp extras), and in pinned form in sdk-python/requirements.txt, requirements-dev.txt, requirements-langgraph.txt, and requirements-mcp.txt. TypeScript dependencies for the OpenClaw integration are declared in integrations/openclaw/package.json with a package-lock.json lockfile.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml
Dependabot is configured in .github/dependabot.yml with weekly scans across four ecosystems: Python (pyproject.toml at root), Python (sdk-python/requirements.txt), npm (integrations/openclaw), and github-actions. Major version bumps are intentionally held for manual review; minor and patch updates are grouped into PRs. GitHub also performs automated vulnerability scanning on the repository's dependency graph.*

PIC uses standard ecosystem components only — Python packages from PyPI (pydantic, jsonschema, cryptography, jsonschema, etc.) and Node packages from npm. All dependencies are managed via standard package managers (pip, npm) and can be updated via the standard pip install -U <pkg> or npm update flows. There are no vendored convenience copies of third-party code.

PIC targets Python ≥3.10 and uses current, actively-maintained dependencies: Pydantic ≥2.13.3 (current major version, not the deprecated 1.x line), jsonschema ≥4.0.0 (current major version), cryptography ≥42.0.0 (current; older, deprecated cryptography releases are excluded by the version floor). The TypeScript plugin targets Node ≥18, ES2022, and uses NodeNext module resolution. CI tests against Python 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 to catch deprecation warnings early.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml

Two CI workflows run on every push and pull request: (1) .github/workflows/ci.yml runs pytest across a Python 3.10/3.11/3.12 matrix (with both pinned and latest dependency canaries) plus a separate job for the TypeScript OpenClaw integration (tsc type-check + vitest); (2) .github/workflows/conformance.yml runs the PIC Conformance suite (python -m conformance.run) against the canonicalization and core verifier vectors. Both produce per-job pass/fail reports visible in the Actions tab. CI status is shown via the ![CI] README badge.

The project routinely adds regression tests for fixed bugs and behavior changes. Concrete examples in tests/: test_trust_deprecation_warning.py codifies the v0.8.0 verdict baseline as a 24-row parametrized verdict-regression matrix (6 example proposals × strict_trust × verify_evidence) that pins behavior across the dict-vs-model boundary refactor (CHANGELOG §[0.8.1]); test_evidence_sandbox.py codifies path-traversal rejection; test_mcp_guard_async_timeout.py and test_mcp_guard_time_budget.py codify DoS-limit behavior; test_strict_trust.py codifies trust-sanitization semantics. The conformance suite (conformance/) provides additional behavior-pinning vectors that run on every PR.

Python statement coverage 82.0% measured by coverage.py (config in pyproject.toml; gate fail_under = 80 enforced by CI). TypeScript integration plugin coverage measurement deferred to v0.9.x follow-up. See PR #73 for the implementation.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

CONTRIBUTING.md §Test Policy formally requires that pull requests adding or changing behavior include automated tests under tests/, with conformance vectors under conformance/ for new verifier behavior, and regression tests for bug fixes. Documentation-only and refactor-only PRs are exempt. Maintainers will not merge PRs adding new functionality without corresponding tests.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

CI + test suite already enforces clean runs; the deprecation handling shows strictness.

https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md#security-properties

PIC is itself a secure-design protocol; the Saltzer & Schroeder principles are explicit in its architecture and documented in RFC-0001:
Fail-safe defaults (fail-closed) — every error path (schema invalid, evidence missing, tool-binding mismatch, timeout, signature invalid, file not found) results in the action being blocked. There is no fallback to "allow anyway." Documented as Security Property #1 and Conformance MUST #2.
Complete mediation — every high-impact tool call is gated at the action boundary; the verifier intercepts before any side effect occurs. Documented in RFC-0001 §Protocol Summary and §Conformance MUST #1 (schema validation before execution).
Open design — protocol, schema, reference implementation, and conformance vectors are all Apache-2.0 and public. RFC-0001 is published as a defensive publication; security does not depend on obscurity.
Least privilege & separation of privilege — trust is verifier-derived, not declared by the agent: untrusted provenance can only be upgraded to trusted via successful cryptographic evidence verification (Security Property #5). The strict_trust mode (v0.7.5+) sanitizes all inbound trust to "untrusted" before any pipeline step consumes it.
Economy of mechanism — local-first verifier, deterministic, no external services required (Security Property #4 and #8). The pipeline is intentionally minimal: schema → verifier → evidence.
Defense in depth — multiple independent gates: JSON Schema validation, fail-closed enforcement, tool-binding integrity check, sandboxed evidence resolution within evidence_root_dir with path-traversal rejection (Security Property #6), Ed25519 signature verification with key expiry and revocation lists (Security Property #7), and DoS resistance limits (64 KB max proposal, 500 ms eval budget, 5 MB max evidence file, 64-item array caps — threat T7).
Minimize attack surface — local-first by default with no outbound network calls; HTTP bridge is opt-in; integration extras (langgraph, mcp, crypto) are opt-in; trust sanitization shrinks the exploitable surface to verifiable evidence only.
Input validation — every proposal is validated against the PIC/1.0 JSON Schema before execution; tool arguments cannot exceed what the proposal binds to (tool-binding integrity, Conformance MUST #4).
Threat model and mitigations for seven concrete attack classes (T1–T7: prompt injection, hallucination-driven loss, privilege escalation via tool chaining, untrusted-data laundering, evidence forgery, verification bypass, DoS via proposals) are documented in RFC-0001 §Threat Model.