pic-standard

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 12790 is silver Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Open standard for Provenance & Intent Contracts (PIC) in AI agents. Verify intent, provenance, and evidence before high-impact tool calls.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Project oversight


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/LICENSE

    This criterion is a SHOULD, and the project has not yet implemented a formal DCO or CLA mechanism. The decision is intentional at the project's current scale: PIC is a single-maintainer project with a small contributor base, and inbound contributions are governed by GitHub's Terms of Service §D.6 ("Inbound=Outbound" — by submitting a pull request to a public repository, the contributor licenses their contribution under the repository's license) combined with the project's Apache-2.0 license, which itself contains an explicit contribution clause (§5: "Unless You explicitly state otherwise, any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work by You to the Licensor shall be under the terms and conditions of this License"). This provides a baseline legal grant for contributions today. Adopting a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO) is on the project roadmap as the contributor base grows; once DCO is enabled (via the DCO GitHub App and a CONTRIBUTING.md update), this criterion will be re-evaluated as Met.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#%EF%B8%8F-governance-model

    Governance is documented in CONTRIBUTING.md §Governance Model. The PIC Standard is consensus-driven; major changes to specifications and schemas must be initiated as a discussion in GitHub Discussions before a PR is opened. Spec evolution sequencing (DRAFT → cross-implementation conformance → normative) is documented in ROADMAP.md §"How spec normative freezes are sequenced.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md

    Project has adopted the Contributor Covenant version 2.1, posted at the repository root as CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, with enforcement contact at team@madeinpluto.com and four-tier Community Impact Guidelines (Correction → Warning → Temporary Ban → Permanent Ban).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md#continuity-plan

    Continuity plan documented in MAINTAINERS.md §Continuity Plan, covering operational continuity (Apache-2.0 fork rights, immutable PyPI/GitHub release history, Zenodo-archived spec, no DNS dependencies), account-access escrow (GitHub recovery codes, PyPI credentials, email credentials, signed authorization letter held in a sealed continuity envelope), legal continuity (Apache-2.0 grants successor rights without permission, no trademark blockers), a named designated successor (Rebecca Yallop) with documented activation procedure, and a 7-day operational-continuity demonstration target. The successor is a non-technical family member whose authorized role is to bridge access between loss of the Lead Maintainer and continuation by a technical successor of her choosing — the lockbox-and-will pattern explicitly contemplated by this criterion.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/graphs/contributors


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/ROADMAP.md

    ROADMAP.md is a 36KB living plan covering the next 12+ months: v0.8.2 (conformance expansion + initial spec drafts), v0.9.0 (TypeScript verifier interop milestone, OpenAPI bridge spec, Docker hardening), v0.9.1–v0.9.2 (differential testing, fuzzing, ambiguity burn-down), and v1.0.0 (production-grade protocol freeze, Internet-Draft submission). It also explicitly lists what is NOT in scope: "Deferred beyond v1.0: broader TS hardening, trust bundle profile, discovery profile, optional CBOR profile, registry/governance machinery beyond the v1.0 minimum, additional transport bindings."


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md#protocol-summary-pic10-action-proposal

    Architecture is documented in RFC-0001, including the action-boundary interception design, the Action Proposal envelope structure, the verification pipeline (schema → verifier → evidence), the impact taxonomy, the three-way ID binding mechanism, and the reference component list (verifier, CLI, LangGraph node, MCP guard, OpenClaw plugin, HTTP bridge). The README also includes a Mermaid flow diagram of the data flow.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md#security-properties

    Security requirements are documented in RFC-0001 §Security Properties (eight MUST/SHOULD properties: fail-closed execution, causal accountability, tool-binding integrity, local-first verification, evidence-as-output-of-verification, sandboxed evidence resolution, key lifecycle, deterministic verification) and §Non-Goals (eight things PIC explicitly does not provide: output guardrails, authentication, authorization, prompt filtering, runtime sandbox, logging/SIEM, tool input validation, protection against compromised trusted signers).


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard#quickstart

    README §Quickstart gives a one-minute install-and-verify path: pip install pic-standard, then pic-cli verify examples/financial_irreversible.json, with additional examples for evidence-aware verification (hash and signature) and optional extras for LangGraph, MCP, and crypto.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation is kept in sync with each release; CHANGELOG.md tracks user-visible changes. RFC-0001 explicitly states the version range it covers and is updated across releases. Version-specific behavior (e.g., v0.7.5 strict_trust mode, v0.8.0 canonicalization) is annotated inline in the README. No known documentation defects.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard#-pic-standard-provenance--intent-contracts


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    Project sites are GitHub repository pages and PyPI, both of which follow WCAG accessibility practices. Project documentation is plain Markdown rendered with semantic HTML, alt text on images, descriptive link text, and accessible headings. The Mermaid diagram in the README is paired with a textual description of the same flow. CLI output is plain text and screen-reader compatible.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    PIC is a verifier library and CLI for AI agent action gating. It does not generate user-facing text intended for end-user consumption, does not sort human-readable text in locale-sensitive ways, and emits only structured machine-readable output (JSON decisions, error codes). Internationalization does not apply.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    The project does not operate any site that stores user passwords. The repository is hosted on GitHub and the package is distributed via PyPI; both providers manage their own authentication systems. The project does not host its own website or authentication service.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/migration-trust-sanitization.md

    The project follows Semantic Versioning and provides a documented upgrade path to newer versions. Per SECURITY.md, only the latest minor release on the v0.x line receives security fixes; older versions are end-of-life, and users are expected to upgrade. To support that upgrade path, the project provides:
    (1) CHANGELOG.md — a detailed per-release log following semver, with explicit Added / Deprecated / Changed / Notes sections noting wire-format compatibility on every release.
    (2) docs/migration-trust-sanitization.md — a dedicated migration guide for the v0.7.x → v0.8.x → v1.0 trust-model migration, covering: what is changing and why, a per-version timeline table (v0.7.x, v0.8.0, v0.8.1, v1.0), the deprecation warnings producers will see (PICTrustFutureWarning, PICSemiTrustedDeprecationWarning), and step-by-step migration instructions (audit → add evidence → enable evidence verification → opt in to strict_trust=True early).
    (3) ROADMAP.md §"How spec normative freezes are sequenced" — documents the trajectory of every spec artifact (DRAFT → cross-implementation conformance → normative) and the release ladder showing exactly what changes between versions.
    Wire-format compatibility is explicitly tracked: v0.8.1 release notes confirm "Existing v0.8.0 proposals continue to parse, verify, and produce the same allow/block verdicts under v0.8.1," and a verdict-regression matrix in tests/test_trust_deprecation_warning.py is a permanent CI guard against silent behavior changes.


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/security/advisories

    No vulnerabilities have been resolved in the last 12 months. The project's first commit was 2026-01-08 and no security advisories have been filed via the GitHub Security Advisories channel as of submission. The repository's Security Advisories page is publicly viewable at the URL above. SECURITY.md commits the project to crediting reporters in published advisories unless they explicitly request anonymity ("Reporters are credited in the published advisory unless they explicitly request anonymity").


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/SECURITY.md

    The vulnerability response process is documented in SECURITY.md and covers: (1) reporting channel — GitHub Security Advisories private vulnerability reporting, with a step-by-step submission path and explicit instruction not to file public issues; (2) what to include — affected versions, component, reproduction, impact assessment, optional suggested mitigation; (3) disclosure timeline — acknowledgment within 7 days, initial triage within 30 days, fix release targeted within 90 days for High/Critical issues, coordinated public disclosure default 90 days from acknowledgment; (4) scope — in-scope components (Python SDK, canonicalization implementation, verifier, pipeline, evidence, keyring, integration adapters, conformance suite, OpenClaw plugin, specs under docs/) and out-of-scope (downstream code, third-party plugins, hosted services, end-of-life pre-v0.8.0 releases); (5) reporter credit policy — credited in advisory unless anonymity requested; (6) supported-versions table aligning with the SemVer release line.


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

    Python contributions follow PEP 8 as stated in CONTRIBUTING.md §"Requirements for Acceptable Contributions" ("Python code should follow PEP 8 style"). TypeScript contributions in integrations/openclaw use TypeScript's strict mode ("strict": true in tsconfig.json) with NodeNext module resolution and ES2022 target, type-checked in CI via tsc --noEmit.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Python style enforced by Ruff (config in pyproject.toml; rule set E F W I N B SIM RUF). TypeScript style enforced by ESLint v9 flat config + Prettier (config in integrations/openclaw/eslint.config.mjs and .prettierrc.json). Both gated in CI via .github/workflows/ci.yml. Documented for contributors in CONTRIBUTING.md.


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    PIC produces no native binaries. The Python package builds via setuptools to a pure-Python wheel; the TypeScript plugin builds via tsc to JavaScript. No C/C++ compiler or linker is invoked.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    No native build occurs. Python sources are distributed as-is in the wheel; TypeScript compiles to JavaScript with sourcemap-capable settings in tsconfig.json. No stripping step exists.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    Build is handled by setuptools (Python) and tsc (TypeScript). Neither performs recursive Make-style subdirectory builds; both resolve the full dependency graph in a single pass before producing artifacts.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    PIC is a Python package distributed as source plus a pure-Python wheel; source files are used directly and no compilation occurs. The Dockerfile pins the base image by SHA-256 digest (python:3.12-slim@sha256:3d5ed9...) and installs pinned dependency versions for reproducible container builds, but the underlying Python package itself does not have a compilation step subject to bit-for-bit reproducibility.


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    PIC is published to PyPI and installable via the standard Python convention pip install pic-standard (or with extras: pip install "pic-standard[langgraph,mcp,crypto]"). Uninstall via pip uninstall pic-standard. Documented in README §Quickstart. A Docker image is also available via the included Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Installation uses pip, which honors standard Python packaging install-location conventions including --prefix, --root (the Python equivalent of DESTDIR for staged installs), --user, and --target. The project does not override or replace these mechanisms; setuptools handles them via the standard Python build backend declared in pyproject.toml.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard#quickstart

    README §Quickstart documents the standard editable-install convention: git clone ... && cd pic-standard && pip install -e ".[langgraph,mcp,crypto]" && pytest -q. This installs the package in development mode with all optional integrations and runs the full test suite (24 test files in tests/) plus the conformance suite via python -m conformance.run.


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/pyproject.toml

    External dependencies are declared in computer-processable form in pyproject.toml ([project] dependencies and [project.optional-dependencies] for langgraph/crypto/mcp extras), and in pinned form in sdk-python/requirements.txt, requirements-dev.txt, requirements-langgraph.txt, and requirements-mcp.txt. TypeScript dependencies for the OpenClaw integration are declared in integrations/openclaw/package.json with a package-lock.json lockfile.


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml
    Dependabot is configured in .github/dependabot.yml with weekly scans across four ecosystems: Python (pyproject.toml at root), Python (sdk-python/requirements.txt), npm (integrations/openclaw), and github-actions. Major version bumps are intentionally held for manual review; minor and patch updates are grouped into PRs. GitHub also performs automated vulnerability scanning on the repository's dependency graph.*


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    PIC uses standard ecosystem components only — Python packages from PyPI (pydantic, jsonschema, cryptography, jsonschema, etc.) and Node packages from npm. All dependencies are managed via standard package managers (pip, npm) and can be updated via the standard pip install -U <pkg> or npm update flows. There are no vendored convenience copies of third-party code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    PIC targets Python ≥3.10 and uses current, actively-maintained dependencies: Pydantic ≥2.13.3 (current major version, not the deprecated 1.x line), jsonschema ≥4.0.0 (current major version), cryptography ≥42.0.0 (current; older, deprecated cryptography releases are excluded by the version floor). The TypeScript plugin targets Node ≥18, ES2022, and uses NodeNext module resolution. CI tests against Python 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 to catch deprecation warnings early.


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml

    Two CI workflows run on every push and pull request: (1) .github/workflows/ci.yml runs pytest across a Python 3.10/3.11/3.12 matrix (with both pinned and latest dependency canaries) plus a separate job for the TypeScript OpenClaw integration (tsc type-check + vitest); (2) .github/workflows/conformance.yml runs the PIC Conformance suite (python -m conformance.run) against the canonicalization and core verifier vectors. Both produce per-job pass/fail reports visible in the Actions tab. CI status is shown via the ![CI] README badge.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    The project routinely adds regression tests for fixed bugs and behavior changes. Concrete examples in tests/: test_trust_deprecation_warning.py codifies the v0.8.0 verdict baseline as a 24-row parametrized verdict-regression matrix (6 example proposals × strict_trust × verify_evidence) that pins behavior across the dict-vs-model boundary refactor (CHANGELOG §[0.8.1]); test_evidence_sandbox.py codifies path-traversal rejection; test_mcp_guard_async_timeout.py and test_mcp_guard_time_budget.py codify DoS-limit behavior; test_strict_trust.py codifies trust-sanitization semantics. The conformance suite (conformance/) provides additional behavior-pinning vectors that run on every PR.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Python statement coverage 82.0% measured by coverage.py (config in pyproject.toml; gate fail_under = 80 enforced by CI). TypeScript integration plugin coverage measurement deferred to v0.9.x follow-up. See PR #73 for the implementation.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md

    CONTRIBUTING.md §Test Policy formally requires that pull requests adding or changing behavior include automated tests under tests/, with conformance vectors under conformance/ for new verifier behavior, and regression tests for bug fixes. Documentation-only and refactor-only PRs are exempt. Maintainers will not merge PRs adding new functionality without corresponding tests.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    CI + test suite already enforces clean runs; the deprecation handling shows strictness.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md#security-properties

    PIC is itself a secure-design protocol; the Saltzer & Schroeder principles are explicit in its architecture and documented in RFC-0001:
    Fail-safe defaults (fail-closed) — every error path (schema invalid, evidence missing, tool-binding mismatch, timeout, signature invalid, file not found) results in the action being blocked. There is no fallback to "allow anyway." Documented as Security Property #1 and Conformance MUST #2.
    Complete mediation — every high-impact tool call is gated at the action boundary; the verifier intercepts before any side effect occurs. Documented in RFC-0001 §Protocol Summary and §Conformance MUST #1 (schema validation before execution).
    Open design — protocol, schema, reference implementation, and conformance vectors are all Apache-2.0 and public. RFC-0001 is published as a defensive publication; security does not depend on obscurity.
    Least privilege & separation of privilege — trust is verifier-derived, not declared by the agent: untrusted provenance can only be upgraded to trusted via successful cryptographic evidence verification (Security Property #5). The strict_trust mode (v0.7.5+) sanitizes all inbound trust to "untrusted" before any pipeline step consumes it.
    Economy of mechanism — local-first verifier, deterministic, no external services required (Security Property #4 and #8). The pipeline is intentionally minimal: schema → verifier → evidence.
    Defense in depth — multiple independent gates: JSON Schema validation, fail-closed enforcement, tool-binding integrity check, sandboxed evidence resolution within evidence_root_dir with path-traversal rejection (Security Property #6), Ed25519 signature verification with key expiry and revocation lists (Security Property #7), and DoS resistance limits (64 KB max proposal, 500 ms eval budget, 5 MB max evidence file, 64-item array caps — threat T7).
    Minimize attack surface — local-first by default with no outbound network calls; HTTP bridge is opt-in; integration extras (langgraph, mcp, crypto) are opt-in; trust sanitization shrinks the exploitable surface to verifiable evidence only.
    Input validation — every proposal is validated against the PIC/1.0 JSON Schema before execution; tool arguments cannot exceed what the proposal binds to (tool-binding integrity, Conformance MUST #4).
    Threat model and mitigations for seven concrete attack classes (T1–T7: prompt injection, hallucination-driven loss, privilege escalation via tool chaining, untrusted-data laundering, evidence forgery, verification bypass, DoS via proposals) are documented in RFC-0001 §Threat Model.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No SHA-1, no CBC in SSH, no weak modes.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    PIC's evidence model is algorithm-extensible: the evidence field uses a discriminated type enum (hash, sig) and the schema is designed so additional algorithm types can be added without breaking existing implementations. The current reference implementation supports SHA-256 hashes and Ed25519 signatures — both modern, non-deprecated primitives. Algorithm migration is enabled at the protocol layer (new type values can be added) and at the keyring layer (alg field on signature evidence makes the algorithm explicit per signature, supporting parallel algorithms during migration). The KeyResolver protocol (v0.7+) further allows operators to plug in custom trust backends including HSM-backed services with their own algorithm support.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/keyring.md

    Trusted public keys are stored in a dedicated keyring file (pic_keys.json, see pic_keys.example.json for schema) entirely separate from configuration (pic_policy.json), code, and logs. The keyring file contains trusted_keys (with per-key expires_at) and revoked_keys. Keys can be added, expired, revoked, or rotated at runtime by editing the file — no code recompilation required. The KeyResolver protocol (v0.7+) additionally allows custom trust backends (HSM-backed services, Vault-managed keys, cached remote keyrings) to plug into the verifier and pipeline directly via the StaticKeyRingResolver or any operator-supplied implementation. PIC never stores private keys; the project handles only public keys for verification.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    PIC is a local-first verifier library and performs no outbound network communications. The MCP integration runs in-process (no HTTP). The optional pic-cli serve HTTP bridge is opt-in (the operator must explicitly invoke the subcommand) and intended for loopback IPC only. No insecure network protocol is enabled by default.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The PIC reference implementation does not use TLS. The verifier and SDK are local-first; the optional HTTP bridge is intended for loopback IPC only and does not terminate TLS.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    PIC does not use TLS. The reference implementation is local-first; no outbound TLS connections are made.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Releases are cryptographically signed via two complementary layers:

    Layer 1 (PyPI distribution artifacts): PEP 740 attestations (Sigstore-backed, tied to the GitHub Actions Trusted Publisher workflow identity madeinplutofabio/pic-standard running release.yml under the pypi environment). Verifiable via pypi-attestations verify pypi --repository https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard <wheel-or-sdist>.

    Layer 2 (git tags): SSH-signed with the project's dedicated Ed25519 release-signing key (public key at .github/release-signing-key.pub; fingerprint SHA256:blCcqBpKLCrJUtUYwOvxE3tmUa4F37/COJvy8F80hHg). Verifiable via git tag -v.

    First release through the new infrastructure: v0.8.1.1 (2026-05-11). Both verification paths reproducibly succeed against this release. Full documented process: https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/RELEASING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    All release tags from v0.8.1.1 onward are cryptographically signed using the project's dedicated Ed25519 release-signing key. The signature is verified by the release workflow before any artifact is built (.github/workflows/release.yml → verify-and-build job). GitHub server-side verification of the v0.8.1.1 tag returns "verified": true with reason "valid".

    Public key + fingerprint pinned in https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/RELEASING.md


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    Every Action Proposal is validated against the PIC/1.0 JSON Schema (sdk-python/pic_standard/schemas/proposal_schema.json) using jsonschema before any pipeline step executes — schema validation is the first stage of the verifier and uses an explicit allowlist of permitted fields, types, and enum values (impact classes, trust levels, evidence types). Pydantic models in sdk-python/pic_standard/ provide a second validation layer with field validators (e.g., the Provenance.trust validator that normalizes deprecated values). Invalid inputs are rejected fail-closed: schema violations, unknown enum values, missing required fields, oversized payloads (>64 KB), oversized arrays (>64 items), and oversized evidence files (>5 MB) all return block. File evidence is sandboxed within evidence_root_dir with explicit path-traversal rejection. Tool-binding integrity is verified — action.tool MUST match the actual tool being invoked, and unexpected tool arguments outside the proposal envelope are rejected.


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md#security-properties

    PIC implements multiple hardening mechanisms documented in RFC-0001: (1) fail-closed enforcement on every error path; (2) sandboxed evidence resolution within a configured evidence_root_dir, with path-traversal rejection; (3) DoS resistance limits (64 KB max proposal, 500 ms eval budget, 5 MB max evidence file, 64-item array caps); (4) Ed25519 signature verification with key expiry and revocation lists; (5) strict-trust mode (v0.7.5+) sanitizing inbound provenance trust; (6) tool-binding integrity check rejecting any tool mismatch. See RFC-0001 §Security Properties and §Threat Model.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    https://github.com/madeinplutofabio/pic-standard/blob/main/docs/RFC-0001-pic-standard.md

    RFC-0001 serves as the project's assurance case and contains all four required elements:
    (1) Threat model — RFC-0001 §Threat Model enumerates seven concrete threats (T1–T7: prompt injection to side effect, hallucination to financial loss, privilege escalation via tool chaining, untrusted-data laundering, evidence forgery, verification bypass, DoS via proposals) with explicit PIC mitigations for each.
    (2) Trust boundaries — RFC-0001 §Scope and §Non-Goals identify the security boundary explicitly. PIC operates at the action boundary (after agent reasoning, before any side effect). Inputs are classified by a three-level provenance trust model (trusted, semi_trusted [deprecated], untrusted). Trust is verifier-derived in v1.0+, never declared by the agent. Non-Goals enumerate eight things explicitly outside the boundary (model output guardrails, user/agent authentication, RBAC, prompt filtering, runtime sandbox, logging/SIEM, tool input validation, protection against compromised trusted signers).
    (3) Secure-design principles applied — argued in RFC-0001 §Security Properties (eight MUST/SHOULD properties: fail-safe defaults via fail-closed enforcement, complete mediation at the action boundary, open design via Apache-2.0 + defensive publication, separation of privilege via verifier-derived trust, economy of mechanism via local-first design, deterministic verification, sandboxed evidence resolution, key lifecycle management).
    (4) Common implementation weaknesses countered — JSON Schema + Pydantic input validation against an allowlist (counters injection, malformed input, type confusion); fail-closed on every error path (counters logic-error vulnerability classes); sandboxed file resolution with path-traversal rejection (counters CWE-22); DoS limits on proposal size, evaluation time, evidence size, and array length (counters CWE-400); Ed25519 with key expiry and revocation (counters key compromise and stale-trust); tool-binding integrity check (counters confused-deputy patterns); deprecation/migration warnings before behavior changes (counters silent-semantic-shift vulnerability classes).
    The assurance case is anchored to specific code modules with SHA-256 fingerprints in RFC-0001 §Spec Fingerprint and docs/RFC-0001.SHA256, providing tamper-evident binding between the argument and the implementation it argues about.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    The TypeScript type checking + Python test/conformance suite already surface many common issues.


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    main codebase is Python (memory-safe) and the small TypeScript integration is also memory-safe with type checking. No C/C++ or other unsafe languages.



This data is available under the Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). This means that a Data Recipient may share the Data, with or without modifications, so long as the Data Recipient makes available the text of this agreement with the shared Data. Please credit Fabio Marcello Salvadori and the OpenSSF Best Practices badge contributors.

Project badge entry owned by: Fabio Marcello Salvadori.
Entry created on 2026-05-09 11:08:52 UTC, last updated on 2026-06-22 23:27:53 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-05-09 13:34:54 UTC.