Veredictum

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    An independent conformance instrument for openEHR clinical data repositories. A machine-readable catalogue of 1103 spec-cited test cases and 247 operation bindings is driven against a running CDR over its own REST wire; verdicts are a pure function of the party statement, the recordings, the catalogue and the capability matrix, and the emitted record is sealed with a SHA-256 digest manifest and a detached OpenPGP signature so anyone can re-check it. Every expectation cites the released openEHR specification section it enforces, and the specification text is vendored so each citation resolves.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the requirements for an acceptable contribution: the gate commands every PR must pass (cargo build/clippy -D warnings/fmt --check/nextest/deny check, plus veredictum validate at zero findings), the hard rules (every expectation cites its specification section; never weaken, skip or delete a test; coverage ratchets up only; a red row is attributed before anything changes; comment form per RFC 505 and RFC 1574), enforced-signed commits, conventional-commit subjects, a same-PR changelog entry, and tests with behaviour changes: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    Inbound = outbound, by the licence itself rather than by a separate agreement: Apache-2.0 section 5 places every contribution under the same licence unless the contributor explicitly states otherwise, and CONTRIBUTING.md and GOVERNANCE.md § What this project will not do both restate it — there is no CLA and no copyright assignment, contributors keep their copyright, and the licence stays Apache-2.0 for everyone including the maintainer. Authorship is verifiable rather than asserted: every commit in the history is OpenPGP-signed and the main ruleset refuses an unsigned one. There is no DCO sign-off trailer: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents the model as it actually is: one maintainer with final say, why the released specifications and not the maintainer decide conformance (including the stated conflict of interest with FerroEHR, a CDR this instrument grades), where decisions are recorded, how a change gets in, how someone becomes a maintainer, and the standing refusals: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    Contributor Covenant, in the standard root location, with the enforcement contact and the four-tier enforcement ladder, and linked from CONTRIBUTING.md and GOVERNANCE.md: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    GOVERNANCE.md defines the roles and how a change gets in; MAINTAINERS.md names who holds them (one person, since 2026-08-26) and, identity by identity, what each credential can publish; .github/CODEOWNERS carries the review ownership. The three edits that add a maintainer are named explicitly: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    Honest: this is met, and MAINTAINERS.md § Publishing identities and § If the maintainer is unavailable say so first-hand rather than promising a plan. Every identity that can publish under this name terminates at one person's GitHub account, one person's hardware, or one person's registrar login: the OpenPGP commit- and tag-signing key is not escrowed, the repository is user-owned so GitHub account recovery is the only route, and crates.io and Zenodo both hang off that same account. Nothing already published disappears (immutable releases, an undeletable container digest, a permanent Zenodo DOI, Apache-2.0 plus public history so a fork is a complete continuation) — but nothing new ships, and no one else could create or close issues, accept a change, or cut a release within a week. The trigger is a second maintainer with write access and a second holder wherever an identity permits one: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The bus factor is 1. GET /repos/rubentalstra/Veredictum/collaborators returns one login; one person can accept a pull request and cut a release; no organisation or legal entity stands behind the project. The route to a second maintainer, explicitly including one from a competing implementation, is open and documented in GOVERNANCE.md § Becoming a maintainer: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    A public roadmap board now exists and is linked from the README: https://github.com/users/rubentalstra/projects/5 — planned, in progress and shipped, as a view over the issue tracker, with milestones as releases. The prose halves back it: ARCHITECTURE.md § 11 Gap-fill roadmap is the ordered content plan for the catalogue (querying/AQL first, then the maximal-coverage template round-trip, the scenario/lifecycle suites, the performance and volumetrics chapter — each a bounded, assignable chapter task ordered by procurement value), and GOVERNANCE.md § What this project will not do is the explicit will-not-do half: no CLA or copyright assignment, no expectation without a specification citation, no gate weakened to go green, no verdict a reader cannot re-derive, no paid pass and no privileged party.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    ARCHITECTURE.md is the design record rather than a summary of one: the testable surface and case-core field definitions, the per-operation wire bindings, the outcome taxonomy and ambiguity register, the assertion vocabulary, the verdict computation (§ 8), and the population-anchored performance-class model with its journey decomposition (§ 8.14). The user-facing conformance-method chapter is at https://veredictum.eu/docs/methodology.html : https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/ARCHITECTURE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    Two documents, and neither repeats the other. SECURITY.md carries what a user can and cannot expect: the supported version is the most recent release only — no maintenance branch, no LTS line, no backports — stated with its consequence for anyone publishing a conformance record; the private reporting route and the response commitments; safe harbour; § Scope notes on which classes are security-relevant here (credentials for the system under test, verdict integrity, release-artifact integrity) and which deliberately are not; and the standing warning never to point the runner at a live clinical deployment, because it writes into the system it tests. ASSURANCE_CASE.md carries the argument behind those requirements, boundary by boundary: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    Two of them. The README § Quick start is four commands from a clone to a rendered verdict (validate, copy a party example, run, verdicts), with a prebuilt-binary path and a cargo install path beside it; the documentation site carries the same as its installation and running chapters: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum#quick-start


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    The docs are machine-held to the code. The Docs workflow gates on mdbook-lint over every chapter and a blocking internal link check (lychee) before the site deploys, scripts/checks/site-counts.sh fails if the counts the site prints disagree with what veredictum validate reports over the catalogue, and CI requires a user-visible change to add its CHANGELOG entry in the same pull request. The published API documentation is generated from the source with missing_docs as a lint, so it cannot drift from the code: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/docs.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The README's badge rows are live readings, not claims, and they include this badge (project 14252) beside OpenSSF Scorecard, SLSA Build L3, the Zenodo DOI, CI, CodeQL and the four SonarQube Cloud ratings; the comment beneath them says which read below their ceiling today and why, check by check: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum#readme


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    Not evaluated systematically, so not claimed. The console is built with accessibility affordances in place — ARIA landmarks and labels on the primary navigation, breadcrumbs, the dark-mode toggle and the toast dismissal, and the journey tests select on those aria-labels, so they cannot silently disappear — but no WCAG audit, axe run or assistive-technology pass has been done, and the console is still under construction (image tags published before its first release carry the CLI as the payload). The CLI itself is plain text on a terminal. The trigger is an accessibility evaluation of the console once its screens settle.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    Stated honestly rather than claimed or dismissed. The instrument's own machine surface is locale-independent by design (spec-fixed openEHR identifiers, ISO datetimes, integer arithmetic with no clock or locale in the resolvers, locale-independent rendering in the document assets), and clinical content carries its own language codes through the openEHR RM. But the human-readable surface — CLI output, the report and certificate documents, and the console's UI strings — is English-only with no localization mechanism, so a translator has nothing to hook into today. There is no i18n framework and no second locale.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    No project site stores passwords for authentication of external users. The repository and the documentation site are GitHub and GitHub Pages, and the web console has no login at all — which is why its publish flag binds it to loopback and exposing it further is explicitly the operator's decision behind their own gate.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    Actively maintained: four releases in the current cycle (0.0.1-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.4, the latest on 2026-08-27), a tracker past #100 under continuous triage, Dependabot plus a scheduled latest-deps lane and a weekly published-image scan that files its own tracking issue, and CHANGELOG.md accumulating entries between cuts: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/releases


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues, with three typed templates (defect, enhancement, task), labels and milestones, used for both defects and enhancement requests: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/issues


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    SECURITY.md § Credit: reporters are named in the advisory and the changelog by default, using whatever name and link they give, and declining credit costs nothing and changes nothing about how the report is handled: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md § Reporting a vulnerability and § What you can expect: private reporting through GitHub Security Advisories, an acknowledgement within 5 working days with a documented public-escalation fallback if it does not arrive, an assessment with a severity and an intended fix window within 14 calendar days, and a coordinated disclosure date agreed with the reporter rather than imposed. Safe harbour is stated. The commitments are framed as commitments to the reporter, not conditions on them: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    CONTRIBUTING.md documents the standards and CLAUDE.md carries the full set: rustfmt, clippy at pedantic-deny, the comment form (line comments only, RFC 505 and RFC 1574, with budgets and typed TODO/NOTE conventions), the citation rule for every expectation, and the test discipline. The machine-readable half is in the repository as configuration: rustfmt.toml, clippy.toml and the workspace lint tables in Cargo.toml: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Enforced on every pull request and push, not advisory: cargo fmt --all --check, cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings (plus the console's ssr and wasm hydrate targets), scripts/checks/comment-style.sh over the whole tree, changelog-structure and same-PR changelog-entry guards, a REUSE lint, an image-label guard, a VEX-advisory guard, zizmor and actionlint over the workflows and hadolint over the Dockerfile — all behind one required conclusion check, with a guard that fails if any job is left out of it: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/ci.yml


  • Working build system


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    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    The build is cargo end to end, with no bespoke wrapper to swallow anything: it honours the standard cargo and rustc environment conventions (RUSTFLAGS, CARGO_*, profile overrides in Cargo.toml), and native dependencies built through the cc crate honour CC and CFLAGS in the usual way. Nothing in the repository replaces a passed-in flag set.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    Deliberate, and commented as such in Cargo.toml: the release profile keeps debug = "line-tables-only" so a production panic names its file and line, and strip stays at its default of none because stripping symbols makes traces incomprehensible. overflow-checks = true is kept on in release for the same reason. Nothing strips by default: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    One cargo workspace with one dependency graph, which cargo builds as a single DAG. There is no recursive make and no per-directory build.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    CI builds with --locked against the committed Cargo.lock and a compiler pinned by rust-toolchain.toml; the container build pins its base images by digest (the builder and gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian13:nonroot both by sha256) and a release step checks that the container, rust-toolchain.toml and the Dockerfile agree on the toolchain; release binaries build inside reusable workflows per GitHub's SLSA Build L3 construction and each carries a signed provenance attestation on its digest. A rebuild resolves identical inputs.


  • Installation system


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    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Three install paths, all published: prebuilt x86_64 and aarch64 Linux binaries attached to every release with a sha256sum, a CycloneDX SBOM and a Sigstore bundle; a multi-architecture container image on GHCR (ghcr.io/rubentalstra/veredictum); and the crate on crates.io (cargo install veredictum). The installation chapter carries the commands, including the gh attestation verify invocation: https://veredictum.eu/docs/installation.html


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Each path follows its ecosystem's own convention rather than inventing one: cargo install honours CARGO_INSTALL_ROOT and --root for the install location (and cargo uninstall removes it), the release tarballs are relocatable single static binaries extracted wherever the operator chooses, and the container image is addressed by tag or digest with the catalogue and specification roots passed in as mounted paths rather than baked in.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    git clone, then cargo run -- validate --root artifacts --specs specs/openehr — the toolchain pins itself from rust-toolchain.toml, so there is nothing to install by hand, and cargo-nextest is the only extra tool and only if you intend to run the suite. CONTRIBUTING.md § Setup and § The gates carry the full sequence: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Computer-processable, at three levels: Cargo.toml declares the direct dependency set with each pin commented for why it is there, the committed Cargo.lock is the exact resolved graph (this repository ships a binary, so it is committed deliberately), and every release attaches a generated SPDX repository SBOM plus a per-artifact CycloneDX SBOM, both Sigstore-attested. REUSE.toml declares the licensing of the vendored trees machine-readably: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Four lanes, all running: cargo-deny checks the graph against the RustSec advisory database on every pull request and push; Dependabot raises bump PRs with security updates exempt from the configured cooldowns; a scheduled latest-deps workflow detects in-range upstream breakage; and a weekly Trivy scan of the published container image files or updates its own tracking issue. An accepted advisory needs a published OpenVEX justification in security/vex/, which scripts/checks/vex-advisories.sh enforces: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/deny.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Every reused component is identified and updateable in place. Rust dependencies are ordinary cargo pins in one workspace table with a committed lockfile — no vendored or forked crate copies exist. The vendored material that does exist is specification text and clinical-model corpora, not code: it is fetched by committed scripts (scripts/vendor/adl2-archetypes.sh, ckm-archetypes.sh, ckm-templates.sh), hand-editing it is a hard rule violation, and the fix for any finding inside it is always the script plus a re-run, so an update is a re-vendor rather than a patch to maintain.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The interface documentation is generated from the same source tree, so it cannot lag the code: the published API documentation is complete (https://docs.rs/veredictum — 100% of the crate documented, with missing_docs as a lint), the JSON Schemas in schemas/ are emitted by the instrument itself and drift-tested against the committed copies, and scripts/checks/site-counts.sh fails if the counts the site states disagree with what validate reports. The command reference chapter documents every subcommand: https://veredictum.eu/docs/commands.html


  • Automated test suite


    Enough for a badge!

    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    Integration testing runs above the unit level on every pull request and push: cargo nextest run over the whole workspace including the console's SSR suite, veredictum validate over the entire artifact tree (every machine gate over 1103 cases and 247 bindings, zero findings the only passing result), the console journey tests driving the composed console end to end through a browser, and a screenshot guard that fails when a new screen arrives without a capture. An opt-in mode (UI_E2E_REAL_SUTS=1) composes two real CDRs — FerroEHR's published quickstart and EHRbase's official image pairing — and drives the full wizard against each: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    Applied as a rule rather than a habit: CONTRIBUTING.md § Hard rules forbids weakening, skipping or deleting a test or editing one to route around the defect it exposes, and requires a failing test with a TODO naming its issue when the fix is unclear. In practice, the three document-processing defects the fuzzing lane found (literal nesting depth, brace-expansion variants, a citation-resolution stack overflow) each shipped in 0.1.0-alpha.4 with its pinned regression test and its corpus entry kept: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/releases


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Statement coverage is above 80%, measured by cargo-llvm-cov and published continuously by SonarQube Cloud, whose live coverage badge sits in the README badge row: https://sonarcloud.io/component_measures?id=rubentalstra_Veredictum&metric=coverage . The Sonar lane runs the suite under cargo-llvm-cov and imports the merged lcov through sonar.rust.lcov.reportPaths on every pull request and push. The coverage denominator is deliberately narrower than the analysis scope, with each exclusion carrying its reason in sonar-project.properties: the suite does not measure itself, the CLI entry point is argument plumbing over library functions the suite already drives, and the two document-renderer modules are checked by regenerate-and-diff against committed artifacts rather than by a unit assertion.


  • New functionality testing


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md § Pull requests requires tests to accompany behaviour changes and § Hard rules makes the test discipline non-negotiable (never weaken, skip or delete a test; coverage ratchets up only; a case is added, never removed to make a run green). CI refuses a pull request whose suite is not green, behind the single required conclusion check: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Documented in CONTRIBUTING.md as a stated requirement on every contributor, with the full working discipline in CLAUDE.md, and the gate commands listed so a contributor can run exactly what CI will run: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Warning flags


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    Well beyond the defaults. The workspace lint tables put clippy::all and clippy::pedantic at deny and then name dozens of specific bug-class lints at deny (unwrap_used, expect_used, panic, panic_in_result_fn, indexing_slicing, string_slice, as_conversions, iter_over_hash_type, precedence_bits, unchecked_time_subtraction, allow_attributes_without_reason and more, each with its reason in a comment), and the rust table sets unsafe_code = forbid, non_ascii_idents = forbid, dead_code = deny and let_underscore_drop/lock = deny. CI runs clippy with -D warnings on every target, so any of them fails the build: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    The security-relevant design is structural, and ASSURANCE_CASE.md § 2 states the boundaries it rests on (https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/ASSURANCE_CASE.md). A verdict is a pure function of four inputs — the party's statement, the recorded results, the catalogue and the capability matrix — so no server-controlled value can influence its own result, and two independent runners given those inputs must compute identical verdicts; the verification pack exists to check exactly that, so the instrument is not trusted on its own word. The system under test is untrusted by definition: its responses are evidence in a comparison, never instructions, and an expectation is refuted by a better reading of the released specification and by nothing else. Records are sealed with a byte-deterministic SHA-256 digest manifest and a detached RFC 9580 signature that verify-record recomputes — and that plain gpg --verify checks without this binary present — with typed refusals for a manifest entry that would read outside the bundle or silently replace another digest; a performance class is re-derived from the embedded HDR histograms rather than read from a stored summary. Credentials are unrepresentable inline: the IXIT holds environment-variable names and a declared key path, never a secret. Least privilege in the supply chain: ephemeral per-run tokens, crates.io Trusted Publishing with no stored token, and a reviewer-gated environment on the one irreversible leg.


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No broken or weak primitive is used or accepted: SHA-256 throughout with no truncation, no MD5, no SHA-1, no DES/3DES/RC4, and TLS through rustls, which implements 1.2 and 1.3 only. Signature verification is a real check rather than a formality — verify-record recomputes every digest and verifies the detached signature, so a substituted byte fails.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Corrected and stated precisely, because it is narrower than a plain no. The record format IS agility-ready: the manifest carries a digest_algorithm identifier naming the algorithm every digest below it was taken with, and verification refuses a manifest signed under the wrong algorithm (app/veredictum/src/record.rs), so adding SHA-512 or SHA-3 is a new enum variant and a match arm rather than a format break. The negotiating layers are agile by construction too — TLS versions and suites are negotiated by rustls, and an OpenPGP signature carries its own hash-algorithm identifier. What is not true today is the criterion's own test: only SHA-256 is implemented, so an operator cannot switch if it breaks. The trigger is a second DigestAlgorithm variant with its selection surface, which belongs on an issue before it is claimed here.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    Nothing is embedded and nothing needs a recompilation to change. A credential for the system under test never enters the repository at all: the party's IXIT declares only the NAME of the environment variable that carries it, so the secret stays in the operator's environment and out of the catalogue, the records and the logs. The signing key is a file path passed as --sign-key at the moment it is used and is never stored by the tool. The project's own publishing credentials store no secret either — the release lane runs on an ephemeral per-run GITHUB_TOKEN and the crate publishes through crates.io Trusted Publishing (OIDC), as recorded identity by identity in MAINTAINERS.md: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/MAINTAINERS.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    All network security uses standard published protocols, never bespoke transport cryptography: TLS through rustls on every outbound connection (reqwest is configured with default features off and the rustls feature on, so no platform TLS backend is silently substituted), and JWT (RFC 7519) bearer authentication against a system under test.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    The TLS stack is rustls, which implements TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only — an older protocol version is not representable in the library, so there is nothing to disable and no configuration switch that could re-enable one.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    rustls with webpki certificate verification is the default on every outbound TLS connection, and there is no escape hatch: no danger_accept_invalid_certs, no accept_invalid_hostnames and no insecure or no-verify option is exposed anywhere in the configuration surface or the code.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    Certificate verification happens before anything private is sent: the client is rustls with webpki verification and no way to switch it off, so the JWT bearer token and any basic-auth credential for the system under test only ever travel over a verified TLS session. Private keys are never transmitted or logged — signing is done locally from a key path the operator passes, only the detached signature leaves the process, and pointer_format is a denied lint so addresses cannot leak into Debug output either.


  • Secure release


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Every release is cryptographically signed and independently verifiable. Each artifact carries a Sigstore bundle and a provenance attestation on its digest, built inside reusable workflows per GitHub's documented SLSA Build L3 construction, alongside sha256 sums, a per-artifact CycloneDX SBOM and a generated SPDX repository SBOM that is itself attested; a release step refuses to publish unless every expected asset is attached, and immutable releases are enabled so the assets and tag freeze at publish. Verification is a documented one-liner — gh attestation verify <artifact> -R rubentalstra/Veredictum --signer-workflow rubentalstra/Veredictum/.github/workflows/release-build.yml : https://veredictum.eu/docs/installation.html


    Enough for a badge!

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Release tags are OpenPGP-signed by the maintainer key documented in MAINTAINERS.md, and this is enforced rather than customary: the refs/tags/v* ruleset (no bypass) requires a signature and forbids deleting or non-fast-forward-updating a tag, which protects the exact window in which a tag drives the release build. Every commit in the history is signature-verified under the main ruleset as well: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/tags


  • Other security issues


    Enough for a badge!

    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    Input is validated against a whitelist by construction, not sanitized after the fact. Artifact and party documents are read through strict typed constructors and refused on undeclared or duplicate keys; the catalogue itself is gated by veredictum validate, where zero findings is the only passing result (id uniqueness, citation resolution against the vendored specification text, binding completeness, and coverage of the enumerated wire surface); AQL and citation input is parsed by grammar-exact parsers that reject rather than guess; and every refusal is kept as its own pinned negative test, so a lenient acceptance is a failing test. The lint set removes the classic silent-acceptance paths (indexing_slicing, string_slice, as_conversions all denied). Every reader that parses outside input has a fuzz harness: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/fuzz/README.md


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    The container image is hardened and the hardening is machine-checked: a digest-pinned distroless base (gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian13:nonroot) with an explicit numeric USER 65532:65532 so an orchestrator does not have to resolve a name, no shell and no package manager in the runtime layer, a HEALTHCHECK, OCI metadata that a CI guard (scripts/checks/image-labels.sh) checks agrees with itself, hadolint over the Dockerfile on every pull request and Trivy over the published image weekly. The console binds to loopback unless the operator explicitly publishes it. On the process side the release profile keeps overflow-checks = true, and unsafe_code = forbid removes the memory-unsafety class outright: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/docker/Dockerfile


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    ASSURANCE_CASE.md is the assurance argument, and every row names a file in this repository so each claim can be opened and checked: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/ASSURANCE_CASE.md . § 1 states the assets an attacker would want (verdict integrity — a wrong green is the worst outcome the product has; record integrity across the bundle, the release tarball and the image; confidentiality of the operator's inputs). § 2 is the trust-boundary table: the catalogue and vendored specifications as trusted-and-gated (validate at zero findings, entry point named), the system under test as untrusted by definition (its responses are evidence in a comparison, never instructions, and it cannot move the reference it is measured against), the operator's IXIT holding credential references only so an inline secret is unrepresentable, every console #[server] fn as a public endpoint bound to loopback by default, and the published record as tamper-evident without this tool (byte-deterministic SHA-256 manifest plus an RFC 9580 detached signature that plain gpg --verify checks). § 3 pairs each security-relevant requirement with the check that fails on violation (unsafe_code = forbid, the denied panic and indexing families, overflow-checks, typed errors at every branching boundary). § 4 names the three rules enforced by review alone rather than hiding them — on the project's own principle that a rule with no failing check is a wish. § 5 states what the case does not claim: no formal verification, no console authentication by design, no sanitizing of what is recorded, and that a verified signature says nothing about the conditions the run executed under. The reporting route stays in SECURITY.md, and a stale claim on that page is handled as a defect in the assurance case.


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    At least one analyser looks specifically for common vulnerability classes on every pull request: CodeQL runs its security query suites over the Rust and GitHub Actions sources on every push and pull request and again weekly, SonarQube Cloud publishes a security rating on the same events, zizmor audits the workflows for the Actions-specific classes (unpinned uses, credential-persisting checkouts, injectable contexts) at --min-severity=low, Trivy scans the published image, and cargo-deny checks the graph against the RustSec advisory database: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/actions/workflows/codeql.yml


  • Dynamic code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    There is no memory-unsafe code to analyse. unsafe_code = "forbid" applies to the whole workspace, and forbid cannot be relaxed by an attribute — not even #[allow] compiles under it — so introducing unsafe would require a deliberate change to stop inheriting the lint table rather than a local suppression. The libFuzzer harnesses still run over every outside-input reader with sanitizer instrumentation regardless: https://github.com/rubentalstra/Veredictum/blob/main/Cargo.toml



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Project badge entry owned by: Ruben Talstra.
Entry created on 2026-08-26 14:17:43 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-27 17:48:50 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-27 15:20:01 UTC.