chock

Projects that follow the best practices below can voluntarily self-certify and show that they've achieved an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge.

There is no set of practices that can guarantee that software will never have defects or vulnerabilities; even formal methods can fail if the specifications or assumptions are wrong. Nor is there any set of practices that can guarantee that a project will sustain a healthy and well-functioning development community. However, following best practices can help improve the results of projects. For example, some practices enable multi-person review before release, which can both help find otherwise hard-to-find technical vulnerabilities and help build trust and a desire for repeated interaction among developers from different companies. To earn a badge, all MUST and MUST NOT criteria must be met, all SHOULD criteria must be met OR be unmet with justification, and all SUGGESTED criteria must be met OR unmet (we want them considered at least). If you want to enter justification text as a generic comment, instead of being a rationale that the situation is acceptable, start the text block with '//' followed by a space. Feedback is welcome via the GitHub site as issues or pull requests There is also a mailing list for general discussion.

We gladly provide the information in several locales, however, if there is any conflict or inconsistency between the translations, the English version is the authoritative version.
If this is your project, please show your badge status on your project page! The badge status looks like this: Badge level for project 14155 is silver Here is how to embed it:
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These are the Silver level criteria. You can also view the Passing or Gold level criteria.

Baseline Series: Baseline Level 1 Baseline Level 2 Baseline Level 3

        

 Basics 17/17 ●

  • General

    Note that other projects may use the same name.

    Governance-as-code for AI coding agents — write a policy once as reviewable committed files; a compiler emits enforcement per agent (pre-tool-use hooks, git hooks, CI gate, instruction files) with an honest per-agent coverage report.

    Please use SPDX license expression format; examples include "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", and "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Do not include single quotes or double quotes.
    If there is more than one language, list them as comma-separated values (spaces optional) and sort them from most to least used. If there is a long list, please list at least the first three most common ones. If there is no language (e.g., this is a documentation-only or test-only project), use the single character "-". Please use a conventional capitalization for each language, e.g., "JavaScript".
    The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a structured naming scheme for information technology systems, software, and packages. It is used in a number of systems and databases when reporting vulnerabilities.

  • Prerequisites


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST achieve a passing level badge. [achieve_passing]

  • Basic project website content


    Enough for a badge!

    The information on how to contribute MUST include the requirements for acceptable contributions (e.g., a reference to any required coding standard). (URL required) [contribution_requirements]

    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md — documents the requirements for acceptable contributions: DCO sign-off on every commit (enforced by a CI check), ruff for code style and formatting (enforced in CI and by the repo's own commit hooks), tests expected for behavior changes, and PR-only changes to main with required status checks.


  • Project oversight


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD have a legal mechanism where all developers of non-trivial amounts of project software assert that they are legally authorized to make these contributions. The most common and easily-implemented approach for doing this is by using a Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), where users add "signed-off-by" in their commits and the project links to the DCO website. However, this MAY be implemented as a Contributor License Agreement (CLA), or other legal mechanism. (URL required) [dco]
    The DCO is the recommended mechanism because it's easy to implement, tracked in the source code, and git directly supports a "signed-off" feature using "commit -s". To be most effective it is best if the project documentation explains what "signed-off" means for that project. A CLA is a legal agreement that defines the terms under which intellectual works have been licensed to an organization or project. A contributor assignment agreement (CAA) is a legal agreement that transfers rights in an intellectual work to another party; projects are not required to have CAAs, since having CAA increases the risk that potential contributors will not contribute, especially if the receiver is a for-profit organization. The Apache Software Foundation CLAs (the individual contributor license and the corporate CLA) are examples of CLAs, for projects which determine that the risks of these kinds of CLAs to the project are less than their benefits.

    All contributions require a Developer Certificate of Origin sign-off: every commit must carry a Signed-off-by line, enforced automatically by a required dco status check that blocks merging, and documented in CONTRIBUTING.md with a link to developercertificate.org.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and document its project governance model (the way it makes decisions, including key roles). (URL required) [governance]
    There needs to be some well-established documented way to make decisions and resolve disputes. In small projects, this may be as simple as "the project owner and lead makes all final decisions". There are various governance models, including benevolent dictator and formal meritocracy; for more details, see Governance models. Both centralized (e.g., single-maintainer) and decentralized (e.g., group maintainers) approaches have been successfully used in projects. The governance information does not need to document the possibility of creating a project fork, since that is always possible for FLOSS projects.

    Governance is documented in GOVERNANCE.md: the decision-making model (solo-maintainer with final say, bound in practice to the project's published invariants rather than taste), key roles and their responsibilities (maintainer, contributors, security reporters), how disagreements are handled (issues/Discussions, decisions explained), and how the document itself changes (by pull request, material changes noted in release notes).
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST adopt a code of conduct and post it in a standard location. (URL required) [code_of_conduct]
    Projects may be able to improve the civility of their community and to set expectations about acceptable conduct by adopting a code of conduct. This can help avoid problems before they occur and make the project a more welcoming place to encourage contributions. This should focus only on behavior within the community/workplace of the project. Example codes of conduct are the Linux kernel code of conduct, the Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct, the Debian Code of Conduct, the Ubuntu Code of Conduct, the Fedora Code of Conduct, the GNOME Code Of Conduct, the KDE Community Code of Conduct, the Python Community Code of Conduct, The Ruby Community Conduct Guideline, and The Rust Code of Conduct.

    The project has adopted a code of conduct (Contributor Covenant), posted at the standard location CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md in the repository root, where GitHub surfaces it in the community profile and the new-issue/PR flows.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST clearly define and publicly document the key roles in the project and their responsibilities, including any tasks those roles must perform. It MUST be clear who has which role(s), though this might not be documented in the same way. (URL required) [roles_responsibilities]
    The documentation for governance and roles and responsibilities may be in one place.

    GOVERNANCE.md ("Roles and responsibilities") defines each role and its tasks: the maintainer (reviews and merges PRs, triages issues, cuts releases, holds the security-report inbox, approves policy-catalog additions, reviews every weekly threat-intel digest before merge), contributors (via pull request, with the requirements in CONTRIBUTING.md), and security reporters (per SECURITY.md). Who holds each role is explicit: the maintainer is named (@open-coder-ai), and the document states that any future grant of triage/commit rights will be recorded there.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to continue with minimal interruption if any one person dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to continue support of the project. In particular, the project MUST be able to create and close issues, accept proposed changes, and release versions of software, within a week of confirmation of the loss of support from any one individual. This MAY be done by ensuring someone else has any necessary keys, passwords, and legal rights to continue the project. Individuals who run a FLOSS project MAY do this by providing keys in a lockbox and a will providing any needed legal rights (e.g., for DNS names). (URL required) [access_continuity]

    Documented in GOVERNANCE.md ("Access continuity"). The repositories live under the open-coder-ai GitHub organization rather than a personal account, so access can be extended or transferred without rewriting history or URLs. Publishing uses PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC) scoped to the repository's release workflow — there are no long-lived personal tokens, so a successor with repository access immediately inherits the ability to release. Everything needed to maintain the project (build, tests, release workflow, policy sources, documentation) is in the repository itself; there is no private infrastructure, no separate DNS, and no keys held only by one person. Independently of any credential transfer, the Apache-2.0 license makes forking a legitimate continuity path: any user can fork, build, and continue the project within a week using only public material.

    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD have a "bus factor" of 2 or more. (URL required) [bus_factor]
    A "bus factor" (aka "truck factor") is the minimum number of project members that have to suddenly disappear from a project ("hit by a bus") before the project stalls due to lack of knowledgeable or competent personnel. The truck-factor tool can estimate this for projects on GitHub. For more information, see Assessing the Bus Factor of Git Repositories by Cosentino et al.

    The project is currently maintained by one person, stated plainly rather than padded with nominal co-maintainers who do not actually review or release. What the criterion protects against — the project becoming unrecoverable if that person stops — is addressed structurally, and the recovery path needs no cooperation from the current maintainer:

    Repositories are owned by the open-coder-ai GitHub organization, not a personal account, so ownership can be transferred or extended without rewriting history or URLs. Publishing to PyPI uses Trusted Publishing (OIDC) scoped to the repository's release workflow, so the ability to release travels with repository access rather than with a person holding a token; there is no credential to recover from anyone. Everything required to build, test, validate, and release is committed in the repository — there is no private infrastructure, no separately-held DNS, and no unpublished process. Under Apache-2.0, any user can fork the project today and cut a working release from public material alone.

    GOVERNANCE.md documents both halves of the succession commitment: sustained, high-quality contributors may be offered triage or commit rights (recorded there when it first happens), and if the project is visibly unmaintained for six months and someone credible wants to continue it, the maintainer's stated intent is to add maintainers or transfer stewardship rather than let it rot.

    The project will not appoint a second maintainer solely to satisfy this criterion; the role will be offered when a contributor has earned it, at which point this criterion becomes genuinely met rather than nominally so.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md


  • Documentation


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) [documentation_roadmap]
    The project might not achieve the roadmap, and that's fine; the purpose of the roadmap is to help potential users and contributors understand the intended direction of the project. It need not be detailed.

    docs/roadmap.md is the narrative roadmap: planned enforcement surfaces (MCP-gateway with its scope stated precisely, additional pre-tool-use adapters, human-approval flows), evidence work (tamper-evident gate log, Sigstore-signed catalog policies), each linked to a roadmap-labeled issue carrying rationale and acceptance criteria. It also explicitly documents what the project will NOT do — no policy language (a deliberate scope limit keeping the honesty guarantee tractable) and no hosted service (the project is repo-local by design). Direction is fed by the weekly threat-intel digests, reviewed before merge.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/roadmap.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture]
    A software architecture explains a program's fundamental structures, i.e., the program's major components, the relationships among them, and the key properties of these components and relationships.

    Architecture is documented across three linked documents: docs/concepts.md (the high-level design — policies as versioned manifests, the compile step, artifact types, the coverage-honesty model), docs/enforcement-surfaces.md (the surface architecture: how one policy compiles to pre-tool-use guards, git hooks, the CI gate, and ambient rules, with the per-agent capability matrix), and spec/ (the normative layer: policy spec, gate DSL, enforcement matrix). An automated docs-accuracy test suite keeps these consistent with the code.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/concepts.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) [documentation_security]
    These are the security requirements that the software is intended to meet.

    Security expectations and limits are documented in two places. docs/assurance-case.md states the security requirements, the threat model (six threat classes), the mechanism meeting each requirement with its test evidence, and — critically — the residual risks users must not assume away: catalog installs are trust-on-first-use (hash-pinned, not signed), git hooks are bypassable outside gated agents (the CI gate is the opt-in backstop), and guards are best-effort filters rather than a security boundary. SECURITY.md adds the operational half: supported versions, the private-advisory reporting process with response timelines, release verification, and the same runtime limits stated for adopters. The project's coverage report enforces this honesty per policy and per agent: enforced is claimed only where an installed mechanism is witnessed.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) [documentation_quick_start]
    The idea is to show users how to get started and make the software do anything at all. This is critically important for potential users to get started.

    The README opens with a quick start (pip install chock, chock init, chock sync, first blocked commit), and a dedicated companion repository — chock-quickstart — walks a new user from a cold clone to a working governed repo, verified end-to-end against the published PyPI package and the live policy catalog (including seeing a policy actually block a commit).
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-quickstart


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST make an effort to keep the documentation consistent with the current version of the project results (including software produced by the project). Any known documentation defects making it inconsistent MUST be fixed. If the documentation is generally current, but erroneously includes some older information that is no longer true, just treat that as a defect, then track and fix as usual. [documentation_current]
    The documentation MAY include information about differences or changes between versions of the software and/or link to older versions of the documentation. The intent of this criterion is that an effort is made to keep the documentation consistent, not that the documentation must be perfect.

    Documentation consistency is machine-enforced, not best-effort: an automated docs-accuracy test suite runs in CI on every change and fails the build when documentation disagrees with the code — it checks that every documented CLI command exists (and none that were removed are still described), that documented artifact types match the manifest schema, that documented gate kinds match the implementation, and that referenced repository paths exist. Documentation inconsistencies found by these tests are fixed in the same PR that would have introduced them.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/tests/test_docs_accuracy.py


    Enough for a badge!

    The project repository front page and/or website MUST identify and hyperlink to any achievements, including this best practices badge, within 48 hours of public recognition that the achievement has been attained. (URL required) [documentation_achievements]
    An achievement is any set of external criteria that the project has specifically worked to meet, including some badges. This information does not need to be on the project website front page. A project using GitHub can put achievements on the repository front page by adding them to the README file.

    The repository front page (README) displays and hyperlinks the project's achievements as badges at the top: the OpenSSF Best Practices badge (added the same day the Passing level was attained), the OpenSSF Scorecard score, and the PyPI release badge. New achievements are added to the README as part of the same-day workflow that attains them.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/README.md


  • Accessibility and internationalization


    Enough for a badge!

    The project (both project sites and project results) SHOULD follow accessibility best practices so that persons with disabilities can still participate in the project and use the project results where it is reasonable to do so. [accessibility_best_practices]
    For web applications, see the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) and its supporting document Understanding WCAG 2.0; see also W3C accessibility information. For GUI applications, consider using the environment-specific accessibility guidelines (such as Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows). Some TUI applications (e.g. `ncurses` programs) can do certain things to make themselves more accessible (such as `alpine`'s `force-arrow-cursor` setting). Most command-line applications are fairly accessible as-is. This criterion is often N/A, e.g., for program libraries. Here are some examples of actions to take or issues to consider:
    • Provide text alternatives for any non-text content so that it can be changed into other forms people need, such as large print, braille, speech, symbols or simpler language ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.1)
    • Color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element. ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.1)
    • The visual presentation of text and images of text has a contrast ratio of at least 4.5:1, except for large text, incidental text, and logotypes ( WCAG 2.0 guideline 1.4.3)
    • Make all functionality available from a keyboard (WCAG guideline 2.1)
    • A GUI or web-based project SHOULD test with at least one screen-reader on the target platform(s) (e.g. NVDA, Jaws, or WindowEyes on Windows; VoiceOver on Mac & iOS; Orca on Linux/BSD; TalkBack on Android). TUI programs MAY work to reduce overdraw to prevent redundant reading by screen-readers.

    The software is a text-only command-line tool: all output is plain text consumable by screen readers, information is never conveyed by color alone (gate failures are stated in words with explicit exit codes), and no GUI is produced. Project participation happens through GitHub issues, PRs, and markdown documentation, which follow standard accessible-markdown structure (headings, link text, fenced code blocks).
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The software produced by the project SHOULD be internationalized to enable easy localization for the target audience's culture, region, or language. If internationalization (i18n) does not apply (e.g., the software doesn't generate text intended for end-users and doesn't sort human-readable text), select "not applicable" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Localization "refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)." Internationalization is the "design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language." (See W3C's "Localization vs. Internationalization".) Software meets this criterion simply by being internationalized. No localization for another specific language is required, since once software has been internationalized it's possible for others to work on localization.

    Unmet: the CLI's messages and documentation are English-only and not internationalized. Localization is deliberately out of scope for now: the tool's primary consumers include AI coding agents (which parse the English rule text), and much of the user-visible text is adopter-authored policy content the project does not control. If adopter demand for localization emerges it would be tracked on the public roadmap.


  • Other


    Enough for a badge!

    If the project sites (website, repository, and download URLs) store passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, or PBKDF2). If the project sites do not store passwords for this purpose, select "not applicable" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Note that the use of GitHub meets this criterion. This criterion only applies to passwords used for authentication of external users into the project sites (aka inbound authentication). If the project sites must log in to other sites (aka outbound authentication), they may need to store authorization tokens for that purpose differently (since storing a hash would be useless). This applies criterion crypto_password_storage to the project sites, similar to sites_https.

    N/A: the project's sites are GitHub (repository, issues, releases) and PyPI (downloads); the project itself stores no passwords and runs no authentication service.


 Change Control 1/1 ●

  • Previous versions


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST maintain the most often used older versions of the product or provide an upgrade path to newer versions. If the upgrade path is difficult, the project MUST document how to perform the upgrade (e.g., the interfaces that have changed and detailed suggested steps to help upgrade). [maintenance_or_update]

    The latest release line (0.1.x) is the supported version, stated in SECURITY.md's supported-versions table. The upgrade path is documented and deliberately predictable: CHANGELOG.md describes every release's changes, and the project's versioning contract makes upgrades safe to reason about — PATCH releases never change compiled output (enforced mechanically by a golden-file test suite), and MINOR releases document what changed. Upgrading is pip install --upgrade chock followed by chock sync, which recompiles the repo's artifacts deterministically.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md


 Reporting 3/3 ●

  • Bug-reporting process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use an issue tracker for tracking individual issues. [report_tracker]

    GitHub Issues on the repository (https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/issues), with issue templates, labels (good first issue, roadmap; the catalog repo adds policy wanted), and all current issues triaged.


  • Vulnerability report process


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST give credit to the reporter(s) of all vulnerability reports resolved in the last 12 months, except for the reporter(s) who request anonymity. If there have been no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    N/A: no vulnerability reports have been received or resolved in the last 12 months (the project's first public release was August 2026). The policy is already in place for when one arrives: SECURITY.md commits to crediting reporters unless they request otherwise.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have a documented process for responding to vulnerability reports. (URL required) [vulnerability_response_process]
    This is strongly related to vulnerability_report_process, which requires that there be a documented way to report vulnerabilities. It also related to vulnerability_report_response, which requires response to vulnerability reports within a certain time frame.

    SECURITY.md documents the full response process: reports come through GitHub private security advisories (with an explicit instruction not to open public issues for exploitable findings), what a report should include, acknowledgment within 7 days and initial assessment within 14 days, fixes shipped in a patch release, reporter credit unless anonymity is requested, and a new enforcement-matrix invariant (SEC-* entry) when the fix requires one.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/SECURITY.md


 Quality 19/19 ●

  • Coding standards


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST identify the specific coding style guides for the primary languages it uses, and require that contributions generally comply with it. (URL required) [coding_standards]
    In most cases this is done by referring to some existing style guide(s), possibly listing differences. These style guides can include ways to improve readability and ways to reduce the likelihood of defects (including vulnerabilities). Many programming languages have one or more widely-used style guides. Examples of style guides include Google's style guides and SEI CERT Coding Standards.

    Python is the sole implementation language. The coding style is defined by the Ruff configuration committed in pyproject.toml (lint ruleset + formatter, line length, target Python version), supplemented by the repository's coding rules in AGENTS.md. CONTRIBUTING.md requires contributions to pass these checks, and CI enforces them on every pull request.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/pyproject.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST automatically enforce its selected coding style(s) if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can do so in the selected language(s). [coding_standards_enforced]
    This MAY be implemented using static analysis tool(s) and/or by forcing the code through code reformatters. In many cases the tool configuration is included in the project's repository (since different projects may choose different configurations). Projects MAY allow style exceptions (and typically will); where exceptions occur, they MUST be rare and documented in the code at their locations, so that these exceptions can be reviewed and so that tools can automatically handle them in the future. Examples of such tools include ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), and devtools check (R).

    Enforced automatically by Ruff (FLOSS): ruff check and ruff format --check run in CI on every pull request as part of the required validate jobs, and locally in the repository's own pre-commit conformance gate — a style violation fails the build rather than relying on reviewer attention.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


  • Working build system


    Enough for a badge!

    Build systems for native binaries MUST honor the relevant compiler and linker (environment) variables passed in to them (e.g., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS) and pass them to compiler and linker invocations. A build system MAY extend them with additional flags; it MUST NOT simply replace provided values with its own. If no native binaries are being generated, select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    It should be easy to enable special build features like Address Sanitizer (ASAN), or to comply with distribution hardening best practices (e.g., by easily turning on compiler flags to do so).

    N/A: the project is pure Python and generates no native binaries; there is no compiler or linker invocation in the build.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build and installation system SHOULD preserve debugging information if they are requested in the relevant flags (e.g., "install -s" is not used). If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    E.G., setting CFLAGS (C) or CXXFLAGS (C++) should create the relevant debugging information if those languages are used, and they should not be stripped during installation. Debugging information is needed for support and analysis, and also useful for measuring the presence of hardening features in the compiled binaries.

    N/A: pure Python — there is no compilation step that could strip debugging information; installed files are the source files themselves, and Python tracebacks retain full source context.


    Enough for a badge!

    The build system for the software produced by the project MUST NOT recursively build subdirectories if there are cross-dependencies in the subdirectories. If there is no build or installation system (e.g., typical JavaScript libraries), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    The project build system's internal dependency information needs to be accurate, otherwise, changes to the project may not build correctly. Incorrect builds can lead to defects (including vulnerabilities). A common mistake in large build systems is to use a "recursive build" or "recursive make", that is, a hierarchy of subdirectories containing source files, where each subdirectory is independently built. Unless each subdirectory is fully independent, this is a mistake, because the dependency information is incorrect.

    The project builds as a single Python package via the standard PEP 517 build backend (python -m build); there is no recursive sub-directory build, so no cross-dependency ordering problem can arise.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST be able to repeat the process of generating information from source files and get exactly the same bit-for-bit result. If no building occurs (e.g., scripting languages where the source code is used directly instead of being compiled), select "not applicable" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    GCC and clang users may find the -frandom-seed option useful; in some cases, this can be resolved by forcing some sort order. More suggestions can be found at the reproducible build site.

    N/A: Python is used directly from source rather than compiled — the distribution is a pure-Python wheel containing the source files, with no build-time code generation. (Separately, the artifacts the tool itself generates into adopter repositories are deterministic and byte-identical across platforms and reruns, enforced by a golden-file test suite in CI, but that is the software's runtime behavior rather than a build step.)


  • Installation system


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way to easily install and uninstall the software produced by the project using a commonly-used convention. [installation_common]
    Examples include using a package manager (at the system or language level), "make install/uninstall" (supporting DESTDIR), a container in a standard format, or a virtual machine image in a standard format. The installation and uninstallation process (e.g., its packaging) MAY be implemented by a third party as long as it is FLOSS.

    Installation and uninstallation follow the standard Python packaging convention: pip install chock and pip uninstall chock. The package is published on PyPI, works in any virtualenv, and is also runnable without installation via pipx run chock. Uninstalling removes the tool cleanly; artifacts the tool wrote into an adopter's repository are ordinary committed files under the adopter's control.


    Enough for a badge!

    The installation system for end-users MUST honor standard conventions for selecting the location where built artifacts are written to at installation time. For example, if it installs files on a POSIX system it MUST honor the DESTDIR environment variable. If there is no installation system or no standard convention, select "not applicable" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Installation is delegated entirely to pip, which honors the standard Python installation conventions: virtual environments (VIRTUAL_ENV), --prefix, --root (the DESTDIR equivalent for Python packaging), --target, --user, and PIP_* environment variables. The project defines no custom installer and overrides none of these locations.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide a way for potential developers to quickly install all the project results and support environment necessary to make changes, including the tests and test environment. This MUST be performed with a commonly-used convention. [installation_development_quick]
    This MAY be implemented using a generated container and/or installation script(s). External dependencies would typically be installed by invoking system and/or language package manager(s), per external_dependencies.

    CONTRIBUTING.md opens with a numbered quick-setup block using standard Python conventions: clone, then pip install -e '.[dev]' (editable install with the dev extra, which brings in the full test and lint environment), followed by an explicit verification sequence the contributor runs to confirm the environment works — pytest -q, ruff check ., ruff format --check ., and the project's own conformance checks. No custom tooling or bespoke bootstrap script is required.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Externally-maintained components


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST list external dependencies in a computer-processable way. (URL required) [external_dependencies]
    Typically this is done using the conventions of package manager and/or build system. Note that this helps implement installation_development_quick.

    Runtime and development dependencies are declared in pyproject.toml in the standard PEP 621 computer-processable form (project.dependencies and project.optional-dependencies). CI and build dependencies are additionally pinned in compiled requirements files under requirements/ (generated by pip-compile), each carrying exact versions and sha256 hashes and installed with --require-hashes.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/pyproject.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    Projects MUST monitor or periodically check their external dependencies (including convenience copies) to detect known vulnerabilities, and fix exploitable vulnerabilities or verify them as unexploitable. [dependency_monitoring]
    This can be done using an origin analyzer / dependency checking tool / software composition analysis tool such as OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, and Bundler-audit (for Ruby). Some package managers include mechanisms to do this. It is acceptable if the components' vulnerability cannot be exploited, but this analysis is difficult and it is sometimes easier to simply update or fix the part.

    Dependabot is enabled on the repository for both security alerts and version updates (grouped into a single weekly PR to keep the update stream reviewable), so newly disclosed vulnerabilities in external dependencies surface automatically and are fixed by merging the update. GitHub secret scanning and CodeQL run alongside it. The project vendors no convenience copies of third-party code — every external dependency arrives via pip from the declared manifests — and CI installs are hash-pinned with --require-hashes, so a tampered or substituted dependency fails the build closed rather than installing silently.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST either:
    1. make it easy to identify and update reused externally-maintained components; or
    2. use the standard components provided by the system or programming language.
    Then, if a vulnerability is found in a reused component, it will be easy to update that component. [updateable_reused_components]
    A typical way to meet this criterion is to use system and programming language package management systems. Many FLOSS programs are distributed with "convenience libraries" that are local copies of standard libraries (possibly forked). By itself, that's fine. However, if the program *must* use these local (forked) copies, then updating the "standard" libraries as a security update will leave these additional copies still vulnerable. This is especially an issue for cloud-based systems; if the cloud provider updates their "standard" libraries but the program won't use them, then the updates don't actually help. See, e.g., "Chromium: Why it isn't in Fedora yet as a proper package" by Tom Callaway.

    Both apply. The project uses the standard Python library wherever possible — notably, the vendored pre-tool-use adapter and gate runner that Chock writes into adopter repositories are stdlib-only by contract, so they carry no third-party surface at all. The remaining externally-maintained components are ordinary pip dependencies declared in pyproject.toml (and hash-pinned in requirements/ for CI), so identifying one is reading a single manifest and updating it is a version bump — which Dependabot proposes automatically.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/pyproject.toml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project SHOULD avoid using deprecated or obsolete functions and APIs where FLOSS alternatives are available in the set of technology it uses (its "technology stack") and to a supermajority of the users the project supports (so that users have ready access to the alternative). [interfaces_current]

    The project targets Python 3.11+ and uses current standard-library APIs (e.g. pathlib, tomllib, importlib.resources, datetime with explicit timezones) rather than their deprecated predecessors. Deprecation warnings are treated as defects rather than noise: the test suite surfaces them and Ruff's lint ruleset flags outdated constructs in CI, so a deprecated call fails review rather than accumulating.


  • Automated test suite


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    An automated test suite MUST be applied on each check-in to a shared repository for at least one branch. This test suite MUST produce a report on test success or failure. [automated_integration_testing]
    This requirement can be viewed as a subset of test_continuous_integration, but focused on just testing, without requiring continuous integration.

    The full automated test suite (712 tests) runs in GitHub Actions on every push and every pull request to main, across Python 3.11 and 3.12, alongside an acceptance tier, a packaged-binary check, lint/format checks, and CodeQL. Results are reported as GitHub status checks on the commit and PR, and the core jobs are required checks under branch protection — a failing suite blocks the merge rather than merely reporting
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST add regression tests to an automated test suite for at least 50% of the bugs fixed within the last six months. [regression_tests_added50]

    The project's practice is 100%, not 50%: every bug fix ships with a regression test in the same pull request, and CONTRIBUTING.md requires it. Recent examples each landed with a dedicated test module — the gate-runner bypass fixes (tests/test_gate_bypasses.py), manifest-id validation (tests/test_manifest_id_safety.py), coverage-honesty overclaims (tests/test_coverage_honesty*.py), Windows line-ending defects (tests/test_windows_line_endings.py), adopter-data-loss fixes (tests/test_adopter_safety.py), and the policy-id trailing-newline fix found by the property suite (tests/test_properties.py).
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/tree/main/tests


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST have FLOSS automated test suite(s) that provide at least 80% statement coverage if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can measure this criterion in the selected language. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Many FLOSS tools are available to measure test coverage, including gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, and covr (R). Note that meeting this criterion is not a guarantee that the test suite is thorough, instead, failing to meet this criterion is a strong indicator of a poor test suite.

    Measured with coverage.py (FLOSS): 81% statement coverage across 712 tests. The measured figure understates actual coverage, because a substantial share of the CLI and hook code paths execute in subprocesses during the acceptance tier — coverage.py cannot attribute those lines to the parent run — and the installed hooks execute vendored copies of the source rather than the source files themselves. The test suite itself is FLOSS (pytest + Hypothesis), and coverage is reproducible locally with pytest --cov.


  • New functionality testing


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    The project MUST have a formal written policy that as major new functionality is added, tests for the new functionality MUST be added to an automated test suite. [test_policy_mandated]

    CONTRIBUTING.md states the policy in writing: behavior changes require tests in the same pull request, and the project's review standards name the test suite as non-negotiable for new functionality. It is enforced rather than aspirational — CI runs the full suite plus an acceptance tier on every pull request as required status checks, and the repository's own committed policies (agent-discipline) additionally block weakening or deleting assertions to make a change pass.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST include, in its documented instructions for change proposals, the policy that tests are to be added for major new functionality. [tests_documented_added]
    However, even an informal rule is acceptable as long as the tests are being added in practice.

    Documented in CONTRIBUTING.md, the instructions contributors are pointed at for change proposals: tests are expected for behavior changes, and required CI must pass before merge.


  • Warning flags


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    Projects MUST be maximally strict with warnings in the software produced by the project, where practical. [warnings_strict]
    Some warnings cannot be effectively enabled on some projects. What is needed is evidence that the project is striving to enable warning flags where it can, so that errors are detected early.

    The linters run at strict settings repo-wide with no ignore-baseline; the one deliberately pinned choice (ruff minor version) exists to keep formatting deterministic in CI, not to relax rules. Beyond linting, the project holds itself to stricter-than-typical machine-enforced contracts: byte-identical compiled outputs across PATCH releases (golden suite) and a documented line-budget/style check on its own sources.


 Security 13/13 ●

  • Secure development knowledge


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    The project MUST implement secure design principles (from "know_secure_design"), where applicable. If the project is not producing software, select "not applicable" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    For example, the project results should have fail-safe defaults (access decisions should deny by default, and projects' installation should be secure by default). They should also have complete mediation (every access that might be limited must be checked for authority and be non-bypassable). Note that in some cases principles will conflict, in which case a choice must be made (e.g., many mechanisms can make things more complex, contravening "economy of mechanism" / keep it simple).

    he design applies the standard principles where they bear on a repo-local governance tool. Least privilege: workflow tokens are read-only by default with write scopes granted per-job, and the tool requests no credentials of its own. Fail-safe defaults: gates fail closed — an unresolvable CI base ref exits non-zero rather than passing, the hook installer bakes an absolute interpreter path (a missing interpreter previously meant exit 127, which a host reads as "allow"), and empty or uninstalled surfaces claim nothing. Complete mediation: the CI gate re-checks the same compiled gates server-side, where local hook bypasses cannot reach. Input validation by allowlist: policy ids, manifests, agent selections, URL schemes, and catalog paths are all validated against fixed patterns or schemas. Economy of mechanism: one compiled gate definition drives every surface, so there is a single place to reason about behavior. Untrusted-input separation: repository and web content processed by the tool is treated as data, never as instructions. No dynamic code execution (eval/exec) exists anywhere in the codebase. The full argument, with the test suite proving each mechanism, is in docs/assurance-case.md.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md


  • Use basic good cryptographic practices

    Note that some software does not need to use cryptographic mechanisms. If your project produces software that (1) includes, activates, or enables encryption functionality, and (2) might be released from the United States (US) to outside the US or to a non-US-citizen, you may be legally required to take a few extra steps. Typically this just involves sending an email. For more information, see the encryption section of Understanding Open Source Technology & US Export Controls.

    Enough for a badge!

    The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Concerns about CBC mode in SSH are discussed in CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    No weakened algorithms either: SHA-256 only — no SHA-1, no CBC or any cipher modes (nothing is encrypted), no legacy fallbacks.


    Barely enough for a badge.

    The project SHOULD support multiple cryptographic algorithms, so users can quickly switch if one is broken. Common symmetric key algorithms include AES, Twofish, and Serpent. Common cryptographic hash algorithm alternatives include SHA-2 (including SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 AND SHA-512) and SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Unmet, deliberately. The project's only cryptographic primitive is SHA-256, used for integrity hashing in the lockfile and artifact verification; it performs no encryption and stores no secrets. Algorithm agility in an integrity format is a net negative here: supporting multiple hash algorithms introduces algorithm-confusion and downgrade risk in exactly the check that is supposed to be unambiguous. If SHA-256 ever needed replacing, it would be a versioned change to the lockfile format with an explicit migration, not a runtime-selectable option. Release signing is handled by Sigstore, whose own algorithm agility the project inherits.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST support storing authentication credentials (such as passwords and dynamic tokens) and private cryptographic keys in files that are separate from other information (such as configuration files, databases, and logs), and permit users to update and replace them without code recompilation. If the project never processes authentication credentials and private cryptographic keys, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    N/A: the software never processes authentication credentials or private cryptographic keys. It runs locally against a repository, and its one network path is an unauthenticated HTTPS document fetch. Publishing to PyPI uses OIDC Trusted Publishing, so the release pipeline holds no stored token or key either.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD support secure protocols for all of its network communications, such as SSHv2 or later, TLS1.2 or later (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, and SNMPv3. Insecure protocols such as FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 or earlier, and SSHv1 SHOULD be disabled by default, and only enabled if the user specifically configures it. If the software produced by the project does not support network communications, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    The software's network surface is minimal and HTTPS-only. The one fetch path enforces the scheme explicitly — a URL that is not https:// is refused with a warning and returns empty rather than falling back, so http://, file://, and custom schemes cannot be used even if a future caller passed one. Catalog installs use git clone over HTTPS (or the user's own SSH configuration). There is no insecure-protocol option to disable, because none is implemented.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project SHOULD, if it supports or uses TLS, support at least TLS version 1.2. Note that the predecessor of TLS was called SSL. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    TLS is used through Python's standard library (urllib over the ssl module) with default settings on Python 3.11+, where the minimum protocol version is TLS 1.2 and older SSL/TLS versions are disabled. The project does not lower or override these defaults.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform TLS certificate verification by default when using TLS, including on subresources. If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Note that incorrect TLS certificate verification is a common mistake. For more information, see "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" by Martin Georgiev et al. and "Do you trust this application?" by Michael Catanzaro.

    Certificate verification is on by default and never disabled: the fetch path uses Python's standard urllib.request.urlopen with the default SSL context, which verifies the server certificate and hostname against the system trust store. The codebase contains no unverified context (ssl._create_unverified_context), no verify=False equivalent, and no certificate-check bypass flag for users to enable.


    Enough for a badge!

    The software produced by the project MUST, if it supports TLS, perform certificate verification before sending HTTP headers with private information (such as secure cookies). If the software does not use TLS, select "not applicable" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

    Met, and vacuously safe: certificate verification is performed by the standard library as part of establishing the connection, before any request headers are sent. The software additionally sends no private information at all over its network path — the fetch is an unauthenticated GET of a public documentation page, with no cookies, credentials, or authorization headers.


  • Secure release


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    The project MUST cryptographically sign releases of the project results intended for widespread use, and there MUST be a documented process explaining to users how they can obtain the public signing keys and verify the signature(s). The private key for these signature(s) MUST NOT be on site(s) used to directly distribute the software to the public. If releases are not intended for widespread use, select "not applicable" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    The project results include both source code and any generated deliverables where applicable (e.g., executables, packages, and containers). Generated deliverables MAY be signed separately from source code. These MAY be implemented as signed git tags (using cryptographic digital signatures). Projects MAY provide generated results separately from tools like git, but in those cases, the separate results MUST be separately signed.

    Every release is cryptographically signed via Sigstore: the tag-triggered release workflow generates a build-provenance attestation for each distribution artifact, binding the artifact's digest to the exact source commit and workflow that produced it. Signing uses Sigstore's keyless flow with short-lived certificates issued against the workflow's OIDC identity, so there is no long-lived private signing key at all — and therefore none stored on PyPI or any distribution site. Publishing itself uses PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC), so no static credential exists in the pipeline either.

    The verification process is documented in SECURITY.md under "Verifying a release", pinned to the signing workflow and the version tag rather than to the repository alone:

    gh attestation verify chock-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl --repo open-coder-ai/chock --signer-workflow open-coder-ai/chock/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.1

    Trust roots come from Sigstore's public transparency log, so users need no project-specific key distribution. This command was verified against the published v0.1.1 wheel.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/SECURITY.md


    Barely enough for a badge.

    It is SUGGESTED that in the version control system, each important version tag (a tag that is part of a major release, minor release, or fixes publicly noted vulnerabilities) be cryptographically signed and verifiable as described in signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Unmet: version tags are not GPG-signed. Release integrity is instead provided by Sigstore build-provenance attestations on the distributed artifacts, which bind each artifact to the exact source commit, tag ref, and workflow that produced it — verifiable with a documented command and no project-specific key distribution. Tags are additionally protected by branch/tag rules and can only be pushed by the maintainer. GPG-signing tags as well is a reasonable future addition, but it would duplicate a guarantee the attestation already provides in a form users can verify more easily.


  • Other security issues


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    The project results MUST check all inputs from potentially untrusted sources to ensure they are valid (an *allowlist*), and reject invalid inputs, if there are any restrictions on the data at all. [input_validation]
    Note that comparing input against a list of "bad formats" (aka a *denylist*) is normally not enough, because attackers can often work around a denylist. In particular, numbers are converted into internal formats and then checked if they are between their minimum and maximum (inclusive), and text strings are checked to ensure that they are valid text patterns (e.g., valid UTF-8, length, syntax, etc.). Some data may need to be "anything at all" (e.g., a file uploader), but these would typically be rare.

    All untrusted inputs are validated against allowlists and rejected on mismatch, never sanitized into something "close enough" — a rewritten value would silently disagree with the identifier every other artifact is keyed by. Specifically: policy ids are checked with an anchored fullmatch against a fixed character pattern with a length bound, and must equal their folder name; manifests are validated against committed JSON Schemas; agent selections are checked against a fixed set of known agents; URLs must begin with https:// or the fetch is refused; catalog paths and artifact ids are confined to a single path component within the catalog root, blocking traversal; and content processed from repositories and the web is treated as data, never as instructions. These parsers are covered by property-based tests and weekly coverage-guided fuzzing — which is how a trailing-newline acceptance bug in the id validator was found and fixed in 0.1.1.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md


    Enough for a badge!

    Hardening mechanisms SHOULD be used in the software produced by the project so that software defects are less likely to result in security vulnerabilities. [hardening]
    Hardening mechanisms may include HTTP headers like Content Security Policy (CSP), compiler flags to mitigate attacks (such as -fstack-protector), or compiler flags to eliminate undefined behavior. For our purposes least privilege is not considered a hardening mechanism (least privilege is important, but separate).

    Hardening is applied both to the project's own supply chain and to the artifacts it produces. Supply chain: every GitHub Action is pinned to an immutable commit SHA, workflow tokens default to read-only with write scopes granted per job, pip installs use compiled requirements with --require-hashes so substituted content fails closed, publishing uses OIDC with no stored credentials, and all repositories are under branch-protection rulesets requiring passing checks. Produced artifacts: generated hooks and guards are stdlib-only with no third-party imports, no eval/exec exists in the codebase, subprocess calls avoid shell interpretation and use explicit argument lists, hook commands are written with absolute interpreter paths so a missing interpreter is a hard failure rather than a silent allow, and hooks run under a timeout. Static analysis (CodeQL plus Ruff's security rules) runs on every pull request with findings triaged to zero.


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST provide an assurance case that justifies why its security requirements are met. The assurance case MUST include: a description of the threat model, clear identification of trust boundaries, an argument that secure design principles have been applied, and an argument that common implementation security weaknesses have been countered. (URL required) [assurance_case]
    An assurance case is "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" ("Software Assurance Using Structured Assurance Case Models", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Trust boundaries are boundaries where data or execution changes its level of trust, e.g., a server's boundaries in a typical web application. It's common to list secure design principles (such as Saltzer and Schroeer) and common implementation security weaknesses (such as the OWASP top 10 or CWE/SANS top 25), and show how each are countered. The BadgeApp assurance case may be a useful example. This is related to documentation_security, documentation_architecture, and implement_secure_design.

    The assurance case is published at docs/assurance-case.md. It contains all four required elements as named sections:

    Threat model — six threat classes with their adversaries: agent misbehavior in-session (destructive commands, guardrail tampering, secret commits), malicious or compromised catalog content (policy folders ship executable guard scripts), tampering with installed artifacts, gate bypass by construction (renames, merge commits, non-ASCII paths, unresolvable CI ranges, missing interpreters), overclaim — the project reporting enforcement no installed mechanism provides — and supply-chain compromise of the project itself.

    Trust boundaries — four, identified explicitly: the adopter repository (trusted, versioned), the agent session (untrusted executor that may ignore or attempt to modify guidance), the catalog (semi-trusted remote shipping executable content, trust-on-first-use with hash pinning), and CI (the enforcement floor a local actor cannot bypass).

    Secure design principles applied — least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, economy of mechanism, separation of data from instructions, and open design, each tied to the concrete decision implementing it in this codebase.

    Common implementation weaknesses countered — a table mapping CWE classes (command/argument injection, path traversal, improper input validation, insecure transport, improper handling of exceptional conditions, prompt injection, hardcoded credentials) to the counter and the test suite or gate that evidences it, plus CodeQL and Ruff security rules on every pull request.

    The document also states residual risks plainly rather than claiming completeness: no catalog signing (hash pinning gives detection, not prevention), git hooks bypassable outside gated agents, guards are best-effort filters rather than a security boundary, and fail-open agent hosts.
    https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md


 Analysis 2/2 ●

  • Static code analysis


    Enough for a badge!

    The project MUST use at least one static analysis tool with rules or approaches to look for common vulnerabilities in the analyzed language or environment, if there is at least one FLOSS tool that can implement this criterion in the selected language. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Static analysis tools that are specifically designed to look for common vulnerabilities are more likely to find them. That said, using any static tools will typically help find some problems, so we are suggesting but not requiring this for the 'passing' level badge.

    CodeQL runs with its security query packs for Python — the queries specifically target common vulnerability classes (injection, path traversal, clear-text logging of sensitive data, uninitialized use). They have produced real findings here that were fixed (e.g., statically-unprovable parser exits, a dead re-export), not just noise.


  • Dynamic code analysis


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    If the software produced by the project includes software written using a memory-unsafe language (e.g., C or C++), then at least one dynamic tool (e.g., a fuzzer or web application scanner) MUST be routinely used in combination with a mechanism to detect memory safety problems such as buffer overwrites. If the project does not produce software written in a memory-unsafe language, choose "not applicable" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Examples of mechanisms to detect memory safety problems include Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (available in GCC and LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, and valgrind. Other potentially-used tools include thread sanitizer and undefined behavior sanitizer. Widespread assertions would also work.

    N/A: the project is written entirely in Python, a memory-safe language, with no C/C++ extension modules. (Beyond what this criterion requires, the project does run coverage-guided fuzzing with atheris weekly against its id-validation and agent-selection parsers.)



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Project badge entry owned by: Open Coder AI.
Entry created on 2026-08-19 13:59:52 UTC, last updated on 2026-08-21 02:29:59 UTC. Last achieved passing badge on 2026-08-19 14:49:16 UTC.