The assurance case is published at docs/assurance-case.md. It contains all four required elements as named sections:
Threat model — six threat classes with their adversaries: agent misbehavior in-session (destructive commands, guardrail tampering, secret commits), malicious or compromised catalog content (policy folders ship executable guard scripts), tampering with installed artifacts, gate bypass by construction (renames, merge commits, non-ASCII paths, unresolvable CI ranges, missing interpreters), overclaim — the project reporting enforcement no installed mechanism provides — and supply-chain compromise of the project itself.
Trust boundaries — four, identified explicitly: the adopter repository (trusted, versioned), the agent session (untrusted executor that may ignore or attempt to modify guidance), the catalog (semi-trusted remote shipping executable content, trust-on-first-use with hash pinning), and CI (the enforcement floor a local actor cannot bypass).
Secure design principles applied — least privilege, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, economy of mechanism, separation of data from instructions, and open design, each tied to the concrete decision implementing it in this codebase.
Common implementation weaknesses countered — a table mapping CWE classes (command/argument injection, path traversal, improper input validation, insecure transport, improper handling of exceptional conditions, prompt injection, hardcoded credentials) to the counter and the test suite or gate that evidences it, plus CodeQL and Ruff security rules on every pull request.
The document also states residual risks plainly rather than claiming completeness: no catalog signing (hash pinning gives detection, not prevention), git hooks bypassable outside gated agents, guards are best-effort filters rather than a security boundary, and fail-open agent hosts.
https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock/blob/main/docs/assurance-case.md