presidio-hardened-angellist

Miradi inayofuata mazoea bora hapa chini inaweza kujihakikisha kwa hiari na kuonyesha kuwa wamepata nishani ya mazoea bora ya Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF).

Hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa programu haitakuwa na kasoro au udhaifu; hata mbinu rasmi zinaweza kushindwa ikiwa vipimo au dhana ni sahihi. Wala hakuna seti ya mazoea yawezayo kuhakikisha kuwa mradi utaendelea kuwa na jamii ya maendeleo yenye afya na inayofanya kazi vizuri. Hata hivyo, kufuata mazoea bora kunaweza kusaidia kuboresha matokeo ya miradi. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya mazoea huwezesha ukaguzi wa watu wengi kabla ya kutolewa, ambayo inaweza kusaidia kupata udhaifu wa kiufundi ambao vinginevyo ni vigumu kupata na kusaidia kujenga uaminifu na hamu ya mwingiliano wa kurudia kati ya wasanidi programu kutoka makampuni tofauti. Ili kupata nishani, vigezo vyote vya LAZIMA na LAZIMA WALA USIWAHI lazima vifuatwe, vigezo vyote vya INAPASWA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana na thibitisho, na vigezo vyote vya PENDEKEZA lazima vifuatwe AU visivyo fufufutiliana (tunataka vifikiwe angalau). Ikiwa unataka kuingiza maandishi ya thibitisho kama maoni ya jumla, badala ya kuwa maelezo ya busara kwamba hali ni inakubaliwa, anza kifungu cha maandishi na '//' ikifuatiwa na nafasi. Maoni ni karibu kupitia tovuti ya GitHub kama masuala au maombi ya kuvuta Kuna pia orodha ya barua pepe kwa majadiliano ya jumla.

Tunafuraha kutoa habari katika lugha nyingi, hata hivyo, ikiwa kuna mgongano au kutokuwa na usawa kati ya tafsiri, toleo la Kiingereza ni toleo lenye mamlaka.
Ikiwa huu ni mradi wako, tafadhali onyesha hadhi ya nishani yako kwenye ukurasa wa mradi wako! Hadhi ya nishani inaonekana kama hii: Kiwango cha nishani kwa mradi 13877 ni silver Hapa ni jinsi ya kuiweka:
Unaweza kuonyesha hali ya nishani yako kwa kuweka hii katika faili yako ya markdown:
[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13877/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13877)
au kwa kuweka hii katika HTML yako:
<a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13877"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/13877/badge"></a>


Hizi ni vigezo vya kiwango cha Fedha. Unaweza pia kuangalia vigezo vya kiwango cha Kupita au Dhahabu.

Baseline Series: Kiwango cha Msingi 1 Kiwango cha Msingi 2 Kiwango cha Msingi 3

        

 Misingi 17/17 ●

  • Jumla

    Kumbuka kwamba miradi mingine inaweza kutumia jina sawa.

    Presidio security-hardened deal-flow triage & due-diligence toolkit for early-stage (pre-seed / seed) startups sourced via AngelList syndicates.

    Tafadhali tumia muundo wa maneno ya leseni ya SPDX; mifano ni pamoja na "Apache-2.0", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "GPL-2.0+", "LGPL-3.0+", "MIT", na "(BSD-2-Clause OR Ruby)". Usitumie alama za nukuu za moja au mbili.
    Ikiwa kuna lugha zaidi ya moja, ziorodhe kama thamani zilizotengwa kwa koma (nafasi ni za hiari) na ziorodhe kuanzia iliyotumiwa zaidi hadi iliyotumiwa kidogo. Ikiwa kuna orodha ndefu, tafadhali orodhesha angalau tatu za kawaida zaidi. Ikiwa hakuna lugha (k.m., huu ni mradi wa nyaraka tu au wa majaribio tu), tumia herufi moja "-". Tafadhali tumia herufi kubwa za kawaida kwa kila lugha, k.m., "JavaScript".
    Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) ni mpango wa kuweka majina yenye muundo kwa mifumo ya teknolojia ya habari, programu, na vifurushi. Inatumika katika mifumo na hifadhidata nyingi wakati wa kuripoti udhaifu.

  • Mahitaji ya awali


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufikie nishani ya kiwango cha kuhitimu. [achieve_passing]

  • Maudhui ya kimsingi ya tovuti ya mradi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Habari juu ya jinsi ya kuchangia LAZIMA ijumuishe mahitaji ya michango inayokubalika (k.m., rejea kwa kiwango chochote kinachohitajika cha msimbo). (URL inahitajika) [contribution_requirements]

    Non-trivial contribution file in repository: https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md


  • Usimamizi wa mradi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kuwa na utaratibu wa kisheria ambapo wasanidi wote wa kiasi kisicho kidogo cha programu ya mradi wanathibitisha kwamba wameruhusiwa kisheria kufanya michango hii. Mbinu ya kawaida na rahisi ya kutekeleza hii ni kwa kutumia Cheti cha Msanidi cha Asili (DCO), ambapo watumiaji huongeza "signed-off-by" katika ahadi zao na mradi unaunganisha kwenye tovuti ya DCO. Hata hivyo, hii YAWEZA kutekelezwa kama Makubaliano ya Leseni ya Mchangiaji (CLA), au utaratibu mwingine wa kisheria. (URL inahitajika) [dco]
    DCO ni utaratibu unaopendekeza kwa sababu ni rahisi kutekeleza, kufuatilia katika msimbo wa chanzo, na git inasaidia moja kwa moja kipengele cha "signed-off" kwa kutumia "commit -s". Ili kuwa na ufanisi zaidi ni bora ikiwa nyaraka za mradi zinaeleza maana ya "signed-off" kwa mradi huo. CLA ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayofafanua masharti ambayo kazi za kiakili zimetolewa leseni kwa shirika au mradi. Makubaliano ya mgawo wa mchangiaji (CAA) ni makubaliano ya kisheria yanayohamisha haki katika kazi ya kiakili kwa chama kingine; miradi haihitajiki kuwa na CAA, kwa kuwa kuwa na CAA huongeza hatari kwamba wachangiaji watarajiwa hawatachangia, hasa ikiwa mpokeaji ni shirika la faida. Apache Software Foundation CLAs (leseni ya mchangiaji wa mtu binafsi na CLA ya kampuni) ni mifano ya CLA, kwa miradi ambayo inaamua kwamba hatari za aina hizi za CLA kwa mradi ni chini ya manufaa yao.

    Every commit must carry a DCO Signed-off-by line, added with git commit -s, and pull requests whose commits are not signed off are asked to amend before merge. The requirement, the link to developercertificate.org, and the inbound = outbound MIT terms are documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#licensing-and-developer-certificate-of-origin-dco


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika muundo wake wa utawala wa mradi (njia ya kufanya maamuzi, ikiwa ni pamoja na majukumu muhimu). (URL inahitajika) [governance]
    Kunahitaji kuwa na njia fulani iliyowekwa vyema ya kuandikwa ya kufanya maamuzi na kutatua migogoro. Katika miradi midogo, hii inaweza kuwa rahisi kama "mmiliki wa mradi na kiongozi hufanya maamuzi yote ya mwisho". Kuna miundo mbalimbali ya utawala, ikiwa ni pamoja na dictator wa wema na meritocracy rasmi; kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Miundo ya utawala. Mbinu zote mbili za kati (k.m., mtunzaji mmoja) na zisizo za kati (k.m., watunzaji wa kikundi) zimetumika kwa mafanikio katika miradi. Habari za utawala hazihitajiki kuandika uwezekano wa kuunda uma wa mradi, kwa kuwa hiyo ni iwezekanavyo kila wakati kwa miradi ya FLOSS.

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md documents the model actually in force: a single maintainer under a steward organisation (PRESIDIO Group, via the presidio-v GitHub org). Ordinary changes are decided by the reviewing maintainer on the pull request; security-relevant changes require an explicit security rationale against the enumerated security-sensitive modules and must not weaken an existing default; public-API and compatibility changes are governed by SEMVER.md; and disagreements that cannot be resolved on the pull request escalate to the steward organisation, whose decision is final.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA upitishe kanuni ya mwenendo na kuiweka mahali pa kawaida. (URL inahitajika) [code_of_conduct]
    Miradi inaweza kuweza kuboresha uadilifu wa jamii yao na kuweka matarajio kuhusu tabia inayokubalika kwa kupitisha kanuni ya mwenendo. Hii inaweza kusaidia kuepuka matatizo kabla hayajatokea na kufanya mradi kuwa mahali pa kukaribishwa zaidi ili kuhimiza michango. Hii inapaswa kuzingatia tu tabia ndani ya jamii/mahali pa kazi pa mradi. Mifano ya kanuni za mwenendo ni kanuni ya mwenendo ya kernel ya Linux, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Agano la Mchangiaji, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Debian, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Ubuntu, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Fedora, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya GNOME, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya KDE, Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Jamii ya Python, Mwongozo wa Mwenendo wa Jamii ya Ruby, na Kanuni ya Mwenendo ya Rust.

    Contributor Covenant, posted at the standard repository location: https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — linked from CONTRIBUTING.md, which states that participation is governed by it.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufafanue kwa uwazi na kuandika hadharani majukumu muhimu katika mradi na wajibu wao, ikiwa ni pamoja na kazi zozote ambazo majukumu hayo lazima yafanywe. Lazima iwe wazi ni nani ana jukumu lipi, ingawa hii haiwezi kuandikwa kwa njia ile ile. (URL inahitajika) [roles_responsibilities]
    Nyaraka kwa utawala na majukumu na wajibu zinaweza kuwa mahali pamoja.

    Five roles are defined with their responsibilities and tasks at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities — steward organisation, maintainer, security contact, release manager, and contributor. Who holds which role is identifiable from the repository itself: the maintainer and code owner are listed in .github/CODEOWNERS, and the security contact address is published in SECURITY.md.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kuendelea kwa usumbufu mdogo ikiwa mtu yeyote anakufa, anakuwa katika hali ya kudhoofika, au vinginevyo hawezi au hataki kuendelea kusaidia mradi. Hasa, mradi LAZIMA uweze kuunda na kufunga masuala, kukubali mabadiliko yaliyopendekezwa, na kutoa matoleo ya programu, ndani ya wiki moja ya uthibitishaji wa upotevu wa msaada kutoka kwa mtu yeyote mmoja. Hii INAWEZA kufanywa kwa kuhakikisha mtu mwingine ana funguo zozote zinazohitajika, nywila, na haki za kisheria ili kuendelea mradi. Watu binafsi wanaoendesha mradi wa FLOSS WANAWEZA kufanya hii kwa kuweka funguo katika sanduku la kufungia na wosia unaowezesha haki zozote zinazohitajika za kisheria (k.m., kwa majina ya DNS). (URL inahitajika) [access_continuity]

    Continuity is a property of the steward organisation rather than of one person, and rests on custody arrangements that actually exist for this repository. (a) The repository is owned by the presidio-v GitHub organisation, not a personal account, so organisation owners can grant repository and release access to another member at any time. (b) Publishing uses PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC) bound to this repository and the "pypi" deployment environment, which carries required-reviewer and branch-policy protection rules, so there is no personal long-lived API token that dies with an individual. (c) The release signing key's private half is held in the organisation's password manager, with custody ultimately at PRESIDIO Group leadership, rather than solely on one contributor's machine, so it is recoverable. (d) The release process is documented end to end — signed tag, tag-triggered publish.yml, OIDC publish, release assets — so any authorised engineer can cut a release by following it. (e) The public half of the signing key is committed as allowed_signers, so tag verification does not depend on any individual either. Issues can therefore be created and closed, changes accepted, and versions released within a week of losing any one individual. Documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#project-continuity


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi INAPASWA kuwa na "bus factor" ya 2 au zaidi. (URL inahitajika) [bus_factor]
    "Bus factor" (pia inajulikana kama "truck factor") ni idadi ya chini ya washiriki wa mradi ambao wanapaswa kutoweka ghafla kutoka kwenye mradi ("kupigwa na basi") kabla ya mradi kusimama kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa wafanyakazi wenye elimu au wenye uwezo. Zana ya truck-factor inaweza kukadiria hii kwa miradi kwenye GitHub. Kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia Kutathmini Bus Factor ya Hifadhi za Git na Cosentino et al.

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/GOVERNANCE.md#roles-and-responsibilities . Independent reviewer. Continuity is a property of the steward organisation rather than of one person, and rests on custody arrangements that actually exist for this repository. (a) The repository is owned by the presidio-v GitHub organisation, not a personal account, so organisation owners can grant repository and release access to another member at any time. (b) Publishing uses PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC) bound to this repository and the "pypi" deployment environment, which carries required-reviewer and branch-policy protection rules, so there is no personal long-lived API token that dies with an individual. (c) The release signing key's private half is held in the organisation's password manager, with custody ultimately at PRESIDIO Group leadership, rather than solely on one contributor's machine, so it is recoverable.


  • Nyaraka


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na ramani ya barabara iliyoandikwa inayoeleza kile mradi unakusudia kufanya na kutofanya kwa angalau mwaka unaofuata. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_roadmap]
    Mradi huenda usitimiza ramani ya barabara, na hiyo ni sawa; kusudi la ramani ya barabara ni kusaidia watumiaji na wachangiaji watarajiwa kuelewa mwelekeo unaokusudiwa wa mradi. Haihitaji kuwa na maelezo mengi.

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#next-12-months states what the project intends to do over the next year, in three bands. Now/in flight: the OpenSSF hardening layer — governance and assurance documentation, Scorecard, Bandit, SBOM, the Atheris fuzz harness, and this badge. Next: v0.8.0 with pluggable enrichment providers (Crunchbase, Harmonic) behind a stable interface and queue export/digest, plus the first signed release tag carrying SBOM and provenance. Later, explicitly marked as under evaluation rather than committed: a migration mechanism for the SQLite deal store, broader founder/traction signal extraction, and an independent third-party security review. The release history is kept as a separate section below it so the roadmap stays forward-looking.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe nyaraka za muundo (pia inajulikana kama muundo wa kiwango cha juu) wa programu inayozalishwa na mradi. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_architecture]
    Muundo wa programu unaeleza miundo ya msingi ya programu, yaani, vipengele vikuu vya programu, uhusiano kati yao, na mali muhimu za vipengele na uhusiano hivi.

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ARCHITECTURE.md documents the high-level design: an overview of what the tool is and where state and network calls occur; a component table covering all sixteen modules in dependency order with each one's responsibility; the seven-step processing flow with its failure posture (security controls fail closed, optional enrichment fails open additively) and the orderings that are load-bearing; and a table of the eight trust boundaries with the control applied at each. Linked from the README.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uandike kile mtumiaji anaweza na asiweze kutarajia kwa suala la usalama kutoka kwa programu inayozalishwa na mradi ("mahitaji yake ya usalama"). (URL inahitajika) [documentation_security]
    Haya ni mahitaji ya usalama ambayo programu inakusudiwa kukidhi.

    What the user can and cannot expect is documented in three linked places. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ASSURANCE.md gives the assurance case: the threat model with each adversary mapped to its control, and — importantly for expectations — an explicit out-of-scope list stating what the software does NOT protect against (prompt injection is mitigated but not solved, DNS rebinding, endpoint and account security, an operator-configured LLM endpoint, and the correctness of the investment judgement). https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SECURITY.md#data-handling--trust-boundaries documents the same boundaries operationally, control by control, including residual risks. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md#behavioural-guarantees-stronger-than-api-stability lists the ten security invariants a downstream integrator may rely on, and states that weakening any of them is a breaking change.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe mwongozo wa "kuanza haraka" kwa watumiaji wapya kuwasaidia kufanya kitu haraka na programu. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_quick_start]
    Wazo ni kuonyesha watumiaji jinsi ya kuanza na kufanya programu ifanye chochote. Hii ni muhimu sana kwa watumiaji watarajiwa kuanza.

    The README is the manual, and the quick-start path is its first two sections. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#installation is a single pip install line, followed immediately by https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#cli-usage which opens with a runnable one-liner (angeltriage deal.eml) and shows its actual output, and https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#library-usage which shows the three-line library equivalent. The deterministic path requires no API key and no configuration, so both examples work immediately after install.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ufanye jitihada ya kuweka nyaraka kulingana na toleo la sasa la matokeo ya mradi (ikiwa ni pamoja na programu inayozalishwa na mradi). Kasoro yoyote inayojulikana ya nyaraka inayofanya isilingane LAZIMA irekebishwe. Ikiwa nyaraka kwa ujumla ni za sasa, lakini kwa makosa inajumuisha baadhi ya maelezo ya zamani ambayo sio ya kweli tena, ichukue tu kama kasoro, kisha ifuatilie na urekebishe kama kawaida. [documentation_current]
    Nyaraka ZINAWEZA kujumuisha habari kuhusu tofauti au mabadiliko kati ya matoleo ya programu na/au kuunganisha kwa matoleo ya zamani ya nyaraka. Kusudi la kigezo hiki ni kwamba jitihada inafanywa ili kuweka nyaraka kulingana, siyo kwamba nyaraka lazima ziwe kamili.

    Documentation is updated in the same pull request as the change it describes, and CONTRIBUTING.md makes updating CHANGELOG.md under [Unreleased] a step in the change process. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md is hand-written in Keep a Changelog format and covers every release through v0.7.1; SECURITY.md carries a per-version supported-versions table matching the current release; and the README's release history matches the git tags. Known documentation defects are treated as ordinary defects, tracked and fixed as such.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi ya mradi na/au tovuti LAZIMA utambulishe na kuunganisha kiungo kwa mafanikio yoyote, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani hii ya mazoea bora, ndani ya masaa 48 ya kutambua hadharani kwamba ufanikio umepatikana. (URL inahitajika) [documentation_achievements]
    Ufanikio ni seti yoyote ya vigezo vya nje ambavyo mradi umefanya kazi mahususi kukidhi, ikiwa ni pamoja na nishani fulani. Habari hii haihitaji kuwa kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa tovuti ya mradi. Mradi unaotumia GitHub unaweza kuweka mafanikio kwenye ukurasa wa mbele wa hifadhi kwa kuyaongeza kwenye faili ya README.

    The OpenSSF Best Practices badge is displayed and hyperlinked at the top of the repository front page, alongside CI, CodeQL, and OpenSSF Scorecard badges: https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#readme — the badge links to this project's entry on bestpractices.dev.


  • Ufikiaji na kimataifa


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi (tovuti zote za mradi na matokeo ya mradi) INAPASWA kufuata mazoea bora ya ufikiaji ili watu wenye ulemavu bado waweze kushiriki katika mradi na kutumia matokeo ya mradi ambapo ni busara kufanya hivyo. [accessibility_best_practices]
    Kwa programu za wavuti, angalia Miongozo ya Ufikiaji wa Maudhui ya Wavuti (WCAG 2.0) na hati yake inayosaidia Kuelewa WCAG 2.0; angalia pia habari za ufikiaji za W3C. Kwa programu za GUI, zingatia kutumia miongozo ya ufikiaji ya mazingira maalum (kama vile Gnome, KDE, XFCE, Android, iOS, Mac, na Windows). Baadhi ya programu za TUI (k.m., programu za `ncurses`) zinaweza kufanya mambo fulani ili kuzifanya kufikika zaidi (kama mpangilio wa `force-arrow-cursor` wa `alpine`). Programu nyingi za mstari wa amri zinafikika vizuri kama zilivyo. Kigezo hiki mara nyingi ni N/A, k.m., kwa maktaba za programu. Hapa kuna baadhi ya mifano ya hatua za kuchukua au masuala ya kuzingatia:
    • Toa mbadala za maandishi kwa maudhui yoyote yasiyo ya maandishi ili yaweze kubadilishwa kuwa aina nyingine watu wanahitaji, kama vile chapa kubwa, braille, hotuba, alama au lugha rahisi zaidi ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.1)
    • Rangi haitumiwi kama njia pekee ya kuona ya kuwasilisha habari, kuashiria kitendo, kuchochea jibu, au kutofautisha kipengele cha kuona. ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.1)
    • Uwasilishaji wa kuona wa maandishi na picha za maandishi una uwiano wa tofauti wa angalau 4.5:1, isipokuwa kwa maandishi makubwa, maandishi ya bahati mbaya, na nembo ( mwongozo wa WCAG 2.0 1.4.3)
    • Fanya kazi zote zipatikane kutoka kwenye kibodi (mwongozo wa WCAG 2.1)
    • Mradi wa GUI au wa wavuti INAPASWA kupima na angalau kipaza sauti kimoja cha skrini kwenye jukwaa la lengo (k.m., NVDA, Jaws, au WindowEyes kwenye Windows; VoiceOver kwenye Mac & iOS; Orca kwenye Linux/BSD; TalkBack kwenye Android). Programu za TUI ZINAWEZA kufanya kazi kupunguza uchanganyiko wa ziada ili kuzuia usomaji wa ziada na vipaza sauti vya skrini.

    The project produces a developer library and a text-mode CLI, with no graphical or end-user interface, so the WCAG/ATAG surface does not apply to the project results. Terminal output is plain text with no reliance on colour to convey meaning, and is also available in machine-readable form via --json. The project sites are GitHub and PyPI, whose own accessibility conformance the project does not control.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kuwa kimataifa ili kuwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa utamaduni, eneo, au lugha ya hadhira lengo. Ikiwa kimataifa (i18n) haihusiki (k.m., programu haizalishi maandishi yanayokusudiwa kwa watumiaji wa mwisho na haipangi maandishi yanayosomeka na binadamu), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [internationalization]
    Upatanifu wa lugha "unarejelea upatanifu wa bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ili kukidhi lugha, utamaduni na mahitaji mengine ya soko mahususi la lengo (eneo)." Kimataifa ni "muundo na maendeleo ya bidhaa, programu au maudhui ya hati ambayo huwezesha upatanifu wa lugha wa rahisi kwa hadhira lengo zinazotofautiana katika utamaduni, eneo, au lugha." (Ona "Upatanifu wa Lugha dhidi ya Kimataifa" ya W3C.) Programu inakidhi kigezo hiki kwa kuwa kimataifa tu. Hakuna upatanifu wa lugha kwa lugha nyingine mahususi unaohitajika, kwa kuwa mara tu programu imekuwa kimataifa inawezekana kwa wengine kufanya kazi kwenye upatanifu wa lugha.

    There are no localizable user-facing interface strings: the CLI emits English diagnostic and report text with no message catalogue, and the tool treats deal emails as opaque text to analyse rather than presenting a localized interface. Input is decoded according to the email's declared charset, so non-English deal content is parsed correctly.


  • Mengine


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa tovuti za mradi (tovuti, hifadhi, na URL za kupakua) zinahifadhi nywila kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje, nywila LAZIMA zihifadhiwe kama mificho iliyorudiwa na chumvi kwa-mtumiaji kwa kutumia kanuni ya upanuaji (iliyorudiarudia) wa funguo (k.m., Argon2id, Bcrypt, Scrypt, au PBKDF2). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi hazihifadhi nywila kwa kusudi hili, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [sites_password_security]
    Kumbuka kwamba matumizi ya GitHub yanakidhi kigezo hiki. Kigezo hiki kinatumika tu kwa nywila zinazotumika kwa ajili ya uthibitishaji wa watumiaji wa nje kwenye tovuti za mradi (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa ndani). Ikiwa tovuti za mradi lazima ziingie kwenye tovuti zingine (pia inaitwa uthibitishaji wa nje), zinaweza kuhitaji kuhifadhi ishara za uidhinishaji kwa kusudi hilo kwa njia tofauti (kwa kuwa kuhifadhi mficho hakuna maana). Hii inatumia kigezo cha crypto_password_storage kwa tovuti za mradi, sawa na sites_https.

    No passwords are stored.


 Udhibiti wa Mabadiliko 1/1 ●

  • Matoleo ya awali


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utunze matoleo ya zamani yaliyotumika mara nyingi ya bidhaa au kutoa njia ya usasishaji kwa matoleo mapya. Ikiwa njia ya usasishaji ni ngumu, mradi LAZIMA uandike jinsi ya kufanya usasishaji (k.m., violesura vilivyobadilika na hatua zilizoanishwa kwa undani ili kusaidia usasishaji). [maintenance_or_update]

    Both halves of the criterion are satisfied: two version lines are actively maintained, and a documented upgrade path exists for the rest. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SECURITY.md#supported-versions states support per line — 0.7.x (current, latest 0.7.1) and 0.6.x are supported; 0.5.x through 0.2.x are marked superseded with an explicit instruction to upgrade to 0.7.x, noting that 0.5.x in particular should move up for the SSRF and dependency-CVE fixes; 0.1.x is end-of-life because it wrapped the AngelList Startup/Funding Data API, which has since been shut down, so no successor interface exists for it.
    The upgrade path itself is straightforward and documented rather than difficult. https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md defines the pre-1.0 semver profile: patch releases carry bug and security fixes with no API change and are safe to auto-upgrade; minor releases are additive only, so existing code keeps working, and deprecations are announced at least one minor before any change; only a major release may remove deprecated surface. It also defines precisely what counts as the public API (everything in presidio_angellist.all, the dataclass fields, the exception hierarchy, the angeltriage CLI contract, and the environment-variable contract), so an integrator can tell whether an upgrade can affect them. Integrators are advised to pin to the current minor and run the verification procedure at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md#verifying-an-installation on every upgrade.
    Per-release detail is in https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md, hand-written in Keep a Changelog format. Data compatibility is addressed explicitly: the SQLite deal store is opened rather than rewritten by an upgrade, and https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md#schemawire-stability states plainly that the store ships no migration mechanism today and that any future schema change will be announced in the changelog together with its upgrade path.


 Kuripoti 3/3 ●

  • Mchakato wa kuripoti hitilafu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie kifuatiliaji cha masuala kwa ajili ya kufuatilia masuala ya mtu binafsi. [report_tracker]

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist uses GitHub issues.


  • Mchakato wa kuripoti udhaifu


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe sifa kwa waripoti wa ripoti zote za udhaifu zilizotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, isipokuwa kwa waripoti wanaoomba kutojulikana. Ikiwa hakuna udhaifu uliotatuliwa katika miezi 12 iliyopita, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_report_credit]

    no vulnerabilities resolved in the last 12 months


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na mchakato ulioandikwa kwa ajili ya kujibu ripoti za udhaifu. (URL inahitajika) [vulnerability_response_process]
    Hii ina uhusiano mkubwa na vulnerability_report_process, ambayo inahitaji kuwa kuna njia iliyoandikwa ya kuripoti udhaifu. Pia inahusiana na vulnerability_report_response, ambayo inahitaji majibu kwa ripoti za udhaifu ndani ya kipindi fulani cha muda.

    The process is documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability and covers intake, timing, and outcome. Intake: reports are made privately, either as a GitHub Security Advisory through the repository's Security tab (preferred, with a direct link given) or by email to security@presidio-group.eu; the policy states explicitly that a suspected vulnerability must not be opened as a public issue. Reporters are asked for a description, reproduction steps, impact, and a suggested fix if they have one. Response commitments: acknowledgement within 5 business days, a patch targeted within 30 days of a confirmed vulnerability, and progress updates until the issue is either resolved or dismissed with a stated rationale. Resolution: fixes ship as patch releases on the latest supported minor line, with any minimum-safe dependency floors raised in the same release (https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md#security-response), the reporter is credited unless they request anonymity, and the project follows coordinated vulnerability disclosure. CONTRIBUTING.md points contributors at this same process so the private path is discoverable from the contribution instructions, not only from SECURITY.md.


 Ubora 19/19 ●

  • Viwango vya msimbo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utambulishe miongozo mahususi ya mtindo wa kuandika msimbo kwa lugha kuu inazotumia, na uhitaji kwamba michango kwa ujumla ikidhi. (URL inahitajika) [coding_standards]
    Katika hali nyingi hii inafanywa kwa kurejelea baadhi ya miongozo ya mtindo iliyopo, huenda ikiorodhesha tofauti. Miongozo hii ya mtindo inaweza kujumuisha njia za kuboresha usomaji na njia za kupunguza uwezekano wa kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Lugha nyingi za programu zina miongozo moja au zaidi ya mtindo inayotumika sana. Mifano ya miongozo ya mtindo ni pamoja na miongozo ya mtindo ya Google na Viwango vya Kuandika Msimbo wa SEI CERT.

    The primary and only language is Python. The style guide is ruff's implementation of PEP 8 with an explicit project configuration, declared under [tool.ruff] in https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/pyproject.toml — line length 99, target version py310, and the rule sets E, F, W (pycodestyle/pyflakes), I (import sorting), N (PEP 8 naming), UP (pyupgrade), S (flake8-bandit security), B (bugbear), A (builtin shadowing), C4, SIM, and TCH. Compliance is required of contributions and stated as such at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#style, which also records why each of the three project-wide rule exclusions exists and forbids blanket noqa suppressions of security findings. Formatting is not a matter of taste: ruff format is the single authority.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kiotomatiki mtindo wake wa kuandika msimbo uliochaguliwa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kufanya hivyo katika lugha zilizochaguliwa. [coding_standards_enforced]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia zana za uchambuzi mkako na/au kwa kulazimisha msimbo kupitia vifaa vya kurekebisha msimbo. Katika hali nyingi usanidi wa zana umejumuishwa katika hifadhi ya mradi (kwa kuwa miradi tofauti inaweza kuchagua usanidi tofauti). Miradi INAWEZA kuruhusu vighairi vya mtindo (na kwa kawaida itaruhusu); ambapo vighairi vinatokea, LAZIMA viwe nadra na viandikwe katika msimbo katika maeneo yao, ili vighairi hivi viweze kukaguliwa na ili zana ziweze kuzishughulikia kiotomatiki baadaye. Mifano ya zana kama hizo ni pamoja na ESLint (JavaScript), Rubocop (Ruby), na devtools check (R).

    Enforced automatically by ruff, a FLOSS tool, in CI. The test job of https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml runs both ruff check . and ruff format --check . on every push and every pull request, across all four supported Python versions, and fails the build on any finding. There is no warning-only mode and no advisory pass — main is protected with required status checks, so a non-conforming change cannot merge. The same commands are documented in the CONTRIBUTING local-verification block so contributors can reproduce the gate before pushing.


  • Mfumo wa ujenzi unaofanya kazi


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya kujenga kwa binari za asili LAZIMA iheshimu vigezo (vya mazingira) vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi vilivyopitishwa kwao (k.m., CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, na LDFLAGS) na kuvipitisha kwenye viito vya mkusanyaji na vya kiunganishi. Mfumo wa kujenga UNAWEZA kuvipanua na bendera za ziada; LAZIMA USIBADILISHE thamani zilizotolewa na zake mwenyewe. Ikiwa hakuna binari za asili zinazozalishwa, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_standard_variables]
    Inapaswa kuwa rahisi kuwezesha vipengele maalum vya kujenga kama Address Sanitizer (ASAN), au kutii mazoea bora ya ugumu wa usambazaji (k.m., kwa kuwezesha kwa urahisi bendera za mkusanyaji kufanya hivyo).

    No native binaries are generated. This is a pure-Python package built by hatchling through PEP 517; there is no compiler or linker invocation anywhere in the build, so CC, CFLAGS, CXX, CXXFLAGS, and LDFLAGS have nothing to be honoured against. The package contains no C extension, no ctypes, and no cffi.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa kujenga na usakinishaji UNAPASWA kuhifadhi taarifa za utatuzi ikiwa zimeombwa katika bendera husika (k.m., "install -s" haitumiwa). Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_preserve_debug]
    K.m., kuweka CFLAGS (C) au CXXFLAGS (C++) inapaswa kuunda taarifa husika za utatuzi ikiwa lugha hizo zinatumika, na hazipaswi kuondolewa wakati wa usakinishaji. Taarifa za utatuzi zinahitajika kwa msaada na uchambuzi, na pia ni muhimu kwa kupima uwepo wa vipengele vya ugumu katika binari zilizokusanywa.

    There are no compiled artifacts and therefore no debugging information to preserve or strip. The wheel contains Python source only; nothing resembling install -s occurs, because installation is performed by pip rather than by a make-style install step.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa kujenga kwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA USIJENGA kwa njia ya kujirudia saraka ndogo ikiwa kuna utegemezi wa kukatana katika saraka ndogo. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa kujenga au usakinishaji (k.m., maktaba za kawaida za JavaScript), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_non_recursive]
    Taarifa ya utegemezi wa ndani ya mfumo wa kujenga wa mradi inahitaji kuwa sahihi, vinginevyo, mabadiliko ya mradi huenda yasijenge vizuri. Mijengo isiyo sahihi inaweza kusababisha kasoro (ikiwa ni pamoja na udhaifu). Kosa la kawaida katika mifumo mikubwa ya kujenga ni kutumia "ujenzi wa kujirudia" au "make ya kujirudia", yaani, mlingano wa saraka ndogo zinazojumuisha faili za chanzo, ambapo kila saraka ndogo inajengwa kwa uhuru. Isipokuwa kila saraka ndogo ni huru kabisa, hii ni kosa, kwa sababu taarifa ya utegemezi si sahihi.

    There is no recursive build. The entire build is a single PEP 517 invocation (python -m build) with hatchling as the backend — no make, no subdirectory builds, and so no possibility of cross-dependencies between recursively-built subdirectories.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweze kurudia mchakato wa kuzalisha taarifa kutoka faili za chanzo na kupata matokeo sawa ya biti-kwa-biti. Ikiwa hakuna ujenzi unaofanyika (k.m., lugha za uandishi ambapo msimbo wa chanzo unatumika moja kwa moja badala ya kukusanywa), chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [build_repeatable]
    Watumiaji wa GCC na clang wanaweza kupata chaguo la -frandom-seed kuwa na manufaa; katika hali fulani, hii inaweza kutatuliwa kwa kulazimisha aina fulani ya mpangilio. Mapendekezo zaidi yanaweza kupatikana kwenye tovuti ya ujenzi unaorudiwa.

    No compilation occurs: this is a pure-Python project, and the criterion's own N/A clause for scripting languages whose source is used directly rather than compiled applies. The wheel and sdist produced by python -m build package the same .py source files that are executed at runtime; there is no compiler, no linker, and no generated binary or generated source whose bit-for-bit reproducibility could differ between builds. Separately, and not claimed here: the project pins its GitHub Actions to commit SHAs but declares runtime dependencies as version floors rather than an exact-pinned lockfile, so the resolved dependency set is not reproducible across time. That is a dependency-pinning gap rather than a build-determinism one, and it is recorded against external_dependencies rather than dressed up here.


  • Mfumo wa usakinishaji


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia ya kusakinisha na kuondoa kwa urahisi programu iliyozalishwa na mradi kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_common]
    Mifano ni pamoja na kutumia meneja wa kifurushi (kwa mfumo au kiwango cha lugha), "make install/uninstall" (inasaidia DESTDIR), chombo katika muundo wa kawaida, au picha ya mashine pepe katika muundo wa kawaida. Mchakato wa usakinishaji na uondoaji (k.m., kifurushi chake) UNAWEZA kutekelezwa na mtu wa tatu mradi tu ni FLOSS.

    Standard PyPI install and uninstall, with no build step and no compiler required. Install: pip install presidio-hardened-angellist for the deterministic core, or pip install 'presidio-hardened-angellist[llm]' to add the Claude-backed extraction and memo. Uninstall: pip uninstall presidio-hardened-angellist. Both commands are the ordinary convention for the language, work identically under pip and uv, and are documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist#installation. The package declares a single console entry point (angeltriage) which pip installs and removes along with it, leaving nothing behind outside the operator's own data directory.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mfumo wa usakinishaji kwa watumiaji wa mwisho LAZIMA uheshimu mkataba wa kawaida kwa kuchagua eneo ambapo vitu vilivyojengwa vinaandikwa kwa wakati wa usakinishaji. Kwa mfano, ikiwa inasakinisha faili kwenye mfumo wa POSIX lazima iheshimu kigezo cha mazingira cha DESTDIR. Ikiwa hakuna mfumo wa usakinishaji au hakuna mkataba wa kawaida, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [installation_standard_variables]

    Installation is performed by a language package manager (pip or uv) from PyPI, which manages its own target paths and respects its own environment (virtualenv, --target, --prefix). There is no POSIX-style install step, so DESTDIR does not apply — the criterion's "no standard convention" case.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe njia kwa wasanidi programu wanaoweza kusakinisha haraka matokeo yote ya mradi na mazingira ya msaada yanayohitajika kufanya mabadiliko, ikiwa ni pamoja na majaribio na mazingira ya majaribio. Hii LAZIMA ifanywe kwa kutumia mkataba unaotumika sana. [installation_development_quick]
    Hii INAWEZA kutekelezwa kwa kutumia chombo kilichozalishwa na/au hati za usakinishaji. Utegemezi wa nje kwa kawaida utasakinishwa kwa kuita mfumo na/au meneja wa kifurushi cha lugha, kwa external_dependencies.

    One documented path installs the package, the tests, and the full test environment: pip install -e ".[dev]", which pulls pytest, pytest-cov, ruff, responses, and pip-audit alongside the package in editable mode. The complete block, including virtualenv creation and the lint-plus-test verification command, is at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#local-verification, and the README repeats the uv equivalent (uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev,llm]"). Both are commonly-used conventions for Python. One caveat is documented rather than hidden: the Atheris fuzz extra is Linux-only, because Atheris publishes no macOS wheel and none for Python 3.10, so fuzzing runs in CI rather than locally on a developer Mac.


  • Vipengee vilivyotunzwa nje


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uorodheshe utegemezi wa nje kwa njia inayoweza kuchakatwa na kompyuta. (URL inahitajika) [external_dependencies]
    Kwa kawaida hii inafanywa kwa kutumia mkataba wa meneja wa kifurushi na/au mfumo wa ujenzi. Kumbuka kwamba hii inasaidia kutekeleza installation_development_quick.

    Dependencies are declared machine-readably in https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/pyproject.toml under [project].dependencies and [project.optional-dependencies]: three runtime dependencies (requests, urllib3, idna) plus separate llm, dev, and fuzz extras. A CycloneDX SBOM is additionally generated in CI on every push and attached to each GitHub Release as sbom.cdx.json, giving a full transitive component list in a standard machine-readable format. Stated precisely: the manifest uses version floors, not an exact-pinned lockfile — there is no uv.lock in the repository, so the resolved graph can vary across time. Currency and vulnerability status are handled by Dependabot on both pip and GitHub Actions and by pip-audit gating every build.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Miradi LAZIMA ifuatilie au kwa muda mrefu iangalie utegemezi wao wa nje (ikiwa ni pamoja na nakala za urahisi) kugundua udhaifu unaojulikana, na kurekebisha udhaifu unaoweza kutumiwa vibaya au kuthibitisha kuwa hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya. [dependency_monitoring]
    Hii inaweza kufanywa kwa kutumia zana ya kichambua chanzo / zana ya kuangalia utegemezi / zana ya uchambuzi wa muundo wa programu kama OWASP's Dependency-Check, Sonatype's Nexus Auditor, Synopsys' Black Duck Software Composition Analysis, na Bundler-audit (kwa Ruby). Baadhi ya waendesha kifurushi wanajumuisha taratibu za kufanya hii. Ni kubaliwa ikiwa udhaifu wa vipengele hauwezi kutumiwa vibaya, lakini uchambuzi huu ni mgumu na wakati mwingine ni rahisi kusasisha au kurekebisha sehemu.

    Three independent mechanisms, all continuous rather than periodic. pip-audit runs in the test job on every push and pull request and fails the build on any dependency with a known vulnerability, so an exploitable dependency cannot merge. Dependabot is configured for both pip and GitHub Actions with weekly checks (https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/.github/dependabot.yml), and Dependabot vulnerability alerts plus automated security-fix pull requests are enabled on the repository. OpenSSF Scorecard runs weekly and on push to main and independently scores dependency currency. There are no vendored or convenience copies to check separately — every reused component is an ordinary PyPI package installed by the package manager. Current state: pip-audit reports no known vulnerabilities and there are 0 open code-scanning alerts.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA au:
    1. fanya iwe rahisi kutambua na kusasisha vipengele vinavyotumiwa tena vilivyotunzwa nje; au
    2. tumia vipengele vya kawaida vinavyotolewa na mfumo au lugha ya programu.
    Kisha, ikiwa udhaifu unapatikana katika kipengele kilichotumiwa tena, itakuwa rahisi kusasisha kipengele hicho. [updateable_reused_components]
    Njia ya kawaida ya kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kutumia mifumo ya usimamizi wa kifurushi ya mfumo na lugha ya programu. Programu nyingi za FLOSS zinasambazwa na "maktaba za urahisi" ambazo ni nakala za ndani za maktaba za kawaida (labda zilizoachana). Kwa yenyewe, hiyo ni sawa. Hata hivyo, ikiwa programu *lazima* itumie nakala hizi za ndani (zilizoachanishwa), basi kusasisha maktaba za "kawaida" kama sasisho la usalama litaacha nakala hizi za ziada bado zenye udhaifu. Hii ni suala hasa kwa mifumo ya wingu; ikiwa mtoa huduma ya wingu anasasisha maktaba zao za "kawaida" lakini programu haitazitumia, basi masasisho hayasaidii kweli. Angalia, k.m., "Chromium: Kwa nini bado haiko katika Fedora kama kifurushi sahihi" na Tom Callaway.

    Both halves of the criterion hold. The project leans heavily on the Python standard library — email, csv, html.parser, sqlite3, ssl, smtplib, imaplib, json, ipaddress, logging — so most reused functionality is the standard component provided by the language and updates with the interpreter. The three non-stdlib runtime dependencies are ordinary PyPI packages resolved by pip with no vendoring, no bundled copies, and no forks, so updating one is a version-floor change in pyproject.toml. This is exercised routinely rather than theoretically: the v0.6.0 release raised urllib3 and idna floors to close upstream CVEs, and merged PRs #21 through #34 are dependency and Action updates.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi UNAPASWA kuepuka kutumia vitendakazi na API zilizokubaliwa kuwa hazitumiki tena au zilizopitwa na wakati ambapo mbadala wa FLOSS zinapatikana katika seti ya teknolojia inayotumia ("kifurushi cha teknolojia" yake) na kwa wengi wa watumiaji ambao mradi unasaidia (ili watumiaji wawe na ufikiaji wa haraka wa mbadala). [interfaces_current]

    Dependencies are kept current by Dependabot on both pip and GitHub Actions, with floors raised above known CVEs. The codebase targets Python 3.10+ and ruff's UP (pyupgrade) rule set runs in CI, which actively flags deprecated and superseded Python idioms and fails the build on them — so drift onto obsolete APIs is caught mechanically, not by inspection. Concretely, the code uses timezone-aware datetime handling, ipaddress for address classification, and ssl.create_default_context() rather than deprecated predecessors. The project's own public API surface is documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SEMVER.md with a stated deprecation policy: any deprecation is announced at least one minor release ahead, and removal may only occur in a major release.


  • Seti ya majaribio otomatiki


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki LAZIMA itumike kwenye kila ukaguzi wa kuingia kwenye hifadhi iliyoshirikiwa kwa angalau tawi moja. Seti hii ya majaribio LAZIMA itoe ripoti ya mafanikio au kushindwa kwa majaribio. [automated_integration_testing]
    Mahitaji haya yanaweza kuonekana kama sehemu ndogo ya test_continuous_integration, lakini yanazingatia majaribio tu, bila kuhitaji uunganisho wa kuendelea.

    The full suite runs on every check-in to the shared repository — on every push to main and on every pull request targeting it — via https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml. It reports success or failure per job in the GitHub Actions UI and as commit status checks; the matrix legs test (3.10) through test (3.13) are required status checks on main, so a failing report blocks the merge rather than merely being recorded. 268 tests across 16 modules, on CPython 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13. Coverage figures are printed in the job log and coverage.xml is retained as a build artifact.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uongeze majaribio ya kurudi nyuma kwa seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki kwa angalau 50% ya hitilafu zilizorekebisha ndani ya miezi sita iliyopita. [regression_tests_added50]

    Above 50% for the period, and verifiable from the merge history. Worked example: PR #20 (v0.7.1) fixed the local-LLM backend returning empty content for reasoning models — +95 lines in src/presidio_angellist/llm.py shipped with +71 lines in tests/test_llm.py in the same pull request. Every functional fix merged in the last six months (PRs #17, #18, #19, #20) carried its tests in the same change; the remaining merges in that window (PRs #21–#34) are dependency and Action-pinning updates with no behavioural surface to regress. The policy requiring this is written at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests, and the coverage gate makes an untested fix hard to land regardless.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki ya FLOSS inayotoa angalau 80% ya usakinishaji wa taarifa ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kupima kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [test_statement_coverage80]
    Zana nyingi za FLOSS zinapatikana kupima usakinishaji wa majaribio, ikiwa ni pamoja na gcov/lcov, Blanket.js, Istanbul, JCov, na covr (R). Kumbuka kwamba kutimiza kigezo hiki sio uhakika kwamba seti ya majaribio ni ya kina, badala yake, kushindwa kutimiza kigezo hiki ni kiashiria kizito cha seti ya majaribio mbaya.

    Measured statement coverage is 95.3%, well above the 80% bar, using coverage.py via pytest-cov — both FLOSS. The gate is enforced in CI rather than merely measured: the test job of https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml requires statement coverage of at least 90% and, separately, branch coverage of at least 80% (currently 86.0%), read from coverage.json. The two metrics are checked independently on purpose, because --cov-fail-under blends them into a single figure and would let branch coverage sag behind a high statement number. Both floors are enforced on all four supported Python versions.


  • Upimaji wa utendaji mpya


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uwe na sera rasmi iliyoandikwa kwamba kadri utendakazi mkubwa mpya unaongezwa, majaribio ya utendakazi mpya LAZIMA yaongezwe kwenye seti ya majaribio ya kiotomatiki. [test_policy_mandated]

    A formal written policy at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests states in mandatory terms: "any change that adds or modifies functionality must ship with tests in the same pull request," and bug fixes must include a regression test that fails before the fix and passes after it. The policy is backed by two enforcement mechanisms rather than good intentions — it is an explicit item on the reviewer's checklist in the Code review section, and the CI coverage floors (statement 90%, branch 80%) fail the build if new code arrives untested. CONTRIBUTING.md is the document contributors are pointed to, so the policy sits in the change-proposal instructions themselves.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA ujumuishe, katika maelekezo yake yaliyoandikwa kwa mapendekezo ya mabadiliko, sera kwamba majaribio yataongezwa kwa utendakazi mkubwa mpya. [tests_documented_added]
    Hata hivyo, hata sheria isiyo rasmi inakubaliwa mradi majaribio yaongezwe kimakosa.

    The policy is stated in the contribution instructions themselves: https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#tests


  • Bendera za maonyo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Miradi LAZIMA iwe na ukali wa juu zaidi na maonyo katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi, iwezekanavyo vitendo. [warnings_strict]
    Baadhi ya maonyo hayawezi kuwashwa kwa ufanisi kwenye miradi fulani. Kinachohitajika ni ushahidi kwamba mradi unajitahidi kuwasha bendera za onyo ambapo inaweza, ili makosa yagundulika mapema.

    Enabled ruff rule sets, well beyond the E4/E7/E9/F default: E, F, W (pycodestyle/pyflakes), I (import sorting), N (naming), UP (pyupgrade), S (flake8-bandit security rules), B (bugbear), A (builtin shadowing), C4 (comprehensions), SIM (simplification), TCH (type-checking imports). Documented exclusions: S101 (bare assert is correct in tests), S603/S607 (inherited from the shared Presidio ruff profile; this package invokes no subprocess, so neither rule has anything to suppress), and N802 under fuzz/ because Atheris dispatches on the exact function name TestOneInput.


 Usalama 13/13 ●

  • Maarifa ya maendeleo yenye usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utekeleze kanuni za muundo salama (kutoka "know_secure_design"), pale inapohusika. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [implement_secure_design]
    Kwa mfano, matokeo ya mradi yanapaswa kuwa na mipangilio salama ya kuzuia makosa (maamuzi ya ufikiaji yanapaswa kukataa kwa chaguo-msingi, na usakinishaji wa mradi unapaswa kuwa salama kwa chaguo-msingi). Pia yanapaswa kuwa na kikuu cha kati kikamilifu (kila ufikiaji ambao unaweza kuwekwa kikomo lazima ufanyiwe ukaguzi wa mamlaka na usiweze kuvukwa). Kumbuka kwamba katika hali fulani kanuni zitagombana, na katika hali hiyo chaguo lazima lifanywe (k.m., taratibu nyingi zinaweza kufanya mambo kuwa magumu zaidi, kukiuka "uchumi wa utaratibu" / iweke rahisi).

    Argued per principle, grounded in real controls, at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ASSURANCE.md#3-secure-design-principles-applied. Fail-safe defaults: every network capability is off until the operator enables it (enrichment needs --enrich, LLM steps need a configured backend, IMAP and SMTP need environment credentials), and each security control raises rather than degrading — a non-HTTPS scheme, a non-public host, an invalid weights file, or plaintext IMAP stops the operation. Complete mediation: the scheme check, HTTPS upgrade, SSRF guard, and rate limiter live inside HardenedSession.request, and log redaction is a logging.Filter attached to the package logger at import, so neither can be bypassed or forgotten by a future caller — a new _log.info anywhere in the package is covered the moment it is written. Least privilege: the project holds no long-lived secret of its own, opens the IMAP mailbox read-only, publishes via short-lived OIDC credentials rather than a stored token, and declares read-only top-level tokens in every workflow with only the single job needing security-events: write elevating. Defence in depth: transport hardening, destination validation, log hygiene, input hygiene, and supply-chain controls are independent layers, and because the scoring rubric is deterministic and model-free, a successful prompt injection cannot change the score, only the advisory prose. Economy of mechanism: no cryptography is implemented, stdlib parsers are used throughout, and the runtime dependency set is three packages.


  • Tumia mazoea mazuri ya msingi ya usimbuaji

    Kumbuka kwamba programu fulani haihitaji kutumia taratibu za usimbuaji. Ikiwa mradi wako unazalisha programu ambayo (1) inajumuisha, inaamilisha, au inafanya usimbuaji kuwa hai, na (2) inaweza kutolewa kutoka Marekani (US) kwenda nje ya Marekani au kwa raia asiye wa Marekani, inaweza kuwa ni lazima kisheria kuchukua hatua chache za ziada. Kawaida hii inahusisha tu kutuma barua pepe. Kwa maelezo zaidi, tazama sehemu ya usimbuaji ya Kuelewa Teknolojia ya Chanzo Wazi & Udhibiti wa Usafirishaji wa Marekani.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mifumo ya usalama ya chaguo-msingi ndani ya programu inayozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA ISITEGEMEE algoriti za kriptologia au hali zenye udhaifu mkubwa unaojulikana (k.m., algoriti ya hash ya kriptologia ya SHA-1 au hali ya CBC katika SSH). [crypto_weaknesses]
    Wasiwasi kuhusu hali ya CBC katika SSH unajadiliwa katika CERT: SSH CBC vulnerability.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi INAPASWA kusaidia algoriti nyingi za kriptologia, ili watumiaji waweze kubadilisha haraka ikiwa moja imevunjwa. Algoriti za kawaida za funguo za simetria ni pamoja na AES, Twofish, na Serpent. Mbadala wa algoriti za hash za kriptologia za kawaida ni pamoja na SHA-2 (ikiwa ni pamoja na SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 NA SHA-512) na SHA-3. [crypto_algorithm_agility]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA usaidie kuhifadhi vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji (kama vile nywila na ishara za nguvu) na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia katika mafaili ambayo yametengwa na habari nyingine (kama vile mafaili ya usanidi, hifadhidata, na kumbukumbu), na kuruhusu watumiaji kusasisha na kubadilisha bila ukusanyaji upya wa msimbo. Ikiwa mradi haufanyi usindikaji wa vitambulisho vya uthibitishaji na funguo za kibinafsi za kriptologia, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_credential_agility]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA kusaidia itifaki salama kwa mawasiliano yake yote ya mtandao, kama vile SSHv2 au zaidi, TLS1.2 au zaidi (HTTPS), IPsec, SFTP, na SNMPv3. Itifaki zisizo salama kama vile FTP, HTTP, telnet, SSLv3 au mapema zaidi, na SSHv1 ZINAPASWA kuzimwa kwa chaguo-msingi, na kuzimwa tu ikiwa mtumiaji anaisanidi mahususi. Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi haiesaidii mawasiliano ya mtandao, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_used_network]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi INAPASWA, ikiwa inasaidia au inatumia TLS, kusaidia angalau toleo la TLS 1.2. Kumbuka kuwa kilichotangulia TLS kiliitwa SSL. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_tls12]

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti cha TLS kwa chaguo-msingi inapotumia TLS, ikiwa ni pamoja na rasilimali ndogo. Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_certificate_verification]
    Kumbuka kuwa uthibitishaji usio sahihi wa cheti cha TLS ni kosa la kawaida. Kwa maelezo zaidi, angalia "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software" na Martin Georgiev et al. na "Do you trust this application?" na Michael Catanzaro.

    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Programu iliyozalishwa na mradi LAZIMA, ikiwa inasaidia TLS, ifanye uthibitishaji wa cheti kabla ya kutuma vichwa vya HTTP na habari ya kibinafsi (kama vile vidakuzi salama). Ikiwa programu haitumii TLS, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [crypto_verification_private]

  • Kutolewa kwa usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA uweke saini kwa kriptologia matoleo ya matokeo ya mradi yanayokusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, na LAZIMA kuwe na mchakato ulioandikwa unaoweleza watumiaji jinsi wanaweza kupata funguo za umma za saini na kuthibitisha saini. Funguo ya kibinafsi kwa saini hizi LAZIMA ISIWE kwenye tovuti zinazosambaza moja kwa moja programu kwa umma. Ikiwa matoleo hayakusudiwa kwa matumizi ya kila mahali, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [signed_releases]
    Matokeo ya mradi ni pamoja na msimbo wa chanzo na matokeo yoyote yaliyozalishwa pale inapohusika (k.m., mifumo inayotekelezeka, vifurushi, na vyombo). Matokeo yaliyozalishwa YANAWEZA kuwekwa saini tofauti na msimbo wa chanzo. Hizi ZINAWEZA kutekelezwa kama lebo za git zilizowekwa saini (kwa kutumia saini za kidijitali za kriptologia). Miradi YAWEZA kutoa matokeo yaliyozalishwa tofauti na zana kama vile git, lakini katika hali hizo, matokeo tofauti LAZIMA yawekwe saini tofauti.

    Met as of v0.7.2. Three independent signatures cover each release, and the private key for none of them lives on a distribution site. (1) The release git tag is SSH-signed with the organisation's release key; GitHub reports it Verified (the API's verification.verified is true for v0.7.2) and it verifies locally with git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=allowed_signers verify-tag v0.7.2. The key's private half is held only in the organisation's password manager and is never on PyPI, GitHub, or a build runner; only the public half is committed, as https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/allowed_signers. (2) A Sigstore-backed in-toto build-provenance attestation is produced over the artifacts by the tag-triggered workflow and attached to the GitHub Release as provenance.intoto.jsonl, alongside a CycloneDX SBOM; it verifies with gh attestation verify <artefact> --repo presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist. (3) The PyPI artifacts carry PEP 740 attestations issued through Trusted Publishing (OIDC), retrievable from PyPI's integrity API; signing uses ambient short-lived credentials, so again there is no long-lived private key anywhere, least of all on the index. The documented verification process for all three is at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-releases-and-obtaining-public-signing-keys. Note for completeness: tags up to and including v0.7.1 predate tag signing and are unsigned, since a published tag cannot be re-signed; signed tags begin at v0.7.2.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    INAPENDEKEZWA kuwa katika mfumo wa udhibiti wa toleo, kila lebo muhimu ya toleo (lebo ambayo ni sehemu ya toleo kuu, toleo dogo, au kurekebishwa udhaifu uliotangazwa hadharani) iwekwe saini kwa kriptologia na iweze kuthibitishwa kama ilivyoelezwa katika signed_releases. [version_tags_signed]

    Met as of v0.7.2. The release tag is SSH-signed with the organisation's release key and verifiable both ways: GitHub reports it as Verified (verification.verified is true via gh api repos/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/git/tags/<sha>), and it verifies locally against the public key committed in the repository with git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=allowed_signers verify-tag v0.7.2, which reports a good signature for ED25519 key SHA256:MLin275d/xTVoZqBhyHETA8iZ7xfX29es/L2PdedxPw. The verification procedure is documented at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/SECURITY.md#verifying-releases-and-obtaining-public-signing-keys, as required by signed_releases. Stated plainly: the three earlier tags (v0.6.0, v0.7.0, v0.7.1) predate the adoption of tag signing and remain unsigned, because a published tag cannot be retroactively signed. Every tag from v0.7.2 onward is signed.


  • Masuala mengine ya usalama


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Matokeo ya mradi LAZIMA yafanye ukaguzi wa pembejeo zote kutoka vyanzo visivyoaminika ili kuhakikisha ni halali (*orodha zinazokubalika*), na kukataa pembejeo zisizo halali, ikiwa kuna vizuizi vyovyote kwenye data kabisa. [input_validation]
    Kumbuka kuwa kulinganisha ingizo dhidi ya orodha ya "miundo mibaya" (aka *orodha za kukataza*) kwa kawaida haitoshi, kwa sababu washambuliaji mara nyingi wanaweza kuepuka orodha ya kukataza. Hasa, nambari zinabadilishwa kuwa miundo ya ndani na kisha kuangaliwa ikiwa ziko kati ya chini na juu zao (ikiwa ni pamoja), na vifungu vya maandishi vinaangaliwa ili kuhakikisha kuwa ni ruwaza halali za maandishi (k.m., UTF-8 halali, urefu, sintaksia, n.k.). Baadhi ya data inaweza kuhitaji kuwa "chochote kabisa" (k.m., kipakia faili), lakini hizi kwa kawaida zingekuwa nadra.

    Untrusted input is checked at the boundary before use, with the boundaries enumerated at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ARCHITECTURE.md#trust-boundaries. Operator configuration is allowlisted and fails closed: a --rubric file is rejected outright if it contains any top-level key outside the recognised set, with the error naming the valid keys, and a --weights file is rejected on an unknown rubric dimension, a non-numeric, negative, or boolean value, a non-object document, or an all-zero weight set, raising WeightsConfigError rather than silently substituting a default — a typo in a weights file must not quietly change how a deal scores. Deal-workflow status values are likewise restricted to a fixed tuple. For free-form untrusted content, where an allowlist of values is not meaningful, the restriction enforced is structural: forwarded emails and CSVs are parsed only by the stdlib email and csv modules, HTML is reduced to text by an html.parser subclass that drops script, style, head, and title rather than interpreting them, and the extracted text can only populate typed dataclass fields — it never reaches a shell, a SQL statement, the filesystem, or an eval. On the egress side the company URL extracted from that untrusted email is validated before any fetch: the scheme must be HTTPS (http is upgraded, anything else refused) and assert_public_host resolves the host and rejects loopback, private, link-local including 169.254.169.254, reserved, multicast, and unspecified addresses, checking every resolved address and unwrapping IPv4-mapped IPv6. The parsing path is additionally fuzzed with Atheris in CI.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Taratibu za kuimarisha ZINAPASWA kutumiwa katika programu iliyozalishwa na mradi ili kasoro za programu ziwe na uwezekano mdogo wa kusababisha udhaifu wa usalama. [hardening]
    Taratibu za kuimarisha zinaweza kujumuisha vichwa vya HTTP kama Sera ya Usalama wa Maudhui (CSP), bendera za mkusanyaji ili kupunguza mashambulizi (kama vile -fstack-protector), au bendera za mkusanyaji ili kuondoa tabia isiyofafanuliwa. Kwa madhumuni yetu upendeleo mdogo hauhesabiwi kuwa utaratibu wa kuimarisha (upendeleo mdogo ni muhimu, lakini tofauti).

    Hardening mechanisms in place, all verifiable in the repository. At runtime: TLS 1.2 floor with mandatory certificate and hostname verification and an ephemeral-EC-only cipher list on all egress; HTTP upgraded to HTTPS and other schemes refused; an SSRF guard on every attacker-influenced fetch; sink-level secret redaction via a logging filter installed at import, so credentials cannot reach a log even from a call site that forgets to redact; credentials read from environment variables only and never accepted as command-line arguments, which would expose them in ps output and shell history; plaintext IMAP refused unless explicitly overridden; the IMAP mailbox opened read-only; fully parameterized SQL; and bounded retries, per-host rate limiting, and explicit timeouts to limit resource exhaustion. In the supply chain: every GitHub Action pinned to a commit SHA; read-only top-level workflow tokens with elevation only in the one job that needs it; persist-credentials: false on checkouts; protected main with required status checks and admin enforcement; OIDC Trusted Publishing with no stored PyPI token, behind a required-reviewer deployment environment; and SBOM plus build-provenance attestation on releases. Not applicable here: there is no container image, so no base-image digest pinning, and Python provides memory safety without needing compiler hardening flags.


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utoe kesi ya uhakika inayosababisha kwa nini mahitaji yake ya usalama yanakidhi. Kesi ya uhakika LAZIMA ijumuishe: maelezo ya muundo wa tishio, utambulisho wazi wa mipaka ya kuaminiwa, hoja kwamba kanuni za muundo salama zimetumika, na hoja kwamba udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama umekabiliana nao. (URL inahitajika) [assurance_case]
    Kesi ya uhakika ni "mwili wa ushahidi ulioandikwa unaotoa hoja inayoshawishi na halali kwamba seti maalum ya madai muhimu kuhusu mali za mfumo ziko na sababu za kutosha kwa programu maalum katika mazingira maalum" ("Uhakika wa Programu Kwa kutumia Miundo ya Kesi ya Uhakika Iliyopangwa", Thomas Rhodes et al, NIST Interagency Report 7608). Mipaka ya kuaminiwa ni mipaka ambapo data au utekelezaji hubadilisha kiwango chake cha kuaminiwa, k.m., mipaka ya seva katika programu ya kawaida ya wavuti. Ni ya kawaida kuorodhesha kanuni za muundo salama (kama vile Saltzer na Schroeer) na udhaifu wa kawaida wa utekelezaji wa usalama (kama vile OWASP top 10 au CWE/SANS top 25), na kuonyesha jinsi kila moja unavyokabiliana. Kesi ya uhakika ya BadgeApp inaweza kuwa mfano wenye manufaa. Hii inahusiana na documentation_security, documentation_architecture, na implement_secure_design.

    https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ASSURANCE.md is the assurance case and contains all four required elements. (1) Threat model, section 1: names the two assets — the analyst's machine and network position, since the tool ingests email from strangers and on request fetches URLs those strangers chose, and the analyst's credentials plus commercially sensitive deal data — then maps twelve concrete threats each to the control that counters it, and states five out-of-scope items explicitly rather than leaving them implied (prompt injection is mitigated but not solved, DNS rebinding, endpoint and account security, the operator-configured LLM endpoint, and correctness of the investment judgement). (2) Trust boundaries, section 2: eight boundaries, each named, classified as input-validation or egress, and given its control, cross-referenced to the canonical table in ARCHITECTURE.md#trust-boundaries. (3) Secure design principles, section 3: fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, least privilege, defence in depth, and economy of mechanism, each argued against specific code rather than asserted. (4) Common implementation weaknesses, section 4: a table of ten weakness classes — CWE-20/74 including prompt injection, CWE-89, the CWE-119 memory-safety family, CWE-327/916, CWE-798/532, CWE-319/295/918, CWE-502, CWE-400, CWE-1104, CWE-1357 — each mapped to a control and to the tool that checks it, followed by the named SAST and posture tooling actually run. The document also records plainly that no independent third-party security review has been commissioned, and does not claim one.


 Uchanganuzi 2/2 ●

  • Uchambuzi tuli wa msimbo


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Mradi LAZIMA utumie angalau zana moja ya uchanganuzi tuli yenye sheria au mbinu za kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida katika lugha au mazingira yaliyochanganuliwa, ikiwa kuna angalau zana moja ya FLOSS inayoweza kutekeleza kigezo hiki katika lugha iliyochaguliwa. [static_analysis_common_vulnerabilities]
    Zana za uchambuzi tuli ambazo zimeundwa hasa kutafuta udhaifu wa kawaida zina uwezekano mkubwa wa kuzipata. Hata hivyo, kutumia zana zozote za tuli kwa kawaida itasaidia kupata baadhi ya matatizo, kwa hivyo tunashauri lakini hatunahitaji hii kwa kiwango cha nishani ya 'kupita'.

    CodeQL's security-extended suite specifically targets common vulnerability classes (injection, path traversal, SSRF, unsafe deserialization, weak crypto), and Bandit adds a Python-specific pass over the same classes. The weakness classes this project is exposed to are enumerated and each mapped to both a control and the tool that checks it at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-angellist/blob/main/ASSURANCE.md#4-common-implementation-weaknesses-countered. pip-audit covers the dependency-CVE side and fails the build on any known-vulnerable package. All are currently clean, with 0 open code-scanning alerts.


  • Uchambuzi wa msimbo wa nguvu za ziada


    Ya kutosha kwa nishani!

    Ikiwa programu iliyozalishwa na mradi inajumuisha programu iliyoandikwa kwa kutumia lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu (k.m., C au C++), basi angalau zana moja ya nguvu (k.m., fuzzer au kitafutaji cha programu ya wavuti) LAZIMA itumike kwa kawaida kwa pamoja na utaratibu wa kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu kama vile uandikaji zaidi wa kipengele. Ikiwa mradi hauzalishi programu iliyoandikwa katika lugha isiyosalama ya kumbukumbu, chagua "haihusiki" (N/A). [dynamic_analysis_unsafe]
    Mifano ya taratibu za kugundua matatizo ya usalama wa kumbukumbu ni pamoja na Address Sanitizer (ASAN) (inapatikana katika GCC na LLVM), Memory Sanitizer, na valgrind. Zana nyingine zinazoweza kutumika ni pamoja na thread sanitizer na undefined behavior sanitizer. Madai ya kila mahali pia yaweza kufanya kazi.

    The test suite is assertion-based (pytest, 268 tests) and nothing runs under -O, so assertions are checked. The fuzz job likewise invokes python without -O and does not set PYTHONOPTIMIZE, so runtime assertions stay enabled during fuzzing.



Data hii inapatikana chini ya Community Data License Agreement – Permissive, Version 2.0 (CDLA-Permissive-2.0). Hii inamaanisha kuwa Mpokeaji wa Data anaweza kushiriki Data, na au bila marekebisho, mradi Mpokeaji wa Data anapatanisha maandishi ya mkataba huu na Data iliyoshirikiwa. Tafadhali tambua Vladimir Stantchev na wachangiaji wa nishani ya Mazoea Bora ya OpenSSF.

Ingizo la nishani ya mradi linamilikiwa na: Vladimir Stantchev.
Ingizo liliundwa siku 2026-07-29 20:26:21 UTC, iliyosasishwa mara ya mwisho siku 2026-07-29 21:38:04 UTC. Ilipata mara ya mwisho nishani ya kupita siku 2026-07-29 21:01:00 UTC.